The New Education Malpractice Litigation

In recent years, a growing body of evidence has confirmed what personal experience and intuition have long suggested: the quality of a child’s teacher has a profound and lasting impact on the child’s academic achievement. According to one expert, replacing just the least effective five percent of America’s teaching force with average teachers could catapult our nation’s K-12 education system from its current place among the worst performing in the developed world to among the top. Yet for complex reasons related to school culture, administrative inertia, and the time and cost associated with dismissing a teacher for poor performance, schools across the country continue to subject students to chronically ineffective teachers in considerable numbers. 

In this Article we revive the argument, first raised in courts in the 1970s and 80s, that children assigned to ineffective teachers should be able to sue school districts under elementary principles of tort law, seeking relief in the form of reassignment to an adequate teacher and remedial education services. Courts initially rejected this “educational malpractice” theory of litigation due to the plaintiffs’ inability to establish basic elements of the negligence tort, pointing in particular to the lack of a workable standard of reasonable care (since little consensus existed regarding appropriate pedagogical methods) and problems showing proximate cause (since the effects of teacher quality on student learning were so difficult to prove). 

The common law of torts, however, is designed to be judicially responsive to changing times and public policy considerations. And times have certainly changed: School officials today operate with access to unprecedented amounts of data concerning teacher effectiveness and teacher impacts on student learning that was wholly absent decades ago. These modern advances demand re-examination of the old reasons that courts provided for rejecting educational malpractice claims. To date, however, the academy has failed to undertake any such analysis.

This Article seeks to fill that gap. We argue that the recent advances in educational data substantially undermine the basic rationales offered by courts for dismissing the original educational malpractice lawsuits. In particular, unlike the initial era of educational negligence claims that proceeded principally under the theory that a school district should be liable for the negligent teaching practices of its teachers, we argue that a plaintiff student may state a claim against a school district for its negligence one step earlier: in its decision to assign the student to a classroom taught by a teacher whom school officials know to be chronically ineffective based on extensive statistical data concerning the teacher’s performance. For instance, schools now know with some degree of certainty, over a period of years, whether a particular teacher typically improves her students’ academic ability by more or less than a full grade level’s worth of gains. The worst teachers, it turns out, tend to produce paltry gains year-after-year. This data offers both an eminently workable standard of care for determining whether a school has been negligent in subjecting students to an incompetent teacher (indeed, some states such as New York require schools to classify teachers as “ineffective” on the basis of the student learning data), and also an evidentiary link establishing that the teacher is a proximate cause of the child’s lack of attainment. 

In addition to setting the groundwork for this new educational malpractice claim, the Article also explores potential policy responses on the part of school districts who may seek to head off costly litigation brought by plaintiff students who have been assigned to inadequate teachers. We suggest that some schools may respond proactively in precisely the fashion that the plaintiffs and school reformers have long desired, by voluntarily dismissing and replacing their least effective teachers. Others may attempt to evade liability without acting to remove ineffective teachers, for example by foreclosing public access to teacher effectiveness data or reducing their own reliance on such data in the first moment. In all events, however, we think this much is for certain: a new era of educational malpractice litigation may well be on the horizon.

Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice

It is by now well known that federal prosecutors hold the reins of power in individual federal criminal cases. They have almost unlim-ited and unreviewable power to select the charges that will be brought against defendants. Prosecutors have also been a driving force in the political arena for mandatory minimum sentences and new federal criminal laws.

But prosecutorial power over federal criminal justice policy goes deeper still. Because of the structure of the Department of Justice, prosecutors are involved in other areas of criminal justice policymak-ing. Indeed, we are living in a time of “prosecutorial administration,” with prosecutors at the helm of every major federal criminal justice matter.

This Article describes the current regime of “prosecutorial admin-istration” and explains why its consequences should concern anyone interested in a rational criminal justice regime that is unbiased in any particular direction. It focuses on three areas of criminal justice poli-cy— corrections, clemency, and forensics—and describes how these matters came under the aegis of the Department without much con-cern about the conflicts they would create with the Department’s law enforcement mission. It is a well-established feature of institutional design that agencies with competing mandates will adhere to the dominant one. In the case of the Department of Justice, that dominant mandate is undoubtedly law enforcement and obtaining convictions in particular cases. As a result, whenever conflicts arise (or appear to arise) between this mission and other functions such as corrections, clemency, or forensic science, the law enforcement interests (as per-ceived by the Department’s prosecutors) will dominate.

Thus, if decisions about corrections, forensics, and clemency are be-ing made by prosecutors—and thus through the lens of what would be good for prosecutors and their cases—it is possible that these deci-sions are not accounting for what would be good policy overall, taking into account interests other than law enforcement. Indeed, even if the goal is law enforcement, prosecutors are not well-suited to take into account the long-term goals of law enforcement because they tend to focus on the short-term pressure of dealing with current cases and may develop cognitive biases that make it hard for them to see a broader perspective. 

The Article thus turns to the question of how institutional design could help create a more balanced approach in the areas of correc-tions, forensics, and clemency that is not so tilted to law enforcement concerns. After making the case that institutional change is feasible in at least some areas, the Article tackles the question of what changes could yield positive results in each of these areas and what tradeoffs they entail.

The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts

There is no liability rule for constitutional torts. There are, rather, several different liability rules, ranging from absolute immunity at one extreme to absolute liability at the other. States and state agencies are absolutely immune from damages liability for violations of constitutional rights, no matter how egregious their conduct may be. The same is true for those who perform legislative, judicial, and certain prosecutorial actions. In contrast, local governments are strictly liable for constitutional violations committed pursuant to official policy or custom, even if the right found to have been violated was first recognized after the conduct triggering liability. Most defendants — including federal, state, and local officers — are neither absolutely immune nor strictly liable. Instead, they are protected by qualified immunity, a fault-based standard approximating negligence as to illegality. 

This article attempts a unified theory of constitutional torts. Less grandly, it offers a comprehensive normative guide to the award of damages for violation of constitutional rights. It seeks generally to align the damages remedy on one liability rule, a modified form of qualified immunity, with limited deviations justified on functional grounds and constrained by the reach of those functional justifications. The analysis begins with absolute immunity, then proceeds to absolute liability, and concludes with extended consideration of qualified immunity. The argument calls for curtailment of the first two categories and reform of the third. The overall goals are restoration of money damages as an effective means of enforcing constitutional rights; protection against the downside risks of wholly unconstrained damages liability; and rationalization of the law through simplification of existing doctrine.