Habeas Corpus, Due Process and the Suspension Clause: A Study in the Foundations of American Constitutionalism

Ever since the attacks of September 11, 2001, constitutional scholars have been exploring the controversial issues surrounding the so-called “Emergency Constitution.” One of the very few provisions of the Constitution that explicitly contemplates such emergency situations is Article I, section 9, concerning the writ of habeas corpus. That provision prohibits suspension of the “Great Writ,” except “when in cases of [r]ebellion or [i]nvasion the public [s]afety may require it.”

The writ of habeas corpus has long stood as the primary weapon against the development of tyranny. It enables a court to demand that the executive produce individuals it is detaining and explain the lawful basis for that detention, and to order the detainees’ release if it finds the confinement to be unlawful. Absent the availability of habeas corpus, there would exist no legal means of preventing those in power from arresting any individual they want, for as long as they want, regardless of the legitimacy of the arrest. Yet pursuant to the so-called Suspension Clause, in times of rebellion or invasion the government is authorized to suspend the writ.

Highly respected scholars have recently engaged in an intense debate over the meaning and implications of the Suspension Clause. All of them, however, have seriously missed the mark, because all have assumed the continuing validity of that Clause. In this Article, we argue that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment effectively repeals the Suspension Clause. We reach this conclusion for two reasons: first, the Suspension Clause indisputably authorizes summary detention without the availability of any form of hearing before a neutral adjudicator. Whatever “due process” means at its outer fringes, there is no doubt that such a practice deprives an individual of liberty without due process of law. Yet the Due Process Clause, on its face, is unlimited in its application; it contemplates no exceptions, when an individual is to be deprived of life, liberty or property. Thus, purely as a matter of textual construction, the Due Process Clause, contained in an amendment, supersedes the Suspension Clause, which appears in the body of the Constitution. Moreover, it is important to recognize that the Suspension Clause authorizes tyrannical practices wholly inconsistent with and undermining of foundational precepts of American Constitutionalism. This concept dictates a governmental commitment to the rule of law and to limited governmental authority over its citizens. The Due Process Clause should be deemed to protect these core values. After establishing the supremacy of the Due Process Clause, the Article carefully explores the manner in which the Due Process Clause should be found to limit coercive governmental authority in times of national crisis.

Taxing Punitive Damages

There is a curious anomaly in the law of punitive damages. Jurors assess punitive damages in an amount that they believe will best “punish” the defendant. But, in fact, defendants are not always punished to the degree that the jury intends. Under the Internal Revenue Code, punitive damages paid by business defendants are tax deductible and, as a result, these defendants often pay (in real dollars) far less than the jury believed they deserved to pay.

To solve this problem of under-punishment, many scholars and policymakers, including President Obama, have proposed making punitive damages nondeductible in all cases. In our view, however, such a blanket nondeductibility rule would, notwithstanding its theoretical elegance, be ineffective in solving the under-punishment problem. In particular, defendants could easily circumvent the nondeductibility rule by disguising punitive damages as compensatory damages in pre-trial settlements.

Instead, the under-punishment problem is best addressed at the state level by making juries “tax aware.” Tax-aware juries would adjust the amount of punitive damages to impose the desired after-tax cost to the defendant. As we explain, the effect of tax awareness cannot be circumvented by defendants through pre-trial settlements. For this and a number of other reasons, tax awareness would best solve the under-punishment problem even though it does come at the cost of enlarging plaintiff windfalls. However, given the defendant-focused features of current punitive damages doctrine, this cost is not particularly troubling.

Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure: A Reassessment

In the last decade, magistrate judges around the United States have introduced a new practice of regulating the search and seizure of computers by imposing restrictions on computer warrants. These ex ante restrictions are imposed as conditions of obtaining a warrant: Magistrate judges refuse to sign warrant applications unless the government agrees to the magistrate’s limitation on how the warrant will be executed. These limitations vary from magistrate to magistrate, but they generally target four different stages of how computer warrants are executed: the on-site seizure of computers, the timing of the subsequent off-site search, the method of the off-site search, and the return of the seized computers when searches are complete.

This Article contends that ex ante restrictions on the execution of computer warrants are both unconstitutional and unwise. The Fourth Amendment does not permit judges to devise limits on the execution of warrants. When such limits are imposed, they have no legal effect. The imposition of ex ante limits on computer warrants is also harmful: Ex ante assessments of reasonableness in ex parte proceedings are highly error-prone, and they end up prohibiting reasonable practices when paired with ex post review. Although ex ante restrictions may seem necessary in light of the present uncertainty of computer search and seizure law, such restrictions end up having the opposite effect. By transforming litigation of the lawfulness of a warrant’s execution into litigation focusing on compliance with restrictions rather than reasonableness, ex ante restrictions prevent the development of reasonableness standards to be imposed ex post that are needed to regulate the new computer search process. Magistrate judges should refuse to impose such restrictions and should let the law develop via judicial review ex post.