Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty

Most state court judges are elected to office, and thus must be attentive to voter preferences just like other elected officials. Critics of judicial elections fear that subjecting judges to majoritarian pressures jeopardizes the rights of disfavored groups and undermines the rule of law, and accordingly call for their abolition. The reality, however, is that judicial elections are firmly entrenched in thirty-eight states, and thus appear to be a permanent part of the legal landscape. 

This article suggests that the so-called “majoritarian difficulty” posed by elected judges can be tempered by regular interactions with appointed, life-tenured federal judges, who are better insulated from public opinion. By constitutional design, the federal courts work closely with their state counterparts, overseeing state court decisions and sharing jurisdiction over questions of both state and federal law. As a result, federal courts have the potential to offset majoritarian influences on state courts by reviewing state court decisions, issuing binding and persuasive precedent on questions of federal and state law, and providing state courts with political cover for unpopular decisions. Most important, litigants can often frame their cases to get into federal court when they fear that an elected state court judge would be likely to rule against them. 

After describing the important role that federal courts can play in diluting majoritarian influences on elected state court judges, the article then examines empirical evidence suggesting that federal courts are, in fact, more involved in overseeing elected state court judges than their appointed counterparts. The article concludes by asserting that federal courts should assume a more proactive role in mitigating the majoritarian difficulty by taking a state’s judicial selection method into account when making jurisdictional choices. 

Warrantless Searches in a Digital World: Limiting the Private Search Exception for Computer Investigations

The “Private Search” exception to the Fourth Amendment allows law enforcement officers to re-create, without a warrant, a search conducted by a private individual, provided two conditions are met. First, the individual may not act at the behest of the government (the agency prong) and second, officers may not search beyond what was already discovered by the private searcher (the scope prong). The exception is premised on the theory that the private searcher destroyed whatever expectation of privacy the suspect had in his information, thereby eliminating any Fourth Amendment protection. In applying this otherwise well-understood exception to searches of computers, however, courts have adopted widely varying approaches based on divergent assumptions and leading to dramatically different results. This Note argues that, because of the nature of computer storage, courts should narrow the application of the private search exception by broadly interpreting the “agency” prong and narrowly interpreting the “scope” prong. Such an approach maintains the purpose of the exception without unduly sacrificing informational privacy or law enforcement efficacy.

Record Viewership: Towards a Theoretical Framework for the Video Record

It has been almost thirty years since the use of videotapes to create trial records began to gain acceptance in this country, but many questions linger about the impact of video records on issues related to appellate review. While there has been a recent movement towards the expansion of video record use in lieu of court stenographers, many states continue to use both methods and the replacement of stenography with video records is highly controversial. The argument has recently been made that the video record is both more accurate and cost-effective than stenography, but the implications of thoroughly integrating video into the court system have not been fully considered. Particularly in the area of appellate review, a theoretical framework is needed to facilitate decision-making about the integration of the video record into American jurisprudence. This Note examines the current debate over which method of creating a trial record is preferable, analyzes potential legal issues created by a switch to video recording, and argues that a transition to the video record must be accompanied by a detailed, carefully considered framework for appellate review. Finally, this Note proposes a basic theoretical framework for dealing with the most important known ramifications of a transition to the video record.