The void-for-vagueness doctrine and the nondelegation doctrine share an intuitive connection: when Congress drafts vague statutes, it delegates lawmaking authority to courts and the executive. In three recent cases, the Supreme Court gave expression to this link by speaking of the doctrines using nearly identical vocabulary. Notably, Justice Gorsuch suggested that as the nondelegation doctrine waned during the second half of the twentieth century, vagueness replaced it,—doing much of the doctrinal work that nondelegation would have done otherwise.
This Note tests that historical claim, and in doing so, offers two main contributions. First, it concludes that as a historical matter, Justice Gorsuch tells only part of the story. Although early vagueness doctrine in the late 1800s had strong streaks of nondelegation, vagueness doctrine of the post-New Deal era did not. The latter vagueness instead turned toward protecting individual rights and preventing racial discrimination by state and local governments. Here, nondelegation concerns were absent.
But the Roberts Court has rebooted the early vagueness doctrine that did indeed incorporate nondelegation. Modern vagueness cases thus resemble early vagueness cases. In these cases, absent are questions of individual rights, replaced by a focus on the separation of powers. In effect, there are two vagueness doctrines, one focused on individual rights and another centered around the separation of powers. This Note thus offers its second contribution: categorizing the Court’s vagueness cases and recognizing the categories for what they are.
“[O]nce we lift the veil of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, the revelations can be far reaching.”1 1.Risa L. Goluboff, Dispatch from the Supreme Court Archives: Vagrancy, Abortion, and What the Links Between Them Reveal About the History of Fundamental Rights, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1361, 1387 (2010).Show More
Suppose Congress enacts a statute that reads as follows: “Any person engaging in morally blameworthy conduct or lacking good moral character shall be punished as provided by this Code.” Is this statute unconstitutional? If so, why? Is it because of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, under which vague criminal laws violate the Constitution’s due process protections? Or is it because of the nondelegation doctrine, under which Congress cannot delegate its Article I legislative power to the executive and judicial branches through unintelligible statutes?
Or is it both?
In three recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, decided within a year of each other, these two relatively dormant doctrines—vagueness and nondelegation—simultaneously reemerged. In United States v. Davis2 2.139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019).Show More and Sessions v. Dimaya,3 3.138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223 (2018).Show More the Court struck down provisions in the federal criminal code as void for vagueness, while in Gundy v. United States, the Court addressed a nondelegation challenge to Congress’s delegation of authority to the Attorney General.4 4.139 S. Ct. 2116, 2122 (2019).Show More
At first glance, vagueness and nondelegation appear more different than alike. The Court has located the nondelegation doctrine in the Constitution’s “Vesting Clauses”—the Article I, Article II, and Article III provisions which vest the legislative, executive, and judicial powers in their respective branches—while vagueness doctrine has its roots in fair notice concerns and the Due Process Clauses. Vagueness’s most prominent application has been in cases involving state and local vagrancy offenses and status crimes, while the nondelegation doctrine has been employed in largely conservative-libertarian projects aimed to rein in the ever-expanding administrative and regulatory state.
Despite these differences, the two doctrines share an intuitive connection: when legislatures draft vague statutes, they delegate lawmaking authority to other branches of government. The Court gave expression to this link in Dimaya, Davis, and Gundy, describing the two doctrines using starkly similar vocabulary and shedding light on their interrelatedness. In Dimaya, Justice Kagan referred to vagueness as the “corollary” of the separation of powers that undergirds the nondelegation doctrine.5 5.Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1212.Show More In his Dimaya dissent, Justice Thomas noted that the “Court’s precedents have occasionally described the vagueness doctrine in terms of nondelegation.”6 6.Id.at 1248 (Thomas, J., dissenting).Show More Most notably, in Gundy, Justice Gorsuch argued that “most any challenge to a legislative delegation can be reframed as a vagueness complaint,” and that the Court’s “void-for-vagueness cases became much more common soon after the Court began relaxing its approach to legislative delegations.”7 7.Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2142 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).Show More That is, as the Court backed away from using the nondelegation doctrine to police Congress’s delegation of its legislative power in the second half of the twentieth century, the Court began using vagueness to do the work that nondelegation would have done otherwise.
This Note picks up on the thread that Justice Gorsuch started in Gundy and explores the relationship between vagueness and nondelegation. In so doing, this Note offers two main contributions.
First, it concludes that as a historical matter, Justice Gorsuch’s claim about vagueness replacing nondelegation tells only part of the story. The Note looks to pre- and post-New Deal doctrinal development of both vagueness and nondelegation to conclude that while the doctrines have some overlap, Justice Gorsuch overstated their connection. The Court’s vagueness cases from the late 1800s, the early days of the doctrine, did indeed police legislative delegations. But the cases that came after 1937 did not. The Court instead began using vagueness to protect individual rights like free speech. It also wielded vagueness to protect racial minorities from invidious discrimination by state and local police. In these post-New Deal vagueness cases, federal nondelegation concerns were largely absent. This version of vagueness did not replace the nondelegation doctrine, which the Court largely discarded.
Still, the Roberts Court picked up where the early vagueness cases left off; nondelegation again entered the realm of vagueness. In modern vagueness cases, concerns of individual rights and free speech are absent. Also absent are issues of invidious racial discrimination. These cases instead emphasize the proper constitutional role of Congress, the executive, and the judiciary within the federal separation of powers. To the extent that the Court and Justice Gorsuch see an overlap between vagueness and nondelegation, it is this line of cases that they see.
In effect, there are two vagueness doctrines. One comprises the majority of the Court’s vagueness cases after the New Deal era, including the landmark case Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville. The second has its origins in the earliest vagueness cases. And although this latter doctrine subsided after 1937, the Court has revived it in recent cases like Dimaya and Davis.
This Note categorizes the Court’s vagueness cases into (1) Rights-Based Vagueness and (2) Structure-Based Vagueness. Although both categories of cases involve due process concerns, they diverge from there. Cases like Papachristou, and their emphasis on individual rights and equal protection, comprise Rights-Based Vagueness. In contrast, Structure-Based Vagueness is the vagueness that the Court employs in Dimaya, Davis, and Gundy. In these latter cases, the Court emphasizes nondelegation and the separation of powers. To the extent that vagueness and nondelegation converge, it is in the context of Structure-Based Vagueness. This Note thus offers its second contribution: categorizing the Court’s vagueness cases and recognizing the categories for what they are.
Recognizing Structure-Based Vagueness for what it is has important implications. Identifying this category adds analytical clarity to the literature on the intersection of vagueness and nondelegation, which to this point has remained cursory and underdeveloped. It further offers insight into how a vagueness doctrine that was previously wielded to address racial discrimination by local police has transformed into a vagueness doctrine that seemingly only has purchase in challenges to federal malum prohibitum crimes. This Note thus adds to the realist literature that views vagueness doctrine as a doctrinal makeweight, which can be reshaped to serve broader and unrelated judicial values and priorities.
Identifying Structure-Based Vagueness has practical consequences too. Structure-Based Vagueness offers common ground to criminal justice reformers and immigrant rights advocates on the one hand, and conservative-libertarians interested in curbing the power of the federal government on the other. By employing the rhetoric of separation of powers in their vagueness arguments, criminal justice reformers and immigrant rights advocates can win meaningful progressive victories from a Court enamored with nondelegation. Moreover, Structure-Based Vagueness offers a limiting principle to opponents of a more aggressive nondelegation doctrine. By tying Structure-Based Vagueness and its nondelegation component to their underlying rationales, skeptics of the nondelegation doctrine can cabin its application to only criminal and penal laws, reducing the potentially harmful impact that a more rigid doctrine would have on environmental, labor, and other economic regulations.
This Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides a brief summary of the vagueness and nondelegation doctrines and canvasses literature that addresses their intersection. It then summarizes the Court’s decisions in Dimaya, Davis, and Gundy and draws out Justice Gorsuch’s specific claim about the relationship between vagueness and nondelegation. Part II inspects the historical trajectory of both doctrines, beginning just before the Lochner era and ending with today’s Roberts Court. It uses this history to challenge Justice Gorsuch’s claim. Part III then categorizes vagueness into its two conceptions—Rights-Based Vagueness and Structure-Based Vagueness. Part IV explores the theory behind Structure-Based Vagueness and identifies future applications. A brief conclusion follows.
- Risa L. Goluboff, Dispatch from the Supreme Court Archives: Vagrancy, Abortion, and What the Links Between Them Reveal About the History of Fundamental Rights,
Stan. L. Rev.
1361, 1387 (2010).
- 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019). ↑
- 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223 (2018). ↑
- 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2122 (2019). ↑
- Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1212. ↑
- Id. at 1248 (Thomas, J., dissenting). ↑
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2142 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). ↑
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