This Article analyzes the under-explored phenomenon of unilateral exit from international agreements and intergovernmental organizations. Although clauses authorizing denunciation and withdrawal from treaties are pervasive, international legal scholars and international relations theorists have largely ignored them. This Article draws upon new empirical evidence to provide a comprehensive interdisciplinary framework for understanding treaty exit. It examines when and why states abandon their treaty commitments and explains how exit helps to resolve certain theoretical and doctrinal puzzles that have long troubled scholars of international affairs.
The Federal Courts, the First Congress, and the Non-Settlement of 1789
The extent of Congress’s power to curtail the jurisdiction of the federal courts has produced a long-running debate. Article III traditionalists defend broad congressional power to withhold jurisdiction from the federal courts altogether, while critics argue that some or all Article III business—most notably cases arising under federal law—must be heard in an Article III tribunal, at least on appeal. But traditionalists and their “aggregate vesting” critics are on common ground in supposing that the Constitution is indifferent to whether Article III cases within the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction are heard initially in a state court or an inferior court that Congress chooses to create. Indeed, this is the settled understanding of Article III. This Article suggests that the First Congress likely did not share the common ground on which these competing visions of congressional power rest. Instead, the debates over the 1789 Judiciary Act reveal a widely-voiced understanding that state courts were constitutionally disabled from hearing certain Article III matters in the first instance—such as federal criminal prosecutions and various admiralty matters—and that Congress could not empower state courts to hear them. Many in Congress therefore also supposed that lower federal courts were mandated if such cases were to be heard at all. Although a vocal minority countered with the now-dominant view of state court power and the constitutional non-necessity of lower federal courts, they did so as part of a losing effort to eliminate the proposed federal district courts. The debates pose problems for traditionalists as well as their critics, but they are ultimately more problematic for the critics. Rather than providing support for a theory of mandatory aggregate vesting of federal question cases or other Article III business, this underappreciated constitutional dimension of the debate is better viewed as supporting a limited notion of constitutionally-driven jurisdictional exclusivity.
A Litigation Association Model to Aggregate Mass Tort Claims for Adjudication
The judicial system does not adequately accommodate mass tort claims. Even the Rule 23 class action, which is otherwise a powerful aggregation tool, often fails to facilitate trying these claims. This Note argues that a combination of associational standing and statistical sampling produces a new and more effective means to aggregate mass tort claims for adjudication. Claimants can organize an unincorporated association; the association can file a suit seeking redress for its members’ injuries; and evidence can be presented in aggregated form. The proposal is a significant departure from the traditional method of representative litigation—the class action. Yet its predicates are, separately, well established. Moreover, this Note argues that aggregation through association may be preferable to aggregation through class action for several reasons: for example, it may reduce the cost of litigation and perhaps more significantly, it overcomes the choice of law problems that often prevent certification of a mass tort class action under Rule 23.
The relationship between associational standing and sampling is significant and has thus far gone unrecognized: Sampling allows aggregated evidence to take the place of individualized evidence and thereby overcomes the most significant limitation on the use of associational standing in damages actions. The proposal does not require satisfaction of the various prerequisites to class certification contained in Rule 23. The Note examines the history of representative group litigation and concludes, however, that those prerequisites are unnecessary where representation is based on consent (as it is in this Note’s proposal) as opposed to a common interest (what underlies Rule 23).