American copyright and patent laws are founded on utilitarian notions of providing limited incentives to create socially valuable works. This Article shows that incentives that express solicitude for and protect a creator’s strong personhood and labor interests can serve to support this underlying utilitarian purpose. In so doing, this Article shows that important incentives exist in addition to traditional pecuniary incentives. Through this lens, this Article demonstrates that what scholars typically see as a conflict between theories of utilitarianism and moral rights in intellectual property can in fact come together much of the time in a useful harmony to promote cultural, scientific, and technological progress. The Article then shows a number of promising areas for application in copyright and patent law of expressive incentives, such as attribution, the structure of duration, copyright’s originality requirement and its reversion right, and patent’s first-to-invent standard and written-description requirement. These areas are promising ones for investigation into the ideal mix of pecuniary and expressive incentives in intellectual property. Other areas, like integrity and robust restraints on alienability, are more troublesome because their societal costs might exceed their benefits.
Article
The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract Design
Over the past 40 years, an irrelevance proposition has been prevalent in law -and -economics scholarship: bargaining power should affect only price and not non-price terms of a contract. In contrast, practitioners and commentators in industry regularly invoke bargaining power to explain static and dynamic variance in non-price contract terms. This paper unpacks and analyzes the assumptions of the strong—and weak—versions of this bargaining power irrelevance proposition, to bridge the gap between theory and the real world. In the first half of the paper, we identify and discuss a variety of explanations for the effect of bargaining power on contract design, under conditions of information asymmetry and positive transaction costs. These include the effects of shifts in market supply and demand and the effect of bargaining through lawyers. In the second half of the paper, we present an in-depth examination of one set of explanations, concerning the impact of bargaining power and information asymmetry on non-price terms, when the value and cost of non-price terms vary across contracting parties. In the extreme cases in which one or the other party enjoys overwhelming bargaining power, the efforts of that party to capture a larger share of the surplus by screening or signaling may compromise the efficiency of the non-price terms. We show that this incentive disappears or is mitigated when bargaining power is more evenly shared between the parties: for example, when a monopolist faces the threat of competition, when the parties can renegotiate, or when they engage in bilateral bargaining with more even bargaining power. As a whole, the paper provides a theoretical basis for interpreting the intuition among market participants that the impact of bargaining power extends beyond price terms. Before concluding, we briefly suggest implications for legal policy, particularly the contract law doctrine of unconscionability.
Taking Conscience Seriously
For too long, the conventional account of morality in medicine has placed conscience firmly on one side of the moral divide. The archetypal doctor who refuses to participate in controversial treatments—most commonly end-of-life care, abortion, sterilization, and contraception—has been the lodestar of legislative efforts and scholarly accounts. In the name of institutional conscience, healthcare facilities have also been permitted to assert moral or religious objections to care and impose them on employees and affiliates of all beliefs and backgrounds. Doctors, nurses, and institutions that are willing to deliver controversial care have been virtually absent from discussions.
This Article aims to reframe the debate by taking conscience seriously. Through engagement with the moral philosophical literature, it makes two inter-related arguments. First, conscience equally may compel a doctor or nurse to deliver a controversial treatment to a patient in need. Yet legislation meant to protect conscience, paradoxically, has undermined the consciences of these doctors and nurses. Second, endowing healthcare institutions with conscience via legislation is theoretically and practically problematic. By privileging the institutions’ rights to refuse to provide certain treatments, legislation impinges on the rights of individual providers to provide care they feel obligated by conscience to deliver. Ultimately, if legislation is to protect conscience, it must negotiate between competing claims of conscience of health providers and the facilities in which they work—regardless of whether they refuse or are willing to provide controversial care. This Article introduces a new framework for achieving a better balance between the interests of institutions, individual doctors and nurses, and the patients who depend on them for care.