Taking “Due Account” of the APA’s Prejudicial Error Rule

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) incorporates the principle of harmless error in its provision for judicial review. It instructs courts to take “due account” of the “rule of prejudicial error.” Pervasive as the rule is, no one has fully described how the rule operates in administrative cases. This Note seeks to fill the gap in the literature, and finds a half-finished, often inconsistent framework in need of completion.

Courts generally require challengers of agency action to demonstrate that errors were harmless, but on rare occasion will shift the burden to an agency. Wherever the burden lies, courts often choose one of two tests for prejudice. An “outcome-based” standard, applied primarily to substantive errors, asks whether the agency would have arrived at the same result absent its mistake. A “record-based” standard is used only for procedural errors and asks whether the record before the agency is different thanks to a mistake. But these two tests are used inconsistently, and other standards are often introduced in almost haphazard fashion.

The Note offers several suggestions to improve the prejudicial error framework, including a replacement for the record-based test called the “contribution-based” standard. Rather than focus on agencies, the proposed standard looks to challengers. It asks whether an error limited a challenger’s contributions to the administrative proceeding regardless of what other parties had to say. The test strikes a better balance between regulated parties’ interests in participating in the administrative process and other values.

The Hidden Function of Takings Compensation

To date, scholars have justified the constitutional mandate to pay compensation for takings of property on the intuitively appealing grounds that fairness demands recompensing aggrieved owners; on the basis of a belief that government that fails to pay will suffer from “fiscal illusion” and take excessively; or due to the need to neutralize politically powerful property owners who would otherwise foil socially beneficial projects.

This Essay offers a new explanation of the role of takings compensation in ensuring good government. Inspired by public choice theory, we argue that takings compensation is intended to reduce the incentives for corruption by limiting the ability of politicians to profit from takings. Specifically, we show that mandating compensation reduces the funds self-serving politicians can extort from property owners. At the same time, mandating compensation permits publicly oriented politicians to continue pursuing socially beneficial projects.

This justification for compensation also yields important insights into the optimal structure of takings compensation. First, current incentives to use eminent domain excessively in the service of private developers cannot be blunted by modifying compensation policy. These undesirable incentives can be reduced or eliminated only by a separate policy that charges developers for the benefits they receive. Second, overcompensation is even worse than under-compensation insofar as corruption is concerned. For this reason, we should look skeptically at laws requiring the payment of fixed percentage bonus above market value to property condemnees. Additionally, market value compensation might be attractive, notwithstanding its shortcomings, where judges are thought systematically to overrate the subjective value owners attach to their properties. Third, our theory demonstrates that a private insurance system for compensating property owners for takings is not only impractical but undesirable, as it, too, could encourage political corruption.

Multiple Gatekeepers

In the context of business transactions, gatekeepers are lawyers, investment bankers, accountants and other actors with the capacity to monitor and control the disclosure decisions of their clients – and thereby to deter corporate securities fraud. After each wave of corporate upheaval, including the recent financial crisis, the spotlight of responsibility invariably falls on gatekeepers for failing to avert the wrongs of their clients. A rich vein of literature has considered what liability regime would lead gatekeepers optimally to deter securities fraud, but has overlooked the phenomenon that multiple interdependent gatekeepers act on business transactions and thus form an interlocking web of protection against wrongdoing. To date the literature has adopted a unitary conception of the gatekeeper, assuming that a single gatekeeper acts on a transaction or, where multiple gatekeepers are involved, that each is independently capable of deterring securities fraud.

This article explains the pattern of multiple gatekeeper involvement that characterizes business transactions. It analyzes why gatekeepers exist at all and why corporations turn to a multiplicity of them for most transactions. It then extends gatekeeper liability theory to account explicitly for the possibility that the fraud-deterrence capacity of gatekeepers will be interdependent, and not simply independent. In doing so, the article draws on optimal deterrence theory and analogizes the position of multiple gatekeepers with that of joint tortfeasors. The article also assesses the U.S. federal securities law regime from the perspective of the prescriptions of gatekeeper liability theory, identifying gaps in the regime that arise from the fragmentation of gatekeeping services and suggesting reforms designed to compel cooperation among gatekeepers to fill them. The theory has implications for the post-financial crisis reform proposals that would impose gatekeeper liability on credit rating agencies, which the article specifically considers.