This is the first study to explore the forensic science testimony by prosecution experts in the trials of innocent persons, all convicted of serious crimes, who were later exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing. Trial transcripts were sought for all 156 exonerees identified as having trial testimony by forensic analysts, of which 137 were located and reviewed. These trials most commonly included serological analysis and microscopic hair comparison, but some included bite mark, shoe print, soil, fiber, and fingerprint comparisons, and several included DNA testing. This study found that in the bulk of these trials of innocent defendants—82 cases or 60 percent—forensic analysts called by the prosecution provided invalid testimony at trial—that is, testimony with conclusions misstating empirical data or wholly unsupported by empirical data. This was not the testimony of a mere handful of analysts: this set of trials included invalid testimony by seventy-two forensic analysts called by the prosecution and employed by fifty-two laboratories, practices, or hospitals from twenty-five states. Unfortunately, the adversary system largely failed to police this invalid testimony. Defense counsel rarely cross-examined analysts concerning invalid testimony and rarely obtained experts of their own. In the few cases in which invalid forensic science was challenged, judges seldom provided relief. This evidence supports efforts to create scientific oversight mechanisms for reviewing forensic testimony and to develop clear scientific standards for report writing and testimony. The scientific community can promulgate standards to ensure the valid presentation of forensic science in criminal cases and thus the integrity and fairness of the criminal process.
Issue 1
Information Markets: Using Market Predictions to Make Today’s Decisions
Presidential betting markets predict election outcomes more
accurately than polls because of their ability to effectively aggregate information. Empirical research and theory indicates that the result extends to other contexts. Betting markets, more formally called information markets, provide accurate predictions about future product sales, box office receipts, and other future events. Moreover, market predictions generally outperform other prediction mechanisms. This paper argues that empirical research and theory indicates that we should use information markets’ predictive power to make administrative decisions. In addition, it presents a model information market designed to help policy makers evaluate policies prior to their implementation by providing policy makers information about the policies’ effects in the form of market predictions. To design such a market, it is necessary to determine how the market should pay off bettors when the agency does not implement a policy because the market predicts it will have an adverse effect. The problem is that bets pay off based on the outcome of an event, but when the policy makers decide not to implement a policy, the policy has no effect and thus it is unclear how to compensate bettors. This paper shows that through clever market design it is possible to return the market price of a bet, prior to an agency’s decision not to implement the policy on which the bet depends, without fear of market manipulation. Consequently, even in cases where using market predictions to make administrative decisions appears problematic, it is possible.
Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decision Architectures
This essay proposes a new way to assess the desirability of intellectual property rights.
Traditionally, intellectual property assignment is assessed based on a incentive/monopoly pricing tradeoff. I suggest they should be further assessed by their effects on the decision architectures surrounding the property right – their effects on how firms make product innovation decisions. The reason is that different decisional structures for product development can be are fundamental to the performance of firms, industries, and even the economy as a whole.
The organizational economics literature can help with this assessment. It makes an important and useful distinction between hierarchical (centralized) and polyarchical (decentralized) decision architectures. The key point of this paper is that government’s decisions with respect to property assignments can steer decision architectures toward a polyarchical or hierarchical architecture, respectively.
Each may be optimal in difference scenarios. In industries where technologies are stable and where the industry is flat or in decline, avoiding mistakes is more important, and uncertainty may be more limited, meaning that a hierarchy supported by strong rights may produce a more profitable outcome. Conversely, strong IP rights may undesirable in fast growing-industries where the technologies in flux, because overly centralized decision-making may block the emergence of the most innovative ideas.