Introduction
Suppose you have just landed a job. On your first day at work, your new employer requires you to undergo an onboarding process.1 1.Our picture of onboarding synthesizes elements from both case law and commentary. See, e.g., Talya N. Bauer & Berrin Erdogan, Organizational Socialization: The Effective Onboarding of New Employees, in 3 APA Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology 51, 54–57 (Sheldon Zedeck et al. eds., 2011).Show More A human resources (“HR”) representative directs you to a boilerplate document (or digital form) that declares you are an at-will employee who may be terminated at any time, for any reason, or for no reason at all. That same document—or others in the formidable stack (or series of screens) you will review and acknowledge—also purports to restrict your contractual rights. One clause precludes enforcement of any oral or written assurances you may have received during your recruitment and hiring process. Another clause prophylactically disclaims the legal significance of any future promise you may receive from any supervisor. Yet more boilerplate appears in other documents that describe the employer’s generous benefit plans and your entitlements as an employee. For example, a prominent provision in the employee handbook expressly disclaims that the employer’s written policies constitute a contractual commitment. And still another term reserves to your employer the unilateral right to change the handbook and other personnel policies at any time.
Notice first the irony of this ostensible employment contract. Although it observes key rituals of contract formation—legal language and signature lines—its evident purpose is to avoid creating a contract at all. Instead, your employer uses “exculpatory boilerplate” to eliminate any plausible basis you might have to bring a contract action against them.2 2.See Rachel Arnow-Richman & J.H. Verkerke, Deconstructing Employment Contract Law, 75 Fla. L. Rev. 897, 948 (2023).Show More Each clause aims to foreclose a potential source of express or implied contract claims. In lieu of binding contractual obligations, the employer offers you informal assurances that they value your service, will treat you fairly, and hope the employment relationship will endure. Your only hope of enforcing these promises, however, depends on nonlegal workplace and industry norms.3 3.See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1913, 1930–38 (1996) (asserting that an informal just-cause norm in workplace settings should be self-enforcing, not legally binding).Show More In short, your employer appears to have opted for a “norms-only” relationship that excludes, to the maximum extent permissible, any grounds you might have for legal enforcement.4 4.See J.H. Verkerke, Legal Ignorance and Information-Forcing Rules, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 899, 950–55 (2015) [hereinafter Verkerke, Legal Ignorance] (describing exculpatory language as an attempt to preserve a norm-governed relationship).Show More
But, in a second ironic twist, your employer is not content with mere workplace norms when it comes to enforcing your obligations to the company. As part of the onboarding process, they attempt to impose various legally binding terms as a condition of your employment.5 5.One of us has previously referred to this phenomenon as the “contractualiz[ation]” of the employment relationship. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term, Standard Form Employment Agreements, 49 Ariz. L. Rev. 637, 638, 651–56 (2007) [hereinafter, Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts].Show More One of these terms surrenders your right to a jury trial and obliges you to submit any employment-related claims to binding arbitration.6 6.See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. Rev. 679, 681 (2018).Show More This agreement to arbitrate also precludes class or collective actions and requires you to bring only individual claims in an arbitral forum.7 7.See, e.g., id. at 693.Show More It may even shorten the statute of limitations on any claims you pursue under federal and state employment protection legislation.8 8.See, e.g., Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino, 939 F.3d 824, 838 (6th Cir. 2019).Show More Your employer may also require you to accept various restrictive covenants that will limit your ability to leave your new position to pursue other work. For example, you could be subject to a noncompete clause, a nonsolicitation agreement, a nondisclosure agreement, an intellectual property assignment, and even a training repayment agreement.9 9.See, e.g., Jonathan F. Harris, Unconscionability in Contracting for Worker Training, 72 Ala. L. Rev. 723, 725–26 (2021); Orly Lobel, Boilerplate Collusion: Clause Aggregation, Antitrust Law & Contract Governance, 106 Minn. L. Rev. 877, 878 (2021) (describing the employer practice of “bundling . . . restrictive provisions in employment contracts” that constrain worker competition).Show More In addition to these affirmative obligations, the documents you sign may designate a forum and applicable state law that favor your employer’s interests should they ever pursue claims against you.10 10.See generally The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (holding forum selection clauses presumptively enforceable so long as they are not unreasonable or contrary to public policy); Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 214 (2d Cir. 2014) (enforcing a forum selection clause in an employment contract). Other common provisions include invention assignments and holdover clauses. Orly Lobel, Exit, Voice & Innovation: How Human Capital Policy Impacts Equality (& How Inequality Hurts Growth), 57 Hou. L. Rev. 781, 791–92 (2020).Show More
So, what is the true nature of your employment relationship? Does a clever combination of binding agreements and exculpatory boilerplate free your employer from any contractual commitments and simultaneously impose significant legal obligations on you as an employee? Or might courts reject employers’ attempts to have their contractual cake and eat it too, and instead adopt a more nuanced and holistic view of the parties’ reciprocal obligations?
Perhaps surprisingly, nearly all states give employers exactly the asymmetrical obligations they crave. Courts tend to view standard-form language that imposes affirmative duties on employees as contractual.11 11.For example, unless prohibited by statute, noncompetition agreements in most jurisdictions are enforceable when properly limited in time and space, supported by consideration, and justified by some legitimate employer interest. See Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 188 cmts. a, d (A.L.I. 1981). Many states impose additional restrictions by statute. See generally Norman D. Bishara & Lorenzo G. Luisetto, Goodbye, Noncompetes? Policy Diffusion and State-Level Reforms, 47 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 231 (2026) (summarizing recent statutory changes for noncompetition agreements). Our point, however, is that these employer-imposed provisions are deemed contractually binding, albeit subject to the various requirements of external law.Show More Yet these same courts tend to defer uncritically to boilerplate that insulates employers from any contract claims. Thus, under current law, most judges allow employers to say: “Heads I win; tails you lose.” The result is that companies may enforce an employee’s legal obligations to the firm, while simultaneously escaping any obligation to their employees.12 12.For a particularly poignant example of this judicial double standard, see MIMEDX Grp. v. Fox, No. 16-cv-11715, 2017 WL 3278913, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2017), in which the district court held that although the employer’s handbook contained a disclaimer, provisions that purported to bind the employee were enforceable because the formal nondisclosure agreement the employee was forced to sign incorporated those provisions by reference.Show More
Even more surprising, both contract and employment law scholars have largely neglected this “judicial deference” problem, as we refer to it. To be sure, many have challenged the enforcement of rights-waiving documents, such as arbitration agreements and restrictive covenants, against employees.13 13.See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts, supra note 5, at 651; Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379, 420–21 (2006); Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 789, 853 (2015).Show More But they have not interrogated the corresponding problem of employers’ pervasive use of “disclaimers”—shorthand for the exculpatory boilerplate we describe above—to foreclose workers’ potential contract claims.14 14.For exceptions, see Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and Policy Statements: From Gratuities to Contracts and Back Again, 21 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 307, 313–14 (2017) [hereinafter Befort, Policy Statements]; Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13 Indus. Rels. L.J. 326, 348 (1991) [hereinafter Befort, Legal Effect of Disclaimers]; Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of the Implied Employment Contract, 29 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 345, 365–68 (2008).Show More Rather, they appear to accept that employers not only will but may use contract tools as both sword and shield.
This Article rejects that view, condemning judicial deference to disclaimers on both normative and doctrinal grounds. We make three contributions. First, we comprehensively review and classify contemporary judicial treatment of disclaimers. Our research reveals that courts defer far too readily to such language, shifting the balance of legal rights powerfully in favor of the already-dominant employer. Second, we expose the many errors of that approach from a mainstream contract law perspective. Judicial deference to disclaimers might be defensible if well-settled law dictated that result. However, contemporary contract theory and doctrine repudiate narrow, formalistic analysis of written text in relationships of dependence, like employment. Third, we offer an alternative “holistic approach” to disclaimers that “defuses” their destructive effects on employee contract rights.
We begin, in Part I, with a bit of history. During the first half of the twentieth century, courts developed a distinctive jurisprudence for employment contracts. A nearly irrebuttable employment-at-will “super-presumption” led judges to ignore contrary evidence of commitment and to distort contract law to preserve managerial discretion.15 15.See Arnow-Richman & Verkerke, supra note 2, at 907–21 (discussing the historical development of employment contract doctrine).Show More In the 1980s, however, some courts began to entertain implied contract claims based on protective language in employee handbooks and other assurances of job security.16 16.Id. at 918–19.Show More But those same decisions repeatedly invited employers to draft express disclaimers to ward off any contractual liability.17 17.See J.H. Verkerke, The Story of Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche: Finding a Way to Enforce Employee Handbook Promises, in Employment Law Stories 23, 54, 58, 61–62 (Samuel Estreicher & Gillian Lester eds., 2007) [hereinafter Verkerke, The Story of Woolley] (quoting representative language from leading cases).Show More In the ensuing decades, company attorneys progressively refined and expanded their clients’ boilerplate, eventually developing a formidably comprehensive “ironclad” disclaimer.18 18.Cf. Lobel, supra note 9, at 895–96 (using “ironclad” to describe employers’ use of multiple types of restrictive covenants); see also Arnow-Richman & Verkerke, supra note 2, at 948–49 (describing the evolution of employee handbook disclaimer language).Show More
And they convinced courts of its effectiveness. Our research reveals that most courts now fulfill employers’ desire to be free of contractual obligations by granting disclaimers legal effect subject only to a superficial analysis of clarity and prominence. Such decisions reflect what we have elsewhere called “employment contract exceptionalism”—a tendency of courts to misapply formal contract principles and invent questionable doctrinal shortcuts to regulate employment contracts.19 19.See Arnow-Richman & Verkerke, supra note 2, at 902.Show More The following Parts develop three overlapping critiques that show what is wrong with courts’ reflexive deference to disclaimers and how to fix this problem.
Part II presents a “boilerplate critique” that questions whether workers express meaningful assent to employer-drafted disclaimers. Common contracting practices impose broad exculpatory language on newly hired employees who have little opportunity or incentive to read and understand those terms. A vast scholarly literature has criticized similar problems afflicting consumer contracts of adhesion.20 20.See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1242 (1983); Nancy S. Kim, Wrap Contracts: Foundations and Ramifications 176 (2013); David A. Hoffman, Defeating the Empire of Forms, 109 Va. L. Rev. 1367, 1372 (2023).Show More But, surprisingly, judicial deference to employment disclaimers has attracted comparatively little critical scholarly analysis.21 21.See supra note 14.Show More We propose that judges, at a minimum, should demand that employers offer workers a reasonable opportunity to review all significant employment terms before accepting a job offer. We also invite creative use of tools such as the contra proferentem canon to constrain the exculpatory power of disclaimers. And we argue courts should impose more forceful substantive limits on the use of such clauses.
Part III presents an “interpretive critique.” Courts currently apply what we call a pro proferentem approach to interpreting disclaimers that privileges the text of written disclaimers over all other sources of contract terms, express or implied. We call out the absurdity of allowing one document to govern this fluid, constantly evolving, hyper-relational setting. Courts should instead adopt the contemporary contextualist approach to contract interpretation that looks beyond the written word to incorporate and reconcile oral and implied sources of contract terms. More aggressive courts could adopt a “reasonable expectations” doctrine that would refuse enforcement of exculpatory terms that conflict with the reasonable understanding of the weaker party. Either approach would more faithfully capture the agreement implied by the parties’ complex relationship.
Part IV presents a “regulatory critique.” It confronts what we characterize as an existential question—when and whether employers (or other parties) should be able to contract out of contractual obligation entirely. A truly ironclad disclaimer not only precludes enforcement of prior, present, and future assurances but also attempts to foreclose any and all contractual obligations. We contend, however, that allowing a party to categorically disclaim all contractual obligations is anathema to contract law. Even the most “ironclad” disclaimer must sometimes give way to contrary evidence that parties had a mutual agreement concerning some aspect of their employment relationship. We would welcome statutory intervention analogous to the protective measures proposed for consumer contracts. But even if legislative solutions are not forthcoming, the common law constrains parties’ ability to impose egregiously one-sided terms. We argue that both unconscionability and the duty of good faith prevent one party from enforcing terms that utterly preclude contractual obligations from arising in an ongoing relationship like employment.
Part V proposes a new “holistic” approach that understands disclaimers as one element of a more complex, ongoing, and changeable employment relationship. Currently, employers’ exculpatory boilerplate obliterates the very notion of contractual obligation in the employment relationship. We seek to “defuse” that destructive force and draw employment contract doctrine back to the mainstream. Doing so continues our broader project of developing a contractual understanding of employment-at-will that better balances the competing goals of protecting workers’ expectations and preserving managerial discretion.
Of course, an article about disclaimers would not be complete without a few of our own. First, we acknowledge that some of the contract principles on which we rely are at least partially contested. For example, a prominent neo-formalist critique of contextualist interpretation advocates for more textually oriented approaches to interpretation. These neo-formalist arguments, however, presume a transaction between sophisticated actors in which the parties execute a final writing.22 22.See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 847, 848 (2000) (developing an economic and instrumental defense of formalistic interpretation of contracts to protect party intent and reduce uncertainty).Show More In contrast, employment is a relationship of dependence best described as “hyper-relational”—“a long-term, fluid, and reciprocal undertaking governed by an agreement that is necessarily incomplete, usually expressed in indefinite terms, and constantly evolving.”23 23.Arnow-Richman & Verkerke, supra note 2, at 905.Show More In this context, we feel justified in calling for courts to apply the accepted contract principles that are most flexible and protective of employees.
Second, we will undoubtedly be accused both of destroying employment-at-will and of being unduly deferential to the prevailing at-will presumption. Our intention is to craft a doctrinal framework that many courts will find appealing. For that reason, we must take seriously their long-standing commitment to employment-at-will, even as we work to persuade judges that employment disclaimer doctrine requires substantial reform. Our Article therefore accepts the premise that parties can terminate their relationship whenever they wish, but rejects the facile conclusion that disclaimers can categorically prevent them from contracting for greater rights. In other words, we seek to downgrade the at-will super-presumption to the status of an ordinary default.
Third, we recognize that if we are successful in defusing disclaimers, additional challenging questions will arise. Courts will have to determine what aspects of the parties’ hyper-relational arrangement are contractual. In this Article, we advocate for a holistic approach to employment contract enforcement, leaving for later the task of elaborating how and when specific types of employer promises should be enforceable.24 24.See Rachel Arnow-Richman & J.H. Verkerke, Reconstructing Employment Contract Law (unpublished manuscript on file with authors).Show More For now, we seek only to free employment contract law from the tyranny of exculpatory boilerplate.
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Our picture of onboarding synthesizes elements from both case law and commentary. See, e.g., Talya N. Bauer & Berrin Erdogan, Organizational Socialization: The Effective Onboarding of New Employees, in 3 APA Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology 51, 54–57 (Sheldon Zedeck et al. eds., 2011). ↑
-
See Rachel Arnow-Richman & J.H. Verkerke, Deconstructing Employment Contract Law, 75 Fla. L. Rev. 897, 948 (2023). ↑
-
See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1913, 1930–38 (1996) (asserting that an informal just-cause norm in workplace settings should be self-enforcing, not legally binding). ↑
-
See J.H. Verkerke, Legal Ignorance and Information-Forcing Rules, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 899, 950–55 (2015) [hereinafter Verkerke, Legal Ignorance] (describing exculpatory language as an attempt to preserve a norm-governed relationship). ↑
-
One of us has previously referred to this phenomenon as the “contractualiz[ation]” of the employment relationship. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term, Standard Form Employment Agreements, 49 Ariz. L. Rev. 637, 638, 651–56 (2007) [hereinafter, Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts]. ↑
-
See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. Rev. 679, 681 (2018). ↑
-
See, e.g., id. at 693. ↑
-
See, e.g., Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino, 939 F.3d 824, 838 (6th Cir. 2019). ↑
-
See, e.g., Jonathan F. Harris, Unconscionability in Contracting for Worker Training, 72 Ala. L. Rev. 723, 725–26 (2021); Orly Lobel, Boilerplate Collusion: Clause Aggregation, Antitrust Law & Contract Governance, 106 Minn. L. Rev. 877, 878 (2021) (describing the employer practice of “bundling . . . restrictive provisions in employment contracts” that constrain worker competition). ↑
-
See generally The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (holding forum selection clauses presumptively enforceable so long as they are not unreasonable or contrary to public policy); Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 214 (2d Cir. 2014) (enforcing a forum selection clause in an employment contract). Other common provisions include invention assignments and holdover clauses. Orly Lobel, Exit, Voice & Innovation: How Human Capital Policy Impacts Equality (& How Inequality Hurts Growth), 57 Hou. L. Rev. 781, 791–92 (2020). ↑
-
For example, unless prohibited by statute, noncompetition agreements in most jurisdictions are enforceable when properly limited in time and space, supported by consideration, and justified by some legitimate employer interest. See Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 188 cmts. a, d (A.L.I. 1981). Many states impose additional restrictions by statute. See generally Norman D. Bishara & Lorenzo G. Luisetto, Goodbye, Noncompetes? Policy Diffusion and State-Level Reforms, 47 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 231 (2026) (summarizing recent statutory changes for noncompetition agreements). Our point, however, is that these employer-imposed provisions are deemed contractually binding, albeit subject to the various requirements of external law. ↑
-
For a particularly poignant example of this judicial double standard, see MIMEDX Grp. v. Fox, No. 16-cv-11715, 2017 WL 3278913, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2017), in which the district court held that although the employer’s handbook contained a disclaimer, provisions that purported to bind the employee were enforceable because the formal nondisclosure agreement the employee was forced to sign incorporated those provisions by reference. ↑
-
See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts, supra note 5, at 651; Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379, 420–21 (2006); Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 789, 853 (2015). ↑
-
For exceptions, see Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and Policy Statements: From Gratuities to Contracts and Back Again, 21 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 307, 313–14 (2017) [hereinafter Befort, Policy Statements]; Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13 Indus. Rels. L.J. 326, 348 (1991) [hereinafter Befort, Legal Effect of Disclaimers]; Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of the Implied Employment Contract, 29 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 345, 365–68 (2008). ↑
-
See Arnow-Richman & Verkerke, supra note 2, at 907–21 (discussing the historical development of employment contract doctrine). ↑
-
Id. at 918–19. ↑
-
See J.H. Verkerke, The Story of Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche: Finding a Way to Enforce Employee Handbook Promises, in Employment Law Stories 23, 54, 58, 61–62 (Samuel Estreicher & Gillian Lester eds., 2007) [hereinafter Verkerke, The Story of Woolley] (quoting representative language from leading cases). ↑
-
Cf. Lobel, supra note 9, at 895–96 (using “ironclad” to describe employers’ use of multiple types of restrictive covenants); see also Arnow-Richman & Verkerke, supra note 2, at 948–49 (describing the evolution of employee handbook disclaimer language). ↑
-
See Arnow-Richman & Verkerke, supra note 2, at 902. ↑
-
See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1242 (1983); Nancy S. Kim, Wrap Contracts: Foundations and Ramifications 176 (2013); David A. Hoffman, Defeating the Empire of Forms, 109 Va. L. Rev. 1367, 1372 (2023). ↑
-
See supra note 14. ↑
-
See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 847, 848 (2000) (developing an economic and instrumental defense of formalistic interpretation of contracts to protect party intent and reduce uncertainty). ↑
-
Arnow-Richman & Verkerke, supra note 2, at 905. ↑
-
See Rachel Arnow-Richman & J.H. Verkerke, Reconstructing Employment Contract Law (unpublished manuscript on file with authors). ↑
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