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Race in the Machine: Racial Disparities in Health and Medical AI

What does racial justice—and racial injustice—look like with respect to artificial intelligence in medicine (“medical AI”)? This Article offers that racial injustice might look like a country in which law and ethics have decided that it is unnecessary to inform people of color that their health is being managed by a technology that likely encodes the centuries of inequitable medical care that people of color have received. Racial justice might look like an informed consent process that is reformed in light of this reality. This Article makes this argument in four Parts. Part I canvases the deep and wide literature that documents that people of color suffer higher rates of illness than their white counterparts while also suffering poorer health outcomes than their white counterparts when treated for these illnesses. Part II then provides an introduction to AI and explains the uses that scholars and developers predict medical AI technologies will have in healthcare, focusing specifically on the management of pregnancy. Part III subsequently serves as a primer on algorithmic bias—that is, systematic errors in the operation of an algorithm that result in a group being unfairly advantaged or disadvantaged. This Part argues that we should expect algorithmic bias that results in people of color receiving inferior pregnancy-related healthcare, and healthcare generally, because medical AI technologies will be developed, trained, and deployed in a country with striking and unforgivable racial disparities in health.

Part IV forms the heart of the Article, making the claim that obstetricians, and healthcare providers generally, should disclose during the informed consent process their reliance on, or consultation with, medical AI technologies that likely encode inequities. To be precise, providers should have to tell their patients that an algorithm has informed the recommendation that the provider is making; moreover, providers should inform their patients how racial disparities in health may have impacted the algorithm’s accuracy. It supports this argument by recounting the antiracist, anti-white supremacist—indeed radical—origins of informed consent in the Nuremberg Trials’ rebuke of Nazi “medicine.” This Part argues that the introduction into the clinical encounter of medical AI—and the likelihood that these technologies will perpetuate racially inequitable healthcare while masking the same—is an invitation to reform the informed consent process to make it more consistent with the commitments that spurred its origination. This Part proposes that, given the antiracist roots of the doctrine of informed consent, it would be incredibly ironic to allow the informed consent process to permit a patient—and, particularly, a patient of color—to remain ignorant of the fact that their medical care is being managed by a device or system that likely encodes racism. This Part argues that informing patients about the likelihood of race-based algorithmic bias—and the reasons that we might expect race-based algorithmic bias—may, in fact, be a prerequisite for actually transforming the inequitable social conditions that produce racial disparities in health and healthcare.

Introduction

As artificial intelligence (“AI”) technologies proliferate across sundry sectors of society—from mortgage lending and marketing to policing and public health—it has become apparent to many observers that these technologies will need to be regulated to ensure both that their social benefits outweigh their social costs and that these costs and benefits are distributed fairly across society. In October 2022, the Biden Administration announced its awareness of the dangers that “technology, data, and automated systems” pose to individual rights.1 1.See Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights: Making Automated Systems Work for the American People, The White House Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol’y, https://www.white‌house.gov/ostp/ai-bill-of-rights/ [https://perma.cc/E5GS-6ZP3] (last visited Jan. 5, 2024). Some states and cities have also initiated efforts to regulate AI. See, e.g.,Laura Schneider, Debo Adegbile, Ariella Feingold & Makenzie Way, NYC Soon to Enforce AI Bias Law, Other Jurisdictions Likely to Follow, WilmerHale (Apr. 10, 2023), https://www.wilmerhale.com/insights/client-alerts/‌20230410-nyc-soon-to-enforce-ai-bias-law-other-jurisdictions-likely-to-follow [https://perm‌a.cc/K47J-XZUQ] (“New York City’s Department of Consumer and Worker Protection (DCWP) is expected to begin enforcing the City’s novel artificial intelligence (AI) bias audit law on July 5, 2023. This law prohibits the use of automated decision tools in employment decisions within New York City unless certain bias audit, notice, and reporting requirements are met.”); Jonathan Kestenbaum, NYC’s New AI Bias Law Broadly Impacts Hiring and Requires Audits, Bloomberg Law (July 5, 2023, 5:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/‌us-law-week/nycs-new-ai-bias-law-broadly-impacts-hiring-and-requires-audits [https://perm‌a.cc/L94C-X3BN] (observing that the “New Jersey Assembly is considering a limit on use of AI tools in hiring unless employers can prove they conducted a bias audit,” that “Maryland and Illinois have proposed laws that prohibit use of facial recognition and video analysis tools in job interviews without consent of the candidates,” and that “the California Fair Employment and Housing Council is mulling new mandates that would outlaw use of AI tools and tests that could screen applicants based on race, gender, ethnicity, and other protected characteristics”); Attorney General Bonta Launches Inquiry into Racial and Ethnic Bias in Healthcare Algorithms, State of Cal. Dep’t of Just. Off. of the Att’y Gen. (Aug. 31, 2022), https://oag.‌ca.gov/‌news/press-releases/attorney-general-bonta-launches-inquiry-racial-and-ethnic-bias-healthca‌re [https://perma.cc/ERC4-GVJJ] (“California Attorney General Rob Bonta today sent letters to hospital CEOs across the state requesting information about how healthcare facilities and other providers are identifying and addressing racial and ethnic disparities in commercial decision-making tools. The request for information is the first step in a DOJ inquiry into whether commercial healthcare algorithms—types of software used by healthcare providers to make decisions that affect access to healthcare for California patients—have discriminatory impacts based on race and ethnicity.”).Show More Through its Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Administration declared the need for a coordinated approach to address the problems that AI technologies have generated—problems that include “[a]lgorithms used in hiring and credit decisions [that] have been found to reflect and reproduce existing unwanted inequities or embed new harmful bias and discrimination,” “[u]nchecked social media data collection [that] has been used to threaten people’s opportunities, undermine their privacy, or pervasively track their activity,” and, most germane to the concerns of this Article, “systems [that are] supposed to help with patient care [but that] have proven unsafe, ineffective, or biased.”2 2.See Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights: Making Automated Systems Work for the American People, supra note 1.Show More

As an initial measure in the effort to eliminate—or, at least, contain—the harms that automation poses, the Administration offers a Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights, which consists of “five principles that should guide the design, use, and deployment of automated systems to protect the American public in the age of artificial intelligence.”3 3.Id.Show More Crucially, the Blueprint identifies “notice and explanation” as a central element in a program that protects the rights of individuals in an increasingly automated society.4 4.Id.Show More That is, the Biden Administration proposes that in order to ensure that AI does not threaten “civil rights or democratic values,” individuals should be informed when “an automated system is being used,” and they should “understand how and why it contributes to outcomes that impact” them.5 5.Id.Show More To apply it to the context to which this Article is most attuned, if a hospital system or healthcare provider relies upon an AI technology when making decisions about a patient’s care, then the patient whose health is being managed by the technology ought to know about the technology’s usage.

Although the Biden Administration appears committed to the idea that an individual’s rights are violated when they are unaware that an AI technology has had some impact on the healthcare that they have received, many actors on the ground, including physicians and other healthcare providers, do not share this commitment. As one journalist reports:

[T]ens of thousands of patients hospitalized at one of Minnesota’s largest health systems have had their discharge planning decisions informed with help from an artificial intelligence model. But few if any of those patients [have] any idea about the AI involved in their care. That’s because frontline clinicians . . . generally don’t mention the AI whirring behind the scenes in their conversations with patients.6 6.Rebecca Robbins & Erin Brodwin, An Invisible Hand: Patients Aren’t Being Told About the AI Systems Advising Their Care, STAT (July 15, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/‌2020/07/15/artificial-intelligence-patient-consent-hospitals/ [https://perma.cc/R3F5-NNX4].Show More

This health system is hardly unique in its practice of keeping this information from patients. “The decision not to mention these systems to patients is the product of an emerging consensus among doctors, hospital executives, developers, and system architects who see little value . . . in raising the subject.”7 7.Id.Show More Moreover, while these actors see few advantages associated with informing patients that AI has informed a healthcare decision or recommendation, they see lots of disadvantages, with the disclosure operating as a “distraction” and “undermin[ing] trust.”8 8.Id.Show More

We exist in a historical moment in which the norms around notice and consent in the context of AI in healthcare have not yet emerged—with some powerful actors in the federal government proposing that patients are harmed when they are not notified that AI has impacted their healthcare, and other influential actors on the ground proposing that patients are harmed when they are notified that AI has impacted their healthcare.9 9.See also Attorney General Bonta Launches Inquiry into Racial and Ethnic Bias in Healthcare Algorithms, supra note 1 (understanding as problematic the fact that some AI tools used in healthcare “are not fully transparent to healthcare consumers”); cf. Schneider et al., supra note 1 (noting that New York City’s law regulating AI in employment requires an employer to provide “applicants and employees who reside in New York City notice of its use of AI in hiring and/or promotion decisions, either via website, job posting, mail or e-mail”). Interestingly, some investigations have shown that some patients do not want to know when physicians and hospital administrators rely on medical AI when managing their healthcare. See Robbins & Brodwin, supra note 6 (reporting that some patients who were interviewed stated that “they wouldn’t expect or even want their doctor to mention” the use of medical AI and stating that these patients “likened it to not wanting to be privy to numbers around their prognosis, such as how much time they might expect to have left, or how many patients with their disease are still alive after five years”). However, other studies have shown that patients do desire this information. See Anjali Jain et al., Awareness of Racial and Ethnic Bias and Potential Solutions to Address Bias with Use of Health Care Algorithms, JAMA Health F., June 2, 2023, at 10, https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama-health-forum/fullarticle/2805595 [https://perma.cc/9FMK-E4VV] (discussing a “recent, nationally representative survey” that showed that “patients . . . wanted to know when [AI] was involved in their care”).Show More As we think about the shape that these norms ought to take, this Article implores us to keep in mind the fact of racial inequality and the likelihood that AI will have emerged from, and thereby reflect, that racial inequality. Indeed, this Article’s central claim is that the well-documented racial disparities in health that have existed in the United States since the dawn of the nation demand that providers inform all patients—but especially patients of color—that they have relied on or consulted with an AI technology when providing healthcare to them.

Although much has been written about AI in healthcare,10 10.Indeed, volumes have been written about algorithmic bias, what AI technologies mean with respect to data privacy, and how we ought to regulate AI inside the medical context. See generally The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics (Carissa Véliz ed., 2021).Show More or medical AI, very little has been written about the effects that medical AI can and should have on the informed consent process.11 11.See I. Glenn Cohen, Informed Consent and Medical Artificial Intelligence: What to Tell the Patient?, 108 Geo. L.J. 1425, 1428 (2020) (noting that his Article, which was published just three years ago, was “the first to examine in-depth how medical AI / [machine learning] intersects with our concept of informed consent”).Show More Moreover, no article to date has interrogated what the reality of racial disparities in health should mean with respect to obtaining a patient’s informed consent to a medical intervention (or nonintervention) that an AI system has recommended. This Article offers itself as the beginning of that conversation. It makes the case that we ought to reform the informed consent process to ensure that patients of color are aware that their health is being managed by a technology that likely encodes the centuries of inequitable medical care that people of color have received in this country and around the world.

The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I canvases the deep and wide literature that documents that people of color suffer higher rates of illness than their white counterparts while also suffering poorer health outcomes than their white counterparts when treated for these illnesses. These racial disparities in health are also present in the context of pregnancy, a fact that is illustrated most spectacularly by the often-quoted statistic describing black women’s three- to four-fold increased risk of dying from a pregnancy-related cause as compared to white women.12 12.Elizabeth A. Howell, Reducing Disparities in Severe Maternal Morbidity and Mortality, 61 Clinical Obstetrics & Gynecology 387, 387 (2018).Show More Part II then provides an introduction to AI and explains the uses that scholars and developers predict medical AI technologies will have in healthcare and, specifically, the management of pregnancy. Part III subsequently serves as a primer on algorithmic bias—that is, systematic errors in the operation of an algorithm that result in a group being unfairly advantaged or disadvantaged. This Part explains the many causes of algorithmic bias and gives examples of algorithmic bias in medicine and healthcare. This Part argues that we should expect algorithmic bias from medical AI that results in people of color receiving inferior healthcare. This is because medical AI technologies will be developed, trained, and deployed in a country with striking and unforgivable racial disparities in health.

Part IV forms the heart of the Article. It begins by asking a question: Will patients of color even want medical AI? There is reason to suspect that significant numbers of them do not. Media attention to the skepticism with which many black people initially viewed COVID-19 vaccines has made the public newly aware of the higher levels of mistrust that black people, as a racial group, have toward healthcare institutions and their agents. That is, the banality of racial injustice has made black people more suspicious of medical technologies. This fact suggests that ethics—and justice—require providers to inform their patients of the use of a medical technology that likely embeds racial injustice within it.

The Part continues by making the claim that healthcare providers should disclose during the informed consent process their reliance on medical AI. To be precise, providers should have to tell their patients that an algorithm has affected the providers’ decision-making around the patients’ healthcare; moreover, providers should inform their patients how racial disparities in health may have impacted the algorithm’s predictive accuracy. This Part argues that requiring these disclosures as part of the informed consent process revives the antiracist, anti-white supremacist origins of the informed consent process. To be sure, the practice of informed consent originated in the Nuremberg Trials’ rebuke of Nazi medicine. These defiant, revolutionary origins have been expunged from the perfunctory form that the informed consent process has taken at present. Resuscitating the rebelliousness that is latent within informed consent will not only help to protect patient autonomy in the context of medical AI but may also be the condition of possibility for transforming the social conditions that produce racial disparities in health and healthcare. That is, the instant proposal seeks to call upon the rebellious roots of the doctrine of informed consent and use it as a technique of political mobilization. A short conclusion follows.

Two notes before beginning: First, although this Article focuses on medical AI in pregnancy and prenatal care, its argument is applicable to informed consent in all contexts—from anesthesiology to x-rays—in which a provider might utilize a medical AI device. Concentrating on pregnancy and prenatal care allows the Article to offer concrete examples of the phenomena under discussion and, in so doing, make crystal clear the exceedingly high stakes of our societal and legal decisions in this area.

Second, the moment that a provider consults a medical AI device when delivering healthcare to a patient of color certainly is not the first occasion in that patient’s life in which racial disenfranchisement may come to impact the healthcare that they receive. That is, we can locate racial bias and exclusion at myriad sites within healthcare, medicine, and the construction of medical knowledge well before a clinical encounter in which medical AI is used. For example: people of color are underrepresented within clinical trials that test the safety and efficacy of drugs—a fact that might impact our ability to know whether a drug actually is safe and effective for people of color.13 13.See The Nat’l Acads. of Scis., Eng’g & Med., Improving Representation in Clinical Trials and Research: Building Research Equity for Women and Underrepresented Groups 24 (Kirsten Bibbins-Domingo & Alex Helman eds., 2022), https://nap.nationalacademies.org/‌catalog/26479/improving-representation-in-clinical-trials-and-research-building-research‌-equity [https://perma.cc/FE2H-9YC5] (explaining that “research has demonstrated that many groups underrepresented and excluded in clinical research can have distinct disease presentations or health circumstances that affect how they will respond to an investigational drug or therapy” and that “[s]uch differences contribute to variable therapeutic responses and necessitate targeted efficacy and safety evaluation”). An FDA report of clinical trials that took place between 2015 and 2019 revealed that while non-Hispanic white people constituted only 61% of the general population in the United States, they were 78% of trial participants. See id. at 35; see also id. at 44–45 (“Even recently completed trials have failed to include enrollment consistent with the distribution of disease across the population—a Phase 2 trial of crenezumab in Alzheimer’s disease with 360 participants across 83 sites in 6 countries reported 97.5 percent of participants being white, and only 2.8 percent of all participants being Hispanic.”). Notably, clinical trials only rarely include pregnant and lactating people. See id. at 40. This means that when most medications are introduced into the market, their safety and efficacy vis-à-vis pregnant and lactating people are unknown—although it is quite common for people to take medications while pregnant or lactating. See id. (“During pregnancy and lactation, greater than 90 percent of these individuals take at least one medication, either to treat pregnancy-related complications or to treat ongoing medical issues.”).Show More For example: the National Institute of Health (“NIH”) and the National Science Foundation (“NSF”) fund medical research conducted by investigators of color at lower rates than that conducted by white investigators14 14.See Christine Yifeng Chen et al., Meta-Research: Systemic Racial Disparities in Funding Rates at the National Science Foundation, eLife, Nov. 29, 2022, at 2, https://doi.org/10.7554/‌eLife.83071 [https://perma.cc/NFS8-T3LB] (showing that the National Science Foundation funded proposals by white principal investigators at +8.5% of the average funding rate while funding proposals by Asian, black, and Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander principal investigators at 21.2%, 8.1%, and 11.3% of the average funding rate, respectively); Donna K. Ginther et al., Race, Ethnicity, and NIH Research Awards, 333 Science 1015, 1016 (2011), https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1196783 [https://perma.cc/NQA9-LYMG] (showing that the National Institute of Health funded proposals by black principal investigators at close to half the rate as white principal investigators).Show More—a fact that might contribute to the underfunding of medical conditions that disproportionately impact people of color. For example: most medical schools still approach race as a genetic fact instead of a social construction, with the result being that most physicians in the United States have not been disabused of the notion that people of color—black people, specifically—possess genes and genetic variations that make them get sicker and die earlier than their white counterparts.15 15.See Christina Amutah et al., Misrepresenting Race—The Role of Medical Schools in Propagating Physician Bias, 384 New Eng. J. Med. 872, 873–74 (2021). Funding for research into the imagined genetic causes of racial disparities in health outcomes vastly outstrips funding for research into social determinants of health or the physiological effects of stress and racism on people of color. Shawn Kneipp et al., Trends in Health Disparities, Health Inequity, and Social Determinants of Health Research, 67 Nursing Rsch. 231, 231 (2018). See also René Bowser, Racial Profiling in Health Care: An Institutional Analysis of Medical Treatment Disparities, 7 Mich. J. Race & L. 79, 114 (2001) (arguing that “physicians who focus on racism as opposed to cultural peculiarities or the genetic basis of disease are likely to be considered both as not ‘real scientists’ and as dangerous” and stating that producing research that explains racial disparities in health outcomes in terms of culture and genes, as opposed to structural racism and inherited disadvantage, “enhances the researcher’s status”). This funding disparity undoubtedly contributes to the perpetuation of the myth of biological race.Show More For example: pulse oximeters, which use infrared light to measure an individual’s blood saturation levels, are so common as to be called ubiquitous, even though it is well-known that the devices do not work as well on more pigmented skin.16 16.See Haley Bridger, Skin Tone and Pulse Oximetry: Racial Disparities in Care Tied to Differences in Pulse Oximeter Performance, Harv. Med. Sch. (July 14, 2022), https://hms.‌harvard.edu/news/skin-tone-pulse-oximetry [https://perma.cc/HZW8-YMAS].Show More For example: most clinical studies that are used to establish evidence-based practices are conducted in well-resourced facilities, making their generalizability to more contingently equipped and more unreliably funded facilities uncertain.17 17.See The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, supra note 13, at 25 (observing that “[c]linical research is often performed in well-resourced tertiary care sites in large urban centers, and may have limited applicability to community sites, less well-resourced safety net settings, and rural settings”).Show More For example: many research studies do not report their findings by race, thereby impeding our ability to know whether the studies’ results are equally true for all racial groups.18 18.See id. at 31 (stating that the “[l]ack of representative studies on screening for cancer or cardiometabolic disease may lead to recommendations that fail to consider earlier ages or lower biomarker thresholds to start screening that might be warranted in some populations” and observing that “due to [a] lack of studies that report findings by race,” the guidelines for some screenings are universal, although there is some evidence that they should vary by race and age).Show More And so on. If providers ought to notify their patients (especially their patients of color) that the provider has relied upon medical AI when caring for the patient, then it is likely true that providers similarly ought to notify their patients about racial inequity in other contexts as well. That is, there is a compelling argument that when a provider prescribes a medication to a patient, they might need to notify the patient that preciously small numbers of people who were not white cisgender men participated in the clinical trial of the medication.19 19.See Barbara A. Noah, Racial Disparities in the Delivery of Health Care,35 San Diego L. Rev. 135, 152 (1998) (noting that “[b]efore the National Institutes of Health (NIH) issued a directive in 1990, investigators almost uniformly tested new chemical entities only on white male subjects”).Show More There is a compelling argument that when a provider tells a black patient that the results of her pulmonary function test were “normal,” they might also need to inform that patient that if she were white, her results would be considered “abnormal,” as the idea that the races are biologically distinct has long informed notions of whether a set of lungs is healthy or not.20 20.See Lundy Braun, Breathing Race into the Machine: The Surprising Career of the Spirometer from Plantation to Genetics, at xv (2014).Show More There is a compelling argument that when a provider affixes a pulse oximeter to the finger of a patient of color, they might also need to inform that patient that the oximeter’s readings may be inaccurate—and the care that she receives based on those readings may be inferior21 21.See Bridger, supra note 16 (describing a study that showed that pulse oximeters reported blood oxygen saturation levels for patients of color that were higher than what they actually were, leading these patients’ providers to give them supplemental oxygen at lower rates).Show More—given the widely known and undisputed fact that such devices do not work as well on darker skin. There is a compelling argument that when a physician tells a pregnant patient laboring in a safety net hospital that the evidence-based practice for patients presenting in the way that she presents is an artificial rupture of membranes (“AROM”) to facilitate the progression of the labor, they might also need to inform the patient that the studies that established AROM as an evidence-based practice were conducted in well-funded research hospitals that were affiliated with universities.22 22.See, e.g., Alan F. Guttmacher & R. Gordon Douglas, Induction of Labor by Artificial Rupture of the Membranes, 21 Am. J. Obstetrics & Gynecology 485, 485 (1931) (establishing artificial rupture of the membranes as an evidence-based practice in obstetrics after studying the safety and efficacy of the procedure among patients cared for at a clinic affiliated with Johns Hopkins University).Show More There is a compelling argument that when a physician tells a forty-year-old black patient that he does not need to do a screening for colorectal cancer until age forty-five, they might also need to inform the patient that the studies that established forty-five as the age when such screenings should commence did not report their findings by race.23 23.See Screening for Colorectal Cancer: US Preventive Services Task Force Recommendation Statement, 325 JAMA 1965, 1970 (2021), https://jamanetwork.com/jour‌nals/jama/fullarticle/2779985 [https://perma.cc/TV68-6W75].Show More And so on.

It does not defeat this Article’s claim to observe that racial bias and exclusion are pervasive throughout medicine and healthcare and that providers in many contexts outside of the use of medical AI ought to notify patients how this bias and exclusion may affect the healthcare that they are receiving. Indeed, it is seductive to claim in those other contexts that it is better to fix the inequities in the healthcare than to tell patients of color about them—a fact that is also true in the context of medical AI. However, fixing the inequities in healthcare in those other contexts and telling patients about them are not mutually exclusive—a fact that is also true in the context of medical AI. And as Part IV argues, telling patients about the inequities in those other contexts might be the condition of possibility of fixing the inequities—a fact that is also true in the context of medical AI.

Essentially, this Article’s claim may be applied in a range of circumstances. In this way, this Article’s investigation into how algorithmic bias in medical AI should affect the informed consent process is simply a case study of a broader phenomenon. This Article’s insights vis-à-vis medical AI are generalizable to all medical interventions and noninterventions.

  1.  See Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights: Making Automated Systems Work for the American People, The White House Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol’y, https://www.white‌house.gov/ostp/ai-bill-of-rights/ [https://perma.cc/E5GS-6ZP3] (last visited Jan. 5, 2024). Some states and cities have also initiated efforts to regulate AI. See, e.g., Laura Schneider, Debo Adegbile, Ariella Feingold & Makenzie Way, NYC Soon to Enforce AI Bias Law, Other Jurisdictions Likely to Follow, WilmerHale (Apr. 10, 2023), https://www.wilmerhale.com/insights/client-alerts/‌20230410-nyc-soon-to-enforce-ai-bias-law-other-jurisdictions-likely-to-follow [https://perm‌a.cc/K47J-XZUQ] (“New York City’s Department of Consumer and Worker Protection (DCWP) is expected to begin enforcing the City’s novel artificial intelligence (AI) bias audit law on July 5, 2023. This law prohibits the use of automated decision tools in employment decisions within New York City unless certain bias audit, notice, and reporting requirements are met.”); Jonathan Kestenbaum, NYC’s New AI Bias Law Broadly Impacts Hiring and Requires Audits, Bloomberg Law (July 5, 2023, 5:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/‌us-law-week/nycs-new-ai-bias-law-broadly-impacts-hiring-and-requires-audits [https://perm‌a.cc/L94C-X3BN] (observing that the “New Jersey Assembly is considering a limit on use of AI tools in hiring unless employers can prove they conducted a bias audit,” that “Maryland and Illinois have proposed laws that prohibit use of facial recognition and video analysis tools in job interviews without consent of the candidates,” and that “the California Fair Employment and Housing Council is mulling new mandates that would outlaw use of AI tools and tests that could screen applicants based on race, gender, ethnicity, and other protected characteristics”); Attorney General Bonta Launches Inquiry into Racial and Ethnic Bias in Healthcare Algorithms, State of Cal. Dep’t of Just. Off. of the Att’y Gen. (Aug. 31, 2022), https://oag.‌ca.gov/‌news/press-releases/attorney-general-bonta-launches-inquiry-racial-and-ethnic-bias-healthca‌re [https://perma.cc/ERC4-GVJJ] (“California Attorney General Rob Bonta today sent letters to hospital CEOs across the state requesting information about how healthcare facilities and other providers are identifying and addressing racial and ethnic disparities in commercial decision-making tools. The request for information is the first step in a DOJ inquiry into whether commercial healthcare algorithms—types of software used by healthcare providers to make decisions that affect access to healthcare for California patients—have discriminatory impacts based on race and ethnicity.”). ↑
  2.  See Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights: Making Automated Systems Work for the American People, supra note 1. ↑
  3.  Id. ↑
  4.  Id. ↑
  5.  Id. ↑
  6.  Rebecca Robbins & Erin Brodwin, An Invisible Hand: Patients Aren’t Being Told About the AI Systems Advising Their Care, STAT (July 15, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/‌2020/07/15/artificial-intelligence-patient-consent-hospitals/ [https://perma.cc/R3F5-NNX4]. ↑
  7.  Id. ↑
  8.  Id. ↑
  9.  See also Attorney General Bonta Launches Inquiry into Racial and Ethnic Bias in Healthcare Algorithms, supra note 1 (understanding as problematic the fact that some AI tools used in healthcare “are not fully transparent to healthcare consumers”); cf. Schneider et al., supra note 1 (noting that New York City’s law regulating AI in employment requires an employer to provide “applicants and employees who reside in New York City notice of its use of AI in hiring and/or promotion decisions, either via website, job posting, mail or e-mail”).

    Interestingly, some investigations have shown that some patients do not want to know when physicians and hospital administrators rely on medical AI when managing their healthcare. See Robbins & Brodwin, supra note 6 (reporting that some patients who were interviewed stated that “they wouldn’t expect or even want their doctor to mention” the use of medical AI and stating that these patients “likened it to not wanting to be privy to numbers around their prognosis, such as how much time they might expect to have left, or how many patients with their disease are still alive after five years”). However, other studies have shown that patients do desire this information. See Anjali Jain et al., Awareness of Racial and Ethnic Bias and Potential Solutions to Address Bias with Use of Health Care Algorithms, JAMA Health F., June 2, 2023, at 10, https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama-health-forum/fullarticle/2805595 [https://perma.cc/9FMK-E4VV] (discussing a “recent, nationally representative survey” that showed that “patients . . . wanted to know when [AI] was involved in their care”). ↑

  10.  Indeed, volumes have been written about algorithmic bias, what AI technologies mean with respect to data privacy, and how we ought to regulate AI inside the medical context. See generally The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics (Carissa Véliz ed., 2021). ↑
  11.  See I. Glenn Cohen, Informed Consent and Medical Artificial Intelligence: What to Tell the Patient?, 108 Geo. L.J. 1425, 1428 (2020) (noting that his Article, which was published just three years ago, was “the first to examine in-depth how medical AI / [machine learning] intersects with our concept of informed consent”). ↑
  12.  Elizabeth A. Howell, Reducing Disparities in Severe Maternal Morbidity and Mortality, 61 Clinical Obstetrics & Gynecology 387, 387 (2018). ↑
  13.  See The Nat’l Acads. of Scis., Eng’g & Med., Improving Representation in Clinical Trials and Research: Building Research Equity for Women and Underrepresented Groups 24 (Kirsten Bibbins-Domingo & Alex Helman eds., 2022), https://nap.nationalacademies.org/‌catalog/26479/improving-representation-in-clinical-trials-and-research-building-research‌-equity [https://perma.cc/FE2H-9YC5] (explaining that “research has demonstrated that many groups underrepresented and excluded in clinical research can have distinct disease presentations or health circumstances that affect how they will respond to an investigational drug or therapy” and that “[s]uch differences contribute to variable therapeutic responses and necessitate targeted efficacy and safety evaluation”). An FDA report of clinical trials that took place between 2015 and 2019 revealed that while non-Hispanic white people constituted only 61% of the general population in the United States, they were 78% of trial participants. See id. at 35; see also id. at 44–45 (“Even recently completed trials have failed to include enrollment consistent with the distribution of disease across the population—a Phase 2 trial of crenezumab in Alzheimer’s disease with 360 participants across 83 sites in 6 countries reported 97.5 percent of participants being white, and only 2.8 percent of all participants being Hispanic.”).

    Notably, clinical trials only rarely include pregnant and lactating people. See id. at 40. This means that when most medications are introduced into the market, their safety and efficacy vis-à-vis pregnant and lactating people are unknown—although it is quite common for people to take medications while pregnant or lactating. See id. (“During pregnancy and lactation, greater than 90 percent of these individuals take at least one medication, either to treat pregnancy-related complications or to treat ongoing medical issues.”). ↑

  14.  See Christine Yifeng Chen et al., Meta-Research: Systemic Racial Disparities in Funding Rates at the National Science Foundation, eLife, Nov. 29, 2022, at 2, https://doi.org/10.7554/‌eLife.83071 [https://perma.cc/NFS8-T3LB] (showing that the National Science Foundation funded proposals by white principal investigators at +8.5% of the average funding rate while funding proposals by Asian, black, and Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander principal investigators at 21.2%, 8.1%, and 11.3% of the average funding rate, respectively); Donna K. Ginther et al., Race, Ethnicity, and NIH Research Awards, 333 Science 1015, 1016 (2011), https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1196783 [https://perma.cc/NQA9-LYMG] (showing that the National Institute of Health funded proposals by black principal investigators at close to half the rate as white principal investigators). ↑
  15.  See Christina Amutah et al., Misrepresenting Race—The Role of Medical Schools in Propagating Physician Bias, 384 New Eng. J. Med. 872, 873–74 (2021). Funding for research into the imagined genetic causes of racial disparities in health outcomes vastly outstrips funding for research into social determinants of health or the physiological effects of stress and racism on people of color. Shawn Kneipp et al., Trends in Health Disparities, Health Inequity, and Social Determinants of Health Research, 67 Nursing Rsch. 231, 231 (2018). See also René Bowser, Racial Profiling in Health Care: An Institutional Analysis of Medical Treatment Disparities, 7 Mich. J. Race & L. 79, 114 (2001) (arguing that “physicians who focus on racism as opposed to cultural peculiarities or the genetic basis of disease are likely to be considered both as not ‘real scientists’ and as dangerous” and stating that producing research that explains racial disparities in health outcomes in terms of culture and genes, as opposed to structural racism and inherited disadvantage, “enhances the researcher’s status”). This funding disparity undoubtedly contributes to the perpetuation of the myth of biological race. ↑
  16.  See Haley Bridger, Skin Tone and Pulse Oximetry: Racial Disparities in Care Tied to Differences in Pulse Oximeter Performance, Harv. Med. Sch. (July 14, 2022), https://hms.‌harvard.edu/news/skin-tone-pulse-oximetry [https://perma.cc/HZW8-YMAS]. ↑
  17.  See The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, supra note 13, at 25 (observing that “[c]linical research is often performed in well-resourced tertiary care sites in large urban centers, and may have limited applicability to community sites, less well-resourced safety net settings, and rural settings”). ↑
  18.  See id. at 31 (stating that the “[l]ack of representative studies on screening for cancer or cardiometabolic disease may lead to recommendations that fail to consider earlier ages or lower biomarker thresholds to start screening that might be warranted in some populations” and observing that “due to [a] lack of studies that report findings by race,” the guidelines for some screenings are universal, although there is some evidence that they should vary by race and age). ↑
  19.  See Barbara A. Noah, Racial Disparities in the Delivery of Health Care, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 135, 152 (1998) (noting that “[b]efore the National Institutes of Health (NIH) issued a directive in 1990, investigators almost uniformly tested new chemical entities only on white male subjects”). ↑
  20.  See Lundy Braun, Breathing Race into the Machine: The Surprising Career of the Spirometer from Plantation to Genetics, at xv (2014). ↑
  21.  See Bridger, supra note 16 (describing a study that showed that pulse oximeters reported blood oxygen saturation levels for patients of color that were higher than what they actually were, leading these patients’ providers to give them supplemental oxygen at lower rates). ↑
  22.  See, e.g., Alan F. Guttmacher & R. Gordon Douglas, Induction of Labor by Artificial Rupture of the Membranes, 21 Am. J. Obstetrics & Gynecology 485, 485 (1931) (establishing artificial rupture of the membranes as an evidence-based practice in obstetrics after studying the safety and efficacy of the procedure among patients cared for at a clinic affiliated with Johns Hopkins University). ↑

  23.  See Screening for Colorectal Cancer: US Preventive Services Task Force Recommendation Statement, 325 JAMA 1965, 1970 (2021), https://jamanetwork.com/jour‌nals/jama/fullarticle/2779985 [https://perma.cc/TV68-6W75]. ↑

Making Section 1983 Malicious-Prosecution Suits Work

The Supreme Court can’t seem to get over Section 1983 malicious prosecution. Thirty years and three significant cases into its project, however, the lower courts look about the same as they did in the early 1990s. The problem is not lack of effort, but lack of proper focus. The Court first endeavored to identify the proper constitutional source of a malicious-prosecution right, all the while failing to consider the more practical problems that make Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claims nearly impossible to win.

The Court seemed to reverse its course in Thompson v. Clark, eschewing big constitutional questions in favor of a narrow, practical one. This Note applauds that turn in spirit. But it seems that the Court overcorrected by choosing too small of a question. This Note contributes the first postmortem of Thompson and finds that a year later, the lower courts look like nothing ever happened: almost every Section 1983 malicious-prosecution case since has been dismissed for reasons unrelated to Thompson’s favorable-termination rule.

What if instead of asking questions too big to be practically impactful, or too small to do much work on their own, we found the questions that are “just right”? This Note identifies these questions by analyzing remaining splits in the lower courts and where those splits overlap with the issues killing otherwise meritorious Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claims. By asking and answering the right questions, this Note constructs a version of Section 1983 malicious prosecution that could work in real life.

Introduction

How do you define a right if you aren’t sure it exists? The right to be free from malicious prosecution has remained elusive despite decades of judicial and scholarly attention. Some still debate whether it even exists, and many more argue that it should not. The constitutional malicious-prosecution claim often brought under Section 1983 is something of an enigma—despite the name, the claims generally are not brought against prosecutors, and they rarely involve malice in an ordinary sense. Rather, they are part of the family of constitutional torts aimed at addressing police misconduct—here, for initiating criminal prosecutions without probable cause.

These lawsuits serve two critical roles. First, they provide redress for the harms uniquely associated with enduring a criminal prosecution, namely, being deprived of rights “to make basic decisions about the future; to participate in community affairs; to take advantage of employment opportunities; to cultivate family, business, and social relationships; and to travel from place to place.”1 1.Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 294 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).Show More And second, because malicious-prosecution claims are not ripe until favorable termination—which occurs when a prosecution ends without a conviction2 2.Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1335 (2022).Show More—they may extend the timeframe to bring civil-rights suits. Because companion constitutional torts generally accrue much earlier,3 3.If a person was unlawfully arrested and then fought charges resulting from the false arrest for two years (and thus was procedurally barred from raising the claim, see Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994) (holding that a damages suit challenging the constitutionality of an imprisonment or conviction “is not cognizable under § 1983” unless plaintiff can demonstrate favorable termination of underlying criminal matter)), for example, the statute of limitations on that false-arrest claim might expire while the harm of the officer’s misconduct was still ongoing. Federal courts also generally abstain from hearing cases challenging state prosecutions while they are ongoing. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971) (reaffirming this principle); see also Brief for Federal Courts Scholars as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Thompson, 142 S. Ct. 1332 (No. 20-659) (clarifying that these doctrines and their underlying federalism rationales have little force after favorable termination).Show More malicious-prosecution suits give a person more time to vindicate at least some of their rights.4 4.Compare Manuel v. City of Joliet, 590 F. App’x 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2015) (rejecting unlawful-arrest claim as time barred), with Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 360 (2017) (finding malicious-prosecution claim did not accrue until prosecution ended, thus extending time to file by about two months).Show More

But regardless of how important they are in theory, in practice, these suits rarely succeed. Despite significant debate over the proper constitutional home of malicious prosecution,5 5.See, e.g., Eric J. Wunsch, Note, Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment—Malicious Prosecution and 1983: Is There a Constitutional Violation Remediable Under Section 1983?, 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 878, 878 (1995) (arguing that malicious prosecutions violate the Procedural Due Process Clause); John T. Ryan, Note, Malicious Prosecution Claims Under Section 1983: Do Citizens Have Federal Recourse?, 64 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 776, 778 (1996) (favoring due process framework and disputing that Albright forecloses it); Esther M. Schonfeld, Malicious Prosecution as a Constitutional Tort, 15 Touro L. Rev. 1681, 1682 (1999) (describing Albright as a failed effort); Jacques L. Schillaci, Note, Unexamined Premises: Toward Doctrinal Purity in § 1983 Malicious Prosecution Doctrine, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 439, 443 (2002) (supporting “divorce” between malicious prosecution and Section 1983); Jacob Paul Goldstein, Note, From the Exclusionary Rule to a Constitutional Tort for Malicious Prosecutions, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 643, 657 (2006) (describing “a Fourth Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution” but suggesting that current version is not functional); Lyle Kossis, Note, Malicious Prosecution Claims in Section 1983 Lawsuits, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1635, 1637 (2013) (suggesting the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as better homes); Erin E. McMannon, Note, The Demise of § 1983 Malicious Prosecution: Separating Tort Law From the Fourth Amendment, 94 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1479, 1498–99 (2019) (arguing that no constitutional right to be free from malicious prosecution exists); Timothy Tymkovich & Hayley Stillwell, Malicious Prosecution as Undue Process: A Fourteenth Amendment Theory of Malicious Prosecution, 20 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 225, 228 (2022) (describing substantive due process as a “superior doctrinal account of malicious prosecution”).Show More there is little clarity on its practicalities: after thirty years of effort, an “embarrassing diversity of judicial opinion” remains.6 6.Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.).Show More In Albright v. Oliver,7 7.510 U.S. 266 (1994) (plurality opinion).Show More and again nearly twenty-five years later in Manuel v. City of Joliet,8 8.580 U.S. 357 (2017).Show More the U.S. Supreme Court made its first error: by focusing only on whether malicious prosecution is properly housed in the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment, the Court twice missed its chance to intervene in any practical sense. Both decisions had shockingly little real-world impact.9 9.See, e.g., Kossis, supra note 5, at 1646–48 (describing post-Albright circuit splits); McMannon, supra note 5, at 1493 (same post-Manuel).Show More But two years ago, in Thompson v. Clark,10 10.142 S. Ct. 1332 (2022).Show More the Court made a new kind of error: by failing to address the most important problems in Section 1983 malicious-prosecution litigation, the Court issued an ostensibly good decision that, as this Note discovers, also failed to make much of a difference.11 11.See infra Section II.C.Show More At each turn, the Court has failed to identify the sources of malicious prosecution’s challenges and thus has failed to provide solutions tailored to those core problems. This Note fills that gap.

By exploring for the first time how the U.S. Courts of Appeals have responded to Thompson, this Note identifies two primary issues. First, in the wake of Thompson, the high-level disagreement that Judge Posner called “embarrassing”12 12.Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 1992).Show More endures.13 13.See infra Section II.C for discussion of the many differences between the circuits, and even within them, on the basic elements of a Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claim.Show More Here, “[v]aried interpretation of federal constitutional law raises . . . troubling[] questions,” and nonuniformity has had tangible consequences.14 14.See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1567, 1569 n.5 (2008) (suggesting that uniformity may be important where nonuniformity has tangible consequences or where questions of federal constitutional law are at stake).Show More The details of these claims diverge wildly depending on the circuit, and even within circuits, so plaintiffs—many of whom are not represented by counsel15 15.See Joanna C. Schwartz, Civil Rights Without Representation, 64 Wm. & Mary L. Rev 641, 650–52 (2023) (discussing difficulties securing counsel in civil-rights cases).Show More—have little chance of figuring it out. Specifically, there is significant disagreement on the two usual elements of a Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claim that most often prove fatal: probable cause and malice. The initiation of criminal charges without probable cause is the “gravamen” of malicious prosecution,16 16.Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1337 (2022).Show More but there is little clarity on what probable cause is relevant.17 17.There is little guidance, generally, on what courts are supposed to make of probable cause. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, Probable Cause Pluralism, 129 Yale L.J. 1276, 1370 (2020) (“[I]n an effort to make probable cause mean everything at once, those entrusted with its enforcement have made it so vague as to mean almost nothing at all.”). As Professor Crespo has argued, existing probable-cause doctrine fails “to guide the judge through that decision—and to help everyone else predict how a judge might rule.” Id. at 1280.Show More Because malicious-prosecution defendants are typically police officers or investigators, and not those directly responsible for decisions to prosecute,18 18.SeeImbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (holding that prosecutors have absolute immunity from Section 1983 malicious-prosecution suits).Show More it can be hard to parse whose decisions—and which of those decisions—matter. Lack of malice, while not always even an element of malicious prosecution, can serve as a nearly insurmountable barrier to plaintiffs.

Second, because the Court has never directly considered what the “seizure” in a malicious prosecution is, some lower courts have artificially narrowed Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claims to encompass only suits where the plaintiff was detained. This misunderstands the harm of a malicious prosecution and closes courthouse doors to individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated. Although we more often think of trans-substantive doctrines like qualified immunity as limitations on the availability of damages remedies, here we see remedial access limited through a restrictive framing of the substantive right itself.19 19.See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Pamela S. Karlan, Peter W. Low & George A. Rutherglen, Civil Rights Actions: Enforcing the Constitution 255 (5th ed. 2022); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—And Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 Va. L. Rev. 633, 637 (2006) (“[W]hen the Court dislikes an outcome or pattern of outcomes, it will often be equally possible for the Justices to reformulate applicable justiciability doctrine, substantive doctrine, or remedial doctrine.”).Show More

Answering these questions the right way could produce the result the Court’s repeated efforts would suggest it desires—a settled doctrinal framework for malicious-prosecution claims brought under Section 1983. And more importantly, clarifying the scope of malicious-prosecution claims should cure the notice issues and inconsistencies that make them harder to win than they should be. Maybe the fourth time could be the charm?

This Note explores these questions through three Parts. Part I will discuss the Court’s historical efforts to determine where a right to be free from malicious prosecution is located in the Constitution, a project that failed to yield doctrinal stability. Part II will provide the first postmortem of Thompson—a case that, promisingly, addressed a narrow, technical aspect of Section 1983 litigation—and explore its (limited) impacts on the lower courts. Part III will answer the questions at the root of Section 1983 malicious prosecution’s problems—those identified in Part II. This Note thus has two primary contributions: first, it provides a descriptive account of the lower courts after Thompson, which both makes evident the Court’s failure in problem identification and identifies the right problems to address next; and second, through answering the questions left open after Thompson, it provides the first account of malicious prosecution that solves the meaningful practical problems that have, until now, gone unaddressed. The goal of this Note is simple: to make Section 1983 malicious-prosecution suits work.

  1.  Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 294 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). ↑
  2.  Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1335 (2022). ↑
  3.  If a person was unlawfully arrested and then fought charges resulting from the false arrest for two years (and thus was procedurally barred from raising the claim, see Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994) (holding that a damages suit challenging the constitutionality of an imprisonment or conviction “is not cognizable under § 1983” unless plaintiff can demonstrate favorable termination of underlying criminal matter)), for example, the statute of limitations on that false-arrest claim might expire while the harm of the officer’s misconduct was still ongoing. Federal courts also generally abstain from hearing cases challenging state prosecutions while they are ongoing. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971) (reaffirming this principle); see also Brief for Federal Courts Scholars as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Thompson, 142 S. Ct. 1332 (No. 20-659) (clarifying that these doctrines and their underlying federalism rationales have little force after favorable termination). ↑
  4.  Compare Manuel v. City of Joliet, 590 F. App’x 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2015) (rejecting unlawful-arrest claim as time barred), with Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 360 (2017) (finding malicious-prosecution claim did not accrue until prosecution ended, thus extending time to file by about two months). ↑
  5.  See, e.g., Eric J. Wunsch, Note, Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment—Malicious Prosecution and 1983: Is There a Constitutional Violation Remediable Under Section 1983?, 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 878, 878 (1995) (arguing that malicious prosecutions violate the Procedural Due Process Clause); John T. Ryan, Note, Malicious Prosecution Claims Under Section 1983: Do Citizens Have Federal Recourse?, 64 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 776, 778 (1996) (favoring due process framework and disputing that Albright forecloses it); Esther M. Schonfeld, Malicious Prosecution as a Constitutional Tort, 15 Touro L. Rev. 1681, 1682 (1999) (describing Albright as a failed effort); Jacques L. Schillaci, Note, Unexamined Premises: Toward Doctrinal Purity in § 1983 Malicious Prosecution Doctrine, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 439, 443 (2002) (supporting “divorce” between malicious prosecution and Section 1983); Jacob Paul Goldstein, Note, From the Exclusionary Rule to a Constitutional Tort for Malicious Prosecutions, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 643, 657 (2006) (describing “a Fourth Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution” but suggesting that current version is not functional); Lyle Kossis, Note, Malicious Prosecution Claims in Section 1983 Lawsuits, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1635, 1637 (2013) (suggesting the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as better homes); Erin E. McMannon, Note, The Demise of § 1983 Malicious Prosecution: Separating Tort Law From the Fourth Amendment, 94 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1479, 1498–99 (2019) (arguing that no constitutional right to be free from malicious prosecution exists); Timothy Tymkovich & Hayley Stillwell, Malicious Prosecution as Undue Process: A Fourteenth Amendment Theory of Malicious Prosecution, 20 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 225, 228 (2022) (describing substantive due process as a “superior doctrinal account of malicious prosecution”). ↑
  6.  Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.). ↑
  7.  510 U.S. 266 (1994) (plurality opinion). ↑
  8.  580 U.S. 357 (2017). ↑
  9.  See, e.g., Kossis, supra note 5, at 1646–48 (describing post-Albright circuit splits); McMannon, supra note 5, at 1493 (same post-Manuel). ↑
  10.  142 S. Ct. 1332 (2022). ↑
  11.  See infra Section II.C. ↑
  12.  Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 1992). ↑
  13.  See infra Section II.C for discussion of the many differences between the circuits, and even within them, on the basic elements of a Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claim. ↑
  14.  See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1567, 1569 n.5 (2008) (suggesting that uniformity may be important where nonuniformity has tangible consequences or where questions of federal constitutional law are at stake). ↑
  15.  See Joanna C. Schwartz, Civil Rights Without Representation, 64 Wm. & Mary L. Rev 641, 650–52 (2023) (discussing difficulties securing counsel in civil-rights cases). ↑
  16.  Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1337 (2022). ↑
  17.  There is little guidance, generally, on what courts are supposed to make of probable cause. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, Probable Cause Pluralism, 129 Yale L.J. 1276, 1370 (2020) (“[I]n an effort to make probable cause mean everything at once, those entrusted with its enforcement have made it so vague as to mean almost nothing at all.”). As Professor Crespo has argued, existing probable-cause doctrine fails “to guide the judge through that decision—and to help everyone else predict how a judge might rule.” Id. at 1280. ↑
  18.  See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (holding that prosecutors have absolute immunity from Section 1983 malicious-prosecution suits). ↑

  19.  See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Pamela S. Karlan, Peter W. Low & George A. Rutherglen, Civil Rights Actions: Enforcing the Constitution 255 (5th ed. 2022); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—And Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 Va. L. Rev. 633, 637 (2006) (“[W]hen the Court dislikes an outcome or pattern of outcomes, it will often be equally possible for the Justices to reformulate applicable justiciability doctrine, substantive doctrine, or remedial doctrine.”). ↑

Ordinary Meaning and Plain Meaning

With textualism’s ascendancy, courts increasingly invoke the canon to assume “ordinary meaning” unless the context indicates otherwise and the rule to enforce “plain meaning” regardless of extratextual considerations. Yet the relationship between ordinary meaning and plain meaning can become confused in practice. Courts use the terms interchangeably, and they conflate them doctrinally.

Ordinary meaning and plain meaning are distinct. Ordinary meaning is what the text would convey to a reasonable English user in the context of everyday communication. Plain meaning refers to a judgment that whatever the text conveys in context is clear from the text. Thus, a term’s ordinary meaning is also its plain meaning only when it is clear from how the term is used in the statute that its context is ordinary, as opposed to technical. Courts conflate the two, however, when they assume ordinary meaning under the ordinary meaning canon and then conclude that they are therefore bound to enforce that meaning under the plain meaning rule. As a result, they end interpretation prematurely, excluding extratextual aids that might well show that the ordinary meaning assumption should give way.

This Article is the first to investigate the relationship between ordinary meaning and plain meaning. It clarifies their differences, identifies the ways in which they are conflated, and evaluates when they should converge. For textualists, greater clarity on this score illuminates when and how to bring ordinary meaning and plain meaning together in a principled manner. For methodological pluralists, understanding the gap between ordinary meaning and plain meaning opens opportunities to argue beyond the text in our increasingly textualist world.

Introduction

Today, the two most fundamental doctrines of statutory interpretation are the ordinary meaning canon and the plain meaning rule. The ordinary meaning canon: assume statutory terms bear their “ordinary meaning” unless the context indicates otherwise.1 1.E.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 152 (2007) (“In interpreting statutory texts courts use the ordinary meaning of terms unless context requires a different result.”).Show More The canon is regularly described as “the [m]ost [f]undamental [p]rinciple of [l]egal [i]nterpretation,”2 2.Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning: A Theory of the Most Fundamental Principle of Legal Interpretation (2015); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Law 33 (2016) (calling the ordinary meaning canon “[t]he prime directive in statutory interpretation”); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 69 (2012) (“The ordinary-meaning rule is the most fundamental semantic rule of interpretation.”).Show More and the Supreme Court has long treated it as an “axiom.”3 3.E.g., Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580 (1975).Show More The plain meaning rule: if the statutory text’s meaning is “plain” (as in clear), then a court must enforce that meaning regardless of other considerations.4 4.E.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (“[W]here . . . the statute’s language is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.’” (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917))).Show More The Supreme Court has deemed it the “cardinal” rule of statutory interpretation that comes “before all others.”5 5.Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992).Show More

Neither doctrine is textualism,6 6.Cf. John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419, 420 (2005) (“[T]extualism does not admit of a simple definition.”).Show More but their prominence has skyrocketed with textualism’s ascendancy.7 7.See, e.g., Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 1915, 1973–74 (finding from a statistical analysis of the U.S. Reports that the Supreme Court’s use of “plain meaning” and “ordinary meaning” has increased exponentially since the 1970s).Show More The ordinary meaning canon is an old practice with supporting aphorisms from Blackstone, Marshall, and Holmes,8 8.See1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *59 (“Words are generally to be understood in their usual and most known signification . . . .”); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827) (Marshall, C.J.) (observing that a legal text’s “words are to be understood in that sense in which they are generally used by those for whom the instrument was intended”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 417–18 (1899) (positing that legal interpretation asks “what [the] words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which they were used”).Show More and it “straddles judicial philosophies.”9 9.Valerie C. Brannon, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45153, Statutory Interpretation: Theories, Tools, and Trends 23 & n.238 (2022) (documenting how “all current members of the Supreme Court have invoked this rule of ordinary meaning”).Show More But the canon is particularly important to textualists.10 10.See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis: Redux, 70 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 855, 856 (2020) (“Textualism . . . insists that judges must construe statutory language consistent with its ‘ordinary meaning.’”).Show More Thus, courts invoke “ordinary meaning” today three times as often as they did half a century ago,11 11.Kevin Tobia, Brian G. Slocum & Victoria Nourse, Statutory Interpretation from the Outside, 122 Colum. L. Rev. 213, 217 (2022) [hereinafter Tobia et al., Statutory Interpretation] (finding from a sample of six million cases that “[o]ver the past fifty years, citation to ‘ordinary meaning’ has tripled”).Show More before the rise of “the new textualism.”12 12.SeeWilliam N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 623–24 (1990) (describing the development in the 1980s of a methodological commitment to enacted text over legislative history as “the new textualism”).Show More As for the plain meaning rule, it was not always in favor,13 13.In 1892, the Supreme Court famously articulated a quite different rule “that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.” Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).Show More and Judge Wald even wrote its obituary in the early 1980s.14 14.SeePatricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 195, 197–98 (1983); cf.Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The “Plain-Meaning Rule” and Statutory Interpretation in the “Modern” Federal Courts, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1299, 1302 (1975) (describing “the refusal of the courts to abandon” the plain meaning rule despite “reports of its death”).Show More But the plain meaning rule is textualism’s “bedrock principle,”15 15.Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 109, 164 (2010); see alsoJohn F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1287, 1309–10 (2010) (describing the “defining feature of ‘second-generation textualism’” to be the “proposition that courts must respect the terms of an enacted text when its semantic meaning is clear, even if it seems contrary to the statute’s apparent overall purpose”).Show More and the Supreme Court now invokes the plain meaning of text more than any other interpretive tool save for precedent.16 16.Cf.Anita S. Krishnakumar, Cracking the Whole Code Rule, 96 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76, 95–97 (2021) (finding that the “text/plain meaning” of a statute was the most used interpretive source other than precedent in a sample of statutory interpretation cases from 2005–2017 Supreme Court Terms).Show More Thus, when Justice Kagan said “we’re all textualists now,”17 17.Harvard Law School, The 2015 Scalia Lecture | A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YouTube, at 8:29–30 (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/‌wat‌ch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg [https://perma.cc/R67U-65ZS].Show More presumably she meant at least this: the text has primacy over other considerations and therefore controls if what it says is plain.18 18.Indeed, when Justice Kagan later quipped about this remark that “[i]t seems I was wrong,” she was faulting the Court for using a “get-out-of-text-free card[].” West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2641 (2022) (Kagan, J., dissenting); John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 113, 129–30 (describing “nontextualist” Justices’ acceptance of the plain meaning rule). On Justice Kagan’s remark and her later retraction, see generally Kevin Tobia, We’re Not All Textualists Now, 78 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 243 (2023).Show More

Yet despite how fundamental ordinary meaning and plain meaning are to our “law of interpretation,”19 19.William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1079, 1084–85 (2017) (developing an account of legal canons as part of the unwritten law that governs legal interpretation).Show More their relationship can become confused in practice. Courts, litigants, and commentators use the terms interchangeably20 20.See sources cited infra notes 310–11.Show More because “plain” can also be a synonym for “ordinary” (as in plain vanilla).21 21.William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 539, 545 (2017). The wonderful “plain vanilla” example is theirs.Show More And courts conflate them doctrinally by beginning interpretation with “ordinary meaning” (or “plain meaning” in the plain-vanilla sense) under the ordinary meaning canon and then concluding that they are therefore bound to end interpretation with that meaning, regardless of extratextual considerations, under the plain meaning rule.22 22.See infra Part III.Show More The problem is that statutes sometimes have technical (i.e., non-ordinary or specialized) meanings.23 23.SeeAmy Coney Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 2193, 2202 (2017) (noting that textualists accept that “terms are sometimes used in their ordinary and sometimes in their technical sense”).Show More When courts conflate ordinary meaning and plain meaning, they risk excluding extratextual interpretive aids that would illuminate whether the ordinary meaning assumption should give way to a different meaning.

Consider an example involving a term with a clear ordinary meaning but less clear statutory context. The Penobscot Nation is a “riverine” Native nation.24 24.H.R. Rep. No. 96-1353, at 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3786, 3787.Show More A statute defines the “Penobscot Indian Reservation” as “the islands in the Penobscot River reserved to the Penobscot Nation by agreement with the States of Massachusetts and Maine” as of June 29, 1818.25 25.Me. Stat. tit. 30, § 6203(8) (2023). The federal Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-420, § 3, 94 Stat. 1785, 1786–87 (1980), incorporates the definition from the Maine Implementing Act, Me. Stat. tit. 30, § 6203(8) (2023). See 25 U.S.C. § 1722(i).Show More An “island,” no doubt, ordinarily does not include its surrounding waters.26 26.SeePenobscot Nation v. Frey, 3 F.4th 484, 491 (1st Cir. 2021) (en banc) (determining from dictionary definitions that it is “clear” that “an island is ‘a piece of land’” and that “[l]and does not ordinarily mean land and water”).Show More But is it plain in this statutory context that “islands” excludes the waters? Notably, the provision references a historical agreement as well as a specific set of “islands,” and the Supreme Court has said that a reservation defined by reference to specific “islands” may encompass the surrounding waters.27 27.See Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 86–89 (1918) (interpreting a reference to “the body of lands known as Annette Islands” in the statutory definition of the Metlakahtla Reservation and holding that “the geographical name was used, as is sometimes done, in a sense embracing the intervening and surrounding waters as well as the upland—in other words, as descriptive of the area comprising the islands”).Show More Moreover, a neighboring provision guarantees fishing rights “within the boundaries of [the] Indian reservation[],”28 28.Me. Stat. tit. 30, § 6207(4) (2023).Show More and there is nowhere on the islands themselves to fish.29 29.Penobscot Nation v. Mills, 151 F. Supp. 3d 181, 186 (D. Me. 2015) (“None of those islands contains a body of water in which fish live.”).Show More The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit nevertheless felt bound to enforce the ordinary meaning of “island” under the plain meaning rule—regardless of what the historical agreement was, the purpose for codifying it, or the canon that ambiguous statutes are construed to Indians’ benefit.30 30.SeePenobscot Nation, 3 F.4th at 491 & n.5 (“Because ‘islands’ is an undefined term, we construe it in accordance with [its] ordinary meaning.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)); id. at 493 (citing McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2469 (2020) (“There is no need to consult extratextual sources when the meaning of a statute’s terms is clear.”)); see also id. at 490–91 (citing additional plain meaning precedents); id. at 496 (“[The statute’s] reference to these treaties does not alter the plain meaning of ‘islands’ and creates no ambiguity.”); id. at 503 (“This canon only applies to ambiguous provisions.”). But see County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992) (“[S]tatutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.” (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985))).Show More

Or consider an example of a term with a disputed ordinary meaning. Bostock v. Clayton County31 31.140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).Show More held that the federal bar on workplace discrimination “because of . . . sex”32 32.Id. at 1738 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).Show More protects employees against discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity.33 33.Id. at 1754.Show More Much has been written in Bostock’s wake on the differences among textualist Justices’ opinions in the case regarding what constitutes ordinary meaning.34 34.See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, Comment, Which Textualism?, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 265, 266 (2020) (“Bostock revealed . . . important tensions within textualism.”); Ilya Somin, Bostock v. Clayton County and the Debate over the Meaning of “Ordinary Meaning,” Volokh Conspiracy (June 19, 2020, 11:25 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/06/19/bostock-v-clayton-county-and-the-debate-over-the-meaning-of-ordinary-meaning/ [https://perma.cc/ZS6W-YN87] (describing “an interesting dispute over what exactly counts as ‘ordinary meaning’” between Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh in Bostock); Kevin Tobia & John Mikhail, Two Types of Empirical Textualism, 86 Brook. L. Rev. 461, 465–72 (2021) (arguing that Bostock revealed competing versions of “empirical textualism”—one focused on “what ordinary people understand [a provision] to mean, applying their own criteria” and the other focused “on the ordinary application of the established legal criterion . . . to interpret and apply the” provision).Show More Left out of that discussion is a stark point about what all the Justices signed on to: the provision’s ordinary meaning was its plain meaning. Indeed, after determining the provision’s “ordinary public meaning,”35 35.Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741 (“From the ordinary public meaning of the statute’s language at the time of the law’s adoption, a straightforward rule emerges: An employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based in part on sex.”).Show More the majority repeatedly justified enforcement of that meaning based on what the majority variously called the provision’s “plain meaning,”36 36.Id. at 1750.Show More “plain terms,”37 37.Id. at 1743, 1748–50, 1752.Show More “plain text,”38 38.Id. at 1751.Show More and “plain statutory command[].”39 39.Id. at 1754.Show More The dissenters drew a similar equation; they just found a different ordinary meaning.40 40.Seeinfra notes 404–07 and accompanying text.Show More Sharp intramural, text-based disputes over the ordinary meaning of the provision would seem to suggest at least that there were other plausible, even if less ordinary, readings of the text. Yet not a single Justice posited that there was any textual ambiguity warranting recourse to additional interpretive aids.

What’s more, Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion justified giving statutory terms their “ordinary public meaning” because “only the words on the page constitute the law adopted by Congress and approved by the President.”41 41.Bostock,140 S. Ct. at 1738.Show More Yet while the fact that only the text has met the Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements for making statutory law may justify enforcing its plain meaning, even textualists recognize that those requirements do not mandate reading the text according to its ordinary meaning.42 42.See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 71–72 (2001).Show More After all, the Constitution does not tell us how to read the text.

In short, how ordinary meaning and plain meaning relate under their respective doctrines has become something of an enigma in practice. Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner’s influential treatise on statutory interpretation even gives a cryptic secondary definition for the plain meaning rule as: “Loosely, the ordinary-meaning canon.”43 43.Scalia & Garner, supranote 2, at 436.Show More

While there are rich literatures on both ordinary meaning44 44.See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 99, 103, 114–15, 120–22.Show More and plain meaning,45 45.See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 135, 196, 215.Show More these literatures have studied the topics separately. Scholars have noted that ordinary meaning and plain (as in clear) meaning are different,46 46.SeeBaude & Doerfler, supra note 21, at 545 (noting that “plain” means obvious under the plain meaning rule, as distinguished from its occasional use “to denote something like ordinary meaning”); Eskridge, supra note 2, at 33 (“‘Plain meaning’ ought to be reserved for a judicial declaration that there is a clear legal meaning for the provision in question . . . .”); Peter W. Schroth, Language and Law, 46 Am. J. Compar. L. 17, 26 n.41 (Supp. 1998) (“Ordinary meaning seems to differ from plain meaning, in that the former denotes something like ‘the sense this expression usually has in such contexts’ while the latter may require absence of ambiguity.”); Slocum, supra note 2, at 23–25 (briefly distinguishing the ordinary meaning canon and plain meaning rule).Show More and others have flagged that “there may be important differences” even between ordinary meaning and plain-vanilla meaning.47 47.Kevin P. Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 726, 736 (2020) [hereinafter Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning]; see also Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 231, 234 n.6 (observing in a footnote “the important point that plain meaning is not equivalent to ordinary meaning”).Show More But no one has explained these differences in any depth. That is my goal—to clarify the differences between ordinary meaning and plain meaning, to identify the ways in which they are conflated, and to evaluate when they should converge.

My thesis: “ordinary meaning” under the ordinary meaning canon and “plain meaning” under the plain meaning rule have different definitions, functions, consequences, and justifications. Both are sensitive to context, however, because courts agree that statutory terms have meaning only in context.48 48.See infra note 84 and accompanying text.Show More Thus, a term bears its ordinary meaning unless the context indicates a technical meaning. But a term’s ordinary meaning is also its plain meaning only when it is plain from how the term is used in the statute that its context is ordinary, not technical. How plain must it be? Because “plainness” is ultimately a legal characterization,49 49.See Ryan D. Doerfler, How Clear Is “Clear”?, 109 Va. L. Rev. 651, 657–58 (2023); Richard M. Re, Clarity Doctrines, 86 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1497, 1505–09 (2019).Show More how plain (and to whom it must be plain) should depend on the court’s purposes for assuming ordinary meaning. The following roadmap previews the details.

Part I defines “meaning.” What the words and phrases in a statute “mean” in a legal sense differs from what they “mean” in a linguistic sense. Ordinary meaning and plain meaning are both claims about linguistic meaning—specifically, what the statutory words and phrases in context would convey to a reasonable English user. But the nature of their claims as well as the consequences for legal meaning are very different.

Part II clarifies the differences between ordinary meaning and plain meaning. First, different definitions: ordinary meaning refers to the content of what the statutory text would convey to a reasonable English user in the context of everyday communication. Plain meaning refers to a judgment that whatever the statutory text conveys in context is clear from the text. Second, different functions: ordinary meaning provides a starting point for what the statute means subject to other considerations, while plain meaning acts as an evidentiary rule to bar other considerations if the statute’s meaning is clear from the text. Third, different consequences: ordinary meaning provides a statute’s default legal meaning, while plain meaning specifies its legal meaning (arguably subject to absurdity). Fourth, different justifications: because statutes are not, in fact, everyday communications, ordinary meaning must ultimately be justified counterfactually (e.g., asking how an ordinary member of Congress, as opposed to a court, would interpret the statute) or by normative values (e.g., democracy and the rule of law). In contrast, courts enforce plain meaning for an epistemic reason: the clear meaning of the text that survived the constitutional process for making statutory law is the best evidence of the legal norms that Congress promulgated.

Part III identifies how courts conflate these differences in practice. Courts refer to ordinary meaning and plain meaning interchangeably, which can lead them to invoke the plain meaning rule to enforce plain-vanilla meaning. Courts also conflate the doctrines by relying on the plain meaning rule to enforce ordinary meaning merely absent a statutory definition, like in Penobscot Nation v. Frey, or other clear statement from Congress. And in recent cases, such as Bostock, the Supreme Court has begun to muddle their justifications, suggesting that the rationale for enforcing plain meaning mandates reading statutes according to their ordinary meaning.

Part IV evaluates when courts should enforce ordinary meaning as plain meaning. A term’s ordinary meaning—even when clear—is also its plain meaning only if the statutory context plainly supports that reading. Thus, ordinary meaning is not always plain meaning. But often they converge. Not only are there easy cases with only one—both ordinary and plain—meaning, but “plainness” also should not require the complete absence of alternative readings. Rather, whether a meaning is “plain” is ultimately a legal judgment that should depend on the court’s purposes for assuming ordinary meaning. If a court assumes that “island” bears its ordinary meaning as an expedient method to reach an agreement among the judges, then the question is “how plain to us?” and the threshold for plainness is low—the whole point is to reach a solution efficiently. But if a court assumes that “island” bears its ordinary meaning because, in a democracy, laws should be interpreted according to how the public would understand them, then the question changes to “how plain to ordinary people?” And the threshold for plainness may go up, depending on the court’s beliefs about how ordinary people distinguish between ordinary and technical language. Thus, for plain meaning, much depends on the reasons for ordinary meaning.

The Conclusion sums up the implications for legal practice. First, courts and litigators should be clear about when they are making a claim about ordinary meaning as opposed to plain meaning, given their different interpretive consequences. Second, courts should ensure they match the correct consequences to ordinary meaning and plain meaning respectively. Third, courts should enforce ordinary meaning as plain meaning only when it is plain from a term’s statutory context that it bears its ordinary meaning.

What lies outside this Article’s scope, however, is whether ordinary meaning and plain meaning are coherent guideposts for statutory interpretation. There is, to be sure, profound disagreement on that score. But what I take to be a less controversial point is that today’s practitioners and courts operate in an environment in which claims about ordinary meaning and plain meaning are facts of life. So this Article is written in the spirit that, regardless of one’s views on ordinary meaning and plain meaning, it is worth trying to understand how they relate.

  1.  E.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 152 (2007) (“In interpreting statutory texts courts use the ordinary meaning of terms unless context requires a different result.”). ↑
  2.  Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning: A Theory of the Most Fundamental Principle of Legal Interpretation (2015); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Law 33 (2016) (calling the ordinary meaning canon “[t]he prime directive in statutory interpretation”); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 69 (2012) (“The ordinary-meaning rule is the most fundamental semantic rule of interpretation.”). ↑
  3.  E.g., Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580 (1975). ↑
  4.  E.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (“[W]here . . . the statute’s language is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.’” (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917))). ↑
  5.  Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992). ↑
  6.  Cf. John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev
    .

    419, 420 (2005) (“[T]extualism does not admit of a simple definition.”). ↑

  7.  See, e.g., Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. Rev
    .

    1915, 1973–74 (finding from a statistical analysis of the U.S. Reports that the Supreme Court’s use of “plain meaning” and “ordinary meaning” has increased exponentially since the 1970s). ↑

  8.  See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *59 (“Words are generally to be understood in their usual and most known signification . . . .”); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827) (Marshall, C.J.) (observing that a legal text’s “words are to be understood in that sense in which they are generally used by those for whom the instrument was intended”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev
    .

    417, 417–18 (1899) (positing that legal interpretation asks “what [the] words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which they were used”). ↑

  9.  Valerie C. Brannon, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45153, Statutory Interpretation: Theories, Tools, and Trends 23 & n.238 (2022) (documenting how “all current members of the Supreme Court have invoked this rule of ordinary meaning”). ↑
  10.  See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis: Redux, 70 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev
    .

    855, 856 (2020) (“Textualism . . . insists that judges must construe statutory language consistent with its ‘ordinary meaning.’”). ↑

  11.  Kevin Tobia, Brian G. Slocum & Victoria Nourse, Statutory Interpretation from the Outside, 122 Colum. L. Rev
    .

    213, 217 (2022) [hereinafter Tobia et al., Statutory Interpretation] (finding from a sample of six million cases that “[o]ver the past fifty years, citation to ‘ordinary meaning’ has tripled”). ↑

  12.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev
    .

    621, 623–24 (1990) (describing the development in the 1980s of a methodological commitment to enacted text over legislative history as “the new textualism”). ↑

  13.  In 1892, the Supreme Court famously articulated a quite different rule “that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.” Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). ↑
  14.  See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 Iowa L. Rev
    .

    195, 197–98 (1983); cf. Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The “Plain-Meaning Rule” and Statutory Interpretation in the “Modern” Federal Courts, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1299, 1302 (1975) (describing “the refusal of the courts to abandon” the plain meaning rule despite “reports of its death”). ↑

  15.  Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. Rev
    .

    109, 164 (2010); see also John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 Calif. L. Rev

    .

    1287, 1309–10 (2010) (describing the “defining feature of ‘second-generation textualism’” to be the “proposition that courts must respect the terms of an enacted text when its semantic meaning is clear, even if it seems contrary to the statute’s apparent overall purpose”). ↑

  16.  Cf. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Cracking the Whole Code Rule, 96 N.Y.U. L. Rev
    .

    76, 95–97 (2021) (finding that the “text/plain meaning” of a statute was the most used interpretive source other than precedent in a sample of statutory interpretation cases from 2005–2017 Supreme Court Terms). ↑

  17.  Harvard Law School, The 2015 Scalia Lecture | A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YouTube, at 8:29–30 (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/‌wat‌ch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg [https://perma.cc/R67U-65ZS]. ↑
  18.  Indeed, when Justice Kagan later quipped about this remark that “[i]t seems I was wrong,” she was faulting the Court for using a “get-out-of-text-free card[].” West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2641 (2022) (Kagan, J., dissenting); John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev
    .

    113, 129–30 (describing “nontextualist” Justices’ acceptance of the plain meaning rule). On Justice Kagan’s remark and her later retraction, see generally Kevin Tobia, We’re Not All Textualists Now, 78 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 243 (2023). ↑

  19.  William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 Harv. L. Rev
    .

    1079, 1084–85 (2017) (developing an account of legal canons as part of the unwritten law that governs legal interpretation). ↑

  20.  See sources cited infra notes 310–11. ↑
  21.  William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev
    .

    539, 545 (2017). The wonderful “plain vanilla” example is theirs. ↑

  22.  See infra Part III. ↑
  23.  See Amy Coney Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev
    .

    2193, 2202 (2017) (noting that textualists accept that “terms are sometimes used in their ordinary and sometimes in their technical sense”). ↑

  24. H.R.

    Rep

    .

    No. 96-1353, at 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3786, 3787. ↑

  25.  Me. Stat. tit. 30, § 6203(8) (2023). The federal Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-420, § 3, 94 Stat. 1785, 1786–87 (1980), incorporates the definition from the Maine Implementing Act, Me. Stat. tit. 30, § 6203(8) (2023). See 25 U.S.C. § 1722(i). ↑
  26.  See Penobscot Nation v. Frey, 3 F.4th 484, 491 (1st Cir. 2021) (en banc) (determining from dictionary definitions that it is “clear” that “an island is ‘a piece of land’” and that “[l]and does not ordinarily mean land and water”). ↑
  27.  See Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 86–89 (1918) (interpreting a reference to “the body of lands known as Annette Islands” in the statutory definition of the Metlakahtla Reservation and holding that “the geographical name was used, as is sometimes done, in a sense embracing the intervening and surrounding waters as well as the upland—in other words, as descriptive of the area comprising the islands”). ↑
  28.  Me. Stat. tit. 30, § 6207(4) (2023). ↑
  29.  Penobscot Nation v. Mills, 151 F. Supp. 3d 181, 186 (D. Me. 2015) (“None of those islands contains a body of water in which fish live.”). ↑
  30.  See Penobscot Nation, 3 F.4th at 491 & n.5 (“Because ‘islands’ is an undefined term, we construe it in accordance with [its] ordinary meaning.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)); id. at 493 (citing McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2469 (2020) (“There is no need to consult extratextual sources when the meaning of a statute’s terms is clear.”)); see also id. at 490–91 (citing additional plain meaning precedents); id. at 496 (“[The statute’s] reference to these treaties does not alter the plain meaning of ‘islands’ and creates no ambiguity.”); id. at 503 (“This canon only applies to ambiguous provisions.”). But see County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992) (“[S]tatutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.” (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985))). ↑
  31.  140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). ↑
  32.  Id. at 1738 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). ↑
  33.  Id. at 1754. ↑
  34.  See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, Comment, Which Textualism?, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 265, 266 (2020) (“Bostock revealed . . . important tensions within textualism.”); Ilya Somin, Bostock v. Clayton County and the Debate over the Meaning of “Ordinary Meaning,” Volokh Conspiracy (June 19, 2020, 11:25 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/06/19/bostock-v-clayton-county-and-the-debate-over-the-meaning-of-ordinary-meaning/ [https://perma.cc/ZS6W-YN87] (describing “an interesting dispute over what exactly counts as ‘ordinary meaning’” between Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh in Bostock); Kevin Tobia & John Mikhail, Two Types of Empirical Textualism, 86 Brook. L. Rev
    .

    461, 465–72 (2021) (arguing that Bostock revealed competing versions of “empirical textualism”—one focused on “what ordinary people understand [a provision] to mean, applying their own criteria” and the other focused “on the ordinary application of the established legal criterion . . . to interpret and apply the” provision). ↑

  35.  Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741 (“From the ordinary public meaning of the statute’s language at the time of the law’s adoption, a straightforward rule emerges: An employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based in part on sex.”). ↑
  36.  Id. at 1750. ↑
  37.  Id. at 1743, 1748–50, 1752. ↑
  38.  Id. at 1751. ↑
  39.  Id. at 1754. ↑
  40.  See infra notes 404–07 and accompanying text. ↑
  41.  Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738. ↑
  42.  See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 71–72 (2001). ↑
  43.  Scalia & Garner
    ,

    supra note 2, at 436. ↑

  44.  See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 99, 103, 114–15, 120–22. ↑
  45.  See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 135, 196, 215. ↑
  46.  See Baude & Doerfler, supra note 21, at 545 (noting that “plain” means obvious under the plain meaning rule, as distinguished from its occasional use “to denote something like ordinary meaning”); Eskridge
    ,

    supra note 2, at 33 (“‘Plain meaning’ ought to be reserved for a judicial declaration that there is a clear legal meaning for the provision in question . . . .”); Peter W. Schroth, Language and Law, 46 Am. J. Compar. L. 17, 26 n.41 (Supp. 1998) (“Ordinary meaning seems to differ from plain meaning, in that the former denotes something like ‘the sense this expression usually has in such contexts’ while the latter may require absence of ambiguity.”); Slocum

    ,

    supra note 2, at 23–25 (briefly distinguishing the ordinary meaning canon and plain meaning rule). ↑

  47.  Kevin P. Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning, 134 Harv. L. Rev
    .

    726, 736 (2020) [hereinafter Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning]; see also Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 231, 234 n.6 (observing in a footnote “the important point that plain meaning is not equivalent to ordinary meaning”). ↑

  48.  See infra note 84 and accompanying text. ↑

  49.  See Ryan D. Doerfler, How Clear Is “Clear”?, 109 Va. L. Rev. 651, 657–58 (2023); Richard M. Re, Clarity Doctrines, 86 U. Chi. L. Rev

    .

    1497, 1505–09 (2019). ↑

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