When White Supremacists Invade a City

In August 2017, hundreds of white supremacists came to Charlottesville, Virginia, ostensibly to protest the city council’s decision to remove a statue of Robert E. Lee. This Essay argues that Charlottesville’s vulnerability in the face of white supremacist invasions is a feature of all cities’ liminal status in American law. Municipal corporations neither enjoy the full power of the state nor the rights accorded individuals and private corporations. Among other limitations, state law restricts Charlottesville’s authority to remove Confederate war memorials or to regulate firearms. So too, our current constitutional doctrine does not easily permit cities to assert First Amendment rights against state-mandated local government speech. Nor can cities readily assert a collective civil or constitutional right to be free from violence and intimidation. The lack of either municipal power or municipal rights means that a city faced with the symbolic and physical “takeover” of its downtown by heavily armed aggressors has limited legal resources with which to respond.

“That we have fallen into the habit of treating the city as a mere jurisdictional entity, subject to the whims of the state, is unnecessary. And it means that the next time the white supremacists come to town, the city will still not have the tools to defend itself.”

Introduction

CHARLOTTESVILLE is a small university town. It has a population of approximately 47,000 residents; it occupies a territory of about 10 square miles.[1] The Charlottesville “downtown” is about eight square blocks. The city has a part-time city council and mayor, a professional city manager, a city attorney and an assistant city attorney. The Charlottesville police department has 127 officers.[2] There is one high school, one synagogue, and the largest employer in town is by far the University of Virginia.

When white supremacists, neo-Nazis, and Ku Klux Klan members targeted Charlottesville in August 2017, they did so in part because the city council had voted to remove a statue of Robert E. Lee that was erected in 1924 as a symbol and reassertion of the authority and power of the Old South, in a town that is 19% African-American and overwhelmingly politically liberal.[3] The statue sits in what used to be Lee Park, until the name was changed to Emancipation Park more recently.[4]

The Unite the Right rally was promoted as a direct challenge to the idea of Charlottesville itself—a relatively socially progressive community seeking to reconcile with its apartheid past. The white supremacists came with torches and marched at night to heighten the sense of foreboding and fear that they intended to foster.[5] The marchers also carried guns, and even more elaborate weaponry—shields, mace, helmets, body armor, clubs, and flag poles.[6] The Unite the Right rally was not a march per se; it was an armed invasion, well-coordinated and planned, and intended to be a visible manifestation of force and occupation. It was, according to the organizers’ own rhetoric, an effort to assert territorial claims, to undermine the feelings of safety and security felt by Charlottesville residents.[7] The protestors chanted “Jews will not replace us,” and more generically, “You will not replace us.”[8] And they promised to keep coming back to Charlottesville—a promise they kept by returning again with a smaller group on October 7, 2017.[9]

What is the proper response of a city to this kind of ongoing threat? It is not entirely clear—at least as a legal matter. Of course, there are practical ways to deploy police to more effectively ensure public safety. Better rules of engagement can be adopted and those who act violently can be arrested.

But the city’s vulnerability is more profound, even if more difficult to address. This vulnerability is a function of the city’s—all cities’—liminal status in American law. Cities are state actors, but without the real power of the state. Constitutionally and legislatively subordinate to state legislatures, cities cannot effectively self-govern in important ways. Cities only exercise “state” power derivatively and that exercise is often and easily overridden.

At the same time, however, cities generally do not enjoy constitutional or civil rights. The city is on the “public” side of the public/private distinction in American law, which means that the city cannot be legally understood to be a victim of powerful private exercisers of violent force.

In other words, American cities are betwixt and between—they enjoy neither power nor rights. The city of Charlottesville is only nominally the state—the Virginia General Assembly exercises virtually plenary power over what it can and cannot do. Yet the city—unlike other corporate or associational entities—is also not a full-fledged rights-bearer. Under current doctrine, a city qua city cannot readily invoke the First Amendment to protect its decision to remove Confederate monuments, nor can it readily assert a collective constitutional or civil right to be free from fear and intimidation. The city has few rights, but also enjoys limited powers.

There is nothing in the nature of cities or local governments to require this state of affairs, as commentators have regularly observed.[10] Municipal corporations could assert rights against the state without threatening the state’s authority; private corporations regularly assert such rights. Similarly, the city could be granted more extensive powers by the state. Again, private corporations have significant authority to govern themselves even while being subject to the state’s general laws.

That cities are limited in their legal capacity is mostly a matter of judicial habit. But this habit has consequences. Unable to exercise the full power of the state but also denied the rights enjoyed by individuals and other corporate bodies, the city finds itself unable to respond to existential threats.

I. The City’s Power

The foundational reality for cities in America is that any power they exercise is—as a legal matter—derivative. Citizens and elected officials in Charlottesville debate what the city can do in response to invading paramilitary, neo-Nazi forces. But the answer is not a great deal, for one major reason: much of the power and authority to act is lodged not in city officials but in state officials, namely in the Virginia General Assembly.

Cities are weak legal creatures, and cities in Virginia are particularly so. Virginia is a so-called “Dillon’s Rule” jurisdiction.[11] Formulated by jurist John Dillon in 1868, Dillon’s rule requires that all exercises of city power be traced back to a specific legislative grant of authority.[12] Dillon’s Rule is often contrasted with “home rule” jurisdictions, in which cities enjoy a broader initial grant of authority and are able to act without specific authorization. The practical differences between Dillon’s Rule and home rule jurisdictions, however, can be slight—a difference of emphasis more than outcome—because even in states with home rule, legislatures can normally override municipal laws with conventional legislation. States do so with increasing regularity.[13]

Two Virginia state laws are relevant in Charlottesville’s case. The first is the Commonwealth’s “open carry” statute, which permits individuals to carry weapons openly on their person except under limited circumstances.[14] Virginia’s open carry law complicates the city’s ability to regulate and control armed protestors. At the August 12 Unite the Right rally, hundreds of protestors (and a few counter-protestors) marched through the city brandishing their semi-automatic weapons.[15] Many protestors were associated with various non-state “militias” that had mustered from different parts of the country—mostly out-of-state. The militia members were in many cases uniformed—some wore helmets, body armor, and carried military-style backpacks and other paraphernalia. For that reason, they were sometimes mistaken for police or national guardsmen.[16]

Arms and the First Amendment create a combustible combination.[17] Jurisdictions have regularly restricted the items that protestors can carry in public places during First-Amendment-protected activities.[18] But in Virginia, local governments are preempted by state law from regulating almost any aspect of firearms ownership and use absent explicit state authorization.[19] The Charlottesville police were constrained in restricting the carrying of guns by Virginia’s laws.[20] If the city had the authority, it would undoubtedly have adopted much more restrictive gun laws than the Commonwealth. But the city does not have that power.

So too if it had the authority, the city would have removed the Robert E. Lee statue that provided the excuse for the armed protestors to march in the first place.[21] But here too state law governs local decisions. Virginia law authorizes localities to erect war memorials to certain wars (including the “War Between the States”) and then bars their removal.[22] This “statue statute” was amended in 1997 to include cities within its ambit.[23] A currently contested question is whether the law applies to Charlottesville’s Confederate monuments, which were constructed before 1997. A Charlottesville circuit court has ruled that it does, while a different circuit court, the Governor, and the Commonwealth’s Attorney General have all asserted that it does not.[24] Charlottesville’s statue of Robert E. Lee was erected in 1924, at the same time that the city created the park in which the statue sits.

There is a strong argument for applying the statute only going forward. In a Dillon’s Rule state, localities only have the powers expressly granted, and the predecessor statute to the 1997 version never granted authority to cities to build Confederate war memorials in the first place. Early versions of the war memorial statute—going back to 1904—expressly authorized counties to erect war memorials and restricted their ability to remove them.[25] When the Lee statue was built, Charlottesville must have been acting under a different grant of authority, and one that never contained a restriction on removal. In 1924, Virginia cities enjoyed a general grant of authority to build, maintain, and beautify parks—a provision that would arguably include putting up statuary.[26] Telling Charlottesville that it is stuck with the monuments it erected in the early part of the twentieth century under a grant to beautify its parks seems like the imposition of a restriction that was not contemplated at the time.

Whether the statute applies only going forward or also to previously erected monuments, however, the point remains the same: the legislature exercises unquestioned control over a city’s decision to erect or remove a war memorial wherever it stands. The statuary in local parks, along local avenues, and in town squares is a matter of state authorization and restriction, at least going forward. The General Assembly could clarify its authorization at any time to permit local governments to remove Confederate monuments. It has instead attempted to do the opposite—passing a 2016 law that the Governor vetoed that would have made clear that the current statute applies retroactively.[27]

Why adopt such a restraint on local authority? It is not entirely clear. A predecessor version of the war memorial statute applied only to Confederate monuments, authorizing their erection and forbidding their removal.[28] Perhaps the General Assembly was worried that some in the community would find the valorization of Confederate soldiers and generals ill-timed or insulting—after all, the Confederates were traitors to the Union. And African-American residents of these places might have different views as to the appropriate memorialization of such men.

Perhaps the legislature thought that future generations might look less kindly on these old generals, or might simply decide to commemorate something else, as memories dimmed and tastes changed. Like many Confederate memorials throughout the South, Charlottesville’s Lee statue was erected in what was originally a whites-only park, as a symbol of racial supremacy during Jim Crow.[29] Its purpose and message was to reassert white southern identity and celebrate a distinctly southern nationalism.[30]

If one asks what sorts of government tasks should be allocated to what level of government, decisions regarding statuary in a local park would seem to be best made by local communities. Why does the state-wide political community care whether Charlottesville has a Lee statue in the middle of now-Emancipation Park? If we begin with a presumption of subsidiarity—a principle that governmental tasks should be allocated to the most decentralized level of government that is competent to perform those tasks[31]—then one needs a rationale for regulating at the state level. The usual rationales for centralized regulation in any given case are the presence of externalities, the need for uniformity, and a concern about pathologies in the local political process that result in majoritarian oppression.

The first two are very weak in the case of Confederate statues, unless the psychic pain of the removal of the Lee statue is so great to residents living in other parts of the state that it overrides any local psychic pain of leaving it standing. Whether externalities should include psychic harms is itself an important question—most centralized regulation is justified when local regulation imposes material costs on outsiders, as when a local government adopts too lax pollution controls. Uniformity too seems unnecessary in this instance; that rationale usually applies to regulatory ordinances that impose costs on cross-border activities. That a city has or does not have a Confederate monument makes little difference in any particular cross-border enterprise.

That leaves oppression—the worry that local majorities are somehow targeting local minorities for differential (and unfavorable) treatment. Certainly there are members of the Charlottesville community who would prefer to see the Lee statue remain. But is this really the kind of majoritarian oppression we are worried about when we regulate centrally? Again, the psychic harms of removal might be real, but do they really demand the assertion of state authority over local decision-making about statues in parks?

Defenders of a general state ban on the removal of war memorials could argue that such a ban protects veterans from being dishonored by local anti-war or anti-veteran factions. But the chances of such dishonor seem slim. Veterans are likely to be well-represented in the local political process; anti-memorial groups are much more likely to lose local political fights—especially if those who oppose the memorials are a traditionally discrete and insular minority. African-American citizens may be more likely to oppose Confederate monuments—but they are generally outvoted. It is worth noting that in an initial vote, Charlottesville’s city council rejected a proposal to remove the Lee statue.[32]

Those who think that local war memorials are properly the province of state law likely would find that any action that locals take with which they disagree is grounds for centralized regulation. So too with regard to open carry laws. For those who believe in strong gun rights, local restrictions are anathema, even if local communities might be better suited to consider the conditions under which guns might be productively regulated. Urban places, for example, might have very different concerns about gun use than rural ones. A sensible decentralization would likely obtain if these policies were not so ideologically fraught.

Unfortunately, a sensible division of labor is not generally the norm. Debates tend to focus on the substantive policy rather than on who should be tasked with adopting it. The location for the regulation of guns and statues is not based on principled decisions about where authority should reside, but is rather a political decision about what outcomes certain groups desire. Once local governments across the country began to take down Confederate monuments, state legislatures (mostly in the former Confederacy) began to restrict or consider restricting local power.[33] That is no surprise.

II. The City’s Rights

That the city is subject to state power is unremarkable—all individuals and corporate bodies are subject to state law. But the city is subordinate in a second way. Unlike individuals and corporations, the city does not generally enjoy countervailing property or constitutional rights. Even though Charlottesville is not the state, it is the “state.” It is conceptually difficult for the city to assert rights against the state or private rights-bearers.

The relative thinness of a municipality’s corporate rights is a function of the rise of the public/private distinction in the nineteenth century. Almost a generation ago, legal scholars Gerald Frug and Hendrik Hartog described how the municipal corporation lost its corporate privileges and became an arm of the state, while the private business corporation attained property and constitutional rights.[34] Both the municipal corporation and the business corporation were and are creatures of the state—the powers of all subordinate corporate bodies are derived from the legislature. And yet the distinction between public and private corporations means that the former are almost wholly beholden to state power, while the latter can assert the rights that all individuals enjoy against state encroachment.

One important implication of the private/public distinction is that the city cannot immediately assert a First Amendment right to speak on its own behalf.[35] Certainly war memorials, Confederate statues, and the names of parks and streets are expressive. But these acts of expression are—in the parlance of the First Amendment—”government speech”[36]—and cities, being subordinate governments, cannot readily argue that the city’s free-speech rights are being violated when the state refuses to let them decide what to say. Private corporations enjoy expansive First Amendment rights.[37] But courts have treated the municipal corporation as differently situated vis a vis state speech restrictions, even if the logic of the distinction is undertheorized.[38]

Recently, Professors Chip Lupu and Robert Tuttle argued that a First Amendment right could be asserted by city residents on the theory that the city’s removal decision implicates core free speech concerns.[39] They argue that in blocking the removal of Confederate monuments, the state is putting a thumb on the speech scale—in this case in favor of a white supremacist message that is anathema to the local community.[40] The privileging of a particular viewpoint by the state violates the Charlottesville citizens’ First Amendment rights by making it impossible for them to decide what they as a community want to say.

That “[e]ach political community—federal, state, and local—should have presumptive political autonomy to decide whom to venerate”[41] (as Lupu and Tuttle write) seems correct to me. Principles of democratic self-government and subsidiarity support that contention.

Nevertheless, the public/private distinction is a barrier to the assertion of the city’s First Amendment rights. As Lupu and Tuttle concede, the state is entitled “to choose and broadcast its own message, even if the message is obnoxious to a number of its people.”[42] Governments speak all the time. For the most part, what they say is a matter of politics and not a matter of constitutional law.

Government speech motivated by animus or speech that denigrates religious or racial minorities by sending a message of disfavored status can be challenged on constitutional grounds, however.[43] Charlottesville can certainly assert that the city’s Confederate monuments were motivated by animus (the Ku Klux Klan was a visible celebrant at the dedication of the Lee statue) and that those statues continue to express a message of disfavored status to the city’s minority communities. More importantly, the city can argue that it does not want to be associated with those messages. It wants to be able to control its own expressive acts in accordance with the views of its own political community.[44]

The public/private distinction makes such arguments doctrinally problematic. If cities qua cities do not enjoy rights, then what is the basis for a claim that a city’s speech is being unconstitutionally restricted? So too the public/private distinction makes it difficult for a city qua city to assert that private actors are threatening its peace and security. Again, the city cannot readily assert a right to be free from intimidation and violence, even if it is under siege from well-organized and well-supported private actors.

Consider two lawsuits arising out of the Unite the Right events. In the first, filed in federal court, members of the Charlottesville community who were injured in the protests are suing white supremacist organizers and actors for conspiring to deprive them of their constitutional rights.[45] They are using a federal statute[46]—the so-called Ku Klux Klan Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and § 1986)—which was intended to counter the power of private vigilante groups to prevent them from terrorizing newly-freed black slaves.[47] The Ku Klux Klan exercised de facto political and coercive power in Charlottesville and in many places in the South (and sometimes in the North)—often operating hand-in-hand with local authorities.[48] That history is a good example of how public rights can be undermined by private actors exercising something that looks like public power.

A second lawsuit has been filed in state court on behalf of the City of Charlottesville, a group of local businesses, and a number of neighborhood associations.[49] That lawsuit seeks an injunction to prevent the return of well-armed militias to the city pursuant to the Virginia Constitution, which states that “in all cases the military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.”[50] The complaint also asserts that the defendant militias engaged in unlawful paramilitary activity in violation of the Virginia Code[51] and that their activities constituted a public nuisance.[52]

Both lawsuits will have to run a First Amendment gauntlet, though the allegations in the complaints together appear to establish that the Unite the Right rally participants engaged in a well-organized effort to threaten and terrorize the city’s residents and commit acts of violence against them.[53] Based on the alleged facts, the protestors’ exercise of constitutionally-protected free speech was incidental to the actual purpose and outcome of their gathering—to spread fear and induce violence against the local populace.

Those acts represent a moment when the state lost control of a central feature of its “stateness.” As the city’s complaint observes “[t]he establishment of private armies is inconsistent with a well-ordered society and enjoys no claim to protection under the law.”[54] Without the capacity to control private paramilitary groups, Charlottesville revealed itself to be a vulnerable party, unable to meet its basic obligation to defend its citizens from violence. In the lawsuit to which it is a party, Charlottesville invokes state power. It seeks to reassert its monopoly on violence by clothing itself in the Commonwealth’s authority to control the militias.

That the city cannot readily join the first lawsuit and has to seek a judicial decree to enforce the state’s basic obligation in the second is telling. On the one hand, the city lacks an injury to a cognizable constitutional right—the city qua city enjoys no such rights. On the other hand, the city appears to have limited power to counter the non-state exercise of coercive force. The city’s duty “to protect public safety was undercut”[55] by the militias, which acted as if they were the police and military. The city’s capacity to protect its citizens was also undercut by the Commonwealth of Virginia, which is the ultimate repository of the monopoly on force and failed effectively to assert it. In the state’s absence, the city has limited capacity to act on its own.

The two complaints are remarkable documents. They reveal a set of interlocking organizations and leaders intent on asserting territorial domination—at least for a short time—over a small university town. The white supremacists mock the mayor, threaten civilians with violence, and make plans for repeated invasions. The purposes and goals of the Unite the Right rally are asserted in military terms—the enemy is the city.[56] The city itself is under siege—physically and mentally—a “takeover” of space that is symbolic of the larger assertion of white supremacy and religious superiority.

More disturbing, however, is the city’s seeming impotence in the face of these threats. The city’s weakness is not in the main a function of its politics or administration (though important questions have been raised about the city’s preparation and response to the events of August 11–12[57]). Whatever the city administration did or failed to do on those days, the city’s legal and constitutional vulnerability remains the same. Limited in its exercise of power and rights, the city can only urge the state to grant it powers or to assert state power on the city’s behalf.

Conclusion

We should worry about this state of affairs, both in the immediate aftermath of white supremacist invasions and more generally. The city is vulnerable in that it is subordinate to the state, which can and does limit the city’s authority significantly.[58] The city is also vulnerable because it is subject to domination by private actors, which can and do imperil the city’s safety, security, and economic stability. We treat cities as if they are exercising state power, but municipal corporations exercise significantly less power than do their private counterparts, as Gerald Frug argued more than twenty-five years ago.[59]

Nevertheless, we demand a great deal from the city—and from sub-state governments of all kinds. Local governments in the United States are charged with effectuating the “police power”: regulating for the health, safety, and morals of the populace. Cities are asked to foster economic development, provide basic services, respond to environmental, public health and other crises, and adopt effective rules and regulations that are responsive to citizens’ needs and desires. These broad responsibilities often come with limited capacity, as the legislature tends to be stingy in its grants of authority or regularly preempts local laws with which it disagrees.

In the case of Charlottesville, state laws limiting the ability of the city to regulate guns or remove controversial war memorials have hampered the city’s efforts to respond to the white supremacist threat. At the same time, the absence of clear and unambiguous municipal rights—a right to local self-expression or a right to live without fear—means that the city cannot readily assert claims on its citizens’ behalf when the state is unresponsive or when private actors threaten the city’s well-being.

To be sure, the city’s well-being is not a legal concept. The city is a jurisdiction, a government, and a state actor for purposes of constitutional doctrine. It is also a place with a history and a people, however. It is an association, a polity, and a community. The law could treat Charlottesville as a substantive rights-holder; it could recognize the existence of municipal powers derived from the locally-governed. That we have fallen into the habit of treating the city as a mere jurisdictional entity, subject to the whims of the state, is unnecessary. And it means that the next time the white supremacists come to town, the city will still not have the tools to defend itself.

 

 


*Perre Bowen Professor, Joseph C. Carter, Jr. Research Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. Many thanks to Jill Rubinger for research assistance, to Amanda Lineberry for fruitful discussions, and to the staff at the Virginia Law Review for their editorial support. 

[1]2016 Charlottesville QuickFacts, U.S. Census Bureau, https://perma.cc/SP7U-4VQE.

[2]Charlottesville Police Dep’t, 2016 Annual Report 2 (2016), https://perma.cc/KC2M-PCJ6.

[3]2016 Charlottesville QuickFacts, supra note 1; Chris Suarez, Charlottesville City Council Votes to Remove Statue from Lee Park, The Daily Progress (Feb. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/2TJN-WPGC.

[4]Jacey Fortin, The Statue at the Center of Charlottesville’s Storm, N.Y. Times (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/charlottesville-rally-protest-statue.html.

[5]See Joe Heim, Recounting a Day of Rage, Hate, Violence and Death, Wash. Post (Aug. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/8VJU-U64N. See also Complaint at 46, Sines v. Kessler, No. 3:17-cv-00072 (W.D. Va. Oct. 12, 2017) [hereinafter Sines Complaint]; Complaint at 30, City of Charlottesville v. Penn. Light Foot Militia, No. 3:17-cv-00078-GEC (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 27, 2017) [hereinafter Penn. Light Foot Militia Complaint].

[6]See Sines Complaint, supra note 5, at 2; William J. Antholis, Two Blocks from the Culture War, The Miller Center (Aug. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/7T65-KEGX; Paul Duggan, Militiamen Came to Charlottesville as Neutral First Amendment Protectors, Commander Says, Wash. Post (Aug. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/HV2E-KDUK; Jon Sharman, Militia Force Armed with Assault Rifles Marches Through US Town Ahead of White Nationalist Rally, The Independent (Aug. 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/82WV-2K6S.

[7]Natasha Bertrand, Here’s What We Know About the ‘Pro-White’ Organizer of ‘Unite the Right,’ Who Was Chased out of His Own Press Conference, Business Insider (Aug. 14, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/who-is-jason-kessler-unite-the-right-charlottesville-2017-8 (“We’re trying to show that folks can stand up for white people. The political correctness has gotten way out of control, and the only way to fight back against it has been to stand up for our own interests.”);Vincent Law, The ‘Unite the Right’ Rally Is Going to Be a Turning Point for White Identity in America, AltRight.com (Aug. 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/JF4R-3UBS.

[8]Sines Complaint, supra note 5, at 20; Heim, supra note 5.

[9]Henry Graff, Richard Spencer Plans Return to Charlottesville, NBC 29 WVIR-TV (Oct. 25, 2017, 6:18 PM), http://www.nbc29.com/story/36573304/richard-spencer-plans-return-to-charlottesville; Matt Stevens, White Nationalists Reappear in Charlottesville in Torch-Lit Protest, N.Y. Times (Oct. 8, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2y2qM1d.

[10]See Gerald E. Frug, City Making: Building Communities Without Building Walls 3–4 (1999); Richard Schragger, City Power: Urban Governance in a Global Age 1–2 (2016). For a specific argument, see Kathleen S. Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2012).

[11]Commonwealth v. Cty. Bd. of Arlington Cty., 232 S.E.2d 30, 40–41 (Va. 1977).

[12]City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids and Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868).

[13]See Richard Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, ___ Tex. L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 2–3), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3026142.

[14]In Virginia, the open carrying of certain handguns is prohibited in specific populous cities and counties. See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-287.4 (2014). Virginia law also states that the prohibition against carrying a concealed weapon “shall not apply to a person who has a valid concealed handgun permit.” Id. § 18.2-308.01. The Virginia statute regarding firearm reciprocity states: “A valid concealed handgun or concealed weapon permit or license issued by another state shall authorize the holder of such permit or license who is at least 21 years of age to carry a concealed handgun in the Commonwealth.” Id. § 18.2-308.014.

[15]Frances Robles, As White Nationalist in Charlottesville Fired, Police ‘Never Moved,’ N.Y. Times (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/25/us/charlottesville-protest-police.html.

[16]Penn. Light Foot Militia Complaint, supra note 5, at 21–22; see also Joanna Walters, Mistaken for the Military: The Gear Carried by the Charlottesville Militia, The Guardian (Aug. 15, 2017), https://perma.cc/4UMR-WLZD.

[17]See Kendall Burchard, Your ‘Little Friend’ Doesn’t Say ‘Hello’: Putting the First Amendment Before the Second in Public Protests, 104 Va. L. Rev. Online 30, 31–32 (2018).

[18]Emily Alpert Reyes, L.A. Bans Pepper Spray, Baseball Bats, Weapons and Other Items at Protests, L.A. Times (Oct. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/3UAU-ZXAQ.

[19]See Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-915 (2014). The Virginia legislature has not regulated the possession of rifles at rallies and protests, but maybe they should. See Martin London, Why States Should Ban Guns From Political Rallies, Time (Aug. 22, 2017), https://perma.cc/P68L-9KAZ.

[20]See Hunton & Williams, Independent Review of the 2017 Protest Events in Charlottesville, Virginia, Final Report, at 156–57 (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.hunton.com/‌images/content/3/4/v2/34613/final-report-ada-compliant-ready.pdf.

[21]Suarez, supra note 3; Payne v. City of Charlottesville, No. CL 17-145, 2017 Va. Cir. LEXIS 323 at *1 (Oct. 3, 2017) (ruling on demurrer).

[22]Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-1812 (2012).

[23]1997 Va. Acts, ch. 587, at 1114.

[24]See Amanda Lineberry, Payne v. City of Charlottesville and the Dillon’s Rule Rationale for Removal, 104 Va. L. Rev. Online 45, 47–48­ (2018); see also Richard Schragger, Opinion, Is Charlottesville’s Robert E. Lee Statue Illegal?, Richmond Times-Dispatch (Aug. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/F6AK-QZ83.

[25]Lineberry, supra note 24, at 49.

[26]Id. at 46­–47.

[27]The proposed amendment eliminated the key conditional, prospective phrase (“[i]f such are erected”) and in its place added “the provisions of this subsection shall apply to all such monuments and memorials regardless of when erected” attempting to apply the war memorial statute retroactively. H.B. 587, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 2016 Sess. (Va. 2016) (proposed amendment); see also Governor’s Veto of H.B. 587, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 2016 Sess. (Va. 2016).

[28]See 1904 Va. Acts, ch. 29, at 62.

[29]Mark Jacob, How a Former Chicago Office Boy Built Charlottesville’s Gen. Lee Statue, Chi. Trib. (Aug. 18, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/history/ct-charlottesville-robert-e-lee-statue-chicago-20170818-story.html (“The deed for McIntire Park described it as ‘a public park and playground for the white people of the City of Charlottesville.’”).

[30]S. Poverty L. Ctr., Whose Heritage? Public Symbols of the Confederacy 15, 35 (April 21, 2016), https://perma.cc/2W6G-6CKM.

[31]Markus Jachtenfuchs & Nico Krisch, Subsidiarity in Global Governance, 79 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1, 1 (2016) (“Subsidiarity is typically understood as a presumption for local-level decisionmaking, which allows for the centralization of powers only for particular, good reasons.”).

[32]Council of the City of Charlottesville, Council Chambers Minutes, at 12 (Jan. 17, 2017), https://perma.cc/T6LU-VX8P.

[33]See Alabama Memorial Preservation Act of 2017, 2017 Ala. Laws 354 (Alabama, the most recently passed restriction); see also Ga. Code Ann. § 50-3-1(b)(1) (2013) (Georgia); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 100-2.1(b) (2015) (North Carolina); S.C. Code Ann. § 10-1-165 (2009) (South Carolina).

[34]Hendrik Hartog, Public Property and Private Power: The Corporation of the City of New York in American Law, 1730–1870, at 223 (1983); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1065–66 (1980); see also Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 659–60 (1819) (dividing private corporations—which are founded by individual contributions of property—from public corporations—which are founded by the government without individual contributions).

[35]For a discussion of municipal speech, see David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1637, 1641 (2006).

[36]Id. (“Courts and commentators alike have long dismissed the notion that the Speech Clause could serve as a source of constitutional protection for government speech.”).

[37]See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010) (finding that the government may regulate corporate speech through “disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether”); First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978) (taking expansive view of corporation speech rights).

[38]See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.2d 628, 635–37 (Mass. 1978) (holding that Boston had no First Amendment right to disregard the state’s campaign finance statute restricting the city’s use of monies in a referendum campaign); City of Boston v. Anderson, 439 U.S. 1060 (1979) (dismissed for want of substantial federal question). For a discussion, see David J. Barron, The Promise of Tribe’s City: Self-Government, the Constitution, and a New Urban Age, 42 Tulsa L. Rev. 811, 819–23 (2007) (describing Boston’s argument that it should be entitled to the same speech protections as private corporations). It should be noted that though the Supreme Court has not directly addressed a state restriction on municipal political speech since Anderson (and did not do so in that case), the Court has held that municipal political advocacy is government speech, immune from challenges by dissenting taxpayers. See Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015) (insulating municipal government speech from challenge by dissenting taxpayers); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009) (same). For an early theory of municipal speech rights, see Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the First Amendment, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 863, 870 (1979). For a discussion of municipal speech rights, see Mosdos Chofetz Chaim, Inc. v. Vill. of Wesley Hills, 701 F. Supp. 2d 568, 598–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

[39]Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Debate Over Confederate Monuments, Take Care (Aug. 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/XCJ3-6LL6.

[40]Id.

[41]Id.

[42]Id.

[43]See Micah Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Charlottesville’s Monuments Are Unconstitutional, Slate (Aug. 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/MV97-S8DW; see also, e.g., McCreary Cty. v. Am. C.L. Union, 545 U.S. 844, 875–76 (2015) (finding that government messages that favor one religion over another or religion over irreligion are suspect under the Establishment Clause); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Auth., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (holding the Equal Protection Clause bars government actions that have a racially discriminatory purpose or intent).

[44]For an argument along these lines, see Fagundes, supra note 35, at 1638, 1645–46; see also, e.g., Cty. of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (“A municipal corporation, like any corporation, is protected under the First Amendment in the same manner as an individual.”), aff’d, 907 F. 2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990).

[45]Sines Complaint, supra note 5, at 1–3, 88.

[46]Id. at 87, 89.

[47]Brian J. Gaj, Section 1985(2) Clause One and Its Scope, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 756, 756 (1985).

[48]S. Poverty L. Ctr., Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence 14, 22 (6th ed. 2011), https://perma.cc/V3AZ-UNUE (“In some counties the Klan became the de facto law, an invisible government that state officials could not control.”).

[49]Penn. Light Foot Militia Complaint, supra note 5.

[50]Va. Const. art. I, § 13; Penn. Light Foot Militia Complaint, supra note 5, at 1.

[51]Penn. Light Foot Militia Complaint, supra note 5, at 74.

[52]Id. at 76.

[53]See id. at 26–27.

[54]Id. at 1.

[55]Id. at 4.

[56]See id. at 47–48; Sines Complaint, supra note 5, at 20.

[57]John Domen, Charlottesville Citizens Vent, Criticize Leaders at Community Recovery Town Hall, WTOP (Aug. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/6VA3-CN3X; see Hunton & Williams, supra note 20, at 4–8.

[58]Schragger, supra note 13.

[59]Frug, supra note 34, at 1065–66.

 

Payne v. City of Charlottesville and the Dillon’s Rule Rationale for Removal

I. Introduction

IN December 19, 2016, the City of Charlottesville’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Race, Memorials, and Public Spaces released a 328-page report to the City Council which, among other things, recommended either the removal or “transform[ation]-in-place” of the city’s monument of Robert E. Lee in what is now known as Emancipation Park.[1] On February 6, 2017, the Charlottesville City Council voted, three to two, to relocate the Lee Monument.[2] Two weeks later, a group of citizens and pro-Confederate activists filed a lawsuit against the city, Payne v. City of Charlottesville, requesting an injunction and alleging that the removal violated Va. Code § 15.2-1812, which regulates localities’ abilities to create and remove war memorials.[3] The injunction was granted and as litigation pended, white nationalists, led in part by University of Virginia alumni Richard Spencer and Jason Kessler, organized a massive rally to protest the monument’s removal.[4] The rally ended in the murder of Heather Heyer, the deaths of two police officers in a helicopter crash, and countless injuries.[5] On October 3, the Charlottesville state circuit court overruled the city’s demurrer and held that Va. Code § 15.2-1812 prevented the city from removing the Lee Monument, allowing the case to go to trial and the monument to remain standing.[6] The ultimate outcome of Payne v. City of Charlottesville will have a significant impact across the state, home to 96 of the country’s 700-plus Confederate monuments.[7]

Many legal issues have been raised in the weekend’s aftermath, from the First Amendment protection of hate speech[8] to the constitutionality of the monuments under the Fourteenth Amendment[9] to state prohibitions on “unlawful paramilitary activity.”[10] The heart of the issue—the reason why the Lee Statute still stands today—is the legal relationship between the Commonwealth of Virginia and its localities.

Virginia is a Dillon’s Rule state, meaning local governments may only exercise those powers expressly granted to them. This includes the authority to construct war memorials, which was first granted to all Virginia counties in 1904 and then all localities (adding cities and towns) in 1997 through various versions of Va. Code § 15.2-1812. Prior to the statute, localities were required to request a specific grant of authority—an Act of Assembly or Joint Resolution from the Virginia legislature—to construct such memorials. Without some form of authorization,[11] it was illegal for the locality to construct these monuments in a Dillon’s Rule state. Any restrictions applicable to the localities’ subsequent treatment of such monuments are governed exclusively by the state authority under which they were built,[12] unless those localities impose further restrictions on themselves, as Virginia statutes generally do not apply retrospectively.[13] Accordingly, monuments built in cities prior to 1997, such as Charlottesville’s 1924 Lee Monument,[14] are either unauthorized (ultra vires) or authorized by a specific Act of Assembly. The only restrictions on removal that are applicable to these pre-1997 monuments are those found within the original grant of authority, those imposed by localities on themselves, or the deeds associated with it—not Va. Code § 15.2-1812.

Only three authorities have directly weighed in on the question of whether Va. Code § 15.2-1812 applies to memorials created in cities prior to 1997: the state circuit court for the City of Danville,[15] the current Attorney General Mark Herring,[16] and the state circuit court for the City of Charlottesville,[17] respectively. They have reached varying conclusions, none of which are binding on other circuit courts across the state. When properly considering what the statute purports to authorize counties (and later cities) to do, it is clear that the statute cannot be read to apply to war memorials built in cities such as Charlottesville before 1997, as evidenced by the statute’s history, the text of the statute, and relevant Virginian common law on Dillon’s Rule and retroactivity.[18] At trial, the court should correct its previous reasoning, find Va. Code § 15.2-1812 to be inapplicable, and solely consider the legality of the removal based on other possible restrictions (if any) in balance with the city’s affirmative defenses.

II. The 1904 Statute Operates as a Specific, Prospective Grant Of Authority

The ability of Virginian cities to create and remove memorials has changed over time and is limited, first and foremost, by Virginia’s adoption of Dillon’s Rule,[19] an interpretive methodology for municipal authority which “limits the power of local governments to those expressly granted by the state or those necessarily implied or essential to express powers.”[20] Thus, “[w]hen a local ordinance exceeds the scope of this authority, the ordinance is invalid.”[21] Should it be reasonably unclear whether a locality, such as a city or county, has a power or not, “the doubt must be resolved against the local governing body.”[22] In other words, if a city wants to create a memorial of any kind, it must first find the authority to do so in an existing state law or ask the state legislature for permission. Any ordinances enacted by a locality beyond the scope of its powers are invalid and any locality actions above and beyond what state law authorizes are illegal.[23]

Prior to any broader statutory authority regarding monuments, the state regularly granted such permission to localities through Acts of Assembly, which often included varying restrictions on removal or modification. For example, in 1901 and 1902, the General Assembly passed such acts for seven counties.[24] In 1903, it passed seven more.[25] Attorney General Mark Herring, in his own analysis, noted that “[s]ome of these Acts contain restrictions on the disturbance of the monument, others are silent, and . . . one Act contains such a restriction and a related Act does not.”[26]

In February 1904, seemingly in lieu of passing many additional individual acts of assembly, the General Assembly passed an act (the “Act”) to empower the circuit court of a county, with the support of the county’s board of supervisors, to authorize “the erection of a Confederate monument upon the public square of such county at the county seat thereof.”[27] More restrictive than some of the individualized grants of authority, the General Assembly provided that “thereafter,” counties “or any other person or persons whatever” could not “disturb or interfere” with such monuments nor “prevent the citizens of [the] county from taking all proper measures and exercising all proper means for the protection, preservation, and care of the same.”[28] Importantly, the grant of authority is limited exclusively to counties.[29] It is unclear why the state did not, at the same time, grant this power also to cities and towns. Overall, however, it is clear that the 1904 Act operated as a very specific kind of authority and did not mean to be comprehensive nor to apply to all war memorials built by counties.[30] It began merely as a grant of authority to only counties to build only Confederate monuments only in public squares.[31] Any other monument in any other place would need separate authorization outside of the statute.

In 1988, the General Assembly passed a law which sought to “amend and reenact” Va. Code § 15.1-270, a recodification of the Act. The 1988 legislation made two significant changes, though the prospective nature and limited scope of the Act stayed constant.[32] First, the statute granted counties the authority to construct memorials for the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the Mexican War.[33] This made clear that counties wishing to build memorials to unlisted wars would still need to seek authorization from the state legislature. Second, the General Assembly changed the clause from its prior reading of “if such shall be erected it shall not be lawful thereafter”[34] to disturb or interfere with the memorials, to “[i]f such are erected, it shall be unlawful”[35] to disturb or interfere with them. The change simplified the statute’s language but did not remove the conditional, proscriptive phrasing. Thus, even taking into account the removal of the word “thereafter,” the effect of the statute remained the same: if a county chooses to erect a memorial under the authority of this statute, it cannot disturb or interfere with the memorial. Such a construction facially has no application to monuments erected previously under a different grant of authority.

In 1997, the General Assembly again changed the statute in several impactful ways. Most importantly for our purposes, the general grant of authority now applied to any “locality,” not just counties.[36] Next, the General Assembly expanded the list of conflicts for which a memorial could be created and moved this list to a different section of the statute.[37] Finally, the statute broadened the authority of both counties and cities by allowing localities to place memorials on any of their property, not just within their public squares.[38]

The most recent amendments          to the statute were passed in 1998, which broadened the statute’s scope but kept its proscriptive format. That statute, codified at Va. Code. § 15.2-1812, now authorizes localities to erect “monuments or memorials for any war or conflict, or . . . any engagement of such war or conflict,” though it still includes a list of well-known conflicts as examples.[39] Additionally, the statute enables a locality to erect such monuments anywhere within its “geographical limits” and not just upon its own property.[40] The amendments also added a definition of “disturb or interfere,” which notably includes “removal” and “placement of Union markings or monuments on previously designated Confederate memorials” and vice versa, though it does not explicitly include relocation.[41] Most importantly, while the General Assembly yet again broadened the statute, it kept the same conditional, prospective phrasing.[42] The common sense reading of the statute remained, and still remains to this day, that the limitations on removal imposed by the statute apply exclusively to those memorials erected under the statute’s authority—not to those erected prior to the passage of the statute. Thus, memorials erected by cities prior to the 1997 (or 1998) amendments simply do not fall within the scope of the statute and are not prevented by the Act or its progeny from being removed or relocated.

III. This Prospective Grant of Authority Cannot Be Read to Apply Retroactively

The above reading of Va. Code. § 15.2-1812 makes it impossible to apply the removal restrictions to monuments built under other grants of authority.[43] If a monument was built under no grant of authority, the above statute, and the prior authorities, certainly do not retroactively authorize the illegally built statue and then restrict its removal. By the same token, the statute’s removal restrictions cannot be read to apply retroactively to monuments built under totally different authorities because Virginia’s common law on retroactivity doctrine and the statute’s legislative history prevent such a reading.

Since 1904, the rule in Virginia has been that the state’s statutes “are construed to operate prospectively only, unless, on the face of the instrument or enactment, the contrary intention is manifest beyond reasonable question.”[44] The principle behind such a rule is to minimize the interference between new laws with old rules or contractual agreements. As recently as 2015, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed that the state “does not favor retroactive application of statutes” unless there is an “express manifestation of intent by the legislature.”[45] Additionally, “[i]t is reasonable to conclude that the failure to express an intention to make a statute retroactive evidences a lack of such intention.”[46] Moreover, courts are particularly cautious in finding a statute to have a retroactive effect on government actors:

Especially do courts shrink from holding an act retrospective when it affects public objects and duties, and, when it affects rights accrued and acts done by law for the public interest and necessities, it must be presumed that the law makers of the new act did not intend it to be retrospective, unless that intent be expressed in the language, or plainly appear upon the face of the act itself.[47]

Given the weight of the restriction imposed by Va. Code. § 15.2-1812 on localities, the conditional and prospective phrasing of the statute’s removal clause, and the public nature of the statues at issue, the language of the statute and the legislative intent are not manifest enough for any court to hold that the statute applies retroactively. Even if a court should find that the language of the statute is ambiguous or debatable, the court’s subsequent course of action is clear: without the language or intent being “manifest beyond reasonable question,”[48] the court must find that the statute does not apply retroactively.

This limiting interpretation of the statute is further evidenced by the attempt of the Virginia General Assembly to enact a bill which explicitly extended the protections of the statute retroactively to war memorials built under other grants of authority. A proposed amendment sought to eliminate the key conditional, prospective phrase (“[i]f such are erected”) and added: “The provisions of this subsection shall apply to all such monuments and memorials, regardless of when erected.”[49] While in all other renditions of the statute[50] the restrictions on removal are tied to the grant of authority, this draft detached them from each other, giving the restrictive clause independent operation. Such a sentence would effectively separate the removal restrictions from the general grant of authority.

The amendment was proposed during the 2016 session, after the October 2015 decision in Danville and the July 2015 removal of the Confederate Flag from state grounds in South Carolina, a response to the tragic murder of nine black Americans by white supremacist Dylann Roof.[51] It was ultimately vetoed by Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe. The Governor defended his veto as follows:

There is legitimate discussion going on in localities across the Commonwealth regarding whether to retain, remove, or alter certain symbols of the Confederacy. These discussions are often difficult and complicated. They are unique to each community’s specific history and the specific monument or memorial being discussed. This bill effectively ends these important conversations.

*  *  *

I am committed to supporting a constructive dialogue regarding the preservation of war memorials and monuments, but I do not support this override of local authority.[52]

The Governor’s justifications summarize important policy arguments for not erroneously construing the current statute to apply retroactively to grants of authority independent of the statute. Note also that the City of Charlottesville Blue Ribbon Commission on Race, Memorials, and Public Spaces relied on this specific legislative history when recommending that the City Council remove or transform the city’s Lee Monument.[53]

In another case,[54] the Danville circuit court properly adhered to state precedent and the legislative history when it held that Va. Code § 15.2-1812 was inapplicable to a monument, which commemorated the Sutherlin Mansion as “the Last Capitol of the Confederacy,” for two reasons: first, because the statute did not apply retroactively, and, second, because the memorial at issue was not a war memorial. In its brief, three-page opinion, the court succinctly concluded that, “[a]s a matter of law, Virginia Code § 15.2-1812 does not apply retroactively to the monument at issue in this litigation, which was donated to the City of Danville in 1994 and erected . . . in 1995.”[55] The court’s focus in this holding was clearly on the years that the monument was received and formerly established. Given that both of these actions occurred prior to the statute’s inclusion of all localities—not just counties—in 1997, the statute was not applicable.

In contrast, when the Charlottesville Circuit Court overruled the city’s demurrer in Payne v. City of Charlottesville, it misunderstood the operation of the statute and did not adhere to the principle established in Arey that statutes generally only operate prospectively. Instead the court decided that the statute applied retroactively, based on the “content and wording of the statute itself,” as well as “[l]ogic and common sense.”[56] The court found that the 1997 amendment of the statute was “expanding protections as well as the power and authority originally applicable to the counties,” but did not recognize that those protections were only operative to actions taken from that same grant of authority.[57]

This reasoning runs counter to Arey, which establishes that the court cannot read in what it interprets to be the “common sense” reading of the statute when the question is whether or not the statute applies retroactively. Instead, the court’s outcome must be dictated by “the face of the instrument or enactment” that is “manifest beyond reasonable question.”[58] The court’s insistence that its interpretation is common sense simply does not change the face of the statute nor its contradictory legislative history, which must govern under Arey. In other words, the lack of legislative history supporting the court’s interpretation and the plain language of the statute dictate that the court only applies it to monuments which were built under its authority, which could not have included the 1924 Lee Monument in Charlottesville, which is a city.

The Charlottesville Circuit Court placed substantial reliance on the outcome of Sussex Community Services Association v. Virginia Society for Mentally Retarded Children, Inc., which said, in dictum, that “we have never imposed a requirement that any specific word or phrase be used in order to support a finding of clear legislative intent or retroactive application.”[59] The key difference between the statute at issue in Sussex and the one at issue here is the word “any” and the lack of a conditional, prospective clause. The statute in Sussex read: “A family care home, foster home, or group home . . . shall be considered for all purposes residential occupancy by a single family when construing any restrictive covenant which purports to restrict occupancy or ownership of real or leasehold property to members of a single family.”[60] If that statute were to apply prospectively—and thus mimic the structure of Va. Code § 15.2-1812—the Sussex statute would read: “If a restrictive covenant is formed which purports to restrict occupancy or ownership of real or leasehold property to members of a single family, then a family care home, foster home, or group home shall be considered for all purposes residential occupancy by a single family.” Put another way, if Va. Code § 15.2-1812 were written similarly to the statute at issue in Sussex, it would read like the version vetoed by Governor McAuliffe in 2016.[61] The legislature chose a different construction, and the court should not read intent into the statute, no matter how “inescapable,” “impossible,” or nonsensical that may seem to a particular court.[62]

Finally, in Payne the Charlottesville Circuit Court made a great deal out of a general state policy to protect war memorials even when they may fall out of favor within a locality,[63] but this general policy was clearly defeated when a retroactive version of the statute was vetoed by Governor McAuliffe in 2016. This is further demonstrated by the statute’s evolution, which consistently limited itself only to those conflicts that it saw as important.

Further, when the Act was originally passed, it only applied to Confederate memorials.[64] As noted previously, the amended 1988 statute was expanded to include the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the Mexican War (in addition to the previously included World Wars I and II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War).[65] Such an ad hoc addition of conflicts, which specifically favored some conflicts over others, does not reflect a policy of protecting all war memorials, especially those that may fall out of favor in a particular locality.

IV. Other Restrictions On Removal

Even if a statue was not constructed under the authority of Va. Code § 15.2-1812, other restraints on removal may exist, including locality-specific constraints and monument-specific constraints. Localities have restricted their own abilities to remove or relocate such memorials through, for example, local ordinances, charters, or other planning documents. For example, the City Attorney Allen Jackson reportedly advised Richmond’s City Council that the four Confederate statues on Monument Avenue could not be removed due to a provision of Richmond’s City Charter and its master plan.[66]

Monument-specific constraints include those found in transfer instruments and grant programs. As summarized by Attorney General Herring, “a monument may have been donated to the locality subject to reversionary terms or conditions in the transfer instrument triggered by the locality’s attempt to remove or disturb the monument,” or “a locality might have received funding for the acquisition, maintenance, preservation or enhancement of the monument through a grant program that places restrictions on any alteration of the monument.”[67] However, it is critical to realize that any constraints placed on the city through transfer instruments or grant programs are obligations only to the original parties in the transaction, creating an entirely different procedural dynamic and significantly limiting the population with standing to challenge the city’s actions.

V. Conclusion

In the Commonwealth of Virginia, under Dillon’s Rule, the most appropriate reading of the statute is as a prospective and historically limited grant of authority which comes with embedded restrictions. Every statue erected by a locality in the Commonwealth needs authorization,[68] and many localities derived authority to build war memorials from the 1904 statute. However, this was simply not the case in cities, since the statute narrowly applied only to Confederate monuments in county public squares for eighty-four years. Indeed, the statute did not apply to cities at all for nearly a century. From its inception and throughout its amendments, the statute’s scope remained limited and its conditional, prospective phrasing remained constant. The statute’s limited scope and phrasing dictate a reading that does not have any bearing on the removal of statues built under other grants of authority. In order to apply these restrictions retroactively to illegally-built statues or to statues built under other grants of authority, the state legislature would need to make it manifestly clear on the face of the statute that it is meant to apply retroactively. Thus, as a Dillon’s Rule state a careful reading of Va. Code § 15.2-1812 and its history yields the appropriate result: Va. Code § 15.2-1812 has no bearing on war memorials built in cities prior to 1997 and does not prevent their removal.

 

 


*J.D. Candidate 2019, University of Virginia School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Richard Schragger for his invaluable guidance and edits; Professors Molly Brady and Ben Doherty for their encouragement and research assistance; and my family for their open minds, honest conversations, and unconditional support.

[1]City of Charlottesville Blue Ribbon Comm’n on Race, Memorials, and Pub. Spaces, Report to City Council 8–10 (Dec. 19, 2016), https://perma.cc/C2F5-DWCX.

[2]Chris Suarez, Charlottesville City Council Votes to Remove Statue from Lee Park, Daily Progress (Feb. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/W9PY-CCB2.

[3]Complaint at 9­–11, 16, Payne v. City of Charlottesville, No. 17-145 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 2017).

[4]Payne v. City of Charlottesville, No. CL 17-145, 16 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 3, 2017) (ruling on demurrer); Vincent Law, The ‘Unite the Right’ Rally Is Going To Be A Turning Point For White Identity In America, AltRight.Com (Aug. 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/CN8G-MVQL.

[5]Benjamin Hart & Chas Danner, Three Dead and Dozens Injured After Violent White-Nationalist Rally in Virginia, N.Y. Mag. (Aug. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/6EFS-M7F8.

[6]Payne, No. CL 17-145 at 16.

[7]S. Poverty L. Ctr., Whose Heritage? Public Symbols of the Confederacy 10–11 (April 21, 2016), https://perma.cc/43SU-TGLF.

[8]Leslie Kendrick, How to Defend the Constitution When the KKK Comes to Town, CNN: Opinion (July 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/E9H8-VCW7.

[9]See Micah Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Charlottesville’s Monuments Are Unconstitutional, Slate (Aug. 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/7HZC-W5HR.

[10]Laura Jarrett, Charlottesville Suing to Stop Private Militias at Future Rallies, CNN (Oct. 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/YH2E-9JCY.

[11]Other grants of authority could have been read to include the construction of war memorials in public spaces. In 1908, that the General Assembly granted cities and towns the authority to “establish and maintain parks, playgrounds and boulevards.” 1908 Va. Acts ch. 349. Whether this would or would not have empowered cities and towns to create war memorials, given the state’s adoption of Dillon’s Rule, is beyond the scope of this analysis. However, Professor Richard Schragger’s analysis of the ability to create and beautify parks as applied to the Charlottesville statute suggests that such a power included the ability to create war memorials within those parks. Richard Schragger, Opinion, Is Charlottesville’s Robert E. Lee Statue Illegal?, Richmond Times-Dispatch (Aug. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/‌LXY7-268M.

[12]The controversies on August 11th and 12th demonstrate the benefits of local control. The city democratically decided to remove the statue, and the potential of the state law to prevent its removal has created a window of uncertainty filled by violence and pain. Still, Dillon’s Rule is the law in Virginia. See infra Part II. This Essay proceeds within that framework and argues that, even within it, removal is still a viable option for many statues.

[13]See brief discussion infra Part III and notes 62–63 and accompanying text.

[14]City of Charlottesville, History and Gardens of Emancipation Park, https://perma.cc/7WPP-6Z97.

[15]Heritage Preservation Ass’n v. City of Danville, No. CL15000500-00, slip. op. at 2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 7, 2015).

[16]Letter from Mark R. Herring, Att’y Gen. of Va., to Julie Langan, Dir., Va. Dep’t of Historic Res., concerning § 2.2-505 (Aug. 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/M24G-CUZ8 [hereinafter “Herring Letter”].

[17]Payne v. City of Charlottesville, No. CL 17-145, at 7 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 3, 2017) (ruling on demurrer).

[18]See discussion infra Part III.

[19]The namesake of Dillon’s Rule is Judge Forest Dillon, who authored an important treatise on the law of municipalities and articulated the rule as follows: “It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation,—not simply convenient, but indispensable.” Dillon’s Rule: The Case for Reform, 68 Va. L. Rev. 693, 693–94 (1982) (emphasis omitted) (citing 1 John F. Dillon, Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations § 237 (5th ed. 1911)).

[20]TransDulles Ctr. v. USX Corp., 976 F.2d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 1992).

[21]City of Chesapeake v. Gardner Enter., 482 S.E.2d 812, 814 (Va. 1997).

[22]Bd. of Supervisors v. Reed’s Landing Corp., 463 S.E.2d 668, 670 (Va. 1995).

[23]For a more thorough discussion of municipal and state powers, see generally Richard C. Schragger, When White Supremacists Invade A City, 104 Va. L. Rev. Online 58 (2018).

[24]See 1901 Va. Acts ch. 38 (Appomattox); 1902 Va. Acts ch. 176 (Essex); id. at ch. 177 (Isle of Wight); id. at ch. 183 (Smyth); id. at ch. 332 (Louisa); id. at ch. 386 (Chesterfield); id. at ch. 427 (Madison).

[25]See 1903 Va. Acts ch. 58 (King William); id. at ch. 83 (Amelia); id. at ch. 116 (Bedford); id. at ch. 117 (Campbell); id. at ch. 130 (Botetourt); id. at ch. 307 (Greensville); id. at ch. 465 (Mecklenburg). These acts fall within what the Southern Poverty Law Center identified as the first peak in Confederate memorialization, from 1900 to 1914. S. Poverty L. Ctr., supra note 7, at 14–15.

[26]Herring Letter, supra note 16, at 5.

[27]1904 Va. Acts ch. 29.

[28]Id.

[29]Id.

[30]It is not clear exactly why the statute was passed in 1904, nor why its grant of authority was so limited. For greater discussion about the state’s intentions, see generally Schragger, supra note 23.

[31]1904 Va. Acts ch. 29.

[32]1988 Va. Acts ch. 284; Herring Letter, supra note 16, at 2.

[33]1988 Va. Acts ch. 284; contra 1904 Va. Acts ch. 29. Prior amendments and recodifications had previously added World War I, World War II, and other wars.

[34]1988 Va. Acts ch. 284.

[35]Id.

[36]1997 Va. Acts ch. 587 at 1114.

[37]Id.

[38]Id.

[39]Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-1812 (2017).

[40]Id.

[41]Id.

[42]Id. (“If such are erected, it shall be unlawful for the authorities of the locality, or any other person or persons, to disturb or interfere with any monuments or memorials so erected, or to prevent its citizens from taking proper measures and exercising proper means for the protection, preservation and care of same.” (emphasis added)).

[43]As discussed above, prior legislative acts also could not be read as a source for this authority. See supra notes 19–42 and accompanying text.

[44]Arey v. Lindsey, 48 S.E. 889, 890 (Va. 1904).

[45]Bailey v. Spangler, 771 S.E.2d 684, 686–87 (Va. 2015).

[46]Ferguson v. Ferguson, 192 S.E. 774, 777 (Va. 1937).

[47]City of Richmond v. Supervisors of Henrico Cty., 2 S.E. 26, 30 (Va. 1887)

[48]Arey, 48 S.E. at 890.

[49]H.B. 587, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 2016 Sess. (Va. 2016) (proposed amendment).

[50]See supra notes 19–42 and accompanying text.

[51]Stephanie McCrummen & Elahe Izadi, Confederate Flag Comes Down on South Carolina’s Statehouse Grounds, Wash. Post (July 10, 2015), https://perma.cc/FZ44-4MLF; S. Poverty L. Ctr., supra note 7, at 10–11.

[52]Governor’s Veto of H.B. 587, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 2016 Sess. (Va. 2016).

[53]City of Charlottesville Blue Ribbon Comm’n, supra note 1, at 22.

[54]Heritage Preservation Ass’n v. City of Danville, No. CL15000500-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 7, 2015).

[55]Id. at 2.

[56]Payne v. City of Charlottesville, No. CL 17-145, at 4 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 3, 2017).

[57]Id.

[58]Arey v. Lindsey, 48 S.E. 889, 890 (Va. 1904); see also Gloucester Realty Corp. v. Guthrie, 30 S.E.2d 686, 688 (Va. 1944) (noting that statutes are presumed to be prospective unless “plainly so intended”).

[59]467 S.E.2d 468, 470 (Va. 1996).

[60]Id. at 469 (emphasis added).

[61]See supra notes 52–60 and accompanying text.

[62]Payne, No. CL 17-145 at 4–6.

[63]Id. at 4–5 n.2.

[64]1904 Va. Acts ch. 29.

[65]1988 Va. Acts ch. 284.

[66]Jeremy Lazarus, City Attorney: City Council Has No Authority to Remove Confederate Statues, Richmond Free Press (Oct. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/9JA7-XQ7C. A closer look at the actual text of the city charter calls this conclusion into question, though. See Richmond City Charter, § 17.05 (2006) (“It shall be the further duty and function of the Commission to preserve historical landmarks and to control the design and location of statuary and other works of art which are or may become the property of the City, and the removal, relocation and alteration of any such work; and to consider and suggest the design of harbors, bridges, viaducts, airports, stadia, arenas, swimming pools, street fixtures and other public structures and appurtenances.” (emphasis added)).

[67]Herring Letter, supra note 16, at 5.

[68]See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text.

Your ‘Little Friend’ Doesn’t Say ‘Hello’: Putting the First Amendment Before the Second in Public Protests

“‘I can tell you this, 80 percent of the people here had semiautomatic weapons. You saw the militia walking down the street, you would have thought they were an army. I was just talking to the State Police upstairs; they had better equipment than our State Police had.’”[1]

VIRGINIA Governor Terry McAuliffe gave the preceding statement August 13, 2017, a day after the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia forced Americans to confront racist ideologies and deplorable dogmas most hoped had ended with V-Day in 1945. Nazi sympathizers and members of the alt-right invaded the city with tiki torches, protective gear, shields, and guns, protesting the Charlottesville City Council’s decision to remove a statue of Confederate General Robert E. Lee from Emancipation Park.

“We didn’t aggress. We did not initiate force against anybody,” white nationalist Chris Cantwell told reporter Elle Reeves. “We’re not nonviolent. We’ll fucking kill these people if we have to.”[2]

And kill they did. Three people died during the Unite the Right rally. Heather Heyer, age 32, died after a Nazi sympathizer plowed into a crowd on Charlottesville’s Downtown Mall with his vehicle, and state troopers Lieutenant H. Jay Cullen and Trooper-Pilot Berke M. M. Bates died in a helicopter crash while on their way to respond to the day’s events.[3] Despite the fact that guns were not to blame for these deaths, the display of firearms at protests and demonstrations in Charlottesville and in similar rallies before and after the events of August 11 and 12 have forced cities and municipalities to grapple with Second Amendment rights in relation to First Amendment freedoms. Armed protesters are constitutionally—and in most cases, statutorily—granted a right to bear arms for the purposes of self-defense in certain circumstances; however, the presence of their firearms may chill the speech and expressive rights of unarmed demonstrators or of fellow armed protesters by their very display.

But some gun advocates have argued that, separate and apart from the Second Amendment, the First Amendment further protects the “speech” and expression of their firearms. The First Amendment protects expression, but the line dividing protected speech and conduct from unprotected speech and conduct is often malleable, with protection hinging on good lawyering and favorable facts. This Essay will offer preliminary thoughts regarding the tension between First and Second Amendment rights, and specifically address whether the display of firearms can be construed as symbolic speech. Furthermore, this Essay will explore whether protest sites can be classified as “sensitive places” where prohibitions on the possession of firearms may constitutionally stand under District of Columbia v. Heller.[4] This is by no means an exhaustive analysis—instead, I hope it will serve as the foundation for future scholarship considering the questions at issue.

For the purposes of this Essay, I will be using “demonstrators” to refer to the members of the alt-right and Nazi movement, and “protesters” to describe the people of Charlottesville and surrounding communities who protested against the presence and premise of the Unite the Right demonstrators. Part I addresses whether openly carrying a firearm in public can constitute expression protected under the First Amendment, and considers whether an unloaded gun is entitled to constitutional protections irrespective of whether loaded guns are protected expression. Part II assesses the scope of the Second Amendment right to self-defense discussed by the Supreme Court in Heller, and briefly discusses the deepening circuit split over whether there is a right to carry a firearm for self-defense outside of an individual’s home. After finding that historical evidence and case law support the right to carry a firearm for purposes of self-defense outside the home, Part III explains why the law should protect First Amendment rights over those of the Second Amendment, and discuss how public protests can be classified as a “sensitive place” at which firearms may constitutionally be forbidden.

I. The First Amendment: Open Carry as Symbolic Speech

The line between protected expression and unprotected conduct at times disappears in First Amendment jurisprudence. Although the Supreme Court has rejected “the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea,”[5] it has recognized some conduct may be “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication” to fall within the scope of the First Amendment.[6] To determine whether conduct constitutes speech for First Amendment purposes under Spence v. Washington, the guiding case on the issue, we must ask whether “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present” and whether “in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”[7] As the Court implied in Texas v. Johnson[8] and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,[9] “[s]omeone has to do something with the symbol before it can be speech.”[10] Items themselves are not expressive; although a flag or an armband may be associated with particular nations or causes, it takes the addition of a person’s action and intention for the item to become classified as symbolic speech.

Some open carry advocates have sought protection for the right to carry firearms within the First Amendment’s “symbolic speech” doctrine.[11] Courts that have considered whether open carry amounts to expressive conduct worthy of First Amendment protection have so far found the argument unpersuasive, though they have recognized that under certain circumstances gun possession may function as protected expression. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit conceded in Nordyke v. King that “[g]un possession can be speech” upon a satisfactory showing under Spence,[12] but also noted, “[t]ypically a person possessing a gun has no intent to convey a particular message, nor is any particular message likely to be understood by those who view it.”[13] Similarly, in Baker v. Schwarb, the Eastern District of Michigan found that two gentlemen walking down a public sidewalk with two holstered handguns and two rifles were not protected by the First Amendment because they “gave no visual cues to provide context for their actions” and instead of conveying a message to others, “passer-byes were simply alarmed and concerned for their safety and that of their community.”[14] In Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Division, relying on Baker, the Northern District of Ohio found that because Northrup “had to explain the message he intended to convey” he vastly undermined his own argument “that observers would likely understand the message,” a condition required under Spence.[15]

The case that has come closest to satisfying Spence is Burgess v. Wallingford.[16] In a purportedly expressive display, Richard Burgess wore a t-shirt supporting Connecticut’s right to bear arms and kept gun rights brochures on his person as he attempted to enter Yale Billiards while wearing a loaded gun visible in his hip holster.[17] Despite this, the District of Connecticut found Burgess’s conduct was outside of First Amendment protection because reasonable minds “could disagree regarding whether his shirt established a great likelihood that others would interpret his weapon as a particularized message regarding the Second Amendment rather than, for example, a weapon carried for protection.”[18] As of this writing, none of the courts that have considered whether public gun possession can be protected as symbolic speech have found that the gun’s “expression” was more than merely ancillary to the firearm’s intended function, and thus was undeserving of First Amendment protection.

For the purposes of argument, consider how the calculus would change if we deprived the firearm of its functionality. Can an unloaded gun qualify as expression, once it is no longer an actual threat to the bodily integrity of those in the near vicinity? If the gun cannot physically harm anyone, its holder must intend for it to serve another purpose. However, unlike other expressive items, such as signs, flags, or armbands, the sight of a gun immediately insinuates harm regardless of whether or not it has the potential to do so. Reasonable minds and seasoned experts alike would be unable to discern a loaded “actual threat” from an unloaded “perceived threat,” and the cost of miscalculation is insurmountably high. If gun possession can be speech upon a satisfaction of Spence, the gun-bearers must grapple with the message they intend to convey with their firearm. While inexpressive conduct categorically falls outside of the First Amendment’s purview, some expressive conduct can also fall outside the scope of its protection.[19] It is important to be precise about the message the speaker intended to convey because the speaker’s intention must align with the listener’s likely understanding of the message in order to satisfy Spence.[20] The following discussion considers what firearms might “say”—should they be found to be expressive—and suggests the applicable constitutional limitations.

A. Gun Says “Pro-Second Amendment”

If demonstrators intend to advocate for permissive gun laws in traditional public forums like parks, streets, and sidewalks, then gun possession could be construed as political speech. However, having the item for which individuals are advocating present at the demonstration is unnecessary. Supreme Court jurisprudence establishes that the manner in which protests are conducted can be regulated as long as the government provides “ample alternative channels” for the communication of the protester’s message.[21] Similarly, restrictions on speech in traditional public forums may be subject to content-neutral and narrowly tailored time, place, and manner restrictions designed to serve a compelling state interest.[22] Government regulation of expressive activity is content-neutral as long as it is “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”[23] Therefore, a city or municipality could construct a “manner” restriction to prohibit potentially harm-causing items from appearing at protests so long as the regulation is applied regardless of viewpoint and justified without regard to its communicative impact.[24] The argument is similar to those found compelling in the context of the prohibition of sound amplification at outdoor events,[25] restrictions on protests outside of abortion clinics,[26] and permitting processes for demonstrations more broadly.[27] The communication of the ideas themselves is not prohibited, but the way in which the message may be conveyed to the public is subject to reasonable regulation. Consider demonstrations in support of the legalization of marijuana, or against holding exotic animals in captivity. Although the government may not stop the protests from occurring based on the protester’s view, the government need not permit marijuana to be present at the protest because it furthers the protest’s aim, nor need it allow exotic animals to roam free to convey the protester’s message. So it follows that firearms need not be permitted at pro-Second Amendment demonstrations, because the message may be adequately conveyed without the item at issue present.

B. Gun Says “Be Afraid” or “I Will/I Want Others To Harm You/Others”

If, however, the firearm’s intended message is one of intimidation, threat, or bodily harm, then the expression may be statutorily prohibited[28] as well outside of the First Amendment’s protection.[29] Speech that amounts to mere “offense” is protected under the First Amendment.[30] However, the benefits of some forms of speech, such as “fighting words” and words intended to cause violence, are “clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality” and are outside of the First Amendment’s scope.[31] Notwithstanding this, case law has circumscribed restrictions on these utterances to very specific instances.[32] Most applicable here are bars against “true threats” and the incitement of imminent lawless action. True threats fall outside of First Amendment protection insofar as they “communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or a group of individuals.”[33] In application, however, the standard has been difficult to discern and apply—particularly the intent element.[34]

Speech inciting imminent lawless action is similarly unprotected.[35] The test for discerning such speech, established in Brandenburg v. Ohio, prohibits states from forbidding speech unless “such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”[36] Modern interpretations of the incitement doctrine suggest “implicitly encourag[ing] the use of” force may be enough to satisfy the first prong of the Brandenburg test.[37] Regardless of whether an unloaded gun is used purely for expressive purposes, if the speaker intends violence to result from the speech and it is likely that violence will result, the gun-bearer’s claim to First Amendment protection fails because its speech is outside of the amendment’s protection.[38]

C. Gun Says “Stop Speaking”

Intellectual exercises aside, courts have also consistently found against laws and actions that chill the expressive freedoms of others, particularly in relation to political speech.[39] Firearms at protests and rallies undoubtedly chill the otherwise protected political speech of those both for and against the rally’s message for fear of violence, and this in turn runs directly contrary to the First Amendment’s core intention of protecting constructive political discourse.[40] Although the gun holders may in turn claim their political speech is chilled by prohibiting firearms at rallies, such regulation would create a “benign chilling effect” and would be permissible because the expression of violence and intimidation falls outside of First Amendment protection.[41]

II. Second Amendment: The Fundamental Right to Carry a Firearm in Public for Purposes of Self-Defense

The Second Amendment guarantees “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”[42] The Supreme Court recognized in District of Columbia v. Heller that the Second Amendment codifies a “pre-existing” individual right for “law-abiding citizens” to “possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation” regardless of service in a militia.[43] However, the Court recognized the right is “not unlimited”[44] and carefully cabined Second Amendment rights to protect “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of the hearth and home.”[45] Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court reaffirmed its finding that “the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute in the home”[46] and incorporated the right to “possess a handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense” to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[47] However, the Heller and McDonald Courts did not purport to discern the “full scope of the Second Amendment,” and the extent to which the right to bear arms outside of the home has yet to be established.[48]

Lower courts are divided on whether the right to bear arms for the lawful purpose of self-defense extends outside of the home. In July 2017, the D.C. Circuit addressed discrepancies among the circuits over whether laws prohibiting carrying firearms in public without a showing of “proper” or “good” cause were constitutional in Wrenn v. District of Columbia.[49] The Second,[50] Third,[51] and Fourth[52] Circuits have upheld “proper cause” requirements, deferring to state legislatures to properly determine the balance between the Second Amendment and public safety concerns. However, as the Ninth Circuit noted in a decision that was subsequently vacated, and as the D.C. Circuit acknowledged, these courts may have employed the very interest-balancing test proposed by Justice Breyer in Heller that was handily rejected by the majority.[53] Heller requires a rigorous historical inquiry to discern the scope of the rights protected within the Second Amendment because constitutional rights “are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them.”[54] After conducting a comprehensive historical analysis, the Seventh,[55] Ninth,[56] and D.C. Circuits[57] have essentially reached the conclusion that for “the vast majority of responsible, law-abiding citizens . . . carrying weapons in public for the lawful purpose of self-defense is a central component of the right to bear arms”[58] and therefore the right may not be categorically prohibited but for “longstanding” prohibitions found by the Heller court to be constitutional.[59]

In June 2017, the Ninth Circuit’s petition for certiorari to address the scope of the Second Amendment’s protection outside of the home was denied[60] and in October 2017 the District of Columbia declined to appeal the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Wrenn to the Supreme Court.[61] A definitive ruling from the Court about the extent of Second Amendment rights to carry firearms in public must therefore wait for another case.

Although the Court may recognize some Second Amendment right to carry a firearm in public in the future, the extent of the right will in part be informed by what may appropriately be classified as “self-defense.”[62] If our law only permits carrying guns for self-defense, does that preclude firearms that historically have been used as tools of aggression, like assault rifles? May an individual carry more than one firearm at a time for “self-defense”? How many rounds may an individual load or carry on their person under the guise of self-defense? These questions, too, naturally lead to others—should someone be in violation of these laws, will the government be able to stop them? Or, as in Charlottesville, will those exercising their Second Amendment rights have “‘better equipment than [the] State Police had’” and encourage the state to stand down?[63]

III. The First Before the Second: Limitations and Sensitive Places

Firearms at protests and rallies force fundamental rights into direct conflict. Gun-bearers have the right to speak, to assemble, to express themselves within the confines of the law and exercise their Second Amendment rights to defend themselves should the situation require it.[64] Unarmed attendees also have the right to speak, assemble, and express themselves within the confines of the law, and should be able to do so free from fear for their bodily integrity.[65] Looking both to Charlottesville and beyond, how should courts approach situations in which demonstrators feel that they must exercise their Second Amendment rights to defend against a “hostile audience,”[66] while the audience perceives the speaker’s speech to be hostile in and of itself? When both sides fight for their views in the marketplace of ideas and the “fight” could be properly construed as a war, whose rights should prevail at the expense of the others’?

As the Court has recognized in Heller, the right to carry a firearm in public is not absolute. “Longstanding” prohibitions, like those barring the mentally ill and felons from lawfully owning firearms, are constitutionally permissible.[67] Similarly, and of particular consequence when suggesting appropriate constitutional limitations on firearms in public protest sites, laws can prohibit possession in “sensitive places,” including “schools and government buildings.”[68] These are constitutional in part because bans on particular locations allow carriers to maintain an “undiminished right of self-defense” by providing proper notice so they may avoid those locations.[69]

Lower courts have interpreted “sensitive places” to include county property,[70] national parks,[71] post office parking lots,[72] university campuses,[73] and airplanes.[74] Schools, government buildings, and the additional examples lower courts have recognized as sensitive places have in common a particular obligation for the locations to provide security for their inhabitants and a “regular presence of the police or other state provided security.”[75] Similarly, lower courts have found sensitive places encompass locations that, “unlike homes, . . . are public properties where large numbers of people, often strangers (and including children), congregate for recreational, educational, and expressive activities.”[76]

These explanations suggest an individual’s “well established . . . right to receive information and ideas”[77] supersedes another’s right to bear arms in public when such places 1) provide or should provide the proper security necessary to diminish the need for defense of self and others and/or 2) serve as a place for expressive activity. Although under current jurisprudence these two elements may be independently sufficient to justify a sensitive place, together they justify a protest’s classification as a sensitive place because the preservation of the protest’s expressive activity is greatly constrained or empowered depending on the state’s failed or proper exercise of its police power, respectively.

Although it is well established that police do not have a duty to protect individuals from private harms,[78] the calculus shifts when expression is at issue because First Amendment doctrine has come to demand an unpopular speaker’s protection from the hostile audience and the heckler’s veto.[79] Protests and demonstrations are entitled to police protection to ensure the speaker’s ability to speak. However, in Charlottesville and in other similar instances, the state is unable to secure the speaker’s rights, their protection, or the protection of their listeners because an individual’s “self-defense” right challenges the state’s monopoly on violence.[80] As the Fourth Circuit has recognized, “public safety interests often outweigh individual interests in self-defense.”[81] When we are left with situations in which the exercise of “self-defense” rights castrates the state’s ability to maintain order or protect and serve the public safety interest, an individual’s right to self-defense should be secondary to the police power of the state and to the public interest in freedom of expression.

The expressive rights of demonstrators and protesters alike are severely curtailed when firearms are permitted at demonstrations because disagreement could result in death. As a result, protest sites may be rightly classified as “sensitive places” insofar as the state provides security (and may indeed have a duty to do so) and the traditionally-protected unfettered exchange of ideas demands the minimization of harm to speakers and listeners.

IV. Conclusion

Guns don’t speak. Although they may command attention and fear, the objects themselves are not inherently expressive. Even if they were used in expressive means, the messages conveyed could reasonably fall outside of First Amendment protection. In Charlottesville and around the country, First Amendment protections should not be extended to rights protected under the Second Amendment because the countervailing public safety interests and interest in encouraging expressive activities demand public protests become “sensitive places” excluded from the right to bear arms. Although unloaded guns may seem more expressive to those aware of their benign state, reasonable observers will perceive the threat of harm just as they would if the gun were loaded. This perception chills expressive freedoms and silences worthwhile debate. Furthermore, the policy justification for carrying a firearm in public for the lawful purpose of self-defense loses credence in light of the state’s obligation to protect the speakers, the listeners, and the municipality writ large during permitted demonstrations. At public protests like those in Charlottesville and across the country, protection should be satisfied by the state; therefore, sacrificing expressive freedoms for firearms is unacceptable.

 

 


*J.D. Candidate 2019, University of Virginia School of Law. I would like to thank members of the Virginia Law Review for the opportunity to discuss the events of August 11 and 12 in Charlottesville and collectively seek a way forward. I am grateful to Michael Dooley for his helpful critiques through the editing process. I am thankful for my parents’ support and encouragement, for DW for reminding me why I came, KKF for the wake-up call(s), and CS, ME, and LAH for their friendship and support. Errors are my own. 

[1]Sheryl Gay Stolberg, McAuliffe Counters Critics of Police Response to Charlottesville Violence, N.Y. Times (Aug. 13, 2017), https://web.archive.org/web/20170813232231/‌https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/charlottesville-protests-white-nationalists.html (quoting Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe).

[2]Interview by Elle Reeves with Chris Cantwell, white supremacist and “Unite the Right” attendee, in Charlottesville, Va. (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/8/‌16/‌16155942/charlottesville-protests-nazis-vice.

[3]Emma Bowman & Wynne Davis, Charlottesville Victim Heather Heyer ‘Stood Up’ Against What She Felt Was Wrong, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Aug. 13, 2017), http://www.npr.org/‌sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/13/543175919/violence-in-charlottesville-claims-3-victims.

[4]554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).

[5]United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).

[6]Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974).

[7]Id. at 410–11.

[8]491 U.S. 397, 404–06 (1989) (finding flag burning was protected under the First Amendment though the flag itself was not entitled to automatic protection).

[9]393 U.S. 503, 507–511 (1969) (finding wearing armbands in protest constituted protected speech).

[10]Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 2003).

[11]Tyler Yzaguirre, Why Gun Owners Should Use the First Amendment to Protect Open Carry, The Hill (Aug. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/L4WW-Q2DK.

[12]Nordyke, 319 F.3d at 1190 (citing Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11).

[13]Id.

[14]Baker v. Schwarb, 40 F. Supp. 3d 881, 895 (E.D. Mich. 2014).

[15]Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Div., 58 F. Supp. 3d 842, 848 (N.D. Ohio 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 785 F.3d 1128 (6th Cir. 2015).

[16]2013 WL 4494481, at *1 (D. Conn. May 15, 2013).

[17]Id.

[18]Id. at *9 (discussing First Amendment claim under §1983).

[19]See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362–63 (2003) (upholding Virginia’s ban on cross burning with intent to intimidate despite its expressive nature because of cross burning’s “long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence”).

[20]Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11.

[21]Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (finding a prohibition on sleeping in a public park to convey the plight of homelessness was constitutional in part because protests retained “ample alternative channels” to communicate their intended message).

[22]Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).

[23]Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.

[24]United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968).

[25]Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989) (finding “[t]he principle justification for the sound-amplification guideline is the city’s desire to control noise levels,” not expression, and is therefore content-neutral).

[26]Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 731 (2000) (finding that a comprehensive statute was “evidence against there being a discriminatory governmental motive,” and that the restrictions amounted to prudent location restrictions, not content restrictions).

[27]Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) (“Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people . . . has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend.”).

[28]See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-282 (2014) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to point, hold[,] or brandish any firearm . . . whether capable of being fired or not, in such manner as to reasonably induce fear in the mind of another or hold a firearm . . . in a public place in such a manner as to reasonably induce fear in the mind of another of being shot or injured.”). However, statutes criminalizing threatening speech must be interpreted “with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind.” Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969).

[29]Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” (citation omitted)).

[30]Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (“[T]he mere presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does not serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech capable of giving offense.”).

[31]See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.

[32]See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2014 (2015) (Alito, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (requiring some degree of intent to threaten); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (emphasizing “fighting words” and threats that are sufficiently particularized to an individual or group of individuals); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390–91 (1992) (striking down a city ordinance which regulated “fighting words” predicated “on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender” as viewpoint discrimination); Watts, 394 U.S. at 707–08 (requiring that threats “be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech”).

[33]Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (emphasis added).

[34]See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2013–14 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original) (“[T]he Court refuses to explain what type of intent was necessary. Did the jury need to find that Elonis had the purpose of conveying a true threat? Was it enough if he knew that his words conveyed such a threat? Would recklessness suffice? The Court declines to say.”).

[35]Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969).

[36]Id. at 447.

[37]Nwanguma v. Trump, 2017 WL 3430514, slip. op. at *3 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 9, 2017) (quoting Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 246 (6th Cir. 2015)), appeal filed, see Brief of Appellants at 2, Nwanguma v. Trump, No. 17-6290 (6th Cir. Dec. 13, 2017).

[38]Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–48.

[39]See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) (finding statutory provisions making treasonable or seditious words or acts grounds for dismissal had a “chilling effect” on expressive freedoms); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278–80 (1964).

[40]See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).

[41]See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. Rev. 685, 690 (1978) (emphasis omitted).

[42]U.S. Const. amend. II.

[43]554 U.S. 570, 592–93, 625 (2008) (emphasis omitted).

[44]Id. at 626.

[45]Id. at 635 (emphasis added).

[46]561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010) (quotation and citation omitted).

[47]Id. at 791.

[48]Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (declining to opine on the full scope of the Second Amendment); McDonald, 561 U.S. at 859 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting how the Court declined to “express an opinion” on “carriage of firearms outside the home”).

[49]864 F.3d 650, 661–64 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

[50]Kachalsky v. County. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2012) (upholding “proper cause” requirement to concealed carry).

[51]Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 439 (3rd Cir. 2013) (upholding “justifiable need” standard to open or concealed carry). 

[52]Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 880 (4th Cir. 2013) (upholding a “good-and-substantial-reason requirement” to open or concealed carry).

[53]Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 664 (quoting Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1173–75 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated by 824 F.3d 919 (2016) (en banc)).

[54]Heller, 554 U.S. at 592, 634–35.

[55]Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012).

[56]Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1175.

[57]Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 662.

[58]Id. at 664 (quoting Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1173–75).

[59]Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (affirming longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by the mentally ill, felons, etc.).

[60]Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (declining to reach the open carry question and instead limiting its decision to the constitutionality of prohibiting concealed carry), cert. denied Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017).

[61]Ann E. Marimow & Peter Jamison, D.C. Will Not Appeal Concealed Carry Gun Ruling to Supreme Court, Wash. Post (Oct. 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/8C6M-FER5.

[62]Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 (finding prohibitions against handguns were unconstitutional because they are “overwhelmingly chosen by American society” for the lawful purpose of self-defense and have been “the quintessential self-defense weapon”).

[63]Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Hurt and Angry, Charlottesville Tries to Regroup From Violence, N.Y. Times (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/charlottesville-protests-white-nationalists.html?referer=https://t.co/SbvYUNVHOG?amp=1&_r=0 (quoting Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe). State police dispute the claim that they were unprepared or otherwise intimidated by the demonstrator’s firearms. Arelis R. Hernández, Charlottesville Police Chief Defends Officers, Police Response at Violent Rally, Wash. Post (Aug. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/SQ25-D4P5.

[64]See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (“[E]ven though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental benefit . . . the government . . . may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech.”). But see Adam B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions Questions Everywhere: The Implications of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and Theory, 5 J. Legal Analysis 61, 67 (2013) (“But an amusing aspect of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is that there is no doctrine. At least there is no snappy and established test for analyzing unconstitutional conditions questions.”).

[65]See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (recognizing the right to bodily integrity as part of the “liberty” interest in the Due Process clause).

[66]The “hostile audience” problem is exemplified by Feiner v. New York, where Chief Justice Vinson described the power of the “audience,” in disagreement with the speaker, to effectively silence the speaker by raising their voices, displaying threatening behavior, etc. 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951).

[67]Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.

[68]Id.

[69]Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 662 (quoting Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 940 (7th Cir. 2012)).

[70]Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated en banc, 611 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2010) (remanding to the panel to reconsider in light of McDonald).

[71]United States v. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779, 790–91 (E.D. Va. 2009) (finding prohibitions on guns in national parks are constitutional because it is an area “where large numbers of people, often strangers (and including children), congregate for recreation[]”).

[72]United States v. Dorosan, 350 F. App’x 874, 875–76 (5th Cir. 2009).

[73]DiGiacinto v. Rector and Visitors of George Mason Univ., 704 S.E.2d 365, 370 (Va. 2011) (finding George Mason University “is a school” and “its buildings are owned by the government” and therefore the campus is a “sensitive place” within the meaning of Heller).

[74]United States v. Davis, 304 F. App’x 473, 474 (9th Cir. 2008).

[75]George A. Nation III, The New Constitutional Right to Guns: Exploring the Illegitimate Birth and Acceptable Limitations of This New Right, 40 Rutgers L. J. 353, 414 (2009).

[76]Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 790 (emphasis added).

[77]Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).

[78]See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005) (declining to find an “interest” in restraining order because police retain discretion as to how to enforce the law); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1989) (holding Due Process Clause confers no affirmative right to governmental aid, even when aid may be necessary to protect life).

[79]See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 117–20 (1969) (Black, J., concurring); Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 97 (1972); Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–36 (1992).

[80]See, e.g., Stolberg, supra note 63 (noting how police response in Charlottesville was viewed as flawed and how militia members had access to “better equipment than [the] State Police”).

[81]Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 470.