Issue 4 - Virginia Law Review

Entrapment, Punishment, and the Sadistic State

The entrapment defense is a uniquely American institution, adopted in all American jurisdictions, and almost nowhere else. But while case law and scholarly literature dwell at length on entrapment’s what (what constitutes entrapment; the legal test to be applied), and sometimes on its who (who should rule on entrapment, judge or jury; who qualifies as a state actor), they have comparatively neglected its why—the underlying justification for a defense that, on further examination, seems to violate some of the most basic principles of criminal law jurisprudence. Why should someone who commits a crime, with a criminal state of mind, be found not guilty because the one who tempted him to commit the crime, an otherwise irrelevant fact, was—entirely unbeknownst to him—a police agent?

This Note first shows the insufficiency of existing justifications of the entrapment defense, then provides a more comprehensive explanation for the doctrine. This explanation reveals entrapment to be not a procedural “technicality” protecting a value extrinsic to the underlying prohibition, but rather a substantive defense whose roots run right to the criminal law’s heart: our reasons for punishment. A “punishment-centered” view reveals entrapment to be a manifestation of a totalitarian “sadistic state,” which treats the infliction of punishment not as a means of giving the guilty their just deserts, but as an end in itself, and shows the entrapment defense to be not only a limit on police investigatory technique, but an assertion of individual liberty against the state’s ability to punish.

Delegation Really Running Riot

Conventional delegations—statutes delegating Article I, section 8 authority—are familiar enough and have spawned a large literature regarding their constitutionality. We wish to shift the focus to delegation of other powers. Starting from the assumption that conventional delegations are constitutional, we ask whether Congress may delegate other congressional powers, such as those found in Articles II, III, and IV. For instance, we consider whether Congress may delegate the power to admit states and to propose amendments to the Constitution. We also consider whether Congress may delegate cameral authority, such as the House’s ability to impeach and the Senate’s ability to confirm nominations. Finally, we address whether the Congress may delegate powers to other entities and in the process circumvent or evade powers granted to other branches. We conclude that if one accepts the constitutionality of conventional delegations, one must likewise accept the constitutionality of all manner of unconventional delegations. If the Necessary and Proper clause permits the making of laws outside of the Article I, section 7 process, it likewise permits the approval of treaties outside the Article II, section 2 process. And the same is true for the other unconventional delegations we discuss here. In this way, the delegation of cameral and bicameral power can be a means for “altering,” or at least evading, the structural Constitution’s most notable features.

Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty

Direct relations between the federal government and local governments—what this article calls “cooperative localism”—play a significant and underappreciated role in areas of contemporary policy as disparate as homeland security, law enforcement, disaster response, economic development, social services, immigration, and environmental protection. Despite the ubiquity of this practice, a jurisprudential conflict threatens this important facet of intergovernmental relations. Historically, courts have allowed local governments to invoke federal authority as a source of local autonomy, despite the prevailing view of local governments as powerless instrumentalities of the state. The Supreme Court is increasingly suggesting, however, that state control over local governments is a fundamental aspect of state sovereignty triggering judicial limits on federal power. When this confrontation comes to a head, limiting federal authority to empower local governments would be a mistake. This article instead proposes a new framework for conceptualizing federal empowerment of local governments that is not only consistent with the Court’s contemporary view of federal structure, but in fact advances the Court’s normative and pragmatic goals. The core concerns animating the Court’s current move to devolve and decentralize power are forcefully served by enhancing the autonomy of local governments in the constitutional structure. In short, the very values of federalism on which the Court has relied to enhance state sovereignty provide a compelling localist grounding for the particular exercise of national power represented by cooperative localism.

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