Few questions in the field of Federal Courts have captivated scholars like the question of whether Congress can simultaneously divest both lower federal courts and the U.S. Supreme Court of jurisdiction to hear federal constitutional claims and thereby leave those claims to be litigated in state courts alone. Such a divestiture is known today as “jurisdiction stripping,” and, despite literally decades of scholarship on the subject, scholars have largely been unable to reconcile two widely held views: jurisdiction stripping should be unconstitutional because it deprives constitutional rights of adjudication by independent judges and jurisdiction stripping is nonetheless perfectly consistent with the text and original understanding of the Constitution. In this article, I show how the scholarly impasse that has pitted constitutionalism and judicial independence on the one hand versus text and history on the other can be overcome. In particular, I show that something important has changed in the years since the Constitution was ratified: the gap between the independence of state and federal judges. At the time of the founding, much like their federal counterparts, no state judges were elected and the vast majority of them enjoyed life tenure. Precisely the opposite is true today. As such, the consequences of depriving federal courts of jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims were much different then than they are today. Because state courts were the background against which Article III of the Constitution was written and ratified, these changes enable the answer to the question of whether jurisdiction stripping is constitutional to change as well. In other words, just because jurisdiction stripping was constitutional in 1789 does not mean it must be constitutional today, and it does not mean we must ignore the original understanding of the Constitution to reach that conclusion. The history I have uncovered in this Article has the potential to reshape many other jurisdictional doctrines of the federal courts.
Article
The Law of Nations as Constitutional Law
Courts and scholars continue to debate the status of customary international law in U.S. courts. The modern position argues that courts should treat customary international law as federal common law. The revisionist position contends that customary international law applies only to the extent that positive federal or state law has adopted it. Neither approach, however, adequately takes account of the Constitution’s allocation of powers to the federal political branches or the judiciary’s treatment of the law of nations throughout U.S. history. The Constitution’s allocation of specific powers to the federal political branches—such as the powers to recognize foreign nations, declare war, issue letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules governing captures—can only be understood by reference to certain background principles of the law of nations. Many of the Supreme Court’s decisions applying traditional principles derived from the law of nations may plausibly be understood as upholding the Constitution’s allocation of war and foreign relations powers to the political branches of the federal government. In numerous cases, the Court has upheld the rights of foreign sovereigns in ways that respect the political branches’ possession or exercise of these specific constitutional powers. This understanding has potential implications for the ongoing debate over the status of customary international law in U.S. courts. Specifically, it suggests that the modern position is over-inclusive and the revisionist position is under-inclusive of the role of customary international law. The allocation of powers approach—grounded in specific constitutional provisions and supported by numerous Supreme Court cases—suggests that courts should apply the law of nations when necessary to uphold the Constitution’s exclusive allocation of war and foreign relations powers to the federal political branches.
Atrocity, Entitlement, and Personhood
For a generation since Margaret Jane Radin’s classic article
Property and Personhood
, scholars have viewed personhood as a conception of property that affirms autonomy, dignity, and basic civil rights, a progressive alternative to traditional, more economically focused property theories. This Article presents a fundamental challenge to personhood as a progressive approach to property. It shows that personhood claims often derive from violent and other harmful acts committed in the course of acquiring and owning property. This persistent and pervasive connection between personhood and violence—the “atrocity value” in property—upends core assumptions about the American property tradition and complicates the progressive social function of property law. This Article explains why atrocity creates entitlement, drawing from social psychology and accounts of law and violence to show how violence can foster personhood. The Article then explores the deep historical roots of atrocity within the American property tradition, which helped establish an abiding cultural value that encouraged personal identification with property. Finally, the Article surveys how atrocity continues to foster personhood in an array of contexts involving common ownership, exclusion, and use. Ultimately, personhood emerges less as a progressive value in property than as a challenge that the law has had to negotiate. Property law is often successful in promoting progressive and cooperative goals because courts do not attempt to decide cases on the basis of a personhood value in property.