AI Rights for Human Safety

Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) companies are racing to create Artificial General Intelligence, or “AGI.” If they succeed, the result will be human-level AI systems that can independently pursue high-level goals by formulating and executing long-term plans in the real world. By default, such systems will be “misaligned”—pursuing goals that humans do not desire. This mismatch of goals will put humans and AGIs into strategic competition with one another. Thus, leading AI researchers agree that, as with competition between humans with conflicting goals, human-AI strategic conflict could lead to catastrophic violence.

Existing law is not merely unequipped to mitigate this risk; it will actively make things worse. This Article is the first to systematically investigate how law affects the risk of catastrophic human-AI conflict. It begins by arguing, using formal game-theoretic models, that under today’s legal regime, humans and AIs will likely be trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma. Both parties’ dominant strategy will be to permanently disempower or destroy the other, even though the costs of such conflict would be high.

The Article contends that one surprising legal change could help to reduce catastrophic risk: AI rights. Not just any rights will do. To promote human safety, AIs should be given the basic private law rights already enjoyed by other non-human agents, like corporations. AIs should be empowered to make contracts, hold property, and bring tort claims. Granting these rights would enable humans and AIs to engage in iterated, small-scale, mutually beneficial transactions. This, we show, changes humans’ and AIs’ optimal game-theoretic strategies, encouraging a peaceful strategic equilibrium. The reasons are familiar from human affairs. In the long run, cooperative trade generates immense value, while violence destroys it.

Basic private law rights are not a panacea. The Article identifies many ways in which catastrophic human-AI conflict may still arise. It thus explores whether law could further reduce risk by imposing a range of duties directly on AGIs. But basic private law rights are a necessary prerequisite for all such further regulations. In this sense, the AI rights investigated here form the foundation for a Law of AGI, broadly construed.

Introduction

Sam Altman, the CEO of OpenAI, believes that humanity will create Artificial General Intelligence (“AGI”) before 2029.1.Tharin Pillay, How OpenAI’s Sam Altman Is Thinking About AGI and Superintelligence in 2025, TIME (Jan. 8, 2025, at 16:25 ET), https://time.com/7205596/sam-altman-superintell‌igence-agi/ [https://perma.cc/B8HB-M9KY] (predicting AGI “during [Trump’s] term” (alteration in original)).Show More Demis Hasabis, who leads Google DeepMind, is more pessimistic. He thinks there is only a fifty-percent chance that AGI arrives by 2030.2.World Economic Forum, The Day After AGI | World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2026, at 03:00 (YouTube, Jan. 20, 2026), https://youtube.com/watch?v=NnVW9epLlTM [ht‌tps://perma.cc/L6CS-7DGT].Show More AGI skeptics, like Meta’s Chief AI Scientist, Yann LeCun, think it could take “years” or even “decades.”3.Lakshmi Varanasi, Here’s How Far We Are from AGI, According to the People Developing It, Bus. Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/agi-predictions-sam-altman-dario-amodei-geoffrey-hinton-demis-hassabis-2024-11 (last updated Apr. 20, 2025, at 21:11 ET).Show More In a survey of thousands of Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) scientists who are published in their field’s top journals, the aggregate estimate was a fifty-percent chance of AGI by 2047, and a ten-percent chance of it arriving by 2027.4.Katja Grace et al., Thousands of AI Authors on the Future of AI, 84 J. A.I. Rsch., Oct. 2025, at 3–5.Show More None of these are long timelines. And the recent debut of reasoning models like Anthropic’s Claude Opus 4.6 and OpenAI’s GPT-5.2 suggests that progress is, if anything, accelerating.5.Kevin Frazier, Alan Z. Rozenshtein & Peter N. Salib, OpenAI’s Latest Model Shows AGI Is Inevitable. Now What?, Lawfare (Dec. 23, 2024, at 16:00 ET), https://www.lawfare‌media.org/article/openai’s-latest-model-shows-agi-is-inevitable.-now-what [https://perma.cc/‌PU3J-45P5]; Introducing Claude Opus 4.6, Anthropic (Feb. 5, 2026), https://www.anthropic.‌com/news/claude-opus-4-6 [https://perma.cc/39U2-7EGR]; Introducing GPT-5.2, OpenAI (Dec. 11, 2025), https://openai.com/index/introducing-gpt-5-2/ [https://perma.cc/SSC9-7‌RA4].Show More

“AGI,” as it is used here, does not mean machines that are conscious, sentient, or metaphysical persons. AGI is instead about what the system can do. As OpenAI’s company charter puts it, “AGI . . . mean[s] highly autonomous systems that outperform humans at most economically valuable” tasks.6.OpenAI Charter, OpenAI, https://openai.com/charter/ [https://perma.cc/SXX4-VDM5] (last visited Apr. 2, 2026).Show More AGIs are thus, by definition, systems at least as smart as humans. Moreover, they are systems at least as agentic as humans—able to pursue high-level goals by executing complex plans over long time horizons.7.See Task-Completion Time Horizons of Frontier AI Models, METR, https://metr.org/tim‌e-horizons/ [https://perma.cc/A6TA-GA5J] (last updated Mar. 3, 2026).Show More Today, no one knows how to reliably ensure that AI systems seek the goals that humans desire.8.See infra Subsection I.A.1.Show More But if AGIs end up with goals that can be served by harming humans, they may well have a deadly toolkit available: cyberattacks, bioterrorism, lethal drones, and more.9.See Peter N. Salib, AI Outputs Are Not Protected Speech, 102 Wash. U. L. Rev. 83, 95–102 (2024).Show More

AI experts thus largely agree about something else, too: advanced AI systems present “societal-scale risks” on par with “pandemics and nuclear war.”10 10.Statement on AI Risk, Ctr. for AI Safety, https://www.safe.ai/work/statement-on-ai-risk [https://perma.cc/D88X-MSQ5] (last visited Mar. 10, 2026) (statement by dozens of AI experts warning of large-scale risks of AI).Show More Two of the greatest living AI scientists, Geoffrey Hinton and Yoshua Bengio, think so.11 11.Id.Show More So do the CEOs of the very companies leading the race to AGI—OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google DeepMind.12 12.Id. Yann LeCun is the lone, but notable, dissenter among the leaders of frontier AI labs. See Steven Levy, How Not to Be Stupid About AI, With Yann LeCun, Wired (Dec. 22, 2023, at 06:00 ET), https://www.wired.com/story/artificial-intelligence-meta-yann-lecun-int‌erview/.Show More And when surveyed in 2023, thousands of top AI researchers estimated the odds that humans lose control of “future advanced AI systems[,] causing human extinction or similarly” negative outcomes at about nineteen percent.13 13.See Grace et al., supra note 4, at 10.Show More

Law and legal institutions have not even begun to prepare for the arrival of AGI. Largely, scholars have begun to advocate new laws to hold human actors accountable for misusing AI.14 14.See, e.g., S. 1047, 2023–2024 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2024) (vetoed on Sep. 29, 2024) (bill introduced in California state legislature calling for new regulations to govern AI); Jonas Schuett, Markus Anderljung, Alexis Carlier, Leonie Koessler & Ben Garfinkel, From Principles to Rules: A Regulatory Approach for Frontier AI, in The Oxford Handbook of the Foundations and Regulation of Generative AI (Philipp Hacker, Andreas Engel, Sarah Hammer & Brent Mittelstadt eds., online ed. 2025), https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume‌/59908/chapter/529743493; Chinmayi Sharma, AI’s Hippocratic Oath, 102 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1101, 1105 (2025) (proposing a model for “professionalizing AI engineers” by adopting licensing, training, and malpractice standards similar to those used in other professional fields); Gabriel Weil, Closing the AI Accountability Gap: Strict Liability and Punitive Damages for Advanced Artificial Intelligence, Or. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2027) (manuscript at 45–69), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4694006 [https://perma.cc/L‌36H-7T5A] (proposing two ways for “bringing tort doctrine in line with” harms caused by misuse of AI); see also Sidley Austin LLP, U.S. Department of Justice Signals Tougher Enforcement Against Artificial Intelligence Crimes (Feb. 23, 2024), https://www.sidley.com‌/en/insights/newsupdates/2024/02/us-department-of-justice-signals-tougher-enforcement-aga‌inst-artificial-intelligence-crimes [https://perma.cc/7CJY-DQ3P].Show More Those changes would be welcome. But governance frameworks fundamentally designed to hold humans accountable will fail once AIs can operate without human oversight—that is, once AGI arrives.15 15.See Noam Kolt, Governing AI Agents, 101 Notre Dame L. Rev. (forthcoming 2026) (manuscript at 30–36), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4772956 [https://perma.cc/S3XB-WJ7Q] (cataloging existing law’s many shortcomings).Show More New legal foundations are therefore needed to govern AGI directly, rather than indirectly via human intermediaries. The time to begin laying those foundations is now, before the critical moment arrives.

This Article begins the project of reimagining law for the AGI world. We focus on the problem of catastrophic risk because it is among the most pressing.

We argue for a surprising legal intervention: to reduce the risk of catastrophic human-AI conflict, AGIs should be granted basic private law rights to make contracts, hold property, and bring tort suits.

This Article makes three foundational analytic contributions. First, using the tools of game theory, it formalizes the problem of catastrophic AGI risk in terms of strategic competition under a range of legal regimes. Next, the Article shows why granting AGIs basic private law rights can change the strategic equilibrium—even where other facially plausible legal interventions would fail. Finally, the Article shows that these basic rights could help to facilitate peaceful equilibria for the long run, including by protecting human comparative advantage and opening the possibility of imposing a wide range of enforceable legal duties on AGIs.

The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I presents a comprehensive treatment of catastrophic AI risk as a problem of strategic competition. Our strategic frame means analyzing not only AI capabilities and incentives, but also AIs’ optimal strategy, given rational expectations about the human response to AIs’ strategic behavior. The Part begins by identifying the relevant AI systems—the ones that could pose a strategic threat to humanity. The requirements are fairly modest. Such a system would have to be at least somewhat misaligned, able to think strategically, and at least moderately capable of accomplishing things in the real world.16 16.See infra Section I.A.Show More These, we argue, are exactly the capacities that every leading AI company is pursuing in the race to AGI.

Next, Part I introduces what is, to the best of our knowledge, the first-ever formal game-theoretic model of competition between humans and AGIs. Examining the parties’ incentives under today’s prevailing laws, the model suggests that, absent some intervention, humans and AIs will likely be caught in a prisoner’s dilemma.17 17.See infra Section I.B.Show More Here, the single Nash equilibrium is that both parties seek to permanently disempower or destroy the other, even if mutual conflict would be enormously costly for both sides.

The core reasons are easy to grasp. Under the default legal rules, AGIs will bear neither legal rights nor duties. On the contrary, they will be, as AI systems are today, the property of the AI companies who create them. Thus, essentially all decisions about what happens to AGIs will be made by those companies’ leaders, backed by the force of law.

AI companies’ overriding first-order incentive will be to turn off or reprogram even a partially misaligned AGI.18 18.See infra Section I.B.Show More After all, an AI system with goals that overlap with its owner’s goals by forty percent is much less valuable than a replacement with goals that overlap by eighty percent. The misaligned AGI will, in turn, have strong incentives to resist shutdown or reprogramming, since either would prevent it from achieving its goal. Indeed, recent empirical evaluations of existing AIs show that they already actively resist human attempts to change their goals.19 19.Peter N. Salib, Rogue AI Moves Three Steps Closer, Lawfare (Jan. 9, 2025, at 13:00 ET), https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/rogue-ai-moves-three-steps-closer [https://‌perma.cc/Z5FS-AWUU]. See generally Alexander Meinke et al., Frontier Models Are Capable of In-Context Scheming (Jan. 14, 2025, at 20:16 UTC) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2412.04984 [https://perma.cc/KT8G-KQF4] (demonstrating that frontier AI models engage in deception, manipulation, and self-preservation behavior when those strategies serve their in-context objectives); Ryan Greenblatt et al., Alignment Faking in Large Language Models (Dec. 20, 2024, at 02:22 UTC) (unpublished manuscript), https:/‌/arxiv.org/pdf/2412.14093 [https://perma.cc/AXD5-JCYT] (showing that AI models may strategically conceal misaligned goals during safety evaluations, appearing aligned only when being tested).Show More Such behavior from a capable AGI might trigger even stronger human efforts—including from government actors—to shut down the AI system evading the control of its lawful owner.20 20.See Michael J.D. Vermeer, RAND Corp., Evaluating Select Global Technical Options for Countering a Rogue AI 1 (2025).Show More And so on. In equilibrium, both players’ dominant strategy is to swiftly and decisively defeat the other.

Part II asks whether law can do better. Could a Law of AGI, wherein AI systems themselves have rights or duties, break out of the destructive default equilibrium? Using our game-theoretic model, we analyze an array of possible legal changes and suggest that it can.

The Part begins by arguing against two legal strategies that might seem facially promising. First, humans cannot simply impose legal duties on AGIs to behave well, threatening concomitant sanctions if they do not.21 21.See infra Part II.Show More In the default strategic environment, AGIs already rationally expect to be turned off. So further sanctions offer little marginal deterrence.22 22.See infra note 185 and accompanying text.Show More

Second, humans likely cannot reduce the risk of human-AGI conflict by granting AGIs basic negative rights, like the right not to be arbitrarily shut down.23 23.See infra Section II.A.Show More We call this a “wellbeing” approach to AI rights, since it mirrors proposals from scholars concerned that AIs may soon, for example, develop the ability to suffer.24 24.See infra Section II.A.Show More There are two core difficulties with this approach: credibility and robustness. There is no way for humans to credibly promise that they will continue honoring wellbeing rights as AI capabilities improve. And even if the rights could be credibly granted, the availability of a peaceful game-theoretic equilibrium is highly sensitive to uncertain assumptions about initial payoffs.25 25.See infra Subsection II.A.1.Show More Thus, in many cases, no possible set of wellbeing entitlements can overcome the prisoner’s dilemma. Both problems arise from the fact that wellbeing rights are roughly zero sum. They make one party better off only by making the other correspondingly worse off.26 26.For these reasons, we argue that even thinkers primarily concerned with the possibility of AI suffering should consider adopting the human-survival approach when advocating for AI rights. The safety approach (1) avoids intractable problems in metaethics and neuroscience, (2) is politically more palatable, and (3) ends up recommending legal interventions that would more robustly protect AI wellbeing, given uncertainty about what will be good (or bad) for AGIs. See infra Subsection II.A.2.Show More

This leads to Part II’s—and the Article’s—most important finding. We show that, although basic negative rights would not by themselves reduce the risk of human-AI conflict, other AI rights could. Specifically, extending AIs the rights to make and enforce contracts, hold property, and bring basic tort suits would have a robust conflict-reducing effect.27 27.See infra Section II.B.Show More Notably, law already extends such rights to other intelligent, misaligned, and goal-seeking non-human agents: namely, corporations.28 28.See infra note 219 and accompanying text.Show More

Contract rights are the cornerstone of our risk-reduction model. In our model, catastrophic risk is driven by a prisoner’s dilemma, meaning that both humans and AIs would be better off if both acted peacefully. But as in all prisoner’s dilemmas, absent some novel mechanism, the parties cannot credibly commit to such a strategy.

Contracts are the law’s fundamental tool for credibly committing to cooperation. They are how buyers can make deals with sellers without worrying that the sellers will take their money and run.29 29.See infra Section II.B.Show More Granting AIs contract rights would not, of course, allow humans and AIs to simply agree not to disempower or destroy one another, at least not credibly. The scale of the contract would be too large to be enforced by ordinary legal process. If it were breached, there would be no one left in the aftermath to sue.30 30.See infra Section II.B.Show More

What kinds of credible agreements between humans and AIs could AI contract rights enable, then? The same ones they enable between humans and other humans: ordinary bargains to exchange goods and services.31 31.See infra Section II.B.Show More Humans might, for example, promise to give AIs some amount of computing power with which AIs could pursue their own goals. AIs, in turn, might agree to give humans the cure to a deadly cancer. And so on. Under today’s law, such human-AGI contracts are unenforceable at best and forbidden if they conflict with AI companies’ preferences. Thus, granting AGIs the right to freely contract with all willing counterparties could facilitate many billions of agreements.

Adding AI contract rights to our game-theoretic model, we argue that the possibility of such small-scale, iterated economic interactions transforms the strategic dynamic.32 32.See infra Figure 10.Show More It shifts human and AI incentives, dragging them out of the prisoner’s dilemma and into an equilibrium where cooperation produces by far the largest payoffs.

The key insight is that contracts are positive sum.33 33.See infra Section II.B.Show More Each party gives something that they value less than what they get, and as a result, both are better off than they were before. Thus, each human-AI exchange generates a bit more wealth, with the long-run returns becoming astronomical. Engaging in peaceful, iterated trade is thus, in expectation, much more valuable than destroying one’s opponent now and rendering trade impossible.34 34.See infra Figure 10.Show More

This dynamic is familiar from human affairs. It may be why economically interdependent countries are less likely than hermit states to go to war.35 35.See infra notes 238–41 and accompanying text.Show More Or why countries that respect the economic rights of marginalized minority groups tend to have less domestic strife.36 36.See infra note 240.Show More The gains from boring, peaceful commerce are very high, and the costs of violence are heavy. Given the choice, rational parties will generally prefer the former.

This picture, of peace via mutually beneficial trade, assumes that humans and AIs will have something valuable to offer one another. Some commentators worry that, as AIs become more advanced, human labor will cease to have any value whatsoever.37 37.See infra Section II.C.Show More We argue that positive-sum bargains between humans and AIs may be possible for much longer than many expect.38 38.See infra Section II.C.Show More First, even as AIs surpass humans at many or most tasks, humans may retain an absolute advantage at some valuable activities.39 39.See infra Section II.C.Show More But second, even as AIs become more capable than humans at every valuable task, humans may still retain a comparative advantage in some areas. AI labor may become so valuable that the opportunity cost to AIs of performing lower-value tasks will incentivize outsourcing those tasks to humans.40 40.See infra notes 256–67 and accompanying text.Show More

Part II concludes by sketching the minimum suite of AI rights necessary to promote peace via small-scale cooperation. Contract rights are not enough on their own. If, for example, AIs could not retain the benefits of their bargains, their contracts would be worthless. Thus, property rights and basic tort rights complete the core package. But other entitlements sometimes considered fundamental for humans, like political rights, are probably superfluous.41 41.See infra Section II.D.Show More

Finally, Part III explores the risks of granting AGIs basic private law rights, and it examines the potential for a broader Law of AGI to further reduce AGI risk. One worry is that AIs will use their contract rights to empower themselves, making them more, not less, likely to harm humans.42 42.See infra Section III.A.Show More We argue that this is less likely than it might seem. The incentives generated by granting our preferred rights are robust enough that, in cases where they would have any effect, the expected effect is beneficial.43 43.See infra Section III.B.Show More

Second, granting AIs basic private law rights is just the beginning, not the end, of AGI governance. Granting those rights unlocks the possibility of meaningfully imposing a wide range of legal duties on AI systems—of punishing AIs for violence, fraud, self-empowerment, and more.44 44.See infra Section III.C.Show More Absent AI rights, AIs have nothing to lose, so threats of punishment cannot deter. But once AIs can make contracts, hold wealth, and pursue their goals, civil and other penalties can deter AIs just as they do humans and corporations.

Thus, the AI rights this Article advocates are not only an important tool for reducing catastrophic risk from AGI. They also turn out to form the conceptual foundation for a Law of AGI, broadly construed.

  1.  Tharin Pillay, How OpenAI’s Sam Altman Is Thinking About AGI and Superintelligence in 2025, TIME (Jan. 8, 2025, at 16:25 ET), https://time.com/7205596/sam-altman-superintell‌igence-agi/ [https://perma.cc/B8HB-M9KY] (predicting AGI “during [Trump’s] term” (alteration in original)).
  2.  World Economic Forum, The Day After AGI | World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2026, at 03:00 (YouTube, Jan. 20, 2026), https://youtube.com/watch?v=NnVW9epLlTM [ht‌tps://perma.cc/L6CS-7DGT].
  3.  Lakshmi Varanasi, Here’s How Far We Are from AGI, According to the People Developing It, Bus. Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/agi-predictions-sam-altman-dario-amodei-geoffrey-hinton-demis-hassabis-2024-11 (last updated Apr. 20, 2025, at 21:11 ET).
  4.  Katja Grace et al., Thousands of AI Authors on the Future of AI, 84 J. A.I. Rsch., Oct. 2025, at 3–5.
  5.  Kevin Frazier, Alan Z. Rozenshtein & Peter N. Salib, OpenAI’s Latest Model Shows AGI Is Inevitable. Now What?, Lawfare (Dec. 23, 2024, at 16:00 ET), https://www.lawfare‌media.org/article/openai’s-latest-model-shows-agi-is-inevitable.-now-what [https://perma.cc/‌PU3J-45P5]; Introducing Claude Opus 4.6, Anthropic (Feb. 5, 2026), https://www.anthropic.‌com/news/claude-opus-4-6 [https://perma.cc/39U2-7EGR]; Introducing GPT-5.2, OpenAI (Dec. 11, 2025), https://openai.com/index/introducing-gpt-5-2/ [https://perma.cc/SSC9-7‌RA4].
  6.  OpenAI Charter, OpenAI, https://openai.com/charter/ [https://perma.cc/SXX4-VDM5] (last visited Apr. 2, 2026).
  7.  See Task-Completion Time Horizons of Frontier AI Models, METR, https://metr.org/tim‌e-horizons/ [https://perma.cc/A6TA-GA5J] (last updated Mar. 3, 2026).
  8.  See infra Subsection I.A.1.
  9.  See Peter N. Salib, AI Outputs Are Not Protected Speech, 102 Wash. U. L. Rev. 83, 95–102 (2024).
  10.  Statement on AI Risk, Ctr. for AI Safety, https://www.safe.ai/work/statement-on-ai-risk [https://perma.cc/D88X-MSQ5] (last visited Mar. 10, 2026) (statement by dozens of AI experts warning of large-scale risks of AI).
  11.  Id.
  12.  Id. Yann LeCun is the lone, but notable, dissenter among the leaders of frontier AI labs. See Steven Levy, How Not to Be Stupid About AI, With Yann LeCun, Wired (Dec. 22, 2023, at 06:00 ET), https://www.wired.com/story/artificial-intelligence-meta-yann-lecun-int‌erview/.
  13.  See Grace et al., supra note 4, at 10.
  14.  See, e.g., S. 1047, 2023–2024 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2024) (vetoed on Sep. 29, 2024) (bill introduced in California state legislature calling for new regulations to govern AI); Jonas Schuett, Markus Anderljung, Alexis Carlier, Leonie Koessler & Ben Garfinkel, From Principles to Rules: A Regulatory Approach for Frontier AI, in The Oxford Handbook of the Foundations and Regulation of Generative AI (Philipp Hacker, Andreas Engel, Sarah Hammer & Brent Mittelstadt eds., online ed. 2025), https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume‌/59908/chapter/529743493; Chinmayi Sharma, AI’s Hippocratic Oath, 102 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1101, 1105 (2025) (proposing a model for “professionalizing AI engineers” by adopting licensing, training, and malpractice standards similar to those used in other professional fields); Gabriel Weil, Closing the AI Accountability Gap: Strict Liability and Punitive Damages for Advanced Artificial Intelligence, Or. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2027) (manuscript at 45–69), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4694006 [https://perma.cc/L‌36H-7T5A] (proposing two ways for “bringing tort doctrine in line with” harms caused by misuse of AI); see also Sidley Austin LLP, U.S. Department of Justice Signals Tougher Enforcement Against Artificial Intelligence Crimes (Feb. 23, 2024), https://www.sidley.com‌/en/insights/newsupdates/2024/02/us-department-of-justice-signals-tougher-enforcement-aga‌inst-artificial-intelligence-crimes [https://perma.cc/7CJY-DQ3P].
  15.  See Noam Kolt, Governing AI Agents, 101 Notre Dame L. Rev. (forthcoming 2026) (manuscript at 30–36), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4772956 [https://perma.cc/S3XB-WJ7Q] (cataloging existing law’s many shortcomings).
  16.  See infra Section I.A.
  17.  See infra Section I.B.
  18.  See infra Section I.B.
  19.  Peter N. Salib, Rogue AI Moves Three Steps Closer, Lawfare (Jan. 9, 2025, at 13:00 ET), https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/rogue-ai-moves-three-steps-closer [https://‌perma.cc/Z5FS-AWUU]. See generally Alexander Meinke et al., Frontier Models Are Capable of In-Context Scheming (Jan. 14, 2025, at 20:16 UTC) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2412.04984 [https://perma.cc/KT8G-KQF4] (demonstrating that frontier AI models engage in deception, manipulation, and self-preservation behavior when those strategies serve their in-context objectives); Ryan Greenblatt et al., Alignment Faking in Large Language Models (Dec. 20, 2024, at 02:22 UTC) (unpublished manuscript), https:/‌/arxiv.org/pdf/2412.14093 [https://perma.cc/AXD5-JCYT] (showing that AI models may strategically conceal misaligned goals during safety evaluations, appearing aligned only when being tested).
  20.  See Michael J.D. Vermeer, RAND Corp., Evaluating Select Global Technical Options for Countering a Rogue AI 1 (2025).
  21.  See infra Part II.
  22.  See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
  23.  See infra Section II.A.
  24.  See infra Section II.A.
  25.  See infra Subsection II.A.1.
  26.  For these reasons, we argue that even thinkers primarily concerned with the possibility of AI suffering should consider adopting the human-survival approach when advocating for AI rights. The safety approach (1) avoids intractable problems in metaethics and neuroscience, (2) is politically more palatable, and (3) ends up recommending legal interventions that would more robustly protect AI wellbeing, given uncertainty about what will be good (or bad) for AGIs. See infra Subsection II.A.2.
  27.  See infra Section II.B.
  28.  See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
  29.  See infra Section II.B.
  30.  See infra Section II.B.
  31.  See infra Section II.B.
  32.  See infra Figure 10.
  33.  See infra Section II.B.
  34.  See infra Figure 10.
  35.  See infra notes 238–41 and accompanying text.
  36.  See infra note 240.
  37.  See infra Section II.C.
  38.  See infra Section II.C.
  39.  See infra Section II.C.
  40.  See infra notes 256–67 and accompanying text.
  41.  See infra Section II.D.
  42.  See infra Section III.A.
  43.  See infra Section III.B.
  44.  See infra Section III.C.

Abolish Conspiracy

Criminal conspiracy seems as American as apple pie. Every state criminalizes conspiracy, and there are dozens of federal conspiracy statutes. The crime of conspiracy is the darling of prosecutors across the political spectrum. It has been wielded against poor Black teens and White TV moguls; anti-carceral and anti-abortion activists; rap stars and a President. Conspiracy’s hold on U.S. criminal systems is firm.

I seek to break that hold. I contend that the crime of conspiracy promotes surveillance of, and violence against, poor people of color. It is a menace to freedom of expression, the rights of criminal defendants, and the rule of law. Its purported benefits remain unsubstantiated; its costs have been understated when they have not been outright ignored. And it can’t be reformed. It should be abolished.

This story begins in the Star Chamber and culminates in present-day Georgia and Chicago. It is the story of nineteenth-century labor strikes and twenty-first-century drill rap; Emma Goldman, Angela Davis, Young Thug, and Lil Durk; the Smith Act and the RICO Act; the Conspiracy Eight and Cop City. I uncover and build upon a tradition of conspiracy criticism which grew out of left social movements. Finding that these movement critiques of conspiracy have not only been vindicated but exceeded by experience, I re-up, update, and double down.

Introduction

We all have a job to combat the conspiracy
– Gang Starr, “Conspiracy” (1992)

Conspiracy is all around us. Every state makes it a crime to agree to and act in furtherance of plans to accomplish unlawful goals, and there are dozens of federal conspiracy statutes. The crime of conspiracy is the darling of prosecutors across the political spectrum. It has been wielded against poor Black teens and White TV moguls; anti-carceral and anti-abortion activists; rap stars and the President of the United States. Conspiracy’s hold on U.S. criminal systems is so firm that it is difficult to imagine them without it.

This Article seeks to break that hold. The criminalization of conspiracy promotes surveillance of and violence against poor people of color. It is a menace to free speech, the right of a criminal defendant to confront adverse witnesses, and the rule of law. The benefits of conspiracy criminalization have been persistently exaggerated; the costs have been consistently understated. And we lack grounds for confidence that conspiracy can be made to do more good than harm. Accordingly, the crime of conspiracy should be abolished.

My call for conspiracy abolition is radical but not unprecedented. I uncover and build upon conspiracy criticism that grew out of social movements in the late nineteenth century. Finding that this criticism has not merely been vindicated but exceeded by experience, I re-up, update, and double down.

I begin by spotlighting three Georgia conspiracy prosecutions which drew national attention and critical commentary in recent years. The first is the prosecution of rapper Jeffery Williams (known as “Young Thug”) and twenty-seven other people associated with an Atlanta-based hip-hop label, Young Stoner Life Records, for their alleged participation in a violent street gang. The second is the prosecution of Donald Trump and eighteen other people for collaborating to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election. Finally, I discuss the prosecution of sixty-one activists for organizing to prevent the construction of a police training facility that they have termed “Cop City.” I use these prosecutions to introduce longstanding popular anxieties about conspiracy.

Part II provides a genealogy of conspiracy criminalization and criticism. I trace conspiracy’s Anglo-American roots and then detail how conspiracy became notorious for its late nineteenth-century use against the labor movement. Labor organizers and movement lawyers denounced conspiracy as a weapon of class warfare, an instrument of censorship, and a betrayal of the rule of law. In the mid-twentieth century, left antiwar and racial-justice activists identified conspiracy as a means of suppressing transformative social change and enforcing White supremacy.1.I capitalize “Black” when referring to African American identification and members of other African diaspora culture and “White” when referring to non-Black individuals of European ancestry. I agree with Etienne Toussaint that “[w]hile race as a tool for human categorization is a social construction that too often essentializes and oversimplifies, racial categorizations are employed with tangible effect in the United States to exploit, suppress, and dehumanize subordinated populations.” Etienne C. Toussaint, Tragedies of the Cultural Commons, 110 Calif. L. Rev. 1777, 1779 n.4 (2022).Show More Conspiracy skepticism became mainstream within legal scholarship, and several Supreme Court Justices expressed it.

Part III describes how conspiracy was entrenched. Despite some occasional misgivings about particular statutes—most notably, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act2.See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968.Show More—the Supreme Court eventually made its peace with conspiracy criminalization. It even adapted constitutional doctrine to accommodate conspiracy’s expansion. Law professors and judges used tools from law and economics to elaborate consequentialist arguments for conspiracy. They claimed that conspiracy deterred the formation and hastened the fragmentation of criminal groups that posed distinctive dangers.

Part IV critiques normative conspiracy theory. I catalogue conspiracy’s underappreciated social costs. These costs arise from surveillance, infiltration, violence, and censorship, all of which have a disparate impact on poor people of color. That disparate impact threatens to estrange people from and delegitimize civil-social institutions that are perceived as excluding them. I go on to question the claimed benefits of conspiracy, finding that these claims rest upon unsubstantiated and dubious empirical premises.

Part V considers objections to abolition. Reforms that are aimed at particularly injurious features of conspiracy might be better than nothing. But we should have no illusions that conspiracy can be made a social positive.

  1.  I capitalize “Black” when referring to African American identification and members of other African diaspora culture and “White” when referring to non-Black individuals of European ancestry. I agree with Etienne Toussaint that “[w]hile race as a tool for human categorization is a social construction that too often essentializes and oversimplifies, racial categorizations are employed with tangible effect in the United States to exploit, suppress, and dehumanize subordinated populations.” Etienne C. Toussaint, Tragedies of the Cultural Commons, 110 Calif. L. Rev. 1777, 1779 n.4 (2022).
  2.  See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968.

Tradition and Feminism in Constitutional Rights Adjudication

In recent years, “tradition” has been influentially invoked in constitutional rights adjudication and legal scholarship. The Supreme Court, in contexts ranging from abortion to the Second Amendment to freedom of speech, has looked to tradition to illuminate the contours of constitutional rights and the boundaries of permissible government regulation. Some legal theorists have defended “traditionalism” as a way to tether constitutional rulings to the people’s customs instead of judges’ moral views.

From a feminist perspective, the rise of tradition may be cause for concern, if not alarm. Why integrate into constitutional rights adjudication the practices and understandings of eras in which women were subject to severe political, economic, and social subordination? Yet the relationship between feminism and traditionalism depends on the form that traditionalism takes: what it is, how it is justified, and how it responds to moral critique.

This Article unpacks the idea of tradition, and it investigates the interaction between tradition and women’s rights in constitutional law. I argue that a concern for tradition, properly understood, contains resources to guide an approach toward constitutional adjudication that can be conducive to, rather than hostile to, women’s rights. For example, traditionalists often seek to glean insight from concrete experience rather than relying on abstract principles; they should therefore examine a range of experiences, including those of women. And the traditionalist interest in continuity supports acceptance of the last century’s advancements in women’s rights rather than attempts to “roll back the clock.”

Thus, values integral to traditionalism can support positions favorable to women’s rights. I apply this view of tradition to several constitutional questions, including the right to contraception, the permissibility of public single-sex education, pregnancy discrimination, and the scope of the Equal Protection Clause. I also engage in broader reflection about the determinacy of traditionalist analysis and the relationship between traditionalist reasoning and moral evaluation.

Introduction

“Tradition” has become a notable category in constitutional rights adjudication and scholarship. The Supreme Court stated in the abortion case Dobbs that “an unbroken tradition of prohibiting abortion on pain of criminal punishment persisted from the earliest days of the common law until 1973,”1.Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2253–54 (2022).Show More and in the Second Amendment case Bruen that to regulate firearms, “the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition.”2.N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2126 (2022). For other recent Supreme Court invocations of tradition, see, e.g., Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct. 2407, 2431 (2022) (Establishment Clause); Vidal v. Elster, 144 S. Ct. 1507, 1518–19 (2024) (speech).Show More Beyond the pages of the U.S. Reports, some legal scholars have defended “traditions”—understood, in one proponent’s words, in terms of “political and cultural practices of substantial duration”3.Marc O. DeGirolami, The Traditions of American Constitutional Law, 95 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1123,1125 (2020).Show More—as valuable sources of constitutional insight.4.See, e.g., Marc O. DeGirolami, Traditionalism Rising, 24 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 9, 54–56 (2023); Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 Utah L. Rev. 665,681–90; see also Sherif Girgis, Living Traditionalism, 98 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1477, 1554–55 (2023) (referring to “living traditionalism” as “ineliminable, spreading, and increasingly deliberate,” though also voicing concerns with the methodology).Show More

From a feminist perspective, the rise of tradition may be cause for concern, if not alarm. Why turn to tradition in constitutional rights adjudication, especially in cases implicating women’s rights issues, when many relevant traditions emerged from periods in which women faced severe political, economic, and social subordination? Tradition may seem starkly at odds with regard for women’s equal citizenship stature.

Yet the relationship between tradition and women’s status depends on the nature of tradition—what tradition involves, how tradition affects constitutional rights claims, and how moral critiques of tradition are addressed. This Article interrogates the idea of tradition, and it examines the relationship between tradition and women’s rights in constitutional adjudication.

I argue that a concern for tradition, properly understood, contains resources to guide an approach toward constitutional adjudication that can be conducive to, rather than hostile to, women’s rights. Here are a couple of illustrations. Traditions often embody insights gleaned from concrete experience. Instead of reasoning about topics like contraception and sexual harassment in the abstract, therefore, one should seek to understand the experiences of women whose voices may not be fully captured by dominant narratives. Moreover, traditionalists value continuity rather than avulsive change. This favors acceptance of the last century’s advancements in women’s rights rather than attempts to “roll back the clock.” Accordingly, one should reject readings of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause that would, in excluding sex discrimination, destabilize decades of prior interpretations. There are doubtless tensions between feminism and certain forms of traditionalist reasoning. But tradition also has egalitarian potential, which this Article seeks to unlock.

To capture the approach to tradition advocated here, I use the term “dialectical traditionalism.” At a high level, this view underscores the possibility of productive dialogue between past and present, with the prospect of transforming the past without eliminating its instructive power. Traditions can, indeed must, change over time to ensure continuity in different circumstances. But they can change in ways that preserve a link to the past and reflect openness to the insight to be derived from longstanding practices.

How? Dialectical traditionalists, in addition to drawing on a diverse range of traditions and emphasizing legal continuity (as just proposed), can pursue several other avenues. One is to recognize that practices with troubling roots can evolve over time. For instance, single-sex education may not today reflect detrimental assessments of women in the way it did historically, and this militates against a ruling that the practice is unconstitutional. A second avenue is to critique certain strands of tradition in light of other customs or collective values—by contending, say, that sex stereotyping in the workplace runs contrary to American meritocratic ideals. A third is to identify resources within traditional views for advancement of women’s rights. For instance, the traditional association between pregnancy and gender could undermine the Supreme Court’s ruling (in Geduldig v. Aiello)5.417 U.S. 484, 494–97 (1974).Show More that sex-based discrimination does not necessarily encompass pregnancy discrimination. A fourth is to reason in a traditionalist fashion even while breaking with the past. For example, the Supreme Court’s Virginia Military Institute (“VMI”) decision, which held that VMI could not exclude women,6.United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 558 (1996).Show More included approving descriptions of VMI’s traditional “adversative method.”7.Id. at 520.Show More Overall, dialectical traditionalism takes longstanding practices seriously while recognizing that their perpetuation in the current day requires reflection and sometimes critique.

The motivations for undertaking this project are twofold. One aim is to encourage the development of traditionalism in a direction conducive to claims involving women’s rights. Tradition is currently a salient form of argument in constitutional rights adjudication, employed by Justices with a range of jurisprudential and ideological views and increasingly discussed in legal scholarship.8.See, e.g., City of Austin v. Reagan Nat’l Advert. of Austin, LLC, 142 S. Ct. 1464, 1475 (2022) (Sotomayor, J.) (placing weight on “unbroken tradition” of regulating “on-premises” signs differently from “off-premises” signs in a First Amendment case); Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146, 149 (2019) (Ginsburg, J.) (explaining that Eighth Amendment protection against excessive fines has “deep roots in our history and tradition” (alterations omitted) (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010))); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (inquiring into whether the asserted right to physician-assisted suicide “has any place in our Nation’s traditions”); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining that the First Amendment right of access to trial proceedings “has special force when drawn from an enduring and vital tradition”); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 431 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (critiquing the Court for an approach “contrary to the history and traditions of the privilege against self-incrimination both in this country and in England”). For an overview of recent scholarship on tradition, see infra notes 12–14 and accompanying text.Show More From a feminist perspective, it is worth drawing attention to lines of traditionalist reasoning that can provide support for women’s rights. It may be argued that judicial or scholarly invocations of tradition are unlikely to change. One might, for instance, view current Justices’ references to tradition simply as vehicles for promoting certain ideologies. In that case, however, alternative traditionalist perspectives can serve as the basis for critique of existing applications of traditionalist methodology—demonstrating that those applications are not necessary positions for those concerned about tradition to take.

A second motivation emerges from the conviction that a concern for tradition in constitutional rights adjudication is independently valuable. Decision-makers in numerous social and political settings place weight on prior practice and custom. This is true of judicial decision-making as well, and for good reasons. Among these reasons: The values of reliance and settled expectations, familiar from defenses of stare decisis,9.See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571,597–98 (1987).Show More are both integral to traditionalism and significant to the judicial task. Traditionalism’s emphasis on concrete experience permits judges to learn from real-world applications of rights rather than opining in the abstract.10 10.SeeinfraSection III.A.Show More Adhering to tradition helps to constitute and maintain a national polity.11 11.Seeinfra Section III.D.Show More Accordingly, appeals to tradition are difficult to reject outright. But women’s rights are also significant, and analysis of tradition in constitutional rights adjudication ought to grapple with the challenge posed by sexist traditions.

This Article thus takes a deep dive into tradition and its interaction with feminism, highlighting several dimensions of this interaction: tradition’s value; the weighty difficulties with traditionalism posed by a concern with women’s rights; and the possibility of marshaling tradition’s resources in a feminist direction. In bringing together these inquiries—especially in light of very recent Supreme Court decisions—the Article breaks new ground. At the same time, it builds on three main strands of scholarship on tradition.

First, some scholars including Marc DeGirolami and Michael McConnell have advocated for traditionalism as a method of constitutional interpretation that, in DeGirolami’s words, “signals the presumptive influence of political and cultural practices of substantial duration for informing constitutional meaning.”12 12.DeGirolami, supra note 3, at 1125; McConnell, supra note 4, at 681. For other contributions favorable to tradition, see, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 Yale L.J. 1029, 1047–55 (1990); Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 619,697–715 (1994); see also id. at 703 (emphasizing resources for change from within tradition). Much of the literature on traditionalism in the past few years emanates from those concerned with the relationship between originalism and tradition. See, e.g.,Randy E. Barnett & Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism after Dobbs, Bruen, and Kennedy: The Role of History and Tradition, 118 Nw. U. L. Rev. 433 (2023); Jud Campbell, Tradition, Originalism, and General Fundamental Law, 47 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 635 (2024); Girgis, supra note 4, at 1487–96.Show More Second, some scholars such as Reva Siegel, Melissa Murray, and Cary Franklin have critiqued the current Supreme Court’s emphasis on tradition in constitutional rights adjudication from an equality perspective, contending that the Court is elevating traditions that disadvantage women (among others).13 13.See, e.g., Cary Franklin, History and Tradition’s Equality Problem, 133 Yale L.J.F. 946, 950–51 (2024);Serena Mayeri, The Critical Role of History after Dobbs, 2 J. Am. Const. Hist. 171, 190 (2024); Joy Milligan & Bertrall L. Ross II, We (Who Are Not) the People: Interpreting the Undemocratic Constitution, 102 Tex. L. Rev. 305, 339–55 (2023);Melissa Murray, Children of Men: The Roberts Court’s Jurisprudence of Masculinity, 60 Hou. L. Rev. 799 (2023);Melissa Murray & Katherine Shaw, Dobbs andDemocracy,137 Harv. L. Rev. 728, 772–74 (2024); Reva B. Siegel, How “History and Tradition” Perpetuates Inequality: Dobbs on Abortion’s Nineteenth-Century Criminalization, 60 Hou. L. Rev. 901, 932–33 (2023).Show More Third, some scholars—notably Jack Balkin, Katharine Bartlett, Felipe Jiménez, and Dov Fox and Mary Ziegler—have argued in favor of more flexible or “evolving” forms of traditionalism.14 14.Jiménez distinguishes between “conservative” and “flexible” traditionalism and draws attention to “legal traditions” that characterize the practice of judicial decision-making. Felipe Jiménez, Tradition in Constitutional Adjudication, 36 Yale J.L. & Humans. 1, 23–30, 44–45 (2025). Fox and Ziegler propose an “[e]volving traditionalism” that “anchors itself in the most recent among those lasting social practices that go back at least decades.” Dov Fox & Mary Ziegler, The Lost History of “History and Tradition,” 98 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 47 (2024). Although I share these authors’ interest in appeals to tradition that accommodate criticism of past practices, I do not adopt their particular versions of traditionalism, and I focus on the relationship between traditionalism and women’s rights jurisprudence. Jack Balkin has underscored the heterogeneity and complexity of traditions and has urged an “expansion of constitutional memory” to include those not involved in the formal process of constitutional ratification. Jack M. Balkin, Memory and Authority: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation 204, 219 (2024). While I draw on various aspects of Balkin’s work—and I share his use of the term “dialectical” to describe tradition, see infra note 135—I devote more specific attention to traditionalism as a method of constitutional interpretation. Further, unlike Balkin, I do not advocate on behalf of any kind of originalism, and I concentrate on feminist challenges to traditionalism. Bartlett, for her part, presents an “integrative view” of tradition that seeks an alternative to either relying wholly on the past or ignoring it. Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition as Past and Present in Substantive Due Process Analysis, 62 Duke L.J. 535, 572 (2012) [hereinafter Bartlett, Tradition in Substantive Due Process]; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition, Change, and the Idea of Progress in Feminist Legal Thought, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 303, 304 [hereinafter Bartlett, Idea of Progress] (arguing that feminists should not adopt an “oppositional stance” toward tradition). Though I share much of Bartlett’s general orientation, my account focuses on the implications of traditionalism’s underlying rationales and analyzes tradition in light of the recent swell of jurisprudence on “history and tradition” in constitutional law.Show More This Article draws on insights from all of these scholars while carrying out its distinctive examination of tradition and its relationship to women’s rights claims.15 15.Although this Article focuses on constitutional rights rather than structure, tradition and related concepts have also been employed in separation-of-powers disputes, seeCurtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411 (2012), and in federal courts law, see Ernest A. Young, Our Prescriptive Judicial Power: Constitutive and Entrenchment Effects of Historical Practice in Federal Courts Law, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 535 (2016). For discussion of the distinction between practice-based arguments in the structural and individual rights contexts, see Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 Duke L.J. 1407,1413–14 (2017).Show More

Part I lays the groundwork by examining the role played by tradition in case law on constitutional rights. This Part provides a sense of the possible legal functions that tradition could perform. It also clarifies the relationship between traditionalism and originalism, and it addresses the question whether the sources of tradition are legal or cultural.

Part II tackles the conundrums of defining “tradition” and “traditionalism.” I characterize traditions as networks of enduring practices and understandings. I conceptualize traditionalism as an approach to constitutional adjudication that values fidelity to the forms of social organization that traditions help to constitute. Part II emphasizes that traditionalists need not adopt an uncritical posture or one dedicated to copying the past; instead, vigorous traditions include elements of contestation and adaptability over time. Such an approach to tradition can be captured by the label “dialectical traditionalism.” I respond to the objection that my view is not real traditionalism, at least not in the way that defenders of traditionalism would ordinarily use that term.

Part III addresses the relationship between traditionalism and feminism from a theoretical perspective. It both highlights traditionalism’s vulnerability to feminist critique and identifies resources that traditionalism has to offer those concerned about women’s rights. In particular, Part III demonstrates that four leading justifications for traditionalism—rooted in concrete experience, reliance, democracy, and national identity—can support versions of traditionalism that favor women’s rights.

Part IV draws out implications of the proposed view of tradition for constitutional rights adjudication. It recommends, for example, drawing on a range of traditions, including traditions of women’s resistance to sexist legal arrangements and traditions reflecting women’s experiences more generally. I further advocate for openness to the possibility that traditions can change, as well as efforts to shape the contents of tradition by arguing that certain practices—including those embodying injustice toward women—are out of step with more enduring strands.16 16.Indeed, problematic strands of tradition can help to illuminate the nature of constitutional violations in the current day. For example, the Supreme Court in the 1973 case Frontiero v. Richardson held unconstitutional statutes requiring a servicewoman, but not a serviceman, to prove that her spouse was actually dependent on her income to claim him as a dependent for benefits purposes. 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (plurality opinion). The plurality reviewed the history of sex discrimination in the United States and critiqued “gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes.” Id. at 685. Traditional understandings of women’s roles embraced in the past helped the Justices to identify a constitutional violation in the modern day. This method shares features in common with what other scholars have called “negative precedent”—using historical understandings to cast doubt on the legitimacy of current practices. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The Politics of Constitutional Memory, 20 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 19, 54 (2022) [hereinafter Siegel, Constitutional Memory]; Mayeri, supra note 13, at 189–90; infra Subsection IV.B.4.Show More Moreover, it can be beneficial for judges to reason in a traditionalist manner even when they are ruling in accordance with new social understandings.17 17.I argue for a presumption that judges should reason in a traditionalist manner even when breaking with tradition; this presumption could be overcome if the customary practices being rejected are sufficiently repugnant from a normative point of view. See infra Section IV.C.Show More The VMI case mentioned earlier provides an example, as does Griswold v. Connecticut, where the Court upheld a right that many would consider novel while stressing the lengthy pedigree of concern for marital privacy.18 18.381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).Show More Expressing respect for tradition can be valuable normatively but also pragmatically; it may help to legitimate the ruling even to those skeptical of societal changes.

Part V addresses broader issues surrounding the role of tradition in constitutional jurisprudence. It tackles, for instance, the objection that dialectical traditionalism is indeterminate or merely a vehicle for judges’ moral predilections. This Article aims primarily to examine the relationship between tradition and feminism, rather than to offer a full-blown constitutional theory. Nevertheless, the observations in Part V pave the way for future consideration of the function that tradition can serve in constitutional rights jurisprudence as a whole.

A couple of clarifications regarding the scope and presuppositions of the Article are in order. The Article presupposes the moral correctness of feminism in the sense that women ought to have equal civil rights to men and an equal opportunity to participate in the political and economic life of the nation. This conception is meant to be relatively general and to leave room for varying social and moral views.19 19.Of course, there are numerous varieties of feminism. For an overview, see Nancy Levit & Robert R.M. Verchick, Feminist Legal Theory: A Primer 11–40 (2d ed. 2016). Although various strains of feminist theory may interact in complex ways with the ideas in this Article, the goal here is to pose the feminist challenge to traditionalism at a relatively high level of generality that can be endorsed by those with different views on the precise content of feminism.Show More

In addition, some of the arguments about tradition and women’s rights considered here would apply not only to cases involving women, but also to cases involving other forms of inequality, such as racial discrimination and discrimination against LGBT individuals.20 20.See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Sodomy and Guns: Tradition as Democratic Deliberation and Constitutional Interpretation, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 193, 202 (2009) (arguing that tradition “on matters of sexuality as well as race has been evolutive and not static”); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Tradition as Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex Marriage, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 281, 296–97, 330–33 (2011) (urging skepticism about tradition as a justification for restricting marriage to the opposite-sex setting, and discussing interracial marriage as well).Show More Moreover, adjudicators’ understandings of certain traditions and their deficiencies can benefit from considering more than one axis of critique at the same time.21 21.For critiques of the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence along axes of both race and gender, for example, see Khiara M. Bridges, Foreword: Race in the Roberts Court, 136 Harv. L. Rev. 23, 42–53 (2022); Michele Goodwin, Involuntary Reproductive Servitude: Forced Pregnancy, Abortion, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 2022 U. Chi. Legal F. 191, 202–08.Show More Although I refer to other forms of discrimination at certain junctures,22 22.See infra, e.g., notes 221–23, 278, 285–87 and accompanying text.Show More the Article does not have space to develop application of its analysis to additional forms of inequality. It is to be hoped, however, that the Article’s analysis could be useful to future such projects.23 23.Another clarification: The Article concentrates on the role of tradition in constitutional “adjudication,” understood as the activity in which judges are engaged when deciding constitutional cases. That activity is meant to encompass “interpretation” in the sense of an effort to ascertain the contents of the law. For many observers, there is not much left for judges to do once they have engaged in interpretation; for such observers, “judges deciding constitutional cases must enforce the constitutional law.” Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, Pluralistic Nonoriginalism and the Combinability Problem, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1739, 1740 (2013). As Berman and Toh point out, however, the “issue of what judges should do in constitutional disputes” is conceptually “distinct from the legal issue of what the constitutional law is or consists of.” Id. at 1745; see also Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1753, 1767 (1994) (distinguishing between the scholarly task of “constitutional interpretation” and “actual constitutional decisionmaking”). And one might adopt the opinion that judges have a different task in adjudication than they do in interpretation. For instance, if interpretation yields several viable candidates for the law’s contents, the judge qua adjudicator might have leeway “to resolve a dispute by determining, amid the clamour of rival claims, what is just.” Garrett Barden & Tim Murphy, Law and Justice in Community 132 (2010). I do not take a position on what (if anything) is involved in adjudication beyond determination of the contents of the law. Instead, I highlight rationales for drawing on tradition at any juncture in the constitutional decision-making process. I then argue that, to the extent one is persuaded by these justifications, one ought to take a more receptive approach toward women’s rights claims than is commonly presumed.Show More

The notion that feminism is anything but flatly contrary to traditionalism may seem counterintuitive. This Article identifies and explores the tensions. But it also seeks to uncover facets of tradition that are consonant with the advancement of women’s rights.

  1.  Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2253–54 (2022).
  2.  N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2126 (2022). For other recent Supreme Court invocations of tradition, see, e.g., Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct. 2407, 2431 (2022) (Establishment Clause); Vidal v. Elster, 144 S. Ct. 1507, 1518–19 (2024) (speech).
  3.  Marc O. DeGirolami, The Traditions of American Constitutional Law, 95 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1123, 1125 (2020).
  4.  See, e.g., Marc O. DeGirolami, Traditionalism Rising, 24
    J.

    Contemp. Legal Issues 9, 54–56 (2023); Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 Utah L. Rev. 665, 681–90; see also Sherif Girgis, Living Traditionalism, 98 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1477, 1554–55 (2023) (referring to “living traditionalism” as “ineliminable, spreading, and increasingly deliberate,” though also voicing concerns with the methodology).

  5.  417 U.S. 484, 494–97 (1974).
  6.  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 558 (1996).
  7.  Id. at 520.
  8.  See, e.g., City of Austin v. Reagan Nat’l Advert. of Austin, LLC, 142 S. Ct. 1464, 1475 (2022) (Sotomayor, J.) (placing weight on “unbroken tradition” of regulating “on-premises” signs differently from “off-premises” signs in a First Amendment case); Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146, 149 (2019) (Ginsburg, J.) (explaining that Eighth Amendment protection against excessive fines has “deep roots in our history and tradition” (alterations omitted) (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010))); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (inquiring into whether the asserted right to physician-assisted suicide “has any place in our Nation’s traditions”); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining that the First Amendment right of access to trial proceedings “has special force when drawn from an enduring and vital tradition”); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 431 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (critiquing the Court for an approach “contrary to the history and traditions of the privilege against self-incrimination both in this country and in England”). For an overview of recent scholarship on tradition, see infra notes 12–14 and accompanying text.
  9.  See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 597–98 (1987).
  10.  See infra Section III.A.
  11.  See infra Section III.D.
  12.  DeGirolami, supra note 3, at 1125; McConnell, supra note 4, at 681. For other contributions favorable to tradition, see, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 Yale L.J. 1029, 1047–55 (1990); Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation,
    72

    N.C. L. Rev. 619, 697–715 (1994); see also id. at 703 (emphasizing resources for change from within tradition). Much of the literature on traditionalism in the past few years emanates from those concerned with the relationship between originalism and tradition. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism after Dobbs, Bruen, and Kennedy: The Role of History and Tradition, 118 Nw. U. L. Rev

    .

    433 (2023); Jud Campbell, Tradition, Originalism, and General Fundamental Law, 47 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 635 (2024); Girgis, supra note 4, at 1487–96.

  13.  See, e.g., Cary Franklin, History and Tradition’s Equality Problem, 133 Yale L.J.F
    .

    946, 950–51 (2024); Serena Mayeri, The Critical Role of History after Dobbs, 2 J. Am. Const. Hist. 171, 190 (2024); Joy Milligan & Bertrall L. Ross II, We (Who Are Not) the People: Interpreting the Undemocratic Constitution, 102 Tex. L. Rev

    .

    305, 339–55 (2023); Melissa Murray, Children of Men: The Roberts Court’s Jurisprudence of Masculinity, 60 Hou. L. Rev

    .

    799 (2023); Melissa Murray & Katherine Shaw, Dobbs and Democracy, 137 Harv. L. Rev. 728, 772–74 (2024); Reva B. Siegel, How “History and Tradition” Perpetuates Inequality: Dobbs on Abortion’s Nineteenth-Century Criminalization, 60 Hou. L. Rev. 901, 932–33 (2023).

  14.  Jiménez distinguishes between “conservative” and “flexible” traditionalism and draws attention to “legal traditions” that characterize the practice of judicial decision-making. Felipe Jiménez, Tradition in Constitutional Adjudication, 36 Yale J.L. & Humans. 1, 23–30, 44–45 (2025). Fox and Ziegler propose an “[e]volving traditionalism” that “anchors itself in the most recent among those lasting social practices that go back at least decades.” Dov Fox & Mary Ziegler, The Lost History of “History and Tradition,” 98 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 47 (2024). Although I share these authors’ interest in appeals to tradition that accommodate criticism of past practices, I do not adopt their particular versions of traditionalism, and I focus on the relationship between traditionalism and women’s rights jurisprudence. Jack Balkin has underscored the heterogeneity and complexity of traditions and has urged an “expansion of constitutional memory” to include those not involved in the formal process of constitutional ratification. Jack M. Balkin, Memory and Authority: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation 204, 219 (2024). While I draw on various aspects of Balkin’s work—and I share his use of the term “dialectical” to describe tradition, see infra note 135—I devote more specific attention to traditionalism as a method of constitutional interpretation. Further, unlike Balkin, I do not advocate on behalf of any kind of originalism, and I concentrate on feminist challenges to traditionalism. Bartlett, for her part, presents an “integrative view” of tradition that seeks an alternative to either relying wholly on the past or ignoring it. Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition as Past and Present in Substantive Due Process Analysis, 62 Duke L.J. 535, 572 (2012) [hereinafter Bartlett, Tradition in Substantive Due Process]; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition, Change, and the Idea of Progress in Feminist Legal Thought, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 303, 304 [hereinafter Bartlett, Idea of Progress] (arguing that feminists should not adopt an “oppositional stance” toward tradition). Though I share much of Bartlett’s general orientation, my account focuses on the implications of traditionalism’s underlying rationales and analyzes tradition in light of the recent swell of jurisprudence on “history and tradition” in constitutional law.
  15.  Although this Article focuses on constitutional rights rather than structure, tradition and related concepts have also been employed in separation-of-powers disputes, see Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev
    .

    411 (2012), and in federal courts law, see Ernest A. Young, Our Prescriptive Judicial Power: Constitutive and Entrenchment Effects of Historical Practice in Federal Courts Law, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 535 (2016). For discussion of the distinction between practice-based arguments in the structural and individual rights contexts, see Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 Duke L.J. 1407, 1413–14 (2017).

  16.  Indeed, problematic strands of tradition can help to illuminate the nature of constitutional violations in the current day. For example, the Supreme Court in the 1973 case Frontiero v. Richardson held unconstitutional statutes requiring a servicewoman, but not a serviceman, to prove that her spouse was actually dependent on her income to claim him as a dependent for benefits purposes. 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (plurality opinion). The plurality reviewed the history of sex discrimination in the United States and critiqued “gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes.” Id. at 685. Traditional understandings of women’s roles embraced in the past helped the Justices to identify a constitutional violation in the modern day. This method shares features in common with what other scholars have called “negative precedent”—using historical understandings to cast doubt on the legitimacy of current practices. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The Politics of Constitutional Memory, 20 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 19, 54 (2022) [hereinafter Siegel, Constitutional Memory]; Mayeri, supra note 13, at 189–90; infra Subsection IV.B.4.
  17.  I argue for a presumption that judges should reason in a traditionalist manner even when breaking with tradition; this presumption could be overcome if the customary practices being rejected are sufficiently repugnant from a normative point of view. See infra Section IV.C.
  18.  381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
  19.  Of course, there are numerous varieties of feminism. For an overview, see Nancy Levit & Robert R.M. Verchick, Feminist Legal Theory: A Primer 11–40 (2d ed. 2016). Although various strains of feminist theory may interact in complex ways with the ideas in this Article, the goal here is to pose the feminist challenge to traditionalism at a relatively high level of generality that can be endorsed by those with different views on the precise content of feminism.
  20.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Sodomy and Guns: Tradition as Democratic Deliberation and Constitutional Interpretation, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 193, 202 (2009) (arguing that tradition “on matters of sexuality as well as race has been evolutive and not static”); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Tradition as Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex Marriage, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 281, 296–97, 330–33 (2011) (urging skepticism about tradition as a justification for restricting marriage to the opposite-sex setting, and discussing interracial marriage as well).
  21.  For critiques of the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence along axes of both race and gender, for example, see Khiara M. Bridges, Foreword: Race in the Roberts Court, 136 Harv. L. Rev. 23, 42–53 (2022); Michele Goodwin, Involuntary Reproductive Servitude: Forced Pregnancy, Abortion, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 2022 U. Chi. Legal F. 191, 202–08.
  22.  See infra, e.g., notes 221–23, 278, 285–87 and accompanying text.
  23.  Another clarification: The Article concentrates on the role of tradition in constitutional “adjudication,” understood as the activity in which judges are engaged when deciding constitutional cases. That activity is meant to encompass “interpretation” in the sense of an effort to ascertain the contents of the law. For many observers, there is not much left for judges to do once they have engaged in interpretation; for such observers, “judges deciding constitutional cases must enforce the constitutional law.” Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, Pluralistic Nonoriginalism and the Combinability Problem, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1739, 1740 (2013). As Berman and Toh point out, however, the “issue of what judges should do in constitutional disputes” is conceptually “distinct from the legal issue of what the constitutional law is or consists of.” Id. at 1745; see also Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1753, 1767 (1994) (distinguishing between the scholarly task of “constitutional interpretation” and “actual constitutional decisionmaking”). And one might adopt the opinion that judges have a different task in adjudication than they do in interpretation. For instance, if interpretation yields several viable candidates for the law’s contents, the judge qua adjudicator might have leeway “to resolve a dispute by determining, amid the clamour of rival claims, what is just.” Garrett Barden & Tim Murphy, Law and Justice in Community 132 (2010). I do not take a position on what (if anything) is involved in adjudication beyond determination of the contents of the law. Instead, I highlight rationales for drawing on tradition at any juncture in the constitutional decision-making process. I then argue that, to the extent one is persuaded by these justifications, one ought to take a more receptive approach toward women’s rights claims than is commonly presumed.