“Necessary AND Proper” and “Cruel AND Unusual”: Hendiadys in the Constitution

Constitutional doctrine is often shaped by the details of the constitutional text. Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Supreme Court first considers whether a law is “necessary” and then whether it is “proper.” Some justices have urged the same approach for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause: First ask if the punishment is “cruel,” then if it is “unusual.” That each clause has two requirements seems obvious, and it is has been the assumption underlying vast amounts of scholarship. That assumption is incorrect.

This Article argues that “necessary and proper” and “cruel and unusual” are best read as instances of hendiadys. Hendiadys is a figure of speech in which two terms, separated by a conjunction, work together as a single complex expression. It is found in many languages, including English: For example, “rise and shine,” “nice and fat,” “cakes and ale,” “open and notorious.” When “cruel and unusual” is read as a hendiadys, the clause does not prohibit punishments that merely happen to be both cruel and unusual. Rather, it prohibits punishments that are unusually cruel, that is, innovative in their cruelty. If “necessary and proper” is read as a hendiadys, then the terms are not separate requirements for congressional action. The word “necessary” requires a close relationship between a statute and the constitutional power it is carrying into execution, while “proper” instructs us not to interpret “necessary” in its strictest sense. “Proper” also reminds us that the incidental power Congress is exercising must belong to an enumerated power.

To read each of these constitutional phrases as a hendiadys, though seemingly novel, actually aligns closely with the early interpretations, including the interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch v. Maryland. The readings offered here solve a number of puzzles, and they better capture the subtlety of these clauses

Confronting and Adapting: Intelligence Agencies and International Law

Intelligence activity is—or, more accurately, was—the last bastion of foreign relations unconstrained by international law. States could steal diplomatic secrets, covertly assess rivals’ military capabilities, and disseminate propaganda inside other states without fear of international legal sanction. This absence of regulation made sense as long as a state’s intelligence activities were primarily directed at foreign states and their officials. However, intelligence activity now implicates private actors as never before, as states engage in bulk data collection, steal secrets from corporations, and expand their focus on non-state actors such as terrorist groups. As a result, some states and advocates are now pressing for a formalist approach to international law, claiming that states should interpret various bodies of existing international law as applicable to state intelligence activities. Others contend that intelligence activities will and should remain untouched by international legal constraint. Both approaches are flawed: The realpolitik view of the (nonexistent) relationship between intelligence and international legal constraints is unsustainable and creates troubling legal black holes. The formalist view fails to acknowledge important reasons why state-on-state intelligence activities are distinct from diplomatic and military actions that states view as constrained by international law.

This Article identifies a better way to mediate the relationship between intelligence and international law. Rather than rejecting international law altogether or, alternatively, imposing a rigid legal framework on intelligence activity, it argues that states should differentiate between international laws that protect individuals against tangible harm (such as international humanitarian law and human rights treaties) and those that protect states against harms that are often dignitary (such as respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity). The Article proposes a sliding interpretive scale whereby states engaged in intelligence activity have less freedom to interpret and apply individually-focused international rules and more freedom to interpret state-protective rules.  It also illustrates how several states have begun to pursue this approach in practice.  Ultimately, this Article argues that states and human rights advocates both must adapt—in different ways—their expectations about the proper role of international law in the world of intelligence operations.

Clean Air Post-Healthcare: The Federalism Limits of the Spending Power and the Future of Environmental Regulation

Modern environmental regulation was born in the 1970s, at a time when federalism limits to congressional power were essentially an afterthought. Since then, U.S. constitutional law has undergone a federalism revival as Justices of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have sought to articulate principled limits to the federal power that ballooned during and after the New Deal. Because of federal environmental law’s expansive scope, many commentators have predicted that this growing revolution could soon change the face of federal environmental regulation.

Emblematic of federalism’s shifting landscape is the Supreme Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the politically charged controversy challenging the constitutionality of President Barack Obama’s healthcare reform package, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”). While the majority of headlines about the case reported the Court’s dramatic split over whether the controversial “individual mandate” provision was permissible under the Commerce Clause, the less discussed yet perhaps more significant holding concerned the constitutionality of the “Medicaid expansion” and the scope of the Spending Clause. This new gloss on the Spending Clause could “seriously threaten the constitutionality of a broad swath of federal spending legislation,” including environmental laws.

At the top of the endangered statutes list is the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). The CAA, like many environmental statutes, employs a “cooperative federalism” structure that requires states to take responsibility for administering a federal regulatory program. As “Congress’s most aggressive effort to induce state regulation through the use of conditional spending,” the CAA is considered the most vulnerable environmental statute—and perhaps the most vulnerable statute period—to a federalism challenge post-Sebelius. Just as the PPACA conditioned the receipt of existing Medicaid funds on adopting an expanded Medicaid program, the CAA conditions the receipt of some federal highway funds on the implementation of an air pollution control program tightly managed by the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). This “leveraging” of funds from one program to secure compliance for another was a major factor in the Sebelius majority’s conclusion that the PPACA’s Medicaid expansion was unconstitutional. And although federal highway funds make up a much smaller portion of state budgets than does Medicaid assistance, which might indicate less potential for impermissible “coercion,” federal funds do make up a large proportion of states’ transportation budgets.

EPA’s recent greenhouse gas (“GHG”) rulemakings are a prime example of how the CAA may be vulnerable to a Spending Clause challenge. Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Sebelius pictured conditional spending as a contract with states, suggesting that Congress exceeds the scope of its Spending Clause power when the terms of that contract—of how states participate in the federal program—change drastically in contravention of states’ reasonable expectations. Although the requirements of the CAA are always in flux as EPA crafts national air pollution control policy to conform to new science and changing environmental priorities, the GHG rulemakings represent the largest nonstatutory change in the Act’s scope in its forty-year history.

This Note will explore the implications of the new Spending Clause jurisprudence for the CAA and how the doctrinal trajectory signaled by the Sebelius decision can undermine both the goals of federal environmental policy and those of our system of federalism itself. Many scholars have already offered assessments of the constitutionality of the CAA after Sebelius, and most have concluded that the Act will stand. While this Note will concur with this conclusion, I hope to offer a more detailed look into the operation and effect of the highway funding sanction in Section 179 of the Act and apply Sebelius in the context of EPA’s controversial GHG rulemaking. Most importantly, this Note will point out the danger of injecting a stronger brand of Tenth Amendment federalism into the Court’s Spending Clause jurisprudence and will discuss how Sebelius might signal a dangerous trajectory for environmental policy and cooperative federalism regulatory schemes in general.

The argument will proceed in four parts. Part I will summarize the structure of the CAA and the importance of cooperative federalism within that structure. Part II will then dissect the Court’s Spending Clause precedents in South Dakota v. Dole and Sebelius, and will dig deeper into the concept of “coercion” from those cases. Part III will apply the new Sebelius test to the CAA and EPA’s GHG rulemaking. Finally, Part IV will discuss why this episode in the Court’s federalism revival may hurt environmental policymaking—and may actually marginalize rather than elevate the power of states in our federal system.