Introduction
Groff v. DeJoy “clarif[ied]” the requirements for Title VII’s undue hardship defense to the duty to accommodate religion.1 1.Groff v. DeJoy, 143 S. Ct. 2279, 2286 (2023).Show More Rejecting the “more than a de minimis cost” standard from Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, the Supreme Court held that undue hardship means “substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of [the employer’s] particular business.”2 2.Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977); Groff, 143 S. Ct. at 2295.Show More At the same time, Groff instructed courts to conduct the inquiry “in [a] commonsense manner” that considers “all relevant factors.”3 3.Groff, 143 S. Ct. at 2295–96.Show More Properly understood, Groff appears to make the inquiry more flexible, especially for costs that are difficult to price ex ante. Yet post-Groff decisions have largely embraced only half of Groff’s instruction. Some lower courts have latched onto the heightened standard but ignored the flexibility of the inquiry, demanding concrete proof of costs while rejecting or discounting those they consider “hypothetical.”4 4.See, e.g., Kluge v. Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 150 F.4th 792, 806 n.8 (7th Cir.), reh’gand reh’g en banc denied, No. 24-1942, 2025 WL 2848017, at *1 (7th Cir. Oct. 7, 2025); Naylor v. County of Muscatine, 151 F.4th 973, 976 (8th Cir. 2025) (per curiam) (quoting Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 655 (8th Cir. 1995)); Bellard v. Univ. of Tex. MD Anderson Cancer Ctr., 716 F. Supp. 3d 503, 515 (S.D. Tex. 2024).Show More That approach is in tension with Groff and the inherently predictive nature of the undue hardship inquiry.
Title VII requires an employer to “reasonably accommodate” an employee’s religion unless doing so would cause an “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”5 5.Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).Show More The employer must decide, in many cases ex ante, whether granting an accommodation will generate costs and, if so, how much. When the requested accommodation has not been implemented, those costs, by definition, have not yet materialized—they are hypothetical. But when courts treat hypothetical costs as categorically suspect, employers face a dilemma: deny the accommodation based on a prediction that the costs would be too great to bear, risking liability for failure to accommodate religion; or grant the accommodation, eliminating the risk of liability for failure to accommodate religion but taking on risk in the form of the predicted costs. That dilemma may be tolerable when only modest financial costs are at stake. It is far less tolerable, however, when the predicted costs come in the form of reputational damage, mission derailment, or dignitary harm—costs that may be substantial if realized, yet difficult to prove without running the very experiment the employer seeks to avoid. Courts lack a framework for evaluating when hypothetical costs should be credited in the undue hardship inquiry. As a result, they may default to discounting those costs altogether—effectively narrowing the inquiry despite Groff’s instruction to apply a flexible, commonsense approach.6 6.Groff, 143 S. Ct. at 2295–96.Show More
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the duty to accommodate religion and the functions of the undue hardship defense. Part II examines the post-Groff accommodation disputes that expose the problem of hypothetical, noneconomic costs, focusing on vaccination mandates and name-and-pronoun policies. Part III offers a normative framework for evaluating such costs. Drawing from post-Groff case law, this Note identifies three guidelines for deciding whether to defer to employers’ ex ante cost predictions before proceeding to Groff’s “substantial increased costs” inquiry.7 7.Id. at 2295 (citing Hardison, 432 U.S. at 83 n.14).Show More Courts should begin by examining the employer’s own conduct: a policy that is selectively enforced or casually suspended deserves little deference. Courts should then ask whether the employer’s decision-making process was reasonable. Where uncertainty remains, courts should acknowledge that the prospect of harm being borne disproportionately by vulnerable third parties justifies more deference to the employer’s prediction.
- Groff v. DeJoy, 143 S. Ct. 2279, 2286 (2023). ↑
- Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977); Groff, 143 S. Ct. at 2295. ↑
- Groff, 143 S. Ct. at 2295–96. ↑
- See, e.g., Kluge v. Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 150 F.4th 792, 806 n.8 (7th Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, No. 24-1942, 2025 WL 2848017, at *1 (7th Cir. Oct. 7, 2025); Naylor v. County of Muscatine, 151 F.4th 973, 976 (8th Cir. 2025) (per curiam) (quoting Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 655 (8th Cir. 1995)); Bellard v. Univ. of Tex. MD Anderson Cancer Ctr., 716 F. Supp. 3d 503, 515 (S.D. Tex. 2024). ↑
- Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). ↑
- Groff, 143 S. Ct. at 2295–96. ↑
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Id. at 2295 (citing Hardison, 432 U.S. at 83 n.14). ↑
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