Article

Appointments Without Law

Debates about the Appointments Clause tend to turn on drawing the right distinctions. This Article argues that the Appointments Clause draws a little-recognized distinction between the officers specifically enumerated by the Clause (“Ambassadors,” “other public Ministers and Consuls,” and “Judges of the supreme Court”) and the officers referred to only as a residual category (“all other officers of the United States”). The basic claim is that enumerated offices need not be “established by Law”—that is, by congressional legislation—but are established instead by the Constitution or the law of nations.

Although the “enumerated-residual distinction” has been essentially ignored by judges and scholars, it raises a basic interpretive puzzle. The Appointments Clause appears to give the President the same authority to appoint each category of enumerated officers. But in practice, we have construed the President’s authority to appoint diplomats and Supreme Court Justices quite differently. Since the Founding, the President has appointed diplomats without congressional authorization, but at the same time everyone has assumed that Congress must pass a statute before the President may appoint any Justices.  

This Article argues that the President has the authority to appoint both diplomats and Justices without congressional authorization. This view accords with the Constitution’s text, suits the unique constitutional status of the Supreme Court, and was advanced by political actors soon after the Constitution’s ratification. But even if one rejects the strongest version of this argument, the Article’s core insight—that the Appointments Clause requires parallel treatment of diplomats and Justices—has a series of potential implications for constitutional doctrine.

Insincere Evidence

Proving a violation of law is costly. Because of the cost, minor violations of law often go unproven and thus unpunished. To illustrate, almost everyone drives a little faster than the speed limit, but rarely are we ticketed for doing so. Failure to enforce the law against minor infractions is justifiable from a cost-benefit perspective. The cost of proving a minor violation—for example, that a driver broke the speed limit by one mile per hour—outstrips the benefit. But systemic non-enforcement has the downside of underdeterrence. People drive a little too fast, pollute a little too much, and so on.

This Article explores how insincere rules, meaning rules that misstate lawmakers’ preferences, might reduce proof costs and improve enforcement. To demonstrate the argument, suppose lawmakers want drivers to travel no more than 55 mph. A sincere speed limit of 55 mph may cause drivers to go 65 mph, while an insincere speed limit of 45 mph may cause drivers to drop down to, say, 60 mph—closer to lawmakers’ ideal. Insincere rules work by creating insincere evidence. In the driving example, the reduction in proof costs achieved by an insincere rule is akin to adding an artificial 10 mph to the reading of every radar gun.

The logic of insincere evidence is not confined to speed limits. The conditions necessary for insincerity to work pervade the legal system. We distinguish insincere evidence from familiar concepts like over-inclusive rules, prophylactic rules, and proxy crimes. We connect insincere evidence to burdens of persuasion, showing how it can offset the effects of higher burdens. Finally, we consider the normative implications of insincere evidence for trials, truth, and law enforcement.

Faux Contracts

In deals, parties sometimes enter into agreements that look like contracts but lack the legal bite of formal contracts. What value can these agreements add that formal contracts cannot? This Article shows how parties use these agreements to mitigate so-called mundane transaction costs and to build a small relational ecosystem for future steps in the same transaction.

Parties use non-binding agreements in a variety of unsurprising contexts, like when binding agreements are too expensive or illegal, or when informal enforcement suffices. Use of non-binding agreements is puzzling, however, when parties are sophisticated—that is, when parties have the financial means and technical sophistication to enter into real, binding legal contracts, but choose to use non-binding ones instead. Early-stage mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) is one such situation: parties enter into non-binding term sheets, which often look like contracts, but intentionally opt out of formal enforcement. Informal enforcement is also unlikely, because many M&A parties are not repeat players in the market. Yet, despite lack of enforcement, parties abide by the terms of the non-binding term sheet.

This Article makes two contributions to the literature. First, it shows that sometimes, enforcement is not necessary or even preferred: rather, parties prefer to decouple ex ante contracting from ex post enforcement through “faux contracts” like M&A term sheets. In doing so, parties can leverage the benefits of engaging in a contracting exercise, without actually subjecting themselves to enforcement. Because complex business deals are highly collaborative design processes, using a contract-like tool, even (or especially) without enforcement, helps parties organize, clarify, and understand the metes and bounds of their deals and obligations, whether or not they plan to, or can, enforce them. Second, through original interviews, this Article shows how parties use these early agreements and other activities to build a small relational ecosystem in which they feel enough trust to make further investments. Ultimately, parties’ reputations still matter to them—not on the broader M&A market, but within the individual deal.

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