Introduction
Environmental law has always been entwined with emergencies, with their interplay acting as a persistent force in shaping statutes and their implementation. Mass chemical exposures, oil spills, and toxic waste leaks spurred our landmark environmental legislation.1 1.Professor William Buzbee has summarized this phenomenon:Few environmental initiatives and resulting laws emerged from periods of cool, rational discussion. Instead, most environmental laws emerged from periods of widespread perceptions of crisis. The first federal Clean Water Act with legal teeth was enacted following the Cuyahoga River fire and widespread concern about the environment following the first Earth Day. The Clean Air Act was similarly enacted after . . . heightened awareness of environmental ills. The federal Superfund law . . . was enacted following widespread concern and publicity regarding hazardous waste contamination at Love Canal in upstate New York . . . .William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 57, 128–29 (1999) (footnotes omitted). Indeed, many agencies and administrative laws have arisen as Congress acted in the wake of emergencies such as natural disasters and economic crises. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1613, 1637–39 (2009) (tracing the pattern of enactment of administrative laws and grants of authority to the executive following the 2008 financial crisis and September 11th).Show More Today, some environmental emergencies are unforeseen disasters, and others have their roots in long-term failures of risk assessment or gaps in the law.2 2.See Buzbee, supra note 1, at 129; Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 Duke L.J. 1619, 1670–78 (2004); William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 48–51 (2003).Show More Indeed, not all modern environmental emergencies resemble sudden, high-visibility crises that dominate public attention.
Take the St. Croix Limetree Bay Refinery in the U.S. Virgin Islands. From above, the refinery pierces a cyan gradient of turquoise waters and verdant hills. But when the refinery restarted in 2021 after a hiatus in operations, it subjected 20,000 people to harrowing conditions.3 3.Bennington Coll. Ctr. for the Advancement of Pub. Action, Environmental Justice Begins in St. Croix, https://www.bennington.edu/center-advancement-of-public-action/environment-and-public-action/environmental-justice-begins-st [https://perma.cc/XAL9-RAXP] (last visited Sep. 12, 2026) (evaluating results from a community impact survey of 681 St. Croix residents and documenting widespread health and environmental harms from the Limetree Bay refinery restart).Show More That February, an “oily mist” rained down on the refinery’s downwind communities, coating housing, contaminating water cisterns, and leaving gardens slick and soiled.4 4.Limetree Bay Terminals, LLC, No. CAA-02-2021-1003, at 8–10 (EPA Region 2 May 14, 2021) [hereinafter Limetree Emergency Order] (Clean Air Act emergency order).Show More For weeks, people reported nausea and other symptoms linked to exposure to toxic chemicals, particularly hydrogen sulfide.5 5.Id. at 12, 14–15, 18–20.Show More A community survey revealed the severity of health and property damage from these choking emissions. Residents near the refinery reported a “dense fog” entering homes and daycares; intense sensations of suffocation; burning in their eyes, noses, and throats; workers and children collapsing.6 6.Bennington Coll. Ctr. for the Advancement of Pub. Action, supra note 3.Show More One resident described being “overt[aken]” by a cloud of emissions, then feeling “like it was eating [their] nervous system from the inside.”7 7.Id.; see also Limetree Emergency Order, supra note 4, at 12–18 (finding that the refinery had failed to properly use its hydrogen sulfide monitoring and capture system, and ignored community reports of health impacts).Show More
In response, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) did something extremely rare: it issued an emergency order under Section 303 of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).8 8.Limetree Emergency Order, supra note 4, at 1, 31.Show More The EPA ordered the refinery to cease operations, conduct audits, and submit a plan to undertake corrective measures.9 9.Id. at 31–40.Show More As Section 303’s sixty-day limit on administrative orders approached, the federal government filed a civil action seeking injunctive relief to continue the order’s protections.10 10.Id. at 45; Complaint at 14–15, 18, United States v. Limetree Bay Refin., LLC, No. 21-cv-00264 (D.V.I. July 12, 2021).Show More At the same time, Limetree Bay agreed by joint stipulation to keep the refinery idled unless it satisfied corrective requirements designed to eliminate endangerment from the facility’s emissions.11 11.See Joint Stipulation ¶¶ 1–12, Limetree Bay Refin., No. 21-cv-00264 (D.V.I. July 12, 2021) (filed simultaneously with the Complaint, stipulating that the refinery was idled, and detailing corrective action requirements should the refinery seek to restart operations). Limetree Bay ultimately sold the refinery. Following negotiations and litigation, the EPA and the new owners agreed on the necessary conditions to reopen the facility. Kit MacAvoy, EPA, Port Hamilton Enter New Order on Consent, V.I. Daily News (Aug. 26, 2024), https://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/news/epa-port-hamilton-enter-new-order-on-consent/article_21d22482-6343-11ef-b919-c3032de0f8ef.html [https://perma.cc/6CHL-S4CS].Show More
This Article uses the term “affirmative emergency powers” to refer to the type of provisions in environmental statutes that the EPA invoked against the Limetree Bay Refinery. These provisions authorize officials to sue for or order the immediate abatement or prevention of conditions that endanger health, welfare, or the environment. Federal and state legislatures have included affirmative emergency powers in numerous environmental statutes across the nation.12 12.See infra Section I.A.Show More
Affirmative emergency powers differ from conventional enforcement actions—the far more common and familiar administrative or civil judicial suits for permit violations or unpermitted pollution.13 13.Elsewhere I have detailed the processes and participants in conventional enforcement actions. See Sara A. Colangelo, Forging Complete Justice: Equitable Relief in Environmental Enforcement, 46 Harv. Env’t L. Rev. 315, 322–30 (2022). For additional information on the goals of environmental enforcement programs, see David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, A Holistic Look at Agency Enforcement, 93 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 10–13 (2014); Mark Seidenfeld & Janna Satz Nugent, “The Friendship of the People”: Citizen Participation in Environmental Enforcement, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 269, 270–71 (2005).Show More Environmental permits generally grant a holder limited rights to pollute.14 14.See generally NPDES Permit Basics, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-permit-basics [https://perma.cc/RE2K-K5NS] (last updated July 22, 2026) (noting that, under the Clean Water Act permitting regime, a permit will specify an allowable amount of pollution).Show More Conventional enforcement actions address compliance with permit limits for regulated pollutants or whether a polluter holds the appropriate permit. Permitting regimes across air, water, and land also tend to focus on individual sources or single pollutants, oftentimes without considering their collective effects on a particular location.15 15.See, e.g., Sanne H. Knudsen, Regulating Cumulative Risk, 101 Minn. L. Rev. 2313, 2316 (2017) (observing that “myopic, chemical-by-chemical analysis” misses cumulative risk); Off. of Rsch. & Dev., EPA, Cumulative Impacts Research: Recommendations for EPA’s Office of Research and Development 1–2 (2022), https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-09/Cumulative%20Impacts%20Research%20Final%20Report_FINAL-EPA%20600-R-22-014a.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UFN-7MWJ] (noting that “[t]he landmark environmental statutes [the] EPA draws its authority from . . . have historically been implemented by evaluating the risks and effects associated with exposure to a single pollutant in a single exposure medium” and highlighting their inadequacy to address the reality of pollution-based harms in certain locations).Show More And though they are a powerful check on violations of environmental law, conventional enforcement actions are sometimes insufficient to address serious threats.16 16.See infra Section II.A.Show More
When that happens, affirmative emergency powers can function as a critical backstop for environmental protection because they center risk and harm rather than numeric permit limits. So unlike conventional enforcement actions, officials can invoke affirmative emergency powers even when: polluters are in compliance with a permit;17 17.See infra Subsection II.A.1.Show More rulemaking or standard setting has yet to address new threats;18 18.See infra Subsection II.A.1.Show More regulatory systems result in toxic hotspots;19 19.See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, The Clean Air Act’s Blind Spot: Microclimates and Hotspot Pollution, 65 UCLA L. Rev. 1036, 1036, 1047, 1060–78 (2018) (arguing that “the ambient focus of the CAA, which requires the monitoring and regulation of large air districts to produce background levels of pollution that meet stringent federal standards, actually masks pollution hotspots,” which result in “[l]ow-income communities and communities of color [being] much more likely to live in polluted microclimates”).Show More pollution control approximations in permits or standards have drifted out of sync with real-world conditions; or individual facilities operate in compliance with their permits but nonetheless contribute to acute cumulative environmental burdens.20 20.See, e.g., Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law Outside the Canon, 89 Ind. L.J. 1239, 1241 (2014) (“Many environmental harms continue relatively unregulated.”); Off. of Enf’t & Compliance Assurance, EPA, Guidance on Section 303 of the Clean Air Act 13 (1999) [hereinafter Guidance on Section 303], https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2021-05/documents/transmittalofguidanceonsection303ofcaa040199.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7X5-9CN2] (“Section 303 applies to a broad range of endangerment scenarios. It applies regardless of whether a pollutant is regulated, or how it is regulated . . . [or] even if the plant is in compliance with its regulatory emissions limits . . . .”).Show More
This distinctive ability of affirmative emergency powers to mitigate dangerous conditions regardless of permit status can enable them to protect people and places from urgent hazards, including data center pollution, climate-driven environmental and health threats, severe cumulative pollution, and “forever chemicals.”21 21.See infra Subsections II.A.3, III.A.1 & III.A.3.Show More This is one reason I argue that affirmative emergency powers should not be seen as exceptional departures from democratic governance, a framing that understandably troubles many scholars.22 22.See infra Subsection II.B.3.Show More Rather, they should be understood as corrective mechanisms that re-anchor environmental governance to its underlying protective purpose when regulatory systems or conventional enforcement mechanisms fail and when unforeseen circumstances inevitably arise. Accordingly, affirmative emergency powers are—to borrow a phrase used by Professors Elena Chachko and Katerina Linos—“emergency powers for good.”23 23.Elena Chachko & Katerina Linos, Emergency Powers for Good, 66 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 69 (2024). However, affirmative emergency powers do not align with one element of their framework: societal-level transformation. Chachko and Linos “argue . . . that there exist narrow circumstances in which societal transformations can be appropriately achieved through emergency powers.” Id. at 9. That is beyond the scope of this Article.Show More
Despite these benefits, the use of affirmative emergency powers is exceedingly rare under three of the nation’s most commonly enforced environmental laws, namely the CAA, the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), and the Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”).24 24.See generally John C. Cruden & Bruce S. Gelber, Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement: Process, Actors, and Trends, 18 Nat. Res. & Env’t, Spring 2004, at 10, 17 (classifying the CAA and CWA as the most frequently enforced statutes in the federal civil context). While imperfect, the EPA’s case and consent decree dataset indicates that most enforcement matters concern alleged violations of the CAA or CWA. See Civil and Cleanup Enforcement Cases and Settlements, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/civil-and-cleanup-enforcement-cases-and-settlements [https://perma.cc/4CX6-QDNB] (last updated July 10, 2026).Show More For example, the EPA has issued orders under Section 303 of the CAA fewer than twenty times since 1970.25 25.Robert L. Glicksman & Johanna Adashek, Agency Authority to Address Chemicals of Emerging Concern: EPA’s Strategic Use of Emergency Powers to Address PFAS Air Pollution, 48 Harv. Env’t L. Rev. 369, 410 n.266 (2024) (listing sixteen invocations of Section 303 authority beginning in 1970). Enforcement officials act more frequently under the imminent hazard provisions of both the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), as described below. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Emergency Response and Planning Requirements Applicable to Unpermitted Air Pollution Releases, 2005 BYU L. Rev. 1075, 1154, 1156 (noting “[t]he emergency power to deal with imminent hazards under RCRA [S]ection 7003 has been used extensively” whereas “[t]he emergency power found in the CAA [S]ection 303 is rarely used”). Further scholarship may examine legal and administrative practice-based reasons for the significant divergence in implementation of these provisions.Show More Even in situations as extreme as the Flint Water Crisis, the EPA’s deployment of SDWA-based emergency powers has been infamously belated.26 26.Noah D. Hall, Essay, Flint’s Fight for Environmental Rights, 117 Nw. U. L. Rev. 123, 136–38 (2022). Some estimates count roughly five emergency orders issued under the SDWA per year. See Margot J. Pollans, Drinking Water Protection and Agricultural Exceptionalism, 77 Ohio St. L.J. 1195, 1239–40 & n.268 (2016) (describing the types of enforcement actions contemplated by the SDWA and the likely quantity of emergency actions per year, and hypothesizing as to why so few are brought).Show More
Why affirmative emergency powers are so rarely deployed under these laws remains unclear, in part because they have not been the subject of significant scholarly attention.27 27.See infra Section I.A (providing quantitative comparison between invocations of affirmative emergency powers and related scholarship under the CAA, CWA, and SDWA versus the RCRA and CERCLA). Further, as exemplified in the citations throughout this Article, these authorities are rarely the direct subject of legal scholarship. When discussed, they tend to be a peripheral component of an analysis. See, e.g., Michael S. Alushin, Enforcement of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21 Env’t L. 2217, 2224–25 (1991).Show More The Flint Water Crisis inspired a spate of scholarship exploring emergency powers under the SDWA, but research has since waned.28 28.The majority of legal scholarship focused on the Flint Water Crisis and the SDWA emergency authority specifically was published in or before 2021. See, e.g., Eric Moorman, “A Greater Sense of Urgency”: EPA’s Emergency Authority Under the SDWA and Lessons from Flint, Michigan, 47 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10786, 10787 (2017) (“EPA’s emergency powers under the SDWA are not well-known or well-studied; very little academic literature has explored § 1431 authority in any detail.”). A recent search on HeinOnline is illustrative. I searched for “Flint Water Crisis” in the heading of articles for the date ranges 2015–2021 and 2021–2026. For the former, HeinOnline returned thirty-nine search results; for the latter, only five.Show More Other scholarship has focused on discrete uses of the provisions, such as cleanups at federal facilities or their application under a single statutory provision.29 29.See, e.g., Charles de Saillan, The Use of Imminent Hazard Provisions of Environmental Laws to Compel Cleanup at Federal Facilities, 27 Stan. Env’t L.J. 43, 91–92 (2008) (examining affirmative emergency powers with a focus on leveraging the authorities to litigate cleanups of federal facilities polluted by government actors). Two academic articles from the 1970s centrally address the emergency authority under the CAA. See George E. Hardy, Jr., Paul Pate, Charles B. Robison & W.T. Willis, First Use of the Federal Clean Air Act’s Emergency Authority: A Local Analysis, 64 Am. J. Pub. Health 72, 75 (1974); Doug Rendleman, Legal Anatomy of an Air Pollution Emergency, 2 Env’t Affs. 90, 91–93 (1972); see also Joseph Brau, Note, Coordinating Coordination Requirements in Environmental Emergency Action Provisions, 100 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1211, 1233–41 (2025) (cataloging disparities in the consultation and coordination requirements across several affirmative environmental powers provisions in federal environmental laws).Show More For instance, Professors Robert Glicksman and Johanna Adashek recently analyzed the affirmative emergency powers provision of the CAA within a larger project to identify authorities to address contaminants known colloquially as “forever chemicals.”30 30.See Glicksman & Adashek, supra note 25, at 379 (discussed infra Section III.A).Show More
This Article builds on the limited literature on these provisions and extends environmental enforcement scholarship by foregrounding underexamined authorities to fill gaps in regulatory design and implementation. It engages with the principles of environmental justice and supporting scholarship to consider the goals of protection from disproportionate environmental burdens, but also of participatory power in decision-making. Further, this Article grapples with whether common critiques of broader executive emergency powers have salience for affirmative emergency powers.
Indeed, like other forms of emergency authority, the use of affirmative emergency powers involves trade-offs between expediency and process. This conceptual tension and associated criticisms feature prominently in the abundant literature on emergency powers vested in or delegated to the President. A deep bench of scholars has raised due process, pretextual use, emergency normalization, and other objections to constitutional and statutory-based executive emergency powers.31 31.See infra Sections II.B & III.B. Many of the articles critiquing emergency authority involve presidential declarations, which, though distinct from the authorities discussed herein, are nonetheless instructive for the types of concerns arising from use of emergency-based powers. See, e.g., Amy L. Stein, Energy Emergencies, 115 Nw. U. L. Rev. 799, 801 (2020) (“Emergency powers are also subject to abuse. Without meaningful constraints on a direct presidential delegation, a president is free to declare questionable emergencies to unlock these statutory powers. Even more controversial is when a president declares questionable emergencies to unlock these powers in direct contradiction of congressional intent. Because emergency powers are so broadly granted and representative procedure is so easily abandoned, the inevitable result can involve unaccountability and aggrandizement of the President.” (footnotes omitted)). Another vein of scholarship focuses on congressional delegation of emergency authority to an agency and whether that ameliorates the critiques Stein summarizes above. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s Statutory Authority over Agency Action, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2455, 2458–61 (2011); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 592–93 (1994) (discussing the extent of congressional power to structure agencies); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2255–58 (2001) (tracing the history and extent of congressional control of agencies).Show More But in the environmental context, I adopt Chachko and Linos’s contention that these eminently justified critiques nonetheless “miss[] . . . part of the picture. Emergency powers can be used in constructive ways that promote public goods.”32 32.Chachko & Linos, supra note 23, at 7 (emphasis added).Show More Building on that view, I argue that when deployed with practices that increase procedural transparency and participation, affirmative emergency powers can be reconciled with democratic norms and environmental justice aspirations for self-determination.33 33.See infra Sections II.B & III.B.Show More
Threaded throughout this Article is an urgency to better understand and harness existing authorities at a time when the landscape of legal options to advance environmental protection shrinks under federal retrenchments and burgeoning doctrinal barriers. Those retrenchments are reflected in diminished agency capacity, extensive rollbacks of environmental rules, and repudiation of longstanding statutory public health and welfare mandates.34 34.As of this writing, and based on publicly available information, over 200,000 federal employees have resigned or been terminated, with the EPA losing nearly 3,700 employees. Federal Harms Tracker: The Cost to Your Government, P’ship for Pub. Serv., https://ourpublicservice.org/federal-harms-tracker/cost-to-your-government/ [https://perma.cc/C3FR-TZKG] (last visited Sep. 12, 2026); Press Release, EPA, EPA Announces Reduction in Force, Reorganization Efforts to Save Taxpayers Nearly Three-Quarters of a Billion Dollars (July 18, 2025), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-announces-reduction-force-reorganization-efforts-save-taxpayers-nearly-three [https://perma.cc/39AS-8VDA]; see also Climate Backtracker, Sabin Ctr. for Climate Change L., https://climate.law.columbia.edu/content/climate-backtracker [https://perma.cc/5MMT-RZBU] (last visited Sep. 12, 2026) (identifying “steps taken by the Trump-Vance administration to scale back or wholly eliminate federal climate mitigation and adaptation measures”); Erika Kranz, Carrie Jenks & Sara Dewey, EPA’s Proposal to Eliminate the Endangerment Finding and Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Regulations 2–3, 6, 9–14 (2025).Show More Contemporaneously, the U.S. Supreme Court’s reworking of administrative law principles has constrained agencies’ interpretive authority and capacity for proactive regulation.35 35.See infra Subsection II.A.2.Show More Affirmative emergency powers, however, rest on clear, longstanding statutory delegations and operate at the level of individual facilities. Therefore, as detailed below, their use is comparatively well-insulated from many of the novel doctrines that could hinder more transformative regulatory strategies.
This Article also intervenes in a larger reimagining of environmental law necessitated by these changes to core aspects of administrative and environmental governance. My views here are animated by scholars across law, political science, and ecology who recast times of significant instability as predicates for reform.36 36.For example, “punctuated equilibrium theory” posits that policymaking is typically stable and incremental but occasionally experiences transformational change. See, e.g., Frank R. Baumgartner, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory and Environmental Policy, in Punctuated Equilibrium and the Dynamics of U.S. Environmental Policy 24, 25–26 (Robert Repetto ed., 2006).Show More Within this framing, I argue it is time to revisit affirmative emergency powers with a fresh lens.37 37.Legal scholars have explored the concept of punctuated equilibrium theory in dialogues about administrative change and legal evolution. See Mark C. Niles, Punctuated Equilibrium: A Model for Administrative Evolution, 44 J. Marshall L. Rev. 353, 377 (2011) (“[An] administrative version of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ provides a model for understanding the limited, but significant dynamic of administrative evolution.”); cf. Karrigan S. Börk, An Evolutionary Theory of Administrative Law, 72 SMU L. Rev. 81, 91–96 (2019) (delineating an evolutionary approach to administrative law change); J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 Hou. L. Rev. 933, 939–40 (1997) (critiquing barriers that preclude administrative agencies and environmental law from adapting to evolving regulatory needs); Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 Geo. L.J. 2407, 2415–19 (1995) (describing the process of “legal assimilation” of societal “priorities and information” in environmental law).Show More
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I is descriptive. It details the statutory provisions granting affirmative emergency powers to officials under the CAA, CWA, SDWA, and state analog statutes. To elucidate their scope, I highlight the statutes’ operative terms and standards, identify triggers for action, and describe the types of orders various officials may impose. I then briefly highlight the differences between these authorities and the far more prevalent emergency powers that circumvent environmental protections and processes.
Part II explores affirmative emergency powers’ capacity to advance environmental protection. First, it identifies key benefits regarding responsiveness to instances of dire environmental injustices and to threats that do not involve permit violations. It then outlines the reasons why deployment of affirmative emergency powers avoids much of the doctrinal upheaval inflicted by recent Supreme Court decisions. I conclude that affirmative emergency powers are neglected yet powerful tools for environmental protection and justice, and particularly so in this era of administrative law constraints and regulatory inertia. This Part also surfaces potential counter-considerations. I assess the merits of theoretical and practical challenges, while sketching the limits and drawbacks of using these authorities.
Part III offers a prescriptive framework to guide more effective deployment of affirmative emergency powers. It enumerates contexts where these interventions are especially well-suited to advance environmental protection because conventional enforcement tools have failed to respond adequately or contemporary regulatory regimes have left persistent gaps. I also set forth proposals to inform the use of affirmative emergency powers in ways that complement environmental justice values and diminish common concerns over broad executive emergency authorities.
- Professor William Buzbee has summarized this phenomenon:
Few environmental initiatives and resulting laws emerged from periods of cool, rational discussion. Instead, most environmental laws emerged from periods of widespread perceptions of crisis. The first federal Clean Water Act with legal teeth was enacted following the Cuyahoga River fire and widespread concern about the environment following the first Earth Day. The Clean Air Act was similarly enacted after . . . heightened awareness of environmental ills. The federal Superfund law . . . was enacted following widespread concern and publicity regarding hazardous waste contamination at Love Canal in upstate New York . . . .
William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 57, 128–29 (1999) (footnotes omitted). Indeed, many agencies and administrative laws have arisen as Congress acted in the wake of emergencies such as natural disasters and economic crises. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1613, 1637–39 (2009) (tracing the pattern of enactment of administrative laws and grants of authority to the executive following the 2008 financial crisis and September 11th). ↑
- See Buzbee, supra note 1, at 129; Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 Duke L.J. 1619, 1670–78 (2004); William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 48–51 (2003). ↑
- Bennington Coll. Ctr. for the Advancement of Pub. Action, Environmental Justice Begins in St. Croix, https://www.bennington.edu/center-advancement-of-public-action/environment-and-public-action/environmental-justice-begins-st [https://perma.cc/XAL9-RAXP] (last visited Sep. 12, 2026) (evaluating results from a community impact survey of 681 St. Croix residents and documenting widespread health and environmental harms from the Limetree Bay refinery restart). ↑
- Limetree Bay Terminals, LLC, No. CAA-02-2021-1003, at 8–10 (EPA Region 2 May 14, 2021) [hereinafter Limetree Emergency Order] (Clean Air Act emergency order). ↑
- Id. at 12, 14–15, 18–20. ↑
- Bennington Coll. Ctr. for the Advancement of Pub. Action, supra note 3. ↑
- Id.; see also Limetree Emergency Order, supra note 4, at 12–18 (finding that the refinery had failed to properly use its hydrogen sulfide monitoring and capture system, and ignored community reports of health impacts). ↑
- Limetree Emergency Order, supra note 4, at 1, 31. ↑
- Id. at 31–40. ↑
- Id. at 45; Complaint at 14–15, 18, United States v. Limetree Bay Refin., LLC, No. 21-cv-00264 (D.V.I. July 12, 2021). ↑
- See Joint Stipulation ¶¶ 1–12, Limetree Bay Refin., No. 21-cv-00264 (D.V.I. July 12, 2021) (filed simultaneously with the Complaint, stipulating that the refinery was idled, and detailing corrective action requirements should the refinery seek to restart operations). Limetree Bay ultimately sold the refinery. Following negotiations and litigation, the EPA and the new owners agreed on the necessary conditions to reopen the facility. Kit MacAvoy, EPA, Port Hamilton Enter New Order on Consent, V.I. Daily News (Aug. 26, 2024), https://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/news/epa-port-hamilton-enter-new-order-on-consent/article_21d22482-6343-11ef-b919-c3032de0f8ef.html [https://perma.cc/6CHL-S4CS]. ↑
- See infra Section I.A. ↑
- Elsewhere I have detailed the processes and participants in conventional enforcement actions. See Sara A. Colangelo, Forging Complete Justice: Equitable Relief in Environmental Enforcement, 46 Harv. Env’t L. Rev. 315, 322–30 (2022). For additional information on the goals of environmental enforcement programs, see David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, A Holistic Look at Agency Enforcement, 93 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 10–13 (2014); Mark Seidenfeld & Janna Satz Nugent, “The Friendship of the People”: Citizen Participation in Environmental Enforcement, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 269, 270–71 (2005). ↑
- See generally NPDES Permit Basics, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-permit-basics [https://perma.cc/RE2K-K5NS] (last updated July 22, 2026) (noting that, under the Clean Water Act permitting regime, a permit will specify an allowable amount of pollution). ↑
- See, e.g., Sanne H. Knudsen, Regulating Cumulative Risk, 101 Minn. L. Rev. 2313, 2316 (2017) (observing that “myopic, chemical-by-chemical analysis” misses cumulative risk); Off. of Rsch. & Dev., EPA, Cumulative Impacts Research: Recommendations for EPA’s Office of Research and Development 1–2 (2022), https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-09/Cumulative%20Impacts%20Research%20Final%20Report_FINAL-EPA%20600-R-22-014a.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UFN-7MWJ] (noting that “[t]he landmark environmental statutes [the] EPA draws its authority from . . . have historically been implemented by evaluating the risks and effects associated with exposure to a single pollutant in a single exposure medium” and highlighting their inadequacy to address the reality of pollution-based harms in certain locations). ↑
- See infra Section II.A. ↑
- See infra Subsection II.A.1. ↑
- See infra Subsection II.A.1. ↑
- See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, The Clean Air Act’s Blind Spot: Microclimates and Hotspot Pollution, 65 UCLA L. Rev. 1036, 1036, 1047, 1060–78 (2018) (arguing that “the ambient focus of the CAA, which requires the monitoring and regulation of large air districts to produce background levels of pollution that meet stringent federal standards, actually masks pollution hotspots,” which result in “[l]ow-income communities and communities of color [being] much more likely to live in polluted microclimates”). ↑
- See, e.g., Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law Outside the Canon, 89 Ind. L.J. 1239, 1241 (2014) (“Many environmental harms continue relatively unregulated.”); Off. of Enf’t & Compliance Assurance, EPA, Guidance on Section 303 of the Clean Air Act 13 (1999) [hereinafter Guidance on Section 303], https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2021-05/documents/transmittalofguidanceonsection303ofcaa040199.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7X5-9CN2] (“Section 303 applies to a broad range of endangerment scenarios. It applies regardless of whether a pollutant is regulated, or how it is regulated . . . [or] even if the plant is in compliance with its regulatory emissions limits . . . .”). ↑
- See infra Subsections II.A.3, III.A.1 & III.A.3. ↑
- See infra Subsection II.B.3. ↑
- Elena Chachko & Katerina Linos, Emergency Powers for Good, 66 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 69 (2024). However, affirmative emergency powers do not align with one element of their framework: societal-level transformation. Chachko and Linos “argue . . . that there exist narrow circumstances in which societal transformations can be appropriately achieved through emergency powers.” Id. at 9. That is beyond the scope of this Article. ↑
- See generally John C. Cruden & Bruce S. Gelber, Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement: Process, Actors, and Trends, 18 Nat. Res. & Env’t, Spring 2004, at 10, 17 (classifying the CAA and CWA as the most frequently enforced statutes in the federal civil context). While imperfect, the EPA’s case and consent decree dataset indicates that most enforcement matters concern alleged violations of the CAA or CWA. See Civil and Cleanup Enforcement Cases and Settlements, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/civil-and-cleanup-enforcement-cases-and-settlements [https://perma.cc/4CX6-QDNB] (last updated July 10, 2026). ↑
- Robert L. Glicksman & Johanna Adashek, Agency Authority to Address Chemicals of Emerging Concern: EPA’s Strategic Use of Emergency Powers to Address PFAS Air Pollution, 48 Harv. Env’t L. Rev. 369, 410 n.266 (2024) (listing sixteen invocations of Section 303 authority beginning in 1970). Enforcement officials act more frequently under the imminent hazard provisions of both the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), as described below. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Emergency Response and Planning Requirements Applicable to Unpermitted Air Pollution Releases, 2005 BYU L. Rev. 1075, 1154, 1156 (noting “[t]he emergency power to deal with imminent hazards under RCRA [S]ection 7003 has been used extensively” whereas “[t]he emergency power found in the CAA [S]ection 303 is rarely used”). Further scholarship may examine legal and administrative practice-based reasons for the significant divergence in implementation of these provisions. ↑
- Noah D. Hall, Essay, Flint’s Fight for Environmental Rights, 117 Nw. U. L. Rev. 123, 136–38 (2022). Some estimates count roughly five emergency orders issued under the SDWA per year. See Margot J. Pollans, Drinking Water Protection and Agricultural Exceptionalism, 77 Ohio St. L.J. 1195, 1239–40 & n.268 (2016) (describing the types of enforcement actions contemplated by the SDWA and the likely quantity of emergency actions per year, and hypothesizing as to why so few are brought). ↑
- See infra Section I.A (providing quantitative comparison between invocations of affirmative emergency powers and related scholarship under the CAA, CWA, and SDWA versus the RCRA and CERCLA). Further, as exemplified in the citations throughout this Article, these authorities are rarely the direct subject of legal scholarship. When discussed, they tend to be a peripheral component of an analysis. See, e.g., Michael S. Alushin, Enforcement of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21 Env’t L. 2217, 2224–25 (1991). ↑
- The majority of legal scholarship focused on the Flint Water Crisis and the SDWA emergency authority specifically was published in or before 2021. See, e.g., Eric Moorman, “A Greater Sense of Urgency”: EPA’s Emergency Authority Under the SDWA and Lessons from Flint, Michigan, 47 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10786, 10787 (2017) (“EPA’s emergency powers under the SDWA are not well-known or well-studied; very little academic literature has explored § 1431 authority in any detail.”). A recent search on HeinOnline is illustrative. I searched for “Flint Water Crisis” in the heading of articles for the date ranges 2015–2021 and 2021–2026. For the former, HeinOnline returned thirty-nine search results; for the latter, only five. ↑
- See, e.g., Charles de Saillan, The Use of Imminent Hazard Provisions of Environmental Laws to Compel Cleanup at Federal Facilities, 27 Stan. Env’t L.J. 43, 91–92 (2008) (examining affirmative emergency powers with a focus on leveraging the authorities to litigate cleanups of federal facilities polluted by government actors). Two academic articles from the 1970s centrally address the emergency authority under the CAA. See George E. Hardy, Jr., Paul Pate, Charles B. Robison & W.T. Willis, First Use of the Federal Clean Air Act’s Emergency Authority: A Local Analysis, 64 Am. J. Pub. Health 72, 75 (1974); Doug Rendleman, Legal Anatomy of an Air Pollution Emergency, 2 Env’t Affs. 90, 91–93 (1972); see also Joseph Brau, Note, Coordinating Coordination Requirements in Environmental Emergency Action Provisions, 100 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1211, 1233–41 (2025) (cataloging disparities in the consultation and coordination requirements across several affirmative environmental powers provisions in federal environmental laws). ↑
- See Glicksman & Adashek, supra note 25, at 379 (discussed infra Section III.A). ↑
- See infra Sections II.B & III.B. Many of the articles critiquing emergency authority involve presidential declarations, which, though distinct from the authorities discussed herein, are nonetheless instructive for the types of concerns arising from use of emergency-based powers. See, e.g., Amy L. Stein, Energy Emergencies, 115 Nw. U. L. Rev. 799, 801 (2020) (“Emergency powers are also subject to abuse. Without meaningful constraints on a direct presidential delegation, a president is free to declare questionable emergencies to unlock these statutory powers. Even more controversial is when a president declares questionable emergencies to unlock these powers in direct contradiction of congressional intent. Because emergency powers are so broadly granted and representative procedure is so easily abandoned, the inevitable result can involve unaccountability and aggrandizement of the President.” (footnotes omitted)). Another vein of scholarship focuses on congressional delegation of emergency authority to an agency and whether that ameliorates the critiques Stein summarizes above. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s Statutory Authority over Agency Action, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2455, 2458–61 (2011); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 592–93 (1994) (discussing the extent of congressional power to structure agencies); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2255–58 (2001) (tracing the history and extent of congressional control of agencies). ↑
- Chachko & Linos, supra note 23, at 7 (emphasis added). ↑
- See infra Sections II.B & III.B. ↑
- As of this writing, and based on publicly available information, over 200,000 federal employees have resigned or been terminated, with the EPA losing nearly 3,700 employees. Federal Harms Tracker: The Cost to Your Government, P’ship for Pub. Serv., https://ourpublicservice.org/federal-harms-tracker/cost-to-your-government/ [https://perma.cc/C3FR-TZKG] (last visited Sep. 12, 2026); Press Release, EPA, EPA Announces Reduction in Force, Reorganization Efforts to Save Taxpayers Nearly Three-Quarters of a Billion Dollars (July 18, 2025), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-announces-reduction-force-reorganization-efforts-save-taxpayers-nearly-three [https://perma.cc/39AS-8VDA]; see also Climate Backtracker, Sabin Ctr. for Climate Change L., https://climate.law.columbia.edu/content/climate-backtracker [https://perma.cc/5MMT-RZBU] (last visited Sep. 12, 2026) (identifying “steps taken by the Trump-Vance administration to scale back or wholly eliminate federal climate mitigation and adaptation measures”); Erika Kranz, Carrie Jenks & Sara Dewey, EPA’s Proposal to Eliminate the Endangerment Finding and Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Regulations 2–3, 6, 9–14 (2025). ↑
- See infra Subsection II.A.2. ↑
- For example, “punctuated equilibrium theory” posits that policymaking is typically stable and incremental but occasionally experiences transformational change. See, e.g., Frank R. Baumgartner, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory and Environmental Policy, in Punctuated Equilibrium and the Dynamics of U.S. Environmental Policy 24, 25–26 (Robert Repetto ed., 2006). ↑
-
Legal scholars have explored the concept of punctuated equilibrium theory in dialogues about administrative change and legal evolution. See Mark C. Niles, Punctuated Equilibrium: A Model for Administrative Evolution, 44 J. Marshall L. Rev. 353, 377 (2011) (“[An] administrative version of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ provides a model for understanding the limited, but significant dynamic of administrative evolution.”); cf. Karrigan S. Börk, An Evolutionary Theory of Administrative Law, 72 SMU L. Rev. 81, 91–96 (2019) (delineating an evolutionary approach to administrative law change); J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 Hou. L. Rev. 933, 939–40 (1997) (critiquing barriers that preclude administrative agencies and environmental law from adapting to evolving regulatory needs); Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 Geo. L.J. 2407, 2415–19 (1995) (describing the process of “legal assimilation” of societal “priorities and information” in environmental law). ↑
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