Issue 7

Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment

The nuisance-value settlement problem arises whenever a litigant can profitably initiate a meritless claim or defense and offer to settle it for less than it would cost the opposing litigant to have a court dismiss the claim or defense on a standard motion for merits review like summary judgment. The opposing litigant confronted with such a nuisance-value claim or defense rationally would agree to settle for any amount up to the cost of litigating to have it dismissed. These settlement payoffs skew litigation outcomes away from socially appropriate levels, undermining the deterrence and compensation objectives of civil liability. Yet current procedural rules are inadequate to foreclose nuisance-value strategies. 

Class action is commonly thought to exacerbate the nuisance-value settlement problem to the systematic disadvantage of defendants. This concern has contributed to the growing support among courts and commentators for subjecting class actions to precertification merits review (PCMR), generally understood as conditioning class certification on prior screening of class claims for some threshold level of merit. 

This Article proposes mandatory summary judgment (MSJ) as a solution to the problem of nuisance-value settlement in class actions and in civil litigation generally. Essentially, MSJ denies judicial enforceability to any settlement agreement entered into before the nuisance-value claim or defense has been submitted for merits review on a motion for summary judgment or other standard dispositive motion. Assessing the potential costs of the MSJ solution, we conclude that neither the opportunity for evading MSJ strictures nor the possibility of adding expenses to the settlement of non-nuisance-value litigation outweighs the benefits of MSJ. MSJ will be most cost-effective in the class action context, given the already existing general requirements of judicial review and approval of class action settlements, but MSJ should also prove beneficial in preempting nuisance-value strategies outside of class actions in the standard separate action context.

With the MSJ solution set out, the Article moves finally to offering a more exhaustive analysis of the theoretical soundness and practical efficacy of MSJ in the class action context, where its marginal benefits are arguable the greatest. First, the Article challenges the commonly held belief that class action certification exacerbates the nuisance-value settlement problem, attempting to displace the conventional understanding of complex litigation with a new conceptual framework based on the recharacterization of the class action as part of a continuum of litigation processes rather than an isolated litigation mechanism. Second, the Article provides a comparative analysis of MSJ and PCMR as solutions to the nuisance-value problems that do exist in the class action context, concluding that MSJ presents the superior and more cost-effective option.

Principled Minimalism: Restriking the Balance Between Judicial Minimalism and Neutral Principles

Scholars who grapple with the Rehnquist Court’s activism understandably have relied on the work of those who grappled with the Warren Court’s activism several decades ago. In particular, they have built upon the work of Alexander Bickel, responding to the countermajoritarian difficulty by emphasizing just how much courts should leave unresolved. But this contemporary emphasis on judicial minimalism overlooks half of an important tradition. From the time of the Founding right up until Bickel, judicial power was defended based not only on its narrowness, but also on the expectation that judges would base their decisions on law. The other half of this tradition, captured by Herbert Wechsler in his famous Neutral Principles article, has been largely overlooked. The goal of this Article is to correct the current imbalance between the neutral-principles and minimalist traditions. The Article employs institutional and historical analysis both to cast doubt on the wisdom of the recent shift toward minimalism and to support a jurisprudence of principled minimalism in its place.

Democratic Failure and Emergencies: Myth or Reality?

Academics have long debated the ability of a democratic government to respond to emergencies. This historical debate has assumed new significance as scholars attempt to respond to the challenges presented by the twenty-first century and the “War on Terror.” Commentators have reached different conclusions regarding how a government should operate during times of emergency, but each commentator’s ultimate conclusion must first answer an underlying, prior question: What exactly happens to democracy during times of emergency?

Traditional emergency-politics theorists explain democratic government during emergency with the “democratic failure theory.” But revisionists, led by Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, recently have attacked the “democratic failure” theory, asserting that nothing relevant happens during an emergency to inhibit the ability of a democratic government to function. Certainly, they concede, minorities might “lose” during emergencies, but they do in normal times as well.

This Note, while remaining ambivalent about a broad application of the traditionalists’ democratic failure theory, offers one counterpoint to Posner and Vermeule and their revisionist claim. Introducing primary source research and re-introducing forgotten or overlooked academic arguments, this Note presents a case study of the Japanese internment during World War II. The internment of individuals of Japanese descent was not merely the result, as revisionists argue, of a continuation of the peacetime baseline or of rational concerns for national security. Without contesting that those factors were relevant in the internment decisions, this Note argues that individuals of Japanese descent were interned primarily because an anti-Japanese West-Coast coalition successfully exploited the democratic failure caused by the emergency of World War II. The coalition had long sought these exclusionary measures, but before World War II, those measures lacked mainstream political appeal. World War II changed the political playing field, and the anti-Japanese coalition on the West Coast knew it. Capitalizing on the World War II democratic failure, the coalition finally harnessed the political capital necessary to achieve its exclusionary goal, if only temporarily.

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