Crossroads in Cambodia: The United Nations’ Responsibility to Withdraw Involvement from the Establishment of a Cambodian Tribunal to Prosecute the Khmer Rouge

For almost twenty-five years, the former leaders of the Khmer Rouge, responsible for the deaths of over 1.7 million of their fellow Cambodians, have enjoyed freedom absent domestic and international accountability for their actions. Since 1997, the United Nations and Cambodia have engaged in contentious negotiations for the establishment of a criminal tribunal to try the former leaders of the Khmer Rouge. In March 2003, the United Nations and Cambodia agreed on an internationally supported, yet Cambodian-controlled, tribunal to prosecute the former members of the Khmer Rouge for genocide and crimes against humanity that occurred between 1975 to 1979. The U.N. General Assembly is awaiting its expected ratification by the Cambodian National Assembly. While these developments appear to signal a shift toward international justice and domestic reconciliation, the presence of widely asymmetrical goals and intentions between the U.N. and the Cambodian government poses unfortunate risks both to the Cambodian people and to the international community. 

This Note will argue that the agreed-upon proposal will both fail to meet international standards of justice and prove to be a greater risk than complete withdrawal of international involvement. To this end, the Note will argue that the U.N. should either demand the establishment of an ad hoc international tribunal for Cambodia (with goals and structure similar to existing tribunals created for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda), or completely withdraw from any involvement in the adjudication of the Khmer Rouge crimes. Any alternative would compromise the best interests of the international community, the development and enforcement of international law, and the stability and rehabilitation of Cambodia.

Citizenship Denied: The Insular Cases and the Fourteenth Amendment

Pursuant to the doctrine of territorial incorporation established in the Insular Cases, Puerto Rico is an “unincorporated” territory, and as such, it does not form part of the United States within the meaning of the Constitution. As a result, persons born in Puerto Rico are not “born in the United States” under the Fourteenth Amendment and are not constitutionally entitled to citizenship. Because they enjoy only statutory citizenship, Congress arguably is able to expatriate most Puerto Ricans if the island is declared independent. Moreover, the inferior citizenship status of Puerto Ricans reveals a grave inconsistency in the law of the Fourteenth Amendment that has never been addressed. In response to Dred Scott, the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized the common law doctrine of jus soli, which provides that all persons born on U.S. territory and not subject to the jurisdiction of another sovereign are native-born citizens, regardless of race. Pursuant to this interpretation of the Citizenship Clause, persons born in Puerto Rico have been “born in the United States” since the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. By retroactively narrowing the scope of the term “United States,” the Supreme Court took advantage of the unique geographical circumstances of the insular territories and prevented their inhabitants from obtaining equal citizenship. Thus, the doctrine of territorial incorporation reasserts Dred Scott’s race-based approach to citizenship and should be overruled.

The Right to Education in Juvenile Detention Under State Constitutions

The importance of education to succeed in today’s society is well documented and recognized by courts, but is not adequately provided to the over 96,000 juveniles who are confined each year in the name of rehabilitation. This Note argues that children in juvenile detention have a right to an adequate education based on state constitutional guarantees of education. This right can be used to challenge the inadequacy of the current educational services provided in juvenile detention facilities. The argument proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background on the juvenile justice system, explains the importance of education in juvenile detention, and surveys the applicable federal statutes and corresponding litigation. Part II briefly discusses potential federal constitutional challenges based on the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause, but concludes that these challenges are unlikely to be successful. Part III argues that state constitutional guarantees of education are applicable to students in juvenile detention facilities. First, it analyzes the contours of the state rights to education as interpreted in school finance litigation. Second, it responds to the main objection that children in juvenile detention have sacrificed their right to education by arguing that (1) the purpose of confinement is rehabilitation, which is consistent with the right to education, and (2) even if the purpose of confinement is punishment, it does not follow that juveniles have sacrificed their right to education. Third, it analyzes specific challenges that could be raised by children in juvenile detention. Part IV concludes that given the acceptance of the adequacy conception of the right to education, the time is ripe to challenge the inadequacy of education currently provided in juvenile detention.