The Low Written Description Bar for Software

This Note focuses on the application of 35 U.S.C. � 112�s �written description� disclosure requirement to software. After tracing the contours of the modern written description requirement, it addresses the seemingly-inconsistent treatment of software and biotechnology inventions under � 112. The Note argues that while functional written descriptions are generally held to be insufficient for biotechnology or DNA inventions (�Gene X does Y� does not pass muster), courts will allow inventions involving software to be claimed via functional descriptions (�Program X does Y� is sufficient)�a much lower descriptive bar. The note concludes that the relative predictability of software development as well as the inherently functional nature of software description account for this differing treatment, and that biotechnology inventions will require less burdensome disclosure as the predictability of that field increases.

A Doctrine of Full Faith and Credit

Imagine a judgment from a California state court in which a plaintiff (“P1”) prevails in a civil suit against the defendant (“D”). A second plaintiff (“P2”) brings a related suit in Alabama against D and seeks to estop D from relitigating issues found adverse to D in California. Given the conflict between the preclusion laws of Alabama and California, may the Alabama court choose which state’s law it will enforce? Or does federal law require Alabama to give the California judgment the same preclusive effect that the judgment would have in California? The answers to questions such as these have considerable practical importance. Cost-conscious litigants determine how much they are willing to spend based on the associated risk of loss or probability of gain in any litigation. Uncertainty surrounding the judgment’s preclusive effect will change that analysis. Unfortunately, there is currently no consistent answer to these questions. This Note will argue for a broad understanding of the implementing statute’s scope. This understanding is a clear rule that courts can easily follow, as opposed to a policy-based standard that is difficult to implement. This Note will present a doctrinal theory that both supports such a reading and provides certainty in the application of the implementing statute.

Finding the Proper Balance: A Look at the Continuing Development of Campus Suicide Policies

This Note will address the difficulties that university officials have faced in recent years when addressing suicidal students and the mixed signals that have been sent by courts and legislatures regarding a university’s duties toward suicidal students—signals that influence the development of university suicide policies, and ultimately push many colleges toward a conservative, hands-off course 
of action. This Note will suggest an alternative model for delineating the legal duties of universities with respect to suicidal students—a model that attempts to balance the privacy and civil rights of the suicidal student, the need for suicidal students to receive proper treatment, and the liability concerns of universities. The model emphasizes the importance of using campus suicide policies to push students toward getting the help and treatment they need to cope with their mental health problems. At the same time, the suggested model would allow university officials to maintain control over determining whether a student is permitted to remain on campus.