Partisan Emergencies

Executive emergency powers are tantalizingly effective. They allow presidents to bypass congressional gridlock, do away with procedural safeguards, and act decisively with minimal oversight. But there is a risk that these exceptional powers may become a norm of domestic governance. This Note theorizes a problem of “partisan emergencies,” declared by a president despite significant disagreement about the factual existence of an emergency. One example is President Trump’s declaration of an emergency after Congress refused to fund his border wall. Other examples stem from Democrats calling on President Biden to declare an emergency to address issues like climate change and reproductive health. Congress, initially relying on a legislative veto to terminate such declarations, must now muster a supermajority if it disagrees with them. At the heart of the scheme is the National Emergencies Act, outlining how a president can declare a “national emergency” and what powers he unlocks by doing so without imposing a definition of the term. This Note surveys the judiciary’s recent treatment of emergency powers, positing that while courts are willing to engage in means-ends review about how an executive uses emergency powers, they are not willing to engage in the factual question of whether an emergency exists at all. This Note then argues that the judiciary must be willing to engage with this question to effectively rein in dubious invocations of emergency power. To do so, the courts should treat the term “national emergency” as one capable of statutory interpretation, rather than one posing an intractable political question.

“[J]udicial deference in an emergency or a crisis does not mean wholesale judicial abdication.”1.Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 74 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).Show More

Introduction

With partisan feuds at a high and congressional functionality at a low,2.Aaron Zitner, U.S. Grapples with Political Gridlock as Crises Mount, Wall St. J. (Oct. 11, 2023, 8:12 AM), https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/u-s-grapples-with-political-gridlock-as-crises-mount-be179aca.Show Moreit is tempting for presidents to rely heavily on executive power to implement their policy agendas. An effective way to do so is by declaring a national emergency, allowing a president to “trigger[] executive powers or relax[] otherwise applicable requirements or restrictions.”3.Jennifer K. Elsea, Jay B. Sykes, Joanna R. Lampe, Kevin M. Lewis & Bryan L. Adkins, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R46379, Emergency Authorities Under the National Emergencies Act, Stafford Act, and Public Health Service Act (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/p‌df/R/R46379 [https://perma.cc/V4KS-CMPV].Show MoreOne scholar describes declaring a national emergency as a “master key” that unlocks a treasure trove containing nearly 150 additional grants of statutory power.4.Mark P. Nevitt, Is Climate Change a National Emergency?, 55 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 591, 616 (2021).Show MorePresident Trump relied on the declaration of a national emergency to secure funding for a southern border wall after Congress refused to grant it.5.Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949, 4949 (Feb. 15, 2019).Show MoreIn subsequent years, some Democrats called on President Biden to declare a national emergency to circumvent congressional inaction on climate change, while others looked to emergency powers as a means of protecting abortion access in the wake of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization.6.Tarini Parti, Biden Is Pressed to Declare Emergencies After Climate, Abortion Setbacks, Wall St. J. (July 20, 2022, 4:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-faces-pressure-to-d‌eclare-emergencies-after-climate-abortion-setbacks-11658318400; Myah Ward, Biden Faces Calls to Declare Climate Emergency as He Heads to Maui, Politico (Aug. 20, 2023, 7:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2023/08/20/biden-climate-emergency-hawaii-00111973 [https://perma.cc/P8ZH-6BTS].Show MoreIndeed, President Biden did rely on the COVID-19 emergency declaration in his attempt to address the student loan debt crisis, before the Supreme Court rejected this use of power in Biden v. Nebraska.7.143 S. Ct. 2355 (2023).Show More

Presidential use of emergency power is not new. While the executive lacks explicit emergency authority under the Constitution,8.Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Imbecilic Executive, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1361, 1391 (2013) (describing how Article II does not confer emergency authority, but instead creates an “impotent” executive who relies on statutory delegations of power).Show Morestatutory emergency powers have existed since the founding of the nation.9.See Examining Potential Reforms of Emergency Powers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Const., C.R. & C.L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. 3 (2022) [hereinafter Potential Reforms of Emergency Powers Hearing] (statement of Elizabeth Goitein, Co-Director, Liberty and National Security Program, Brennan Center for Justice) (stating that “since the founding of the nation, Congress has been the primary source of the president’s emergency powers”).Show MoreThese powers are important and perhaps even essential for responding to complex crises in the modern age. And, in many ways, presidents have exercised restraint in their use of the broad swath of powers that are available to them—at least when it comes to domestic policy.10 10.See generally Declared National Emergencies Under the National Emergencies Act, Brennan Ctr. for Just., https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/declared-nat‌ional-emergencies-under-national-emergencies-act [https://perma.cc/Q32Y-J2VD] (last updated Mar. 14, 2025) (listing declared emergencies of which the vast majority have been in the international or foreign affairs context).Show MoreOf the eighty-seven states of national emergency that have been declared in the past forty-five-year period, all but eight were issued to impose economic sanctions on foreign actors under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) or related sanctions laws.11 11.Id.Show MoreBut recent trends signal a risk that these exceptional powers may become a go-to strategy of domestic governance, particularly with the rise of what this Note conceptualizes as “partisan emergencies.”12 12.See Amy L. Stein, Domestic Emergency Pretexts, 98 Ind. L.J. 479, 479 (2023) (discussing the use of “questionable domestic emergencies to achieve unrelated policy goals”).Show More

The term “partisan emergency” refers to situations when presidents unilaterally declare an emergency despite significant disagreement along party lines over the most fundamental factual question: whether an emergency exists at all. President Trump’s declaration of a national emergency to fund the border wall, in the face of congressional opposition, marked a clear example of this. So too would any invocation of emergency powers to protect abortion access. These differ from the more traditional crises such as wars, pandemics, natural disasters, or other physical attacks on American interests, although the scope of even these traditional emergencies is not closed off from this debate.13 13.Cf. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863) (involving parties’ dispute over what constitutes war and who gets to decide the existence of it).Show MoreIndeed the COVID-19 pandemic, at a certain point, could be categorized as a partisan emergency.14 14.J. Clinton, J. Cohen, J. Lapinski & M. Trussler, Partisan Pandemic: How Partisanship and Public Health Concerns Affect Individuals’ Social Mobility During COVID-19,Sci. Advances,Jan. 6, 2021, at 1, 1.Show MoreRecent decisions offer insight into the current philosophy of judicial review in times of crisis15 15.See generally Amanda L. Tyler, Judicial Review in Times of Emergency: From the Founding Through the COVID-19 Pandemic, 109 Va. L. Rev. 489 (2023) (tracing the philosophy of judicial review over time with a helpful discussion on the recent pandemic years).Show Morebut leave open questions regarding the proper role for courts in policing executive overreach. The current discussion surrounding the issue of emergency declarations focuses exclusively on the need for Congress to step in.16 16.Congress has introduced bipartisan legislation to change the National Emergency Act to give it more teeth in limiting emergency declarations, but nothing has passed both houses to date. See, e.g., Limiting Emergency Powers Act of 2023, H.R. 121, 118th Cong.; ARTICLE ONE Act, S. 764, 116th Cong. (2019). A Senate hearing in May 2024 saw experts testify on the need for changes to the current statutory scheme. Restoring Congressional Oversight Over Emergency Powers: Exploring Options to Reform the National Emergencies Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affs., 118th Cong. (2024) [hereinafter Restoring Congressional Oversight Hearing]. Academic scholarship also centers on changes to the statutory scheme. See, e.g., GianCarlo Canaparo & Paul J. Larkin, Heritage Found., The Constitution and Emergencies: Regulating Presidential Emergency Declarations 3 (2023); Samuel Weitzman, Back to Good: Restoring the National Emergencies Act, 54 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 365, 405 (2021); Stein, supra note 12, at 515.Show MoreThis Note provides an alternative ground to limit executive power in the event Congress is unable or unwilling to rise to the occasion, outlining why and how a court should approach the task of interpreting the term “national emergency” as used in the National Emergencies Act (“NEA”).

This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides a high-level overview of emergency powers under the NEA and discusses why Congress is currently ill-equipped to respond to abuses of national emergency declarations. Part II turns to three distinct questions that courts can ask when reviewing an executive declaration of national emergency.17 17.This analytical framework mirrors that proposed in an amicus brief filed in Biden v. Nebraska. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Protect Democracy Project in Support of Respondents, Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355 (2023) (Nos. 22-506 & 22-535).Show MoreFirst, courts can ask whether an emergency existed at the time of invocation or whether it persisted at the time of the use of executive power. Second, courts can ask whether the means the executive used to respond to an emergency violate any constitutional restrictions, notably in the separation of powers or First Amendment realms. Finally, courts can ask whether the executive invoked emergency powers as a pretext to deal with an unrelated social problem. This Note argues that while courts have recently been more comfortable with and willing to ask the second question, they have shied away from asking the first and third questions—often invoking the political question doctrine to avoid them.18 18.See infra Part II.Show MoreWith this taxonomy in mind, Part III then advances the argument that being able to meaningfully engage with the factual existence of an emergency will be an important tool if Congress remains unable to rein in an active executive who invokes emergency powers for partisan reasons.

  1.  Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 74 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
  2.  Aaron Zitner, U.S. Grapples with Political Gridlock as Crises Mount, Wall St. J. (Oct. 11, 2023, 8:12 AM), https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/u-s-grapples-with-political-gridlock-as-crises-mount-be179aca.
  3.  Jennifer K. Elsea, Jay B. Sykes, Joanna R. Lampe, Kevin M. Lewis & Bryan L. Adkins, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R46379, Emergency Authorities Under the National Emergencies Act, Stafford Act, and Public Health Service Act (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/p‌df/R/R46379 [https://perma.cc/V4KS-CMPV].
  4.  Mark P. Nevitt, Is Climate Change a National Emergency?, 55 U.C. Davis L. Rev
    . 591, 616 (2021).

  5.  Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949, 4949 (Feb. 15, 2019).
  6.  Tarini Parti, Biden Is Pressed to Declare Emergencies After Climate, Abortion Setbacks, Wall St. J. (July 20, 2022, 4:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-faces-pressure-to-d‌eclare-emergencies-after-climate-abortion-setbacks-11658318400; Myah Ward, Biden Faces Calls to Declare Climate Emergency as He Heads to Maui, Politico (Aug. 20, 2023, 7:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2023/08/20/biden-climate-emergency-hawaii-00111973 [https://perma.cc/P8ZH-6BTS].
  7.  143 S. Ct. 2355 (2023).
  8.  Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Imbecilic Executive, 99 Va. L. Rev.

    1361, 1391 (2013) (describing how Article II does not confer emergency authority, but instead creates an “impotent” executive who relies on statutory delegations of power).

  9.  See Examining Potential Reforms of Emergency Powers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Const., C.R. & C.L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. 3 (2022) [hereinafter Potential Reforms of Emergency Powers Hearing] (statement of Elizabeth Goitein, Co-Director, Liberty and National Security Program, Brennan Center for Justice) (stating that “since the founding of the nation, Congress has been the primary source of the president’s emergency powers”).
  10.  See generally Declared National Emergencies Under the National Emergencies Act, Brennan Ctr. for Just., https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/declared-nat‌ional-emergencies-under-national-emergencies-act [https://perma.cc/Q32Y-J2VD] (last updated Mar. 14, 2025) (listing declared emergencies of which the vast majority have been in the international or foreign affairs context).
  11.  Id.
  12.  See Amy L. Stein, Domestic Emergency Pretexts, 98 Ind. L.J. 479, 479 (2023) (discussing the use of “questionable domestic emergencies to achieve unrelated policy goals”).
  13.  Cf. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863) (involving parties’ dispute over what constitutes war and who gets to decide the existence of it).
  14.  J. Clinton, J. Cohen, J. Lapinski & M. Trussler, Partisan Pandemic: How Partisanship and Public Health Concerns Affect Individuals’ Social Mobility During COVID-19, Sci. Advances,

    Jan. 6,

    2021

    , at 1, 1

    .

  15.  See generally Amanda L. Tyler, Judicial Review in Times of Emergency: From the Founding Through the COVID-19 Pandemic, 109 Va. L. Rev.
    489 (2023) (

    tracing the philosophy of judicial review over time with a helpful discussion on the recent pandemic years)

    .

  16.  Congress has introduced bipartisan legislation to change the National Emergency Act to give it more teeth in limiting emergency declarations, but nothing has passed both houses to date. See, e.g., Limiting Emergency Powers Act of 2023, H.R. 121, 118th Cong.; ARTICLE ONE Act, S. 764, 116th Cong. (2019). A Senate hearing in May 2024 saw experts testify on the need for changes to the current statutory scheme. Restoring Congressional Oversight Over Emergency Powers: Exploring Options to Reform the National Emergencies Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affs., 118th Cong. (2024) [hereinafter Restoring Congressional Oversight Hearing]. Academic scholarship also centers on changes to the statutory scheme. See, e.g., GianCarlo Canaparo & Paul J. Larkin, Heritage Found
    .,

    The Constitution and Emergencies: Regulating Presidential Emergency Declarations 3 (

    2023);

    Samuel Weitzman, Back to Good: Restoring the National Emergencies Act, 54 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs.

    365, 405 (2021);

    Stein, supra note 12, at 515.

  17.  This analytical framework mirrors that proposed in an amicus brief filed in Biden v. Nebraska. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Protect Democracy Project in Support of Respondents, Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355 (2023) (Nos. 22-506 & 22-535).
  18.  See infra Part II.

The Right to Remain Protected: Upholding Youths’ Fifth Amendment Rights After Vega v. Tekoh

In June 2022, the Supreme Court held in Vega v. Tekoh that a failure to read a suspect their Miranda rights before questioning them does not provide a basis for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Experts predict that this decision will disproportionately affect youth, who are more psychologically vulnerable to coercive interrogation tactics. However, no scholars have yet proposed any ways to mitigate this impact. This Note explores potential changes to Fifth Amendment doctrine that would safeguard youths’ ability to obtain a remedy following a Fifth Amendment violation. It explains that while the voluntariness test gives many youths hope of securing a remedy for a Miranda violation, the current voluntariness doctrine will not protect all youth whose un-Mirandized statements are admitted in court. Furthermore, while protecting youths’ Miranda rights is necessary, Miranda alone is not sufficient to uphold youths’ rights because youth struggle to understand Miranda warnings and waive Miranda at very high rates. In light of these issues, this Note proposes three changes to Fifth Amendment doctrine. First, courts should adopt a rule that statements made by youth in custody without a parent, guardian, or lawyer present are per se involuntary. Additionally, courts should hold that un-Mirandized statements by youths in custody are per se involuntary. Finally, courts should allow youths to bring a lawsuit under § 1983 for the admission of an un-Mirandized statement.

[S]ometimes, as a result [of an un-Mirandized statement being admitted], a [youth] will be wrongly convicted and spend years in prison. He may succeed, on appeal or in habeas, in getting the conviction reversed. But then, what remedy does he have for all the harm he has suffered? . . . [The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fifth Amendment in Vega v. Tekoh] injures the right by denying the remedy.1.Vega v. Tekoh, 142 S. Ct. 2095, 2111 (2022) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).Show More

Introduction

In June 2022, the Supreme Court held in Vega v. Tekoh that a failure to read a suspect their Miranda rights before questioning them does not provide a basis for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2.Id. at 2099.Show More Several experts have indicated that this decision could have grave consequences for the future of the right against self-incrimination. For example, Gary Stuart, author of a 2004 book about Miranda rights,3.Gary L. Stuart, Miranda: The Story of America’s Right to Remain Silent (2004).Show More explained that the decision “will encourage that tiny minority of police officers . . . who abuse these rules routinely, who solve crimes by lying to suspects, by not telling suspects what their constitutional rights are.”4.Joe Dana, Arizona Miranda Rights Experts Weigh Significance of Supreme Court Decision, 12News (June 23, 2022, 6:42 PM), https://www.12news.com/article/news/local/‌arizona/Miranda-rights-experts-weigh-significance-of-us-supreme-court-decision/75-976b5c‌32-19f4-48b2-a97f-4a7035373f3a [https://perma.cc/C7CB-6QN9].Show More While defendants who go to trial can seek the suppression of statements made following a violation of their Miranda rights, “sometimes, such a statement will not be suppressed.”5.Vega, 142 S. Ct. at 2111 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see, e.g., B.A. v. State, 100 N.E.3d 225, 233–34 (Ind. 2018) (overturning a conviction due to a juvenile court failing to suppress a statement a thirteen-year-old student made after a school resource officer escorted him to the vice principal’s office, another officer encouraged the student to “just tell the truth” without giving him a Miranda warning, officers stayed between the student and the door at all times, no one told the student he was free to leave the room, and no one called the student’s parents until after the interview).Show More

Experts predict that Vega’s harm will have an “outsized impact[]” on youth.6.Tami Abdollah,‘You Have to Say the Magic Words.’ What the Supreme Court Ruling on Miranda Rights Means for You, USA Today (June 24, 2022, 7:31 AM), https://www.usa‌today.com/story/news/nation/2022/06/24/supreme-court-ruling-Miranda-weakens-civil-right‌s-activists-say/7716824001/ [https://perma.cc/R7LY-WY27].Show More When asked who is most at risk if police fail to give Miranda warnings, public defender Ilona Coleman responded, “It’s the young—so teenagers who we see . . . in many of our cases that come through the criminal justice system.”7.Shannon Bond, Supreme Court Says Police Can’t Be Sued for Not Reading Out Miranda Rights, NPR (July 3, 2022, 8:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2022/07/03/1109607667/supreme‌-court-says-police-cant-be-sued-for-not-reading-out-Miranda-rights [https://perma.cc/G6DM‌-TDL9].Show More Given these potential consequences, it is essential for lawyers and judges to take action to protect youths’ rights against self-incrimination. This Note argues that courts should hold that a statement made by a youth in custody without a parent, guardian, or lawyer present or without Miranda warnings is per se involuntary and that youth have a cause of action under § 1983 for the admission of an un-Mirandized statement.8.For purposes of this Note, “youth” consists of people under eighteen years old.Show More

Although experts acknowledge that Vega is likely to impact youth disproportionately, no scholarly works have proposed any ways to mitigate this impact. This Note makes two primary contributions to the literature. First, this Note argues that statements made by youth in custody without a parent, guardian, or lawyer present or without Miranda warnings should be deemed per se involuntary. Professor Eve Brensike Primus has discussed the importance of the voluntariness test in upholding interrogation rights as the Supreme Court narrows Miranda’s protections,9.Eve Brensike Primus, The Future of Confession Law: Toward Rules for the Voluntariness Test, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 10–11 (2015).Show More and Professor Hillary Farber has argued that states should adopt statutes requiring consultation with an attorney prior to an interrogation of a youth.10 10.Hillary B. Farber, The Role of the Parent/Guardian in Juvenile Custodial Interrogations: Friend or Foe?, 41 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1277, 1308–11 (2004).Show More However, this Note is the first to argue that courts should expand the voluntariness doctrine to require both the presence of a parent, guardian, or lawyer and Miranda warnings in order for youths’ statements to be deemed voluntary. Additionally, this Note contends that youth should have a § 1983 cause of action for the admission of an un-Mirandized statement even if adults do not. This argument is partially based on the notion that youths’ un-Mirandized statements should be deemed per se involuntary, which would necessitate the availability of a § 1983 cause of action. However, this Note explains that even if courts do not adopt the proposed expansion of the voluntariness doctrine, the balance-of-interests test used in Vega favors extending Miranda to allow youth to bring § 1983 claims for the admission of un-Mirandized statements.

This Note proceeds in five Parts. Part I discusses how it is especially important to protect youths’ rights during interrogations due to their psychological vulnerabilities and the profound harms they face when incarcerated. Part II explains youths’ rights during interrogations under the U.S. Constitution and how the holding in Vega v. Tekoh has limited the ability to vindicate those rights. Part III discusses how the current voluntariness doctrine can help to uphold youths’ interrogation rights after Vega. Part IV argues that courts should adopt rules that statements by youth in custody without a parent, guardian, or lawyer present or without Miranda warnings are per se involuntary. Finally, Part V explains why youth should be able to sue under § 1983 for the admission of an un-Mirandized statement even if adults cannot.

  1.  Vega v. Tekoh, 142 S. Ct. 2095, 2111 (2022) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
  2.  Id. at 2099.
  3.  Gary L. Stuart, Miranda: The Story of America’s Right to Remain Silent (2004).
  4.  Joe Dana, Arizona Miranda Rights Experts Weigh Significance of Supreme Court Decision, 12News (June 23, 2022, 6:42 PM), https://www.12news.com/article/news/local/‌arizona/Miranda-rights-experts-weigh-significance-of-us-supreme-court-decision/75-976b5c‌32-19f4-48b2-a97f-4a7035373f3a [https://perma.cc/C7CB-6QN9].
  5.  Vega, 142 S. Ct. at 2111 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see, e.g., B.A. v. State, 100 N.E.3d 225, 233–34 (Ind. 2018) (overturning a conviction due to a juvenile court failing to suppress a statement a thirteen-year-old student made after a school resource officer escorted him to the vice principal’s office, another officer encouraged the student to “just tell the truth” without giving him a Miranda warning, officers stayed between the student and the door at all times, no one told the student he was free to leave the room, and no one called the student’s parents until after the interview).
  6.  Tami Abdollah, ‘You Have to Say the Magic Words.’ What the Supreme Court Ruling on Miranda Rights Means for You, USA Today (June 24, 2022, 7:31 AM), https://www.usa‌today.com/story/news/nation/2022/06/24/supreme-court-ruling-Miranda-weakens-civil-right‌s-activists-say/7716824001/ [https://perma.cc/R7LY-WY27].
  7.  Shannon Bond, Supreme Court Says Police Can’t Be Sued for Not Reading Out Miranda Rights, NPR (July 3, 2022, 8:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2022/07/03/1109607667/supreme‌-court-says-police-cant-be-sued-for-not-reading-out-Miranda-rights [https://perma.cc/G6DM‌-TDL9].
  8.  For purposes of this Note, “youth” consists of people under eighteen years old.
  9.  Eve Brensike Primus, The Future of Confession Law: Toward Rules for the Voluntariness Test, 114 Mich. L. Rev
    .

    1, 10–11 (2015).

  10.  Hillary B. Farber, The Role of the Parent/Guardian in Juvenile Custodial Interrogations: Friend or Foe?, 41 Am. Crim. L. Rev

    .

    1277, 1308–11 (2004).

Becoming the “Bill of Rights”: The First Ten Amendments from Founding to Reconstruction

The first ten amendments to the federal Constitution have no formal title. It is only by cultural tradition that Americans refer to these provisions as our national “Bill of Rights.” Until recently, most scholars assumed that this tradition could be traced back to the moment of ratification. Over the last decade or so, however, a number of scholars have challenged this assumption. These “Bill of Rights revisionists” claim that Americans did not commonly refer to the first ten amendments as “the bill of rights” until the twentieth century. Prior to that, most Americans either did not believe they had a national bill of rights, or they would have more likely pointed to the Declaration of Independence as the country’s “bill of rights.” If the revisionists are right, then a substantial portion of constitutional historical scholarship is shot through with historical error, in particular scholarship supporting the incorporation of the Bill of Rights as part of the Fourteenth Amendment.

This Article conducts an exhaustive investigation of political, legal, and cultural references to the “bill of rights” from the time of the Founding to Reconstruction (and beyond). These references, most of which are presented here for the first time, prove that the revisionist claims about the first ten amendments are false. Long before the twentieth century, and decades before Reconstruction, Americans commonly referred to the 1791 amendments as “the Bill of Rights.” These references vastly outnumber historical references to the Declaration of Independence as a “bill of rights,” and indicate that nineteenth-century Americans were not at all confused about the meaning and content of their national “Bill of Rights.” If any revision is in order, it is the need to revisit and revise our understanding of how post-Civil War Americans abandoned the original federalist understanding of the Bill of Rights and embraced a new nationalist understanding of their enumerated rights.

Introduction

Americans commonly refer to the first ten amendments to the federal Constitution as “the Bill of Rights.” The amendments themselves, however, have no such title. Unlike the “Declaration of Rights” annexed to many state constitutions,1.See, e.g., Va. Const. art. 1 (drafted 1776, affixed to its constitution in 1830); Pa. Const. ch. I (1776); Mass. Const. pt. I (1780).Show More the ten amendments added to the federal Constitution in 1791 have no formal title at all.2.For a transcription of the official copy of the 1791 amendments, including the message submitted with the original proposed twelve amendments, see The Bill of Rights: A Transcription, National Archives, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/bill-of-rights-transcript [https://perma.cc/5YP9-2EPP] (last visited Jan. 15, 2024). For a PDF of the actual document, see The Bill of Rights, National Archives, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/bill-of-rights [https://perma.cc/5K6S-4ZRD] (last visited Jan. 15, 2024).Show More It is only by cultural tradition that Americans refer to these provisions as our national “Bill of Rights.” Until recently, scholars assumed that this tradition could be traced back to the moment of ratification.

Over the last decade or so, however, a number of scholars have challenged this assumption. These “Bill of Rights revisionists” claim that Americans did not commonly refer to the first ten amendments as “the Bill of Rights” until the twentieth century.3.See, e.g., Randy Barnett & Evan Bernick, The Original Meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment: Its Letter and Spirit 326 (2021) (“[T]his phrase [the Bill of Rights] did not commonly refer to the first ten amendments until sometime in the twentieth century . . . . [E]ven after the first ten amendments were added to the end [of the Constitution], people often characterized the rights affirmed by the previously enacted Declaration of Independence as a ‘bill of rights.’”); Ilan Wurman, The Second Founding: An Introduction to the Fourteenth Amendment 111 (2020) (“[T]he term ‘bill of rights’ was not used as a term of art for the first eight Amendments to the U.S. Constitution until well after the Civil War.”); Gerard N. Magliocca, The Heart of the Constitution: How the Bill of Rights Became the Bill of Rights 6 (2018) (“The belief that the first ten amendments are the Bill of Rights did not become dominant until the twentieth century.”); Michael J. Douma, How the First Ten Amendments Became the Bill of Rights, 15 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 593, 609–11 (2017) (explaining that the term “Bill of Rights” was not defined as the first ten amendments prior to the late 1920s and early 1930s); Pauline Maier, The Strange History of the Bill of Rights, 15 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 497, 506–11 (2017) (arguing that the “Bill of Rights” did not take on its current meaning as a reference to the 1791 amendments until the 1930s).Show More Prior to that, revisionists argue, most Americans either did not believe they had a national bill of rights4.Magliocca, supra note 3, at 5 (“[D]uring the nineteenth century, most people simply did not think that the country had a national bill of rights . . . .”).Show More or they would have pointed to the Declaration of Independence as the country’s “bill of rights.”5.Id. at 58–59 (“Until 1860, the first ten amendments lagged well behind the Declaration of Independence in the race for public recognition as the national bill of rights.”); Maier, supra note 3, at 503 (“The most important statement of rights for early nineteenth century Americans—particularly those who opposed slavery—was not what we call the Bill of Rights but the Declaration of Independence.”); see also Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 326 (arguing that “even after the first ten amendments were added to the [Constitution], people often characterized the rights affirmed by the previously enacted Declaration of Independence as a ‘bill of rights’”).Show More A number of revisionists insist that nineteenth-century Americans used the term “bill of rights” as an abstract reference to a variety of culturally important documents, including the Declaration of Independence and the entire federal Constitution.6.Douma, supra note 3, at 600–01 (“[A] bill of rights was conceived of as an abstraction . . . . [I]n the early Republic, ‘bill of rights’ as a term was quite distinct from and referred to more than just the first ten amendments.”); id. at 602 (noting that prior to the twentieth century, the term “Bill of Rights” was more often used as an “abstract concept” than a reference to a specific document); Randy Barnett & Evan Bernick, The Privileges or Immunities Clause Abridged: A Critique of Kurt Lash on the Fourteenth Amendment, 95 Notre Dame L. Rev. 499, 568–69 (2019) (first citing Magliocca, supra note 3, at 6, 90; then citing Douma, supra note 3, at 609–11; and then citing Maier, supra note 3, at 506–11) (“To begin with, recent scholarship has shown that the first eight or ten amendments to the Constitution were not commonly referred to as ‘the Bill of Rights’ until well into the twentieth century . . . . [As late as 1868,] ‘the Bill of Rights’ lacked a standard meaning.”).Show More These scholars maintain that the term “bill of rights” remained a “mass of linguistic confusion” until the twentieth century, when common usage finally coalesced around the 1791 amendments.7.Douma, supra note 3, at 598.Show More

If the revisionists are right, then a substantial portion of constitutional historical scholarship is shot through with historical error.8.According to Randy Barnett and Evan Bernick, “[a]ttributing the post-New Deal meaning of ‘the Bill of Rights’ to the pre-Fourteenth Amendment public is anachronistic. (Although, we admit, it was an understandable mistake to have made before this recent revisionist scholarship.).” Barnett & Bernick, supra note 6, at 568. Similarly, Michael Douma insists that “anachronistic” scholarly references to the 1791 amendments as the “bill of rights” “runs through the whole sub-field of constitutional history.” Douma, supra note 3, at 596.Show More For more than a century, historians and legal scholars have presumed that, absent a specific signal indicating otherwise, nineteenth-century references to the American “bill of rights” referred to the rights listed in the 1791 amendments.9.A full list would fill libraries. Among some of the more influential works that would have to be revised or reevaluated would include 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 276 (1st ed. 1833); Thomas Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States 199–204 (1880); Edward Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights and What It Means Today vii (1957); Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights 1–2 (1958); Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864–88: Part One, in 6 The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise: History of the Supreme Court of the United States 1123–24 (1971); Bernard Schwartz, The Great Rights of Mankind: A History of the American Bill of Rights 165–67 (1992); Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights 1 (1986); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstructionxi (1998); Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights 1 (1999); Carol Berkin, The Bill of Rights: The Fight to Secure America’s Liberties 1–3 (2015).Show More If this assumption is not correct, then this calls into question a great body of historical scholarship on everything from the history of the original “bill of rights,”10 10.See, e.g., Levy, supra note 9, at 1.Show More to antebellum abolitionist efforts to enforce “the bill of rights,”11 11.See, e.g., Kent Curtis, supra note 9, at 51–54; Amar, supra note 9, at 161–62.Show More to Reconstruction Republican claims that the Fourteenth Amendment would apply “the bill of rights” against the states.12 12.See, e.g., 2 G. Edward White, Law in American History: From Reconstruction Through the 1920s, at 10 (2016).Show More Moreover, since scholars and judges (including Supreme Court Justices) have relied on this scholarship in considering whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights, revisionist claims call into question the historical justification for contemporary incorporation doctrine.13 13.See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 754 (2010); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70–72, 92–110 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); McDonald, 561 U.S. at 828 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (discussing the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, including Justice Black’s historical appendix in Adamson). Bill of Rights revisionism, if correct, also would require rethinking a number of additional common assumptions in legal historical scholarship, including the presumed shift from a federalist reading of the 1791 “bill of rights” to a more libertarian understanding at the time of Reconstruction. See Amar, supra note 9, at 190, 284. But see Maier, supranote 3, at 505 (specifically rejecting Amar’s account). Revisionism also calls into question scholarship on the move from natural rights to a more positivist approach to legal rights during the nineteenth century. Presumptions that Americans came to view the Constitution with its “bill of rights” as representing a document of the unified American people rather than a federalist document of limited national power guaranteeing reserved powers to the states would also have to be re-envisioned since, again, much of this scholarship relies on antebellum discussions of the “bill of rights.”Show More

This Article examines the historical record in order to determine whether the claims of the Bill of Rights revisionists are correct. It presents the results of an exhaustive investigation of political, legal, and cultural references to the “bill of rights” from the time of the Founding to the end of the nineteenth century. These references, most of which are presented here for the first time, suggest that the central revisionist claims are false. Long before the twentieth century, and decades before Reconstruction, Americans commonly referred to the first ten constitutional amendments as “the Bill of Rights.” References to the 1791 amendments as the national bill of rights vastly outnumber historical references to the Declaration of Independence as a “bill of rights,” and nineteenth-century Americans were not at all confused about the meaning and content of the national “Bill of Rights.”

Although antebellum Americans embraced the ten amendments as their Bill of Rights, their understanding of those amendments significantly changed between the Founding and Reconstruction. At the time of the Founding, most Americans viewed the national Bill of Rights as symbolizing a general theory of limited and enumerated federal power.14 14.See infra note 136 and accompanying text.Show More Over time, however, this federalist understanding of the Bill of Rights gave way to a more individual-liberty reading of the ten amendments.15 15.See infra note 277 and accompanying text.Show More By the time of Reconstruction, both Democrats and Republicans viewed the Bill of Rights as declaring the fundamental rights of American citizenship.16 16.See infra note 318 and accompanying text.Show More When John Bingham proposed the addition of an amendment enforcing the “Bill of Rights” against the states, his colleagues understood the proposal as an effort to enforce the personal rights listed in the 1791 amendments. To date, scholars have failed to recognize the significance of the Reconstruction-era vision of “the Bill of Rights” and the role it played in the original understanding of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.

* * *

This Article begins by briefly addressing the basic claims of Bill of Rights revisionists. Although not entirely uniform in their individual conclusions or theoretical approach, they share a number of common assertions. All insist that references to the ten amendments as a bill of rights were extremely rare between the time of the Founding and Reconstruction. This rarity, we are told, reflects the fact that the 1791 amendments lacked the essential characteristics of a bill of rights in late-eighteenth-century America—the amendments did not “look” like a bill of rights.17 17.See, e.g., Maier, supra note 3, at 500 (“Congress did not label the amendments it endorsed a Bill of Rights nor did they look like one to eighteenth century Americans.”); Magliocca, supra note 3, at 37 (“[O]ne reason that the ten amendments ratified by the states in 1791 were not seen as a bill of rights is that they did not match the eighteenth-century expectations of how one was supposed to look.”).Show More During the first half of the nineteenth century, revisionists claim, almost no one referred to the 1791 amendments as a bill of rights.18 18.Magliocca, supra note 3, at 5 (“[F]or more than a century after the first ten amendments were ratified, hardly anyone called them a bill of rights, let alone the Bill of Rights.”).Show More Although some referred to the 1791 amendments as having “the nature of a bill of rights” or were “equivalent to a bill of rights,” they avoided actually naming the amendments “the Bill of Rights.”19 19.Maier, supra note 3, at 502 (emphases added) (noting that such phrases were “more descriptive than [normative]”—“[t]hat is, they fell short of giving [the amendments] the name”).Show More Instead, antebellum Americans more often pointed to the Declaration of Independence as the nation’s Bill of Rights.20 20.Magliocca, supra note 3, at 58–59 (“Until 1860, the first ten amendments lagged well behind the Declaration of Independence in the race for public recognition as the national bill of rights.”); Maier, supra note 3, at 503 (“The most important statement of rights for early nineteenth century Americans—particularly those who opposed slavery—was not what we call the Bill of Rights but the Declaration of Independence.”); see also Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 326 (“[T]his phrase [the Bill of Rights] did not commonly mean the first ten amendments until sometime in the twentieth century. . . . [E]ven after the first ten amendments were added to the end [of the Constitution], people often characterized the rights affirmed by the previously enacted Declaration of Independence as a ‘bill of rights.’”).Show More Although some revisionists point to Reconstruction as the moment when Americans began to call the ten amendments a bill of rights, others insist that the term “bill of rights” remained an “abstract concept” that would not be clarified prior to the twentieth century.21 21.Douma, supra note 3, at 602.Show More Part I concludes by analyzing the empirical nature of the revisionists’ claims and the manner by which such claims can be tested.

Subsequent Parts then take a deep dive into the historical record. Part II explores the meaning of the term “bill of rights” at the time of the Founding. Understood as simply an enumeration of constraints on government power, late-eighteenth-century Americans applied the term “bill of rights” to a number of historical documents, including the Magna Charta,22 22.See, e.g., 1 Gazette U.S. (N.Y.C.), Dec. 30, 1789, at 299 (describing how guarantees of individual rights grew out of the conflict between King John and the rebel barons).Show More the English Petition of Right, the English Bill of Rights, and the states’ “Declarations of Rights.”23 23.Interestingly, late-eighteenth-century Americans did not refer to the Declaration of Independence as a bill of rights. This usage seems not to have occurred until much later, driven primarily by the rising abolitionist movement in the early decades of the nineteenth century, no earlier than 1817. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.Show More All of these otherwise distinguishable documents could be viewed as bills of rights because, according to contemporary definitions, “a bill of rights” was nothing more than a list of enumerated rights or constraints on government power. Placement was not important: there is no evidence that Founding-era Americans believed “bills of rights” needed to be at the beginning or at the end of a constitution or attached to a constitution at all. Nor was the term “bill of rights” reserved for particular kinds of rights or principles—one might criticize a bill of rights for being incomplete, but still consider the incomplete list to be a “bill of rights.”24 24.Infra note 66 and accompanying text.Show More

Part III explores antebellum legal and political rhetoric and the degree to which Americans during that period described the 1791 amendments as a “bill of rights.” Although the amendments themselves lacked an official title, late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century speakers, politicians, and legal commentators repeatedly described the first ten amendments as “a bill of rights,” “the bill of rights,” “our Bill of Rights,” and the “national bill of rights.” These references are found in everything from congressional speeches to children’s schoolbooks. This common way of labeling the 1791 amendments became even more frequent in the decades prior to the Civil War. As the debate over slavery increasingly divided the country, both abolitionists and states’ rights advocates invoked the national “Bill of Rights” in support of their theories of constitutional liberty. By the time of the Civil War, presidential speeches, abolitionist newspapers, essays by critics of the national government, and congressional debates are full of references to the first ten amendments as a (or the) “bill of rights.” Although there are a few scattered references to the Declaration of Independence as a “national bill of rights,” the historical record overwhelmingly indicates that the term “bill of rights” was most commonly used in reference to the 1791 amendments.

Part IV investigates the Civil War and Reconstruction Eras, including the period coinciding with the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. As had their antebellum counterparts, both Republican abolitionists and states-rights Democrats repeatedly pointed to the 1791 Bill of Rights in support of their particular legal and political goals. During the Fourteenth Amendment debates, members of both parties unambiguously referred to the 1791 amendments as the Bill of Rights. When Ohio Republican John Bingham announced his intention to pass an amendment enforcing the “Bill of Rights” against the states, his colleagues in the Thirty-Ninth Congress understood Bingham to be referring to the 1791 amendments and his desire to apply those amendments against the states. Throughout the Reconstruction Congresses, members used the term “Bill of Rights” as a reference to provisions in the 1791 amendments. This practice continued from Reconstruction to the end of the nineteenth century.

The Article concludes by summarizing the historical evidence and considering the implications for future historical research on the national Bill of Rights and the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although historians may confidently continue to presume that Reconstruction-era references to the national bill of rights were references to the enumerated rights of the 1791 amendments, it appears the public understanding of those amendments had changed between the time of the Founding and the Fourteenth Amendment. This has important implications for our understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a clause written by John Bingham, who described his efforts as an attempt to enforce the bill of rights as incorporated against the states.25 25.John Bingham, Speech on the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, March 31, 1791, in 2 The Reconstruction Amendments: Essential Documents 620, 624 (Kurt T. Lash ed., 2021).Show More

  1.  See, e.g., Va. Const. art. 1 (drafted 1776, affixed to its constitution in 1830); Pa. Const. ch. I (1776); Mass. Const. pt. I (1780).
  2.  For a transcription of the official copy of the 1791 amendments, including the message submitted with the original proposed twelve amendments, see The Bill of Rights: A Transcription, National Archives, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/bill-of-rights-transcript [https://perma.cc/5YP9-2EPP] (last visited Jan. 15, 2024). For a PDF of the actual document, see The Bill of Rights, National Archives, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/bill-of-rights [https://perma.cc/5K6S-4ZRD] (last visited Jan. 15, 2024).
  3.  See, e.g., Randy Barnett & Evan Bernick, The Original Meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment: Its Letter and Spirit 326 (2021) (“[T]his phrase [the Bill of Rights] did not commonly refer to the first ten amendments until sometime in the twentieth century . . . . [E]ven after the first ten amendments were added to the end [of the Constitution], people often characterized the rights affirmed by the previously enacted Declaration of Independence as a ‘bill of rights.’”); Ilan Wurman, The Second Founding: An Introduction to the Fourteenth Amendment 111 (2020) (“[T]he term ‘bill of rights’ was not used as a term of art for the first eight Amendments to the U.S. Constitution until well after the Civil War.”); Gerard N. Magliocca, The Heart of the Constitution: How the Bill of Rights Became the Bill of Rights 6 (2018) (“The belief that the first ten amendments are the Bill of Rights did not become dominant until the twentieth century.”); Michael J. Douma, How the First Ten Amendments Became the Bill of Rights, 15 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 593, 609–11 (2017) (explaining that the term “Bill of Rights” was not defined as the first ten amendments prior to the late 1920s and early 1930s); Pauline Maier, The Strange History of the Bill of Rights, 15 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 497, 506–11 (2017) (arguing that the “Bill of Rights” did not take on its current meaning as a reference to the 1791 amendments until the 1930s).
  4.  Magliocca, supra note 3, at 5 (“[D]uring the nineteenth century, most people simply did not think that the country had a national bill of rights . . . .”).
  5.  Id. at 58–59 (“Until 1860, the first ten amendments lagged well behind the Declaration of Independence in the race for public recognition as the national bill of rights.”); Maier, supra note 3, at 503 (“The most important statement of rights for early nineteenth century Americans—particularly those who opposed slavery—was not what we call the Bill of Rights but the Declaration of Independence.”); see also Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 326 (arguing that “even after the first ten amendments were added to the [Constitution], people often characterized the rights affirmed by the previously enacted Declaration of Independence as a ‘bill of rights’”).
  6.  Douma, supra note 3, at 600–01 (“[A] bill of rights was conceived of as an abstraction . . . . [I]n the early Republic, ‘bill of rights’ as a term was quite distinct from and referred to more than just the first ten amendments.”); id. at 602 (noting that prior to the twentieth century, the term “Bill of Rights” was more often used as an “abstract concept” than a reference to a specific document); Randy Barnett & Evan Bernick, The Privileges or Immunities Clause Abridged: A Critique of Kurt Lash on the Fourteenth Amendment, 95 Notre Dame L. Rev. 499, 568–69 (2019) (first citing Magliocca, supra note 3, at 6, 90; then citing Douma, supra note 3, at 609–11; and then citing Maier, supra note 3, at 506–11) (“To begin with, recent scholarship has shown that the first eight or ten amendments to the Constitution were not commonly referred to as ‘the Bill of Rights’ until well into the twentieth century . . . . [As late as 1868,] ‘the Bill of Rights’ lacked a standard meaning.”).
  7.  Douma, supra note 3, at 598.
  8.  According to Randy Barnett and Evan Bernick, “[a]ttributing the post-New Deal meaning of ‘the Bill of Rights’ to the pre-Fourteenth Amendment public is anachronistic. (Although, we admit, it was an understandable mistake to have made before this recent revisionist scholarship.).” Barnett & Bernick, supra note 6, at 568. Similarly, Michael Douma insists that “anachronistic” scholarly references to the 1791 amendments as the “bill of rights” “runs through the whole sub-field of constitutional history.” Douma, supra note 3, at 596.
  9.  A full list would fill libraries. Among some of the more influential works that would have to be revised or reevaluated would include 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 276 (1st ed. 1833); Thomas Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States 199–204 (1880); Edward Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights and What It Means Today vii (1957); Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights 1–2 (1958); Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864–88: Part One, in 6 The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise: History of the Supreme Court of the United States 1123–24 (1971); Bernard Schwartz, The Great Rights of Mankind: A History of the American Bill of Rights 165–67 (1992); Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights 1 (1986); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction

    xi (1998); Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights

    1

    (1999); Carol Berkin, The Bill of Rights: The Fight to Secure America’s Liberties 1–3 (2015).

  10.  See, e.g., Levy, supra note 9, at 1.
  11.  See, e.g., Kent Curtis, supra note 9, at 51–54; Amar, supra note 9, at 161–62.
  12.  See, e.g., 2 G. Edward White, Law in American History: From Reconstruction Through the 1920s, at
    10

    (2016).

  13.  See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 754 (2010); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70–72, 92–110 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); McDonald, 561 U.S. at 828 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (discussing the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, including Justice Black’s historical appendix in Adamson). Bill of Rights revisionism, if correct, also would require rethinking a number of additional common assumptions in legal historical scholarship, including the presumed shift from a federalist reading of the 1791 “bill of rights” to a more libertarian understanding at the time of Reconstruction. See Amar, supra note 9, at 190, 284. But see Maier, supra note 3, at 505 (specifically rejecting Amar’s account). Revisionism also calls into question scholarship on the move from natural rights to a more positivist approach to legal rights during the nineteenth century. Presumptions that Americans came to view the Constitution with its “bill of rights” as representing a document of the unified American people rather than a federalist document of limited national power guaranteeing reserved powers to the states would also have to be re-envisioned since, again, much of this scholarship relies on antebellum discussions of the “bill of rights.”
  14.  See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
  15.  See infra note 277 and accompanying text.
  16.  See infra note 318 and accompanying text.
  17.  See, e.g., Maier, supra note 3, at 500 (“Congress did not label the amendments it endorsed a Bill of Rights nor did they look like one to eighteenth century Americans.”); Magliocca, supra note 3, at 37 (“[O]ne reason that the ten amendments ratified by the states in 1791 were not seen as a bill of rights is that they did not match the eighteenth-century expectations of how one was supposed to look.”).
  18.  Magliocca, supra note 3, at 5 (“[F]or more than a century after the first ten amendments were ratified, hardly anyone called them a bill of rights, let alone the Bill of Rights.”).
  19.  Maier, supra note 3, at 502 (emphases added) (noting that such phrases were “more descriptive than [normative]”—“[t]hat is, they fell short of giving [the amendments] the name”).
  20.  Magliocca, supra note 3, at 58–59 (“Until 1860, the first ten amendments lagged well behind the Declaration of Independence in the race for public recognition as the national bill of rights.”); Maier, supra note 3, at 503 (“The most important statement of rights for early nineteenth century Americans—particularly those who opposed slavery—was not what we call the Bill of Rights but the Declaration of Independence.”); see also Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 326 (“[T]his phrase [the Bill of Rights] did not commonly mean the first ten amendments until sometime in the twentieth century. . . . [E]ven after the first ten amendments were added to the end [of the Constitution], people often characterized the rights affirmed by the previously enacted Declaration of Independence as a ‘bill of rights.’”).
  21.  Douma, supra note 3, at 602.
  22.  See, e.g., 1 Gazette U.S. (N.Y.C.), Dec. 30, 1789, at 299 (describing how guarantees of individual rights grew out of the conflict between King John and the rebel barons).
  23.  Interestingly, late-eighteenth-century Americans did not refer to the Declaration of Independence as a bill of rights. This usage seems not to have occurred until much later, driven primarily by the rising abolitionist movement in the early decades of the nineteenth century, no earlier than 1817. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
  24.  Infra note 66 and accompanying text.
  25.  John Bingham, Speech on the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, March 31, 1791, in 2 The Reconstruction Amendments: Essential Documents 620, 624 (Kurt T. Lash ed., 2021).