Issue 2

Common Sense about Common Decency: Promoting a New Standard for Guard-on-Inmate Sexual Abuse under the Eighth Amendment

When inmates claim they are sexually abused by their prison guards, many courts scrutinize their claims to determine, as a threshold inquiry, whether they allege objectively serious injury. Courts often hold that guard-on-inmate sexual abuse does not inflict that level of injury, and therefore does not violate the Eighth Amendment or impose cruel and unusual punishment.

The dominant body of law arrives at the wrong conclusion because it focuses on the wrong question.  It asks whether guard-on-inmate sexual abuse imposes a threshold level of physical or psychological harm on an inmate. Instead, Eighth Amendment case law should simply ask whether a guard’s sexual abuse of an inmate, as specifically defined in current federal law, can be justified by any legitimate prison-management purpose. If it cannot, the law should presume that guard-on-inmate conduct violates contemporary standards of decency, and thus violates the Eighth Amendment.

This Note will demonstrate that courts’ misdirected focus has negative ramifications beyond its maladjustment to our society’s contemporary standards of decency. First, courts are less likely to find that male inmates meet the injury threshold. Consequently, the dominant standard often results in male inmates receiving less recognition and relief than female or transgender inmates for psychological injuries suffered from sexual abuse. Second, this disparate treatment and certain language in the case law promote a discourse about gender that proves problematic for men, women, and transgender persons alike.

Through this Note, I offer two fairly simple solutions to eliminate this disparate treatment and adjust Eighth Amendment standards to more closely correspond with current sexual abuse law and societal norms. Using emerging case law and Supreme Court precedent, I enumerate specific standards that advocates and courts can use to properly redirect the focus of the Eighth Amendment inquiry from the injury threshold to whether contemporary standards of decency have been violated by guard-on-inmate sexual abuse. State and federal law show our current societal norms deeply condemn such abuse, and suggest courts should presume violations of contemporary standards of decency in specified circumstances of sexual abuse.

Improving Rights

Courts and commentators regularly assume that a single avenue for rights-making is both sufficient and unproblematic. For example, it is enough if a Fourth Amendment claim may be litigated either in suppression hearings or in civil suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In previous work, I presented original quantitative and qualitative evidence that challenged this assumption, arguing that litigation in a single context tends to flatten and distort constitutional rights.

In this Article, I build on this critique by introducing cognitive psychology research suggesting that judicial rights-making is better undertaken simultaneously in multiple contexts. For example, on this view, Fourth Amendment rights would be better crafted both in suppression hearings and in civil suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Such rights-making is preferable because it exposes judges to a broader range of governmental and private actors, factual circumstances, and social interests. In other words, multiple-context rights-making better captures the full array of considerations relevant to defining the proper contour of the right. Multiple-context rights-making would therefore result in better rights—that is, rights that more closely resemble the rights that judges would construct if they considered all the information relevant to the right itself and only that information, freed from bias, cognitive errors, and the influence of other contextual factors.

With this insight as a foundation, the Article then turns to the question of how to create the conditions necessary to improve constitutional rights-making. While previous commentators have wrongly treated rights-making conditions as inevitable, I explain that the conditions under which rights-making occurs are sensitive to factors well within governmental actors’ control, such as available remedies, incentives to litigate, and procedural hurdles. I conclude that government actors can and should take concrete and affirmative steps to improve the conditions of constitutional rights-making.

Market Efficiency after the Financial Crisis: It’s Still a Matter of Information Costs

Compared to the worldwide financial carnage that followed the Subprime Crisis of 2007–2008, it may seem of small consequence that it is also said to have demonstrated the bankruptcy of an academic financial institution: the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (“ECMH”). Two things make this encounter between theory and seemingly inconvenient facts of consequence. First, the ECMH had moved beyond academia, fueling decades of a deregulatory agenda. Second, when economic theory moves from academics to policy, it also enters the realm of politics, and is inevitably refashioned to serve the goals of political argument. This happened starkly with the ECMH. It was subject to its own bubble—as a result of politics, it expanded from a narrow but important academic theory about the informational underpinnings of market prices to a broad ideological preference for market outcomes over even measured regulation. In this Article we examine the Subprime Crisis as a vehicle to return the ECMH to its information cost roots that support a more modest but sensible regulatory policy. In particular, we argue that the ECMH addresses informational efficiency, which is a relative, not an absolute measure. This focus on informational efficiency leads to a more focused understanding of what went wrong in 2007–2008. Yet informational efficiency is related to fundamental efficiency—if all information relevant to determining a security’s fundamental value is publicly available and the mechanisms by which that information comes to be reflected in the security’s market price operate without friction, fundamental and informational efficiency coincide. But where all value-relevant information is not publicly available and/or the mechanisms of market efficiency operate with frictions, the coincidence is an empirical question both as to the information efficiency of prices and their relation to fundamental value.

Properly framing market efficiency focuses our attention on the frictions that drive a wedge between relative efficiency and efficiency under perfect market conditions. So framed, relative efficiency is a diagnostic tool that identifies the information costs and structural barriers that reduce price efficiency which, in turn, provides part of a realistic regulatory strategy. While it will not prevent future crises, improving the mechanisms of market efficiency will make prices more efficient, frictions more transparent, and the influence of politics on public agencies more observable, which may allow us to catch the next problem earlier. Recall that on September 8, 2008, the Congressional Budget Office publicly stated its uncertainty about whether there would be a recession and predicted 1.5 percent growth in 2009. Eight days later, Lehman Brothers had failed, and AIG was being nationalized.

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