Judicial Sincerity

Essay — Volume 94, Issue 4

94 Va. L. Rev. 987
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Although the idea that judges have a duty to be sincere or candid in their legal opinions is widely shared, critics have argued that a strong presumption in favor of candor threatens judicial legitimacy, deters positive strategic action on multi-member courts, reduces the clarity and coherence of doctrine, erodes collegiality, and promotes the proliferation of fractured opinions. Against these and other objections, I defend the view that judges have a duty to give sincere public justifications for their legal decisions. After distinguishing the concepts of sincerity and candor, I argue that the values of legal justification and publicity support a principle of judicial sincerity. This principle imposes weaker constraints than a general duty of judicial candor. But while candor may be desirable, judges who provide sincere justifications for their decisions satisfy the demands of legitimate adjudication. 

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  Volume 94 / Issue 4  

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Citizenship Denied: The Insular Cases and the Fourteenth Amendment

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