Information and the Market for Union Representation

Article — Volume 94, Issue 1

94 Va. L. Rev. 1
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In its oversight of union representation elections, the National Labor Relations Board seeks to create “laboratory conditions” to determine “the uninhibited desires” of employees. Despite its comprehensive regulation of union and employer campaign conduct, the Board fails to insure that employees get basic information relating to their decision. This Article proposes a new paradigm for the representation decision: that of a purchase of representation services. This “purchase of services” model demonstrates that the market for union representation lacks the standard features required under economic theory to drive information into the marketplace. The resulting information deficiencies may render employees poorly equipped to make their representation decision.

  Volume 94 / Issue 1  

Information and the Market for Union Representation

By Matthew T. Bodie
94 Va. L. Rev. 1

Overcoming Procedural Boundaries

By Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher
94 Va. L. Rev. 79

From Langdell to Law and Economics: Two Conceptions of Stare Decisis in Contract Law and Theory

By Jody S. Kraus
94 Va. L. Rev. 157

Finding the Proper Balance: A Look at the Continuing Development of Campus Suicide Policies

By Karin McAnaney
94 Va. L. Rev. 197