Article - Virginia Law Review

Information Gaps and Shadow Banking

This Article argues that information gaps—pockets of information that are pertinent and knowable but not currently known—are a byproduct of shadow banking and a meaningful source of systemic risk. It lays the foundation for this claim by juxtaposing the regulatory regime governing the shadow banking system with the incentives of the market participants who populate that system. Like banks, shadow banks rely heavily on short-term debt claims designed to obviate the need for the holder to engage in any meaningful information gathering or analysis. The securities laws that prevail in the capital markets, however, both presume and depend on providers of capital to perform these functions. In synthesizing insights from diverse bodies of literature and situating those understandings against the regulatory architecture, this Article provides one of the first comprehensive accounts of how the information-related incentives of equity and money claimants explain many core features of securities and banking regulation.

The Article’s main theoretical contribution is to provide a new explanation for the inherent fragility of institutions that rely on money claims. The existing literature typically focuses on either coordination problems among depositors or information asymmetries between depositors and bank managers to explain bank runs. This Article provides a third explanation for why reliance on short-term debt leads to fragility, one which complements the established paradigms. First, information gaps increase the probability of panic by increasing the range of signals that can cast doubt on whether short-term debt that market participants had been treating like “money” remain sufficiently information insensitive to merit such treatment. Second, information gaps impede the market and regulatory responses that can dampen the effects of a shock once panic takes hold. Evidence from the 2007–2009 financial crisis is consistent with the Article’s claims regarding the ways shadow banking creates information gaps and how those gaps contribute to fragility.

The Economic Foundation of the Dormant Commerce Clause

In 2015, a sharply divided Supreme Court decided a landmark dormant Commerce Clause case, Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne. Wynne represents the Court’s first clear acknowledgement of the economic underpinnings of one of its main doctrinal tools for resolving tax discrimination cases, the internal consistency test. In deciding Wynne, the Court relied on economic analysis we provided in an amicus brief. This Article explains that analysis, why the majority accepted it, why the dissenters’ objections to the majority’s reasoning miss their mark, and what Wynne means for state taxation. Essential to our analysis and the Court’s decision in Wynne is the idea that states are capable of discriminating not only on an inbound basis, but also on an outbound basis, and that the Commerce Clause prohibits discrimination on either basis. To aid in explaining our position, this Article introduces the term “retentionism” as an analogue to protectionism. Whereas taxes or regulations are protectionist when they discourage outsiders from engaging in economic activities within a state, taxes or regulations are retentionist when they discourage in-state economic actors from engaging in outof-state activities. As we show, the tax struck down in Wynne was both protectionist and retentionist.

A Tactical Fourth Amendment

What rules regulate when police can kill? As ongoing public controversy over high-profile police killings drives home, the civil, criminal, and administrative rules governing police use of force all remain deeply contested. Members of the public may assume that police rules and procedures provide detailed direction for when officers can use deadly force. However, many agencies train officers to respond to threats according to a force “continuum” that does not provide hardedged rules for when or how police can use force or deadly force. Nor, as recent cases have illustrated, does a criminal prosecution under state law readily lend itself to defining appropriate police uses of force. People might assume that the U.S. Constitution protects citizens against completely unjustified uses of deadly force. They would be wrong to expect clear constitutional rules either, particularly in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Graham v. Connor. Can the Fourth Amendment doctrine be revitalized? This Article begins by excavating key lessons from an earlier moment in time when the Supreme Court did, after careful consideration, adopt in Tennessee v. Garner constitutional rules based on the then-new field of police tactics. Today, where can we turn to develop sound guidance for police use of force? Police tactics have advanced considerably in the decades since, as has policing technology. We conducted an empirical analysis of the force policies of the fifty largest policing agencies in the United States, and found that many agencies lacked guidance on key subjects, such as the need to provide verbal warnings before using force. However, we identify a consistent approach among prominent agencies that adopt detailed policies incorporating tactical methods to de-escalate and minimize the need to use force, some in response to Department of Justice consent decrees. We also find real promise in lower court rulings that rely on tactical research and policy when assessing liability of police. This Article develops a theory of police use of force grounded in the growing body of police-tactics research designed to accomplish law enforcement goals while protecting the lives of officers and citizens. The courts, law enforcement, and the public all desperately require a revitalized constitutional standard regulating police use of force: It is time that we adopt a tactical Fourth Amendment.

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