Manipulating Opportunity

Concerns about online manipulation have centered on fears about undermining the autonomy of consumers and citizens. What has been overlooked is the risk that the same techniques of personalizing information online can also threaten equality. When predictive algorithms are used to allocate information about opportunities like employment, housing, and credit, they can reproduce past patterns of discrimination and exclusion in these markets. This Article explores these issues by focusing on the labor market, which is increasingly dominated by tech intermediaries. These platforms rely on predictive algorithms to distribute information about job openings, match job seekers with hiring firms, or recruit passive candidates. Because algorithms are built by analyzing data about past behavior, their predictions about who will make a good match for which jobs will likely reflect existing occupational segregation and inequality. When tech intermediaries cause discriminatory effects, they may be liable under Title VII, and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act should not bar such actions. However, because of the practical challenges that litigants face in identifying and proving liability retrospectively, a more effective approach to preventing discriminatory effects should focus on regulatory oversight to ensure the fairness of algorithmic systems.

I. Introduction

Our online experiences are increasingly personalized. Facebook and Google micro-target advertisements aimed to meet our immediate needs. Amazon, Netflix, and Spotify offer up books, movies, and music tailored to match our tastes. Our news feeds are populated with stories intended to appeal to our particular interests and biases. This drive toward increasing personalization is powered by complex machine learning algorithms built to discern our preferences and anticipate our behavior. Personalization offers benefits because companies can efficiently offer consumers the precise products and services they desire.

Online personalization, however, has come under considerable criticism lately. Shoshana Zuboff assails our current economic system, which is built on companies amassing and exploiting ever more detailed personal information.1.Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power 8–11 (2019).Show More Ryan Calo and Tal Zarsky explain that firms are applying the insights of behavioral science to manipulate consumers by exploiting their psychological or emotional vulnerabilities.2.SeeRyan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 995, 996, 999 (2014); Tal Z. Zarsky, Privacy and Manipulation in the Digital Age, 20 Theoretical Inquiries L. 157, 158, 160–61 (2019).Show More Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler, and Helen Nissenbaum describe how information technology is enabling manipulative practices on a massive scale.3.Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum, Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World, 4 Geo. L. Tech. Rev. 1, 2, 10 (2019).Show More Julie Cohen similarly argues that “[p]latform-based, massively-intermediated processes of search and social networking are inherently processes of market manipulation.”4.Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 133, 165 (2017); see also Julie E. Cohen, Between Truth and Power: The Legal Constructions of Informational Capitalism 75–77, 83–89, 96 (2019) (describing how techniques for behavioral surveillance and micro-targeting contribute to social harms such as polarization and extremism).Show More In the political sphere as well, concerns have been raised about manipulation, with warnings that news personalization is creating “filter bubble[s]” and increasing polarization.5.See, e.g., Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You 13–14 (2011); Michael J. Abramowitz, Stop the Manipulation of Democracy Online, N.Y. Times (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/opinion/fake-news-russia-kenya.html [https://perma.cc/9YWF-PED7]; James Doubek, How Disinformation and Distortions on Social Media Affected Elections Worldwide, NPR (Nov. 16, 2017, 2:28 PM), https://www.npr.org­/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/11/16/564542100/how-disinformation-and-distortions-on-social-media-affected-elections-worldwide [https://perma.cc/ZJ97-GQ SZ]; Jon Keegan, Blue Feed, Red Feed: See Liberal Facebook and Conservative Facebook, Side by Side, Wall St. J. (Aug. 19, 2019), http://graphics.wsj.com/blue-feed-red-feed/ [https://perma.cc/GJA8-4U9W].Show More These issues were highlighted by revelations that Cambridge Analytica sent personalized ads based on psychological profiles of eighty-seven million Facebook users in an effort to influence the 2016 presidential election.6.Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-Harrison, Revealed: 50 Million Facebook Profiles Harvested for Cambridge Analytica in Major Data Breach,Guardian (Mar. 17, 2018, 6:03 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influ­ence-us-election [https://perma.cc/72CR-9Y8K]; Alex Hern, Cambridge Analytica: How Did It Turn Clicks into Votes?, Guardian (May 6, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/­news/2018/may/06/cambridge-analytica-how-turn-clicks-into-votes-christopher-wylie [https://perma.cc/AD8H-PF3M]; Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Confessore & Carole Cadwalladr, How Trump Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. Times (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.html [https://perma.cc/3WYQ-3YKP].Show More The extensive criticism of personalization is driven by concerns that online manipulation undermines personal autonomy and compromises rational decision making.

Largely overlooked in these discussions is the possibility that online manipulation also threatens equality. Online platforms increasingly operate as key intermediaries in the markets for employment, housing, and financial services—what I refer to as opportunity markets. Predictive algorithms are also used in these markets to segment the audience and determine precisely what information will be delivered to which users. The risk is that in doing so, these intermediaries will direct opportunities in ways that reproduce or reinforce historical forms of discrimination. Predictive algorithms are built by observing past patterns of behavior, and one of the enduring patterns in American economic life is the unequal distribution of opportunities along the lines of race, gender, and other personal characteristics. As a result, these systems are likely to distribute information about future opportunities in ways that reflect existing inequalities and may reinforce historical patterns of disadvantage.

The way in which information about opportunities is distributed matters, because these markets provide access to resources that are critical for human flourishing and well-being. In that sense, access to them is foundational. People need jobs and housing before they can act as consumers or voters. They need access to financial services in order to function in the modern economy. Of course, many other factors contribute to inequality, such as unequal educational resources, lack of access to health care, and over-policing in certain communities. Decisions by landlords, employers, or banks can also contribute to inequality. Tech intermediaries are thus just one part of a much larger picture. Nevertheless, they will be an increasingly important part as more and more transactions are mediated online.7.See, e.g., Miranda Bogen & Aaron Rieke, Help Wanted: An Examination of Hiring Algorithms, Equity, and Bias 5–6 (2018) (describing the role of platforms in the hiring process); Geoff Boeing, Online Rental Housing Market Representation and the Digital Reproduction of Urban Inequality, 52 Env’t & Plan. A 449, 450 (2019) (documenting the growing impact of Internet platforms in shaping the rental housing market).Show More Because they control access to information about opportunities, they have the potential to significantly impact how these markets operate.

Online intermediaries have unprecedented potential to finely calibrate the distribution of information. In the past, traditional print or broadcast media might aim at a particular audience, but they could not prevent any particular individual from accessing information that they published. And if an advertiser tried to signal its interest in only a particular group—as has happened with real estate ads that used code words or featured only white models—the attempts at exclusion were plainly visible. In contrast, online intermediaries have the ability to precisely target an audience, selecting some users to receive information and others to be excluded in ways that are not at all transparent.

The issue is illustrated by Facebook’s ad-targeting tools. Several lawsuits alleged that employers or landlords could use the company’s tools to exclude users on the basis of race, gender, or age from their audience.8.See infra Section II.B.Show More To a large extent, these concerns were resolved by a recent settlement in which Facebook agreed to bar the use of sensitive demographic variables to target employment, housing, and credit advertisements.9.See Galen Sherwin & Esha Bhandari, Facebook Settles Civil Rights Cases by Making Sweeping Changes to Its Online Ad Platform, ACLU (Mar. 19, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/womens-rights-workplace/facebook-settles-civil-rights-cases-making-sweeping [https://perma.cc/H6D6-UMJ4].Show More However, the settlement failed to address another potential source of bias—Facebook’s ad-delivery algorithm, which determines which users within a targeted audience actually receive an ad. As explained below, even if an advertiser uses neutral targeting criteria and intends to reach a diverse audience, an ad-targeting algorithm may distribute information about opportunities in a biased way.10 10.See infra Section II.C.Show More This is an example of a much broader concern—namely, that when predictive algorithms are used to allocate access to opportunities, there is a significant risk that they will do so in a way that reproduces existing patterns of inequality and disadvantage.

Concerns about the distributive effects of predictive algorithms are relevant to all kinds of opportunity markets, including for housing, employment, and basic financial services. Each of these markets operates somewhat differently and is regulated under different laws. They deserve separate attention and more detailed consideration than can be provided here. This Article focuses on the labor market and the relevant laws regulating it; however, the issues it raises likely plague other opportunity markets as well.

Examining employment practices reveals dramatic change. Just a couple of decades ago, employers had a handful of available strategies for recruiting new workers, such as advertising in newspapers or hiring through an employment agency. Today, firms increasingly rely on tech intermediaries to fill job openings.11 11.See Bogen & Rieke, supra note 7, at 5–6.Show More Recent surveys suggest that somewhere from 84% to 93% of job recruiters use online strategies to find potential employees.12 12.Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt., SHRM Survey Findings: Using Social Media for Talent Acquisition—Recruitment and Screening 3 (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys/Documents/SHRM-Social-Media-Recruiting-Screening-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6NT-N4KL]. The Society for Human Resource Management conducts biennial surveys of job recruiters. The surveys demonstrated an increase in the use of online recruiting by employers, rising from fifty-six percent in 2011 to seventy-seven percent in 2013 to eighty-four percent in 2015.Id.; Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt., SHRM Survey Findings: Social Networking Websites and Recruiting/Selection 2 (Apr. 11, 2013), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-sur­veys/Pages/shrm-social-networking-websites-recruiting-job-candidates.aspx [https://perma.cc/U4HN-E7U7]; see also Jobvite’s New 2015 Recruiter Nation Survey Reveals Talent Crunch, Jobvite (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.jobvite.com/news_item/­jobvites-new-2015-recruiter-nation-survey-reveals-talent-crunch-95-recruiters-anticipate-similar-increased-competition-skilled-workers-coming-year-86-expect-exp/ [https://perma.cc /H66S-8E5Z] (stating that 92% of recruiters use social media to discover or evaluate candidates).Show More Employers distribute information about positions through social media. They also rely on specialized job platforms like ZipRecruiter, LinkedIn, and Monster to recruit applicants and recommend the strongest candidates.13 13.See Bogen & Rieke, supra note 7, at 5, 19–20, 24.Show More In addition, passive recruiting—using data to identify workers who are not actively looking for another position—is a growing strategy for recruiting new talent.14 14.Id. at 22.Show More

The use of algorithms and artificial intelligence in the hiring process has not gone unnoticed. Numerous commenters and scholars have described how employers are using automated decision systems and have raised concerns that these developments may cause discrimination or threaten employee privacy.15 15.See, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 Calif. L. Rev. 735, 738–39 (2017); Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41 Cardozo L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 14) (on file with author); Richard A. Bales & Katherine V.W. Stone, The Invisible Web of Work: Artificial Intelligence and Electronic Surveillance in the Workplace, 41 Berkeley J. Lab. & Emp. L. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 Calif. L. Rev. 671, 673–75 (2016); Matthew T. Bodie, Miriam A. Cherry, Marcia L. McCormick & Jintong Tang, The Law and Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. Colo. L. Rev. 961, 989–92 (2017); James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible Discrimination, 7 Calif. L. Rev. Online 164, 170–72, 176–77 (2017); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Future Work, 2020 U. Ill. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 857, 860–61 (2017) [hereinafter Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work]; Pauline T. Kim, Data Mining and the Challenges of Protecting Employee Privacy Under U.S. Law, 40 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 405, 406 (2019); Pauline T. Kim & Erika Hanson, People Analytics and the Regulation of Information Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 61 St. Louis U. L.J. 17, 18–19 (2016); Charles A. Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 Vill. L. Rev. 395, 396 (2018).Show More However, previous work has focused on whether employers can or should be held liable when they use predictive algorithms or other artificial intelligence tools to make personnel decisions. What is missing from this literature is close scrutiny of how tech intermediaries are shaping labor markets and the implications for equality.

This Article undertakes that analysis, arguing that the use of predictive algorithms by labor market intermediaries risks reinforcing or even worsening existing patterns of inequality and that these intermediaries should be accountable for those effects. A number of studies have documented instances of biased delivery of employment ads.16 16.See infra Section II.C.Show More Although the exact mechanism is unclear, it should not be surprising that predictive algorithms distribute information about job opportunities in biased ways. These algorithms are built by analyzing existing data, and one of the most persistent facts of the U.S. labor market is ongoing occupational segregation along the lines of race and gender.17 17.See infra Section II.D.Show More If predictions are based solely on observations about past behavior—without regard to what social forces shaped that behavior—then they are likely to reproduce those patterns.

Tech intermediaries may not intend to cause discriminatory effects, but they are nevertheless responsible for them.18 18.Building predictive models involves numerous choices, many of them implicating value judgments. See, e.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 15, at 674; Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1529, 1539 (2019); David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 653, 703–04 (2017); Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 1085, 1130–31 (2018).Show More They make choices when designing the algorithms that distribute information about job opportunities or suggest the best matches for job seekers and hiring firms. In doing so, they decide what goals to optimize—typically revenue—and those choices influence how information is channeled, making some opportunities visible and obscuring others. Thus, these technologies shape how the market participants—both workers and employers—perceive their available options and thereby also influence their behavior.19 19.Karen Levy and Solon Barocas have explored how the design choices made by platforms “can both mitigate and aggravate bias.” Karen Levy & Solon Barocas, Designing Against Discrimination in Online Markets, 32 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1183, 1185 (2017). The focus of their analysis is on user bias in online markets like ride matching, consumer-to-consumer sales, short-term rentals, and dating. Id. at 1189–90. Because the design choices platforms make will structure users’ interactions with one another, these choices influence behavior, affecting whether or to what extent users can act on explicit or implicit biases. Levy and Barocas review multiple platforms across domains and develop a taxonomy of policy and design elements that have been used to address the risks of bias. Although the focus of this Article is on the impact of predictive algorithms rather than user bias, the issues are obviously interrelated. Past bias by users can cause predictive algorithms to discriminate. Conversely, algorithmic outputs in the form of recommendations or rankings can activate or exacerbate implicit user biases. To that extent, some, but not all, of the strategies they identify may be relevant to addressing bias in online opportunity markets.Show More When these intermediaries structure access to opportunities in ways that reflect historical patterns of discrimination and exclusion, they pose a threat to workplace equality. Even if the discriminatory effects are unintentional, the harm to workers can be real. Employment discrimination law has long targeted discriminatory effects, not just invidious motivation.20 20.See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).Show More

The risk that tech intermediaries will contribute to workplace inequality poses a number of challenges for the law. Discrimination law has largely focused on employers, examining their decisions and practices for discriminatory intent or impact. However, if bias affects how potential applicants are screened out before they even interact with a hiring firm, then focusing on employer behavior will be inadequate to dismantle patterns of occupational segregation. Holding tech intermediaries directly responsible for their effects on labor markets, however, will raise a different set of challenges. Some of these are legal, such as whether existing law reaches these types of intermediaries,21 21.See infra Part III.Show More and whether they can avoid liability by relying on Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA),22 22.47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).Show More which gives websites a defense to some types of liability. Other obstacles are more practical in nature, which suggests that preventing discriminatory effects may require alternative strategies.23 23.See infra Section IV.B.Show More

This Article proceeds as follows. Part II first explores the role that tech intermediaries play in the labor market and how targeting tools can be misused for discriminatory purposes. It next explains that even if employers are no longer permitted to use discriminatory targeting criteria, a significant risk remains that platforms’ predictive algorithms will distribute access to opportunities in ways that reproduce existing patterns of inequality. Because tech intermediaries have a great deal of power to influence labor market interactions, and may do so in ways that are not transparent, I argue in Part II that they should bear responsibility when they cause discriminatory effects.

Parts III and IV consider the relevant legal landscape. Part III discusses how the growing importance of tech intermediaries in the labor market poses challenges for existing anti-discrimination law. It first shows how the question “who is an applicant?”—an issue critical for finding employer liability—is complicated as platforms increasingly mediate job seekers’ interactions with firms. It then explores the possibilities for holding these intermediaries directly liable under existing employment discrimination law, either as employment agencies or for interfering with third party employment relationships. Part IV considers some obstacles to holding tech intermediaries liable for their discriminatory labor market effects. Section IV.A examines and rejects the argument that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act would automatically bar such claims. Section IV.B explains that significant practical obstacles remain, suggesting that a post hoc liability regime may not be the best way to prevent discriminatory harms. Thus, Section IV.B also argues that we should look to regulatory models in order to minimize the risks of discrimination from the use of predictive algorithms.

  1. * Daniel Noyes Kirby Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law, St. Louis, Missouri. I am grateful to Victoria Schwarz, Miranda Bogen, Aaron Riecke, Greg Magarian, Neil Richards, Peggie Smith, Dan Epps, John Inazu, Danielle Citron, Ryan Calo, Andrew Selbst, Margot Kaminski, and Felix Wu for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I also benefited from feedback from participants at the 2019 Privacy Law Scholar’s Conference, Washington University School of Law’s faculty workshop, and Texas A&M School of Law’s Faculty Speaker Series. Many thanks to Adam Hall, Theanne Liu, Joseph Tomchak, and Samuel Levy for outstanding research assistance.
  2. Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power 8–11 (2019).
  3. See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 995, 996, 999 (2014); Tal Z. Zarsky, Privacy and Manipulation in the Digital Age, 20 Theoretical Inquiries L. 157, 158, 160–61 (2019).
  4. Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum, Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World, 4 Geo. L. Tech. Rev. 1, 2, 10 (2019).
  5. Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
    133, 165 (2017)

    ; see also Julie E. Cohen, Between Truth and Power: The Legal Constructions of Informational Capitalism 75–77, 83–89, 96 (2019) (describing how techniques for behavioral surveillance and micro-targeting contribute to social harms such as polarization and extremism).

  6. See, e.g., Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You 13–14 (2011); Michael J. Abramowitz, Stop the Manipulation of Democracy Online, N.Y. Times (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/opinion/fake-news-russia-kenya.html [https://perma.cc/9YWF-PED7]; James Doubek, How Disinformation and Distortions
    on Social Media Affected Elections Worldwide, NPR (Nov. 16, 2017, 2:28 PM), https://www.npr.org­/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/11/16/564542100/how-disinformation-and-distortions-on-social-media-affected-elections-worldwide [https://perma.cc/ZJ97-GQ SZ]; Jon Keegan, Blue Feed, Red Feed: See Liberal Facebook and Conservative Facebook, Side by Side, Wall St. J. (Aug. 19, 2019), http://graphics.wsj.com/blue-feed-red-feed/ [https://perma.cc/GJA8-4U9W].
  7. Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-Harrison, Revealed: 50 Million Facebook Profiles Harvested for Cambridge Analytica in Major Data Breach, Guardian (Mar. 17, 2018, 6:03 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influ­ence-us-election [https://perma.cc/72CR-9Y8K]; Alex Hern, Cambridge Analytica: How Did It Turn Clicks into Votes?, Guardian (May 6, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/­news/2018/may/06/cambridge-analytica-how-turn-clicks-into-votes-christopher-wylie [https://perma.cc/AD8H-PF3M]; Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Confessore & Carole Cadwalladr, How Trump Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. Times (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.html [https://perma.cc/3WYQ-3YKP].
  8. See, e.g., Miranda Bogen & Aaron Rieke, Help Wanted: An Examination of Hiring Algorithms, Equity, and Bias 5–6 (2018) (describing the role of platforms in the hiring process); Geoff Boeing, Online Rental Housing Market Representation and the Digital Reproduction of Urban Inequality, 52 Env’t & Plan. A 449, 450 (2019) (documenting the growing impact of Internet platforms in shaping the rental housing market).
  9. See infra Section II.B.
  10.  See Galen Sherwin & Esha Bhandari, Facebook Settles Civil Rights Cases by Making Sweeping Changes to Its Online Ad Platform, ACLU (Mar. 19, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/womens-rights-workplace/facebook-settles-civil-rights-cases-making-sweeping [https://perma.cc/H6D6-UMJ4].
  11. See infra Section II.C.
  12. See Bogen & Rieke, supra note 7, at 5–6.
  13. Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt., SHRM Survey Findings: Using Social Media for Talent Acquisition—Recruitment and Screening 3 (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys/Documents/SHRM-Social-Media-Recruiting-Screening-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6NT-N4KL]. The Society for Human Resource Management conducts biennial surveys of job recruiters. The surveys demonstrated an increase in the use of online recruiting by employers, rising from fifty-six percent in 2011 to seventy-seven percent in 2013 to eighty-four percent in 2015. Id.; Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt., SHRM Survey Findings: Social Networking Websites and Recruiting/Selection 2 (Apr. 11, 2013), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-sur­veys/Pages/shrm-social-networking-websites-recruiting-job-candidates.aspx [https://perma.cc/U4HN-E7U7]; see also Jobvite’s New 2015 Recruiter Nation Survey Reveals Talent Crunch, Jobvite (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.jobvite.com/news_item/­jobvites-new-2015-recruiter-nation-survey-reveals-talent-crunch-95-recruiters-anticipate-similar-increased-competition-skilled-workers-coming-year-86-expect-exp/ [https://perma.cc /H66S-8E5Z] (stating that 92% of recruiters use social media to discover or evaluate candidates).
  14. See Bogen & Rieke, supra note 7, at 5, 19–20, 24.
  15. Id. at 22.
  16.  See, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 Calif. L. Rev. 735, 738–39 (2017); Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41 Cardozo L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 14) (on file with author); Richard A. Bales & Katherine V.W. Stone, The Invisible Web of Work: Artificial Intelligence and Electronic Surveillance in the Workplace, 41 Berkeley J. Lab. & Emp. L. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 Calif. L. Rev. 671, 673–75 (2016); Matthew T. Bodie, Miriam A. Cherry, Marcia L. McCormick & Jintong Tang, The Law and Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. Colo. L. Rev. 961, 989–92 (2017); James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible Discrimination, 7 Calif. L. Rev. Online 164, 170–72, 176–77 (2017); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Future Work, 2020 U. Ill. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 857, 860–61 (2017) [hereinafter Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work]; Pauline T. Kim, Data Mining and the Challenges of Protecting Employee Privacy Under U.S. Law, 40 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 405, 406 (2019); Pauline T. Kim & Erika Hanson, People Analytics and the Regulation of Information Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 61 St. Louis U. L.J. 17, 18–19 (2016); Charles A. Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 Vill. L. Rev. 395, 396 (2018).
  17. See infra Section II.C.
  18. See infra Section II.D.
  19. Building predictive models involves numerous choices, many of them implicating value judgments. See, e.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 15, at 674; Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1529, 1539 (2019); David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 653, 703–04 (2017); Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 1085, 1130–31 (2018).
  20. Karen Levy and Solon Barocas have explored how the design choices made by platforms “can both mitigate and aggravate bias.” Karen Levy & Solon Barocas, Designing Against Discrimination in Online Markets, 32 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1183, 1185 (2017). The focus of their analysis is on user bias in online markets like ride matching, consumer-to-consumer sales, short-term rentals, and dating. Id. at 1189–90. Because the design choices platforms make will structure users’ interactions with one another, these choices influence behavior, affecting whether or to what extent users can act on explicit or implicit biases. Levy and Barocas review multiple platforms across domains and develop a taxonomy of policy and design elements that have been used to address the risks of bias. Although the focus of this Article is on the impact of predictive algorithms rather than user bias, the issues are obviously interrelated. Past bias by users can cause predictive algorithms to discriminate. Conversely, algorithmic outputs in the form of recommendations or rankings can activate or exacerbate implicit user biases. To that extent, some, but not all, of the strategies they identify may be relevant to addressing bias in online opportunity markets.
  21. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
  22. See infra Part III.
  23. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
  24. See infra Section IV.B.

Measuring Algorithmic Fairness

Algorithmic decision making is both increasingly common and increasingly controversial. Critics worry that algorithmic tools are not transparent, accountable, or fair. Assessing the fairness of these tools has been especially fraught as it requires that we agree about what fairness is and what it requires. Unfortunately, we do not. The technological literature is now littered with a multitude of measures, each purporting to assess fairness along some dimension. Two types of measures stand out. According to one, algorithmic fairness requires that the score an algorithm produces should be equally accurate for members of legally protected groups—blacks and whites, for example. According to the other, algorithmic fairness requires that the algorithm produce the same percentage of false positives or false negatives for each of the groups at issue. Unfortunately, there is often no way to achieve parity in both these dimensions. This fact has led to a pressing question. Which type of measure should we prioritize and why?

This Article makes three contributions to the debate about how best to measure algorithmic fairness: one conceptual, one normative, and one legal. Equal predictive accuracy ensures that a score means the same thing for each group at issue. As such, it relates to what one ought to believe about a scored individual. Because questions of fairness usually relate to action, not belief, this measure is ill-suited as a measure of fairness. This is the Article’s conceptual contribution. Second, this Article argues that parity in the ratio of false positives to false negatives is a normatively significant measure. While a lack of parity in this dimension is not constitutive of unfairness, this measure provides important reasons to suspect that unfairness exists. This is the Article’s normative contribution. Interestingly, improving the accuracy of algorithms overall will lessen this unfairness. Unfortunately, a common assumption that anti-discrimination law prohibits the use of racial and other protected classifications in all contexts is inhibiting those who design algorithms from making them as fair and accurate as possible. This Article’s third contribution is to show that the law poses less of a barrier than many assume.

Introduction

At an event celebrating Martin Luther King, Jr. Day, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) expressed the concern, shared by many, that algorithmic decision making is biased. “Algorithms are still made by human beings, and those algorithms are still pegged to basic human assumptions,” she asserted. “They’re just automated. And if you don’t fix the bias, then you are automating the bias.”1.Blackout for Human Rights, MLK Now 2019, Riverside Church in the City of N.Y. (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.trcnyc.org/mlknow2019/ [https://perma.cc/L45Q-SN9T] (interview with Rep. Ocasio-Cortez begins at approximately minute 16, and comments regarding algorithms begin at approximately minute 40); see also Danny Li, AOC Is Right: Algorithms Will Always Be Biased as Long as There’s Systemic Racism in This Country, Slate (Feb. 1, 2019, 3:47 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/02/aoc-algorithms-racist-bias.html [https://perma.cc/S97Z-UH2U] (quoting Ocasio-Cortez’s comments at the event in New York); Cat Zakrzewski, The Technology 202: Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Is Using Her Social Media Clout To Tackle Bias in Algorithms, Wash. Post: PowerPost (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-technology-202/2019/01/28 /the-technology-202-alexandria-ocasio-cortez-is-using-her-social-media-clout-to-tackle-bias-in-algorithms/5c4dfa9b1b326b29c37­78cdd/?utm_term=.541cd0827a23 [https://perma.cc/ LL4Y-FWDK] (discussing Ocasio-Cortez’s comments and reactions to them).Show More The audience inside the room applauded. Outside the room, the reaction was more mixed. “Socialist Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez . . . claims that algorithms, which are driven by math, are racist,” tweeted a writer for the Daily Wire.2.Ryan Saavedra (@RealSaavedra), Twitter (Jan. 22, 2019, 12:27 AM), https://twitter.com/RealSaavedra/status/1087627739861897216 [https://perma.cc/32DD-QK5S]. The coverage of Ocasio-Cortez’s comments is mixed. See, e.g., Zakrzewski, supra note 1 (describing conservatives’ criticism of and other media outlets’ and experts’ support of Ocasio-Cortez’s comments).Show More Math is just math, this commentator contends, and the idea that math can be unfair is crazy.

This controversy is just one of many to challenge the fairness of algorithmic decision making.3.See, e.g., Hiawatha Bray, The Software That Runs Our Lives Can Be Biased—But We Can Fix It, Bos. Globe, Dec. 22, 2017, at B9 (describing a New York City Council member’s proposal to audit the city government’s computer decision systems for bias); Drew Harwell, Amazon’s Facial-Recognition Software Has Fraught Accuracy Rate, Study Finds, Wash. Post, Jan. 26, 2019, at A14 (reporting on an M.I.T. Media Lab study that found that Amazon facial-recognition software is less accurate with regard to darker-skinned women than lighter-skinned men, and Amazon’s criticism of the study); Tracy Jan, Mortgage Algorithms Found To Have Racial Bias, Wash. Post, Nov. 15, 2018, at A21 (reporting on a University of California at Berkeley study that found that black and Latino home loan customers pay higher interest rates than white or Asian customers on loans processed online or in person); Tony Romm & Craig Timberg, Under Bipartisan Fire from Congress, CEO Insists Google Does Not Take Sides, Wash. Post, Dec. 12, 2018, at A16 (reporting on Congresspeople’s concerns regarding Google algorithms which were voiced at a House Judiciary Committee hearing with Google’s CEO).Show More The use of algorithms, and in particular their connection with machine learning and artificial intelligence, has attracted significant attention in the legal literature as well. The issues raised are varied, and include concerns about transparency,4.See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1249, 1288–97 (2008); Natalie Ram, Innovating Criminal Justice, 112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 659 (2018); Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 Stan. L. Rev. 1343 (2018).Show More accountability,5.See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1529 (2019); Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 633 (2017); Anne L. Washington, How To Argue with an Algorithm: Lessons from the COMPAS-ProPublica Debate, 17 Colo. Tech. L.J. 131 (2018) (arguing for standards governing the information available about algorithms so that their accuracy and fairness can be properly assessed). But see Jon Kleinberg et al., Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25548, 2019), http://www.nber.org/papers/w25548 [https://perma.cc/JU6H-HG3W] (analyzing the potential benefits of algorithms as tools to prove discrimination).Show More privacy,6.See generally Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information (2015) (discussing and critiquing internet and finance companies’ non-transparent use of data tracking and algorithms to influence and manage people); Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 1023, 1024 (2017) (reviewing Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information (2015)) (arguing that instead of “transparency in the design of the algorithm” that Pasquale argues for, “[w]hat we need . . . is a transparency of inputs and results”) (emphasis omitted).Show More and fairness.7.See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 Duke L.J. 1043 (2019) (arguing that current constitutional doctrine is ill-suited to the task of evaluating algorithmic fairness and that current standards offered in the technology literature miss important policy concerns); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 Yale L.J. 2218 (2019) (discussing how past and existing racial inequalities in crime and arrests mean that methods to predict criminal risk based on existing information will result in racial inequality).Show More This Article focuses on fairness—the issue raised by Ocasio-Cortez. It focuses on how we should assess what makes algorithmic decision making fair. Fairness is a moral concept, and a contested one at that. As a result, we should expect that different people will offer well-reasoned arguments for different conceptions of fairness. And this is precisely what we find.

The computer science literature is filled with a proliferation of measures, each purporting to capture fairness along some dimension. This Article provides a pathway through that morass. It makes three contributions: one conceptual, one normative, and one legal. This Article argues that one of the dominant measures of fairness offered in the literature tells us what to believe, not what to do, and thus is ill-suited as a measure of fair treatment. This is the conceptual claim. Second, this Article argues that the ratio between false positives and false negatives offers an important indicator of whether members of two groups scored by an algorithm are treated fairly, vis-à-vis each other. This is the normative claim. Third, this Article challenges a common assumption that anti-discrimination law prohibits the use of racial and other protected classifications in all contexts. Because using race within algorithms can increase both their accuracy and fairness, this misunderstanding has important implications. This Article’s third contribution is to show that the law poses less of a barrier than many assume.

We can use the controversy over a common risk assessment tool used by many states for bail, sentencing, and parole to illustrate the controversy about how best to measure fairness.8.See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, ProPublica (May 23, 2016), https://www.pro­publica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/BA53-JT7V].Show More The tool, called COMPAS, assigns each person a score that indicates the likelihood that the person will commit a crime in the future.9.Equivant, Practitioner’s Guide to COMPAS Core 7 (2019), http://www.equivant.com/wp-content/uploads/Practitioners-Guide-to-COMPAS-Core-040419.pdf [https://perma.cc/LRY6-RXAH].Show More In a high-profile exposé, the website ProPublica claimed that COMPAS treated blacks and whites differently because black arrestees and inmates were far more likely to be erroneously classified as risky than were white arrestees and inmates despite the fact that COMPAS did not explicitly use race in its algorithm.10 10.See Angwin et al., supra note 8 (“Northpointe’s core product is a set of scores derived from 137 questions that are either answered by defendants or pulled from criminal records. Race is not one of the questions.”).Show More The essence of ProPublica’s claim was this:

In forecasting who would re-offend, the algorithm made mistakes with black and white defendants at roughly the same rate but in very different ways. The formula was particularly likely to falsely flag black defendants as future criminals, wrongly labeling them this way at almost twice the rate as white defendants. White defendants were mislabeled as low risk more often than black defendants.11 11.Id.Show More

Northpointe12 12.Northpointe, along with CourtView Justice Solutions Inc. and Constellation Justice Systems, rebranded to Equivant in January 2017. Equivant, Frequently Asked Questions 1, http://my.courtview.com/rs/322-KWH-233/images/Equivant%20Customer%20FAQ%20-%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HH8-LVQ6].Show More (the company that developed and owned COMPAS) responded to the criticism by arguing that ProPublica was focused on the wrong measure. In essence, Northpointe stressed the point ProPublica conceded—that COMPAS made mistakes with black and white defendants at roughly equal rates.13 13.See William Dieterich et al., COMPAS Risk Scales: Demonstrating Accuracy Equity and Predictive Parity, Northpointe 9–10 (July 8, 2016), http://go.volarisgroup.com/rs/430-MBX-989/images/ProPublica_Commentary_Final_070616.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5RL-M9RN].Show More Although Northpointe and others challenged some of the accuracy of ProPublica’s analysis,14 14.For a critique of ProPublica’s analysis, see Anthony W. Flores et al., False Positives, False Negatives, and False Analyses: A Rejoinder to “Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the Country To Predict Future Criminals. And It’s Biased Against Blacks.”, 80 Fed. Prob. 38 (2016).Show More the main thrust of Northpointe’s defense was that COMPAS does treat blacks and whites the same. The controversy focused on the manner in which such similarity is assessed. Northpointe focused on the fact that if a black person and a white person were each given a particular score, the two people would be equally likely to recidivate.15 15.See Dieterich et al., supra note 13, at 9–11.Show More ProPublica looked at the question from a different angle. Rather than asking whether a black person and a white person with the same score were equally likely to recidivate, it focused instead on whether a black and white person who did not go on to recidivate were equally likely to have received a low score from the algorithm.16 16.See Angwin et al., supra note 8 (“In forecasting who would re-offend, the algorithm made mistakes with black and white defendants at roughly the same rate but in very different ways.”).Show More In other words, one measure begins with the score and asks about its ability to predict reality. The other measure begins with reality and asks about its likelihood of being captured by the score.

The easiest way to fix the problem would be to treat the two groups equally in both respects. A high score and low score should mean the same thing for both blacks and whites (the measure Northpointe emphasized), and law-abiding blacks and whites should be equally likely to be mischaracterized by the tool (the measure ProPublica emphasized). Unfortunately, this solution has proven impossible to achieve. In a series of influential papers, computer scientists demonstrated that, in most circumstances, it is simply not possible to equalize both measures.17 17.See, e.g., Richard Berk et al., Fairness in Criminal Justice Risk Assessments: The State of the Art, Soc. Methods & Res. OnlineFirst 1, 23 (2018), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/­10.1177/0049124118782533 [https://perma.cc/GG9L-9AEU] (discussing the required trade­off between predictive accuracy and various fairness measures); Alexandra Chouldechova, Fair Prediction with Disparate Impact: A Study of Bias in Recidivism Prediction Instruments, 5 Big Data 153, 157 (2017) (demonstrating that recidivism prediction instruments cannot simultaneously meet all fairness criteria where recidivism rates differ across groups because its error rates will be unbalanced across the groups when the instrument achieves predictive parity); Jon Kleinberg et al., Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores, 67 LIPIcs 43:1, 43:5–8 (2017), https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2017/8156/pdf/LIPIcs-ITCS-2017-43.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9DM-PER2] (demonstrating how difficult it is for algorithms to simultaneously achieve the fairness goals of calibration and balance in predictions involving different groups).Show More The reason it is impossible relates to the fact that the underlying rates of recidivism among blacks and whites differ.18 18.See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2018 Update on Prisoner Recidivism: A 9-Year Follow-up Period (2005–2014) 6 tbl.3 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/­content/pub/pdf/18upr9yfup0514.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UE3-AS5S] (analyzing rearrests of state prisoners released in 2005 in 30 states and finding that 86.9% of black prisoners and 80.9% of white prisoners were arrested in the nine years following their release); see also Dieterich et al., supra note 13, at 6 (“[I]n comparison with blacks, whites have much lower base rates of general recidivism . . . .”). Of course, the data on recidivism itself may be flawed. This consideration is discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 33–37.Show More When the two groups at issue (whatever they are) have different rates of the trait predicted by the algorithm, it is impossible to achieve parity between the groups in both dimensions.19 19.This is true unless the tool makes no mistakes at all. Kleinberg et al., supra note 17, at 43:5–6.Show More The example discussed in Part I illustrates this phenomenon.20 20.See infra Section I.A.Show More This fact gives rise to the question: in which dimension is such parity more important and why?

These different measures are often described as different conceptions of fairness.21 21.For example, Berk et al. consider six different measures of algorithmic fairness. See Berk et al., supra note 17, at 12–15.Show More This is a mistake. The measure favored by Northpointe is relevant to what we ought to believe about a particular scored individual. If a high-risk score means something different for blacks than for whites, then we do not know whether to believe (or how much confidence to have) in the claim that a particular scored individual is likely to commit a crime in the future. The measure favored by ProPublica relates instead to what we ought to do. If law-abiding blacks and law-abiding whites are not equally likely to be mischaracterized by the score, we will not know whether or how to use the scores in making decisions. If we are comparing a measure that is relevant to what we ought to believe to one that is relevant to what we ought to do, we are truly comparing apples to oranges.

This conclusion does not straightforwardly suggest that we should instead focus on the measure touted by ProPublica, however. A sophisticated understanding of the significance of these measures is fast-moving and evolving. Some computer scientists now argue that the lack of parity in the ProPublica measure is less meaningful than one might think.22 22.See Sam Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, The Measure and Mismeasure of Fairness: A Critical Review of Fair Machine Learning (arXiv, Working Paper No. 1808.00023v2, 2018), http://arxiv.org/abs/1808.00023 [https://perma.cc/ML4Y-EY6S].Show More The better way to understand the measure highlighted by ProPublica would be to say that it suggests that something is likely amiss. Differences in the ratio of false positive rates to false negative rates indicate that the algorithmic tool may rely on data that are themselves infected with bias or that the algorithm may be compounding a prior injustice. Because these possibilities have normative implications for how the algorithm should be used, this measure relates to fairness.

The most promising way to enhance algorithmic fairness is to improve the accuracy of the algorithm overall.23 23.See Sumegha Garg et al., Tracking and Improving Information in the Service of Fairness (arXiv, Working Paper No. 1904.09942v2, 2019), http://arxiv.org/abs/1904.09942 [https://perma.cc/D8ZN-CJ83].Show More And we can do that by permitting the use of protected traits (like race and sex) within the algorithm to determine what other traits will be used to predict the target variable (like recidivism). For example, housing instability might be more predictive of recidivism for whites than for blacks.24 24.See Sam Corbett-Davies et al., Algorithmic Decision Making and the Cost of Fairness, 2017 Proc. 23d ACM SIGKDD Int’l Conf. on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining 797, 805.Show More If the algorithm includes a racial classification, it can segment its analysis such that this trait is used to predict recidivism for whites but not for blacks. Although this approach would improve risk assessment and thereby lessen the inequity highlighted by ProPublica, many in the field believe this approach is off the table because it is prohibited by law.25 25.See id. (“[E]xplicitly including race as an input feature raises legal and policy complications, and as such it is common to simply exclude features with differential predictive power.”).Show More This is not the case.

The use of racial classifications only sometimes constitutes disparate treatment on the basis of race and thus only sometimes gives rise to strict scrutiny. The fact that some uses of racial classifications do not constitute disparate treatment reveals that the concept of disparate treatment is more elusive than is often recognized. This observation is important given the central role that the distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact plays in equal protection doctrine and statutory anti-discrimination law. In addition, it is important because it opens the door to more creative ways to improve algorithmic fairness.

The Article proceeds as follows. Part I develops the conceptual claim. It shows that the two most prominent types of measures used to assess algorithmic fairness are geared to different tasks. One is relevant to belief and the other to decision and action. This Part begins with a detailed explanation of the two measures and then explores the factors that affect belief and action in individual cases. Turning to the comparative context, Part I argues that predictive parity (the measure favored by Northpointe) is relevant to belief but not directly to the fair treatment of different groups.

Part II makes a normative claim. It argues that differences in the ratio of false positives to false negatives between protected groups (a variation on the measure put forward by ProPublica) suggest unfairness, and it explains why this is so. This Part begins by clarifying three distinct ways in which the concept of fairness is used in the literature. It then explains both the normative appeal of focusing on the parity in the ratio of false positives to false negatives and, at the same time, why doing so can be misleading. Despite these drawbacks, Part II argues that the disparity in the ratio of false positive to false negative rates tells us something important about the fairness of the algorithm.

Part III explores what can be done to diminish this unfairness. It argues that using protected classifications like race and sex within algorithms can improve their accuracy and fairness. Because constitutional anti­discrimination law generally disfavors racial classifications, computer scientists and others who work with algorithms are reluctant to deploy this approach. Part III argues that this reluctance rests on an overly simplistic view of the law. Focusing on constitutional law and on racial classification in particular, this Part argues that the doctrine’s resistance to the use of racial classifications is not categorical. Part III explores contexts in which the use of racial classifications does not constitute disparate treatment on the basis of race and extracts two principles from these examples. Using these principles, this Part argues that the use of protected classifications within algorithms may well be permissible. A conclusion follows.

  1. * D. Lurton Massee, Jr. Professor of Law and Roy L. and Rosamond Woodruff Morgan Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law. I would like to thank Charles Barzun, Aloni Cohen, Aziz Huq, Kim Ferzan, Niko Kolodny, Sandy Mayson, Tom Nachbar, Richard Schragger, Andrew Selbst, and the participants in the Caltech 10th Workshop in Decisions, Games, and Logic: Ethics, Statistics, and Fair AI, the Dartmouth Law and Philosophy Workshop, and the computer science department at UVA for comments and critique. In addition, I would like to thank Kristin Glover of the University of Virginia Law Library and Judy Baho for their excellent research assistance. Any errors or confusions are my own.
  2. Blackout for Human Rights, MLK Now 2019, Riverside Church in the City of N.Y. (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.trcnyc.org/mlknow2019/ [https://perma.cc/L45Q-SN9T] (interview with Rep. Ocasio-Cortez begins at approximately minute 16, and comments regarding algorithms begin at approximately minute 40); see also Danny Li, AOC Is Right: Algorithms Will Always Be Biased as Long as There’s Systemic Racism in This Country, Slate (Feb. 1, 2019, 3:47 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/02/aoc-algorithms-racist-bias.html [https://perma.cc/S97Z-UH2U] (quoting Ocasio-Cortez’s comments at the event in New York); Cat Zakrzewski, The Technology 202: Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Is Using Her Social Media Clout To Tackle Bias in Algorithms, Wash. Post: PowerPost (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-technology-202/2019/01/28 /the-technology-202-alexandria-ocasio-cortez-is-using-her-social-media-clout-to-tackle-bias-in-algorithms/5c4dfa9b1b326b29c37­78cdd/?utm_term=.541cd0827a23 [https://perma.cc/ LL4Y-FWDK] (discussing Ocasio-Cortez’s comments and reactions to them).
  3. Ryan Saavedra (@RealSaavedra), Twitter (Jan. 22, 2019, 12:27 AM), https://twitter.com/RealSaavedra/status/1087627739861897216 [https://perma.cc/32DD-QK5S]. The coverage of Ocasio-Cortez’s comments is mixed. See, e.g., Zakrzewski, supra note 1 (describing conservatives’ criticism of and other media outlets’ and experts’ support of Ocasio-Cortez’s comments).
  4. See, e.g., Hiawatha Bray, The Software That Runs Our Lives Can Be Biased—But We Can Fix It, Bos. Globe, Dec. 22, 2017, at B9 (describing a New York City Council member’s proposal to audit the city government’s computer decision systems for bias); Drew Harwell, Amazon’s Facial-Recognition Software Has Fraught Accuracy Rate, Study Finds, Wash. Post, Jan. 26, 2019, at A14 (reporting on an M.I.T. Media Lab study that found that Amazon facial-recognition software is less accurate with regard to darker-skinned women than lighter-skinned men, and Amazon’s criticism of the study); Tracy Jan, Mortgage Algorithms Found To Have Racial Bias, Wash. Post, Nov. 15, 2018, at A21 (reporting on a University of California at Berkeley study that found that black and Latino home loan customers pay higher interest rates than white or Asian customers on loans processed online or in person); Tony Romm & Craig Timberg, Under Bipartisan Fire from Congress, CEO Insists Google Does Not Take Sides, Wash. Post, Dec. 12, 2018, at A16 (reporting on Congresspeople’s concerns regarding Google algorithms which were voiced at a House Judiciary Committee hearing with Google’s CEO).
  5. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1249, 1288–97 (2008); Natalie Ram, Innovating Criminal Justice, 112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 659 (2018); Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 Stan. L. Rev. 1343 (2018).
  6. See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1529 (2019); Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 633 (2017); Anne L. Washington, How To Argue with an Algorithm: Lessons from the COMPAS-ProPublica Debate, 17 Colo. Tech. L.J. 131 (2018) (arguing for standards governing the information available about algorithms so that their accuracy and fairness can be properly assessed). But see Jon Kleinberg et al., Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25548, 2019), http://www.nber.org/papers/w25548 [https://perma.cc/JU6H-HG3W] (analyzing the potential benefits of algorithms as tools to prove discrimination).
  7. See generally Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information (2015) (discussing and critiquing internet and finance companies’ non-transparent use of data tracking and algorithms to influence and manage people); Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 1023, 1024 (2017) (reviewing Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information (2015)) (arguing that instead of “transparency in the design of the algorithm” that Pasquale argues for, “[w]hat we need . . . is a transparency of inputs and results”) (emphasis omitted).
  8. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 Duke L.J. 1043 (2019) (arguing that current constitutional doctrine is ill-suited to the task of evaluating algorithmic fairness and that current standards offered in the technology literature miss important policy concerns); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 Yale L.J. 2218 (2019) (discussing how past and existing racial inequalities in crime and arrests mean that methods to predict criminal risk based on existing information will result in racial inequality).
  9. See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, ProPublica (May 23, 2016), https://www.pro­publica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/BA53-JT7V].
  10. Equivant, Practitioner’s Guide to COMPAS Core 7 (2019), http://www.equivant.com/wp-content/uploads/Practitioners-Guide-to-COMPAS-Core-040419.pdf [https://perma.cc/LRY6-RXAH].
  11. See Angwin et al., supra note 8 (“Northpointe’s core product is a set of scores derived from 137 questions that are either answered by defendants or pulled from criminal records. Race is not one of the questions.”).
  12. Id.
  13. Northpointe, along with CourtView Justice Solutions Inc. and Constellation Justice Systems, rebranded to Equivant in January 2017. Equivant, Frequently Asked Questions 1, http://my.courtview.com/rs/322-KWH-233/images/Equivant%20Customer%20FAQ%20-%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HH8-LVQ6].
  14. See William Dieterich et al., COMPAS Risk Scales: Demonstrating Accuracy Equity and Predictive Parity, Northpointe 9–10 (July 8, 2016), http://go.volarisgroup.com/rs/430-MBX-989/images/ProPublica_Commentary_Final_070616.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5RL-M9RN].
  15. For a critique of ProPublica’s analysis, see Anthony W. Flores et al., False Positives, False Negatives, and False Analyses: A Rejoinder to “Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the Country To Predict Future Criminals. And It’s Biased Against Blacks.”, 80 Fed. Prob. 38 (2016).
  16. See Dieterich et al., supra note 13, at 9–11.
  17. See Angwin et al., supra note 8 (“In forecasting who would re-offend, the algorithm made mistakes with black and white defendants at roughly the same rate but in very different ways.”).
  18. See, e.g., Richard Berk et al., Fairness in Criminal Justice Risk Assessments: The State of the Art, Soc. Methods & Res. OnlineFirst 1, 23 (2018), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/­10.1177/0049124118782533 [https://perma.cc/GG9L-9AEU] (discussing the required trade­off between predictive accuracy and various fairness measures); Alexandra Chouldechova, Fair Prediction with Disparate Impact: A Study of Bias in Recidivism Prediction Instruments, 5 Big Data 153, 157 (2017) (demonstrating that recidivism prediction instruments cannot simultaneously meet all fairness criteria where recidivism rates differ across groups because its error rates will be unbalanced across the groups when the instrument achieves predictive parity); Jon Kleinberg et al., Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores, 67 LIPIcs 43:1, 43:5–8 (2017), https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2017/8156/pdf/LIPIcs-ITCS-2017-43.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9DM-PER2] (demonstrating how difficult it is for algorithms to simultaneously achieve the fairness goals of calibration and balance in predictions involving different groups).
  19. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2018 Update on Prisoner Recidivism: A 9-Year Follow-up Period (2005–2014) 6 tbl.3 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/­content/pub/pdf/18upr9yfup0514.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UE3-AS5S] (analyzing rearrests of state prisoners released in 2005 in 30 states and finding that 86.9% of black prisoners and 80.9% of white prisoners were arrested in the nine years following their release); see also Dieterich et al., supra note 13, at 6 (“[I]n comparison with blacks, whites have much lower base rates of general recidivism . . . .”). Of course, the data on recidivism itself may be flawed. This consideration is discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 33–37.
  20. This is true unless the tool makes no mistakes at all. Kleinberg et al., supra note 17, at 43:5–6.
  21. See infra Section I.A.
  22. For example, Berk et al. consider six different measures of algorithmic fairness. See Berk et al., supra note 17, at 12–15.
  23. See Sam Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, The Measure and Mismeasure of Fairness: A Critical Review of Fair Machine Learning (arXiv, Working Paper No. 1808.00023v2, 2018), http://arxiv.org/abs/1808.00023 [https://perma.cc/ML4Y-EY6S].
  24. See Sumegha Garg et al., Tracking and Improving Information in the Service of
    Fairness (arXiv, Working Paper No. 1904.09942v2, 2019), http://arxiv.org/abs/1904.09942 [https://perma.cc/D8ZN-CJ83].
  25. See Sam Corbett-Davies et al., Algorithmic Decision Making and the Cost of Fairness, 2017 Proc. 23d ACM SIGKDD Int’l Conf. on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining 797, 805.
  26. See id. (“[E]xplicitly including race as an input feature raises legal and policy complications, and as such it is common to simply exclude features with differential predictive power.”).

Myopic Consumer Law

People make mistakes with debt, partly because the chance to buy now and pay later tempts them to do things that are not in their long-term interest. Lenders sell credit products that exploit this vulnerability. In this Article, I argue that critiques of these products that draw insights from behavioral law and economics have a blind spot: they ignore what the borrowed funds are used for. By evaluating financing transactions in isolation from the underlying purchase, the cost-benefit analysis of consumer financial regulation is truncated and misleading. I show that the same psychological bias that allows someone to be sold an exploitative loan also makes it possible that the exploitative loan benefits them by causing them to purchase a product or service that they should, but would not otherwise, buy. I demonstrate the importance of this effect in a study of tax refund anticipation loans. I find that regulation curtailing these loans increased the use of an alternative credit product and reduced the use of paid tax preparers and the take-up of the earned income tax credit.

Introduction

Behavioral law and economics has had significant influence on the regulation of consumer credit.1.See, e.g., Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1593, 1644–47 (2014).Show More This is both important and justified. It is important because consumer finance is central to the functioning of a modern economy; it is what President Obama called the “lifeblood” during the height of the financial crisis in 2009.2.Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress, 1 Pub. Papers 145, 147 (Feb. 24, 2009).Show More At the level of individual households, consumer credit is important because the timing of income and expenses are rarely contemporaneous. And yet, credit transactions are fraught. Credit both reflects and perpetuates wide differences in individuals’ economic opportunities and their vulnerability to financial adversity. Credit is more expensive for the poor, and this fact creates a patina of exploitation and abuse over debt transactions that has resulted in extensive state and federal regulation.

The influence of behavioral economics on consumer credit regulation is justified because two features of consumer credit raise doubts about consumers’ ability to make borrowing choices that are in their best interests. The first feature is complexity. Consumer debt often has a complex fee structure, opaque repayment terms, and default consequences that are hard to evaluate.3.For a discussion of the importance of complexity and faulty borrower comprehension in consumer credit markets, see Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 Md. L. Rev. 707, 766–98 (2006) [hereinafter Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure]. Unfortunately, interventions to increase consumer financial literacy do not appear to help remedy these problems. Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 197, 201 (2008); Lauren E. Willis, The Financial Education Fallacy, 101 Am. Econ.Rev. 429, 429 (2011). Because financial education and disclosure have proven to be largely ineffective, Professor Willis has provocatively argued for an alternative known as “performance-based consumer law.” Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1309, 1311 (2015).Show More The second feature is the tradeoff between current and future purchasing power that is at the heart of every credit transaction. It is the essence of debt that the borrower exchanges her promise to pay amounts in the future for the ability to consume more now. This intertemporal tradeoff is one that individuals often struggle to make properly, and the challenge is especially great for individuals who focus excessively on the short term and who are therefore inclined to borrow impulsively and on terms that they subsequently regret.4.See Ian M. McDonald, The Global Financial Crisis and Behavioural Economics, 28 Econ. Papers 249, 251 (2009).Show More Both complexity and intertemporal choice are areas where behavioral law and economics scholarship is able to traffic in deep intuitions and draw on strong empirical evidence to make recommendations about how to regulate imperfectly rational consumers.5.I am unaware of any data about the intuitive appeal of complexity and impatience as explanations for why people struggle to evaluate credit contracts. Nevertheless, I trust that most readers, particularly those with home mortgages, will be inclined to agree that understanding all the terms of a secured loan, even when one is trained in law or economics, demands a great deal of time and effort. It is unsurprising then that some do not even make the effort. Judge Posner famously declined to read the “boilerplate” on his own home mortgage. David Lat, Do Lawyers Actually Read Boilerplate Contracts?, Above the Law (June 22, 2010, 2:42 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/06/do-lawyers-actaully-read-boilerplate-contracts-judge-richard-posner-doesnt-do-you/ [https://perma.cc/R574-VCQS]. I also expect that most of us identify with the present-biased individual, who procrastinates when it comes to unpleasant tasks and acts impulsively when it comes to food or leisure. For a review of the literature, see Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower and Legal Policy, 5 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 91 (2009).Show More

In this Article, I focus on arguments about consumer finance regulation that draw on research about “present bias,” which is a sort of myopia that causes people to focus on the present and neglect the future. I argue that consumer law scholarship that draws on these insights has itself been myopic. People borrow money in order to buy things, and scholarship has generally neglected to consider what borrowed funds are used for.6.Some researchers do think it is broadly relevant what consumers do with the loan proceeds, but none evaluate the bundled loan and purchase together from the perspective of a biased consumer. See, e.g., Shmuel I. Beecher, Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, Poor Consumer(s) Law: The Case of High-Cost Credit and Payday Loans, in Legal Applications of Marketing Theory (Jacob Gersen & Joel Steckel eds.) (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 10), http://ssrn.com/abstract = 3235810 [https://perma.cc/2ZRB-QQ44].Show More I show that focusing on the terms of a loan, isolated from the good or service that is purchased with the proceeds, leads to misleading conclusions about the benefits to the borrower. Integrating the costs and benefits of the underlying purchase with the terms of the credit transaction can upend standard conclusions about the effects of present bias and relocate efforts to improve consumer welfare from the regulation of financial products to the circumstances that create demand for high-cost credit in the first place. I demonstrate the significance of this theoretical claim by reporting results from a study of tax refund anticipation loans (RALs), which shows how RALs increase the use of paid tax preparers and the take-up of the earned income tax credit (EITC) by low-income households. Because of the size of the EITC, these loans may make present-biased taxpayers better off, even if the loans are designed to exploit their bias.

When considering the benefits of credit transactions for present-biased consumers, why do the motivating purchases matter? The answer is that many goods and services are characterized by significant upfront costs but benefits that are only realized in the future. As I show in Part I, present-biased consumers tend to undervalue products with this temporal pattern of costs and benefits.7.See discussion infra Section I.A.Show More Durable goods, such as homes, cars, and appliances, are like this. Purchasing durable goods involves a significant cash outlay at the time of purchase in exchange for a stream of consumption benefits that are realized over time. In fact, all sorts of choices present this same temporal pattern of immediate costs and future benefits. For example, the benefits of education are mostly realized long after the classroom experience. Applying for social welfare benefits can require an upfront investment of time and effort in exchange for benefits that are received in the future. The EITC, which is the largest federal cash transfer to low-income households,8.Chris Edwards & Veronique de Rugy, Earned Income Tax Credit: Small Benefits, Large Costs, Cato Inst. (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.cato.org/publications/tax-budget-bulletin/earned-income-tax-credit-small-benefits-large-costs [https://perma.cc/5L9L-RHX9].Show More is only available to individuals who file a tax return and complete the burdensome earned income credit (EIC) schedule.9.On the difficulties of filing for the EITC, see Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Beyond Polemics: Poverty, Taxes, and Noncompliance, 14 eJournal Tax Res. 253, 275–77 (2016); Francine J. Lipman, The Working Poor Are Paying for Government Benefits: Fixing the Hole in the Anti-Poverty Purse, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 461, 464; George K. Yin et al., Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals to Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit Program, 11 Am. J. Tax Pol’y 225, 254–56 (1994). In her latest annual report to Congress, however, the National Taxpayer Advocate noted that the IRS has been working to improve EITC outreach and education. Internal Revenue Serv., Nat’l Taxpayer Advoc.,Ann. Rep. to Congress 144 (2017).Show More The key point is that when the deferred costs and immediate benefits of certain exploitative credit products are added to the immediate costs and deferred benefits of durable goods and services, the bundled transaction may be one that is appealing to a present-biased individual and makes them better off. The exploitative loan tempts the present-biased individual to do something that is in her interest but that she would not otherwise do.10 10.I say that a loan is exploitative if only biased borrowers want to borrow on its terms. This definition does not imply anything about the profitability of these loans to the lender or about the division of the gains from trade. For a philosophical treatment of exploitation, see Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation 7–8(1996).Show More

The results from this analysis sound a note of caution about decontextualizing the choices that consumers make. At the most general level, this Article shows that if consumer law is to help imperfectly rational consumers, it is not enough to show that certain goods or services would only be purchased by consumers acting on a bias that operates against their own interests. It must also consider what other choices these consumers are likely to make that depend on that product and how the exploitative product fits into the overall way that they have arranged their lives. The personal affairs of present-biased individuals are likely to be characterized by a variety of biased decisions that may be interconnected in important ways. Although the entire constellation of choices made by present-biased individuals will leave them worse off than if they made the same choices rationally, this does not imply that compelling them to make any one of these choices rationally will leave them better off.11 11.Law and economics scholars will recognize this as an application of the general theory of the second best to intra-personal choice. R.G. Lipsey & R.K. Lancaster, TheGeneral Theory of Second Best, 24 Rev. Econ. Stud. 11, 11–12 (1956).Show More

The second contribution of this Article is to consumer finance regulation specifically. Regulating the substantive terms of consumer credit requires distinguishing between different kinds of loan products and the uses to which the loan proceeds are put. Specifically, secured debt that must be used to purchase goods and services with deferred benefits has different effects on present-biased consumers than general unsecured debt that can be used to change the timing of consumption generally.12 12.Seediscussion infra Section I.A.Show More When we integrate the loan’s terms with the pattern of costs and benefits from the purchase that necessitated the loan, we see that the bundled transaction may in fact be beneficial for present-biased consumers.13 13.Seediscussion infra Section I.A.Show More If the bundled transaction is beneficial, then prohibiting credit terms that are designed to tempt present-biased individuals might hurt those that the ban is meant to help.

Third, and at the level of most direct application, the results of my empirical study have very specific implications for the regulation of RALs and refund anticipation checks (RACs). The results sound a warning to regulators about the effects of eliminating these products. RALs disappeared almost entirely following a regulatory change in 2011,14 14.See discussion infra Section II.D.Show More a change that was celebrated by consumer advocates.15 15.Chi Chi Wu & Jean Ann Fox, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. & Consumer Fed’n of Am., The Party’s Over for Quickie Tax Loans: But Traps Remain for Unwary Taxpayers 2 (2012), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-ral-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9QX-QM­XK] (“While an occasional fringe lender may make a tax-time loan, the sale of RALs as a widespread industry-wide practice is over. RALs will no longer drain the tax refunds of millions of mostly low-income taxpayers.”).Show More The near elimination of RALs reduced the use of paid tax preparers, lowered take-up of the EITC, and increased demand for RACs.16 16.See discussion infra Part II.Show More RACs are popular, and RALs have begun to make a comeback, but both credit products are the focus of opposition from advocates and concern by regulators.17 17.Tax RALs are resurgent, albeit in smaller amounts than before. For a sense of the magnitude of this resurgence, there were 35,000 refund loans made in 2014 and approximately one million loans made in 2016. Kevin Wack, Tax Refund Loans Get a Second Life, Am. Banker (June 15, 2016, 2:49 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/tax-refund-loans-get-a-second-life [https://perma.cc/ZG58-WG4M].Show More Thus, understanding the role they play in affecting tax compliance and the take-up of valuable social benefits is important and timely.

To be clear, present bias is not the only reason to be suspicious of credit transactions, and the purpose of my analysis is not to provide an all-things-considered appraisal of high-cost credit products. Complexity, unrealistic optimism about repayment prospects, and other psychological biases may cause people to choose financial products that are not in their best interests.18 18.Overly optimistic borrowers may borrow too much or too little. See Richard M. Hynes, Overoptimism and Overborrowing, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 127, 131.Show More I agree with scholars who emphasize the problem of complexity and the potential role for regulation in this area.19 19.See, e.g., Saurabh Bhargava & George Loewenstein, Behavioral Economics and Public Policy 102: Beyond Nudging, 105 Am. Econ. Rev. 396, 396 (2015) (arguing that behavioral economics should leverage gaps in the traditional economic approach that assume fully rational and informed individuals to deliver policy solutions).Show More But when regulation is motivated by concerns about borrowers’ psychological biases, it must consider not just how those biases generate demand for the product being regulated but also how that product is likely to fit into the life of someone who exhibits that bias more generally.

Part I explains the present bias framework for thinking about credit transactions and describes how present bias has been used to explain demand for three economically important, high-cost credit products. I show how integrating the underlying purchase transaction into the analysis of these credit products can change our conclusions about whether these products are beneficial. In Parts II–V, I report and discuss the results of an original study of the effects of regulating RALs. The results illustrate the theoretical effects I describe in Part I, provide evidence that is relevant for regulating this financial product, and raise hard questions about the intermediating role of the private sector between individuals and the U.S. Treasury. In Part VI, I describe a framework for thinking about the regulation of consumer credit products, paying special attention to RALs.

  1. * Class of 1948 Professor of Scholarly Research in Law, University of Virginia School of Law. Thanks to Jennifer Arlen, Oren Bar-Gill, Gustavo Bobonis, Tom Brennan, Ryan Bubb, Mihir Desai, Brian Galle, Yehonatan Givati, Jacob Goldin, Daniel Hemel, Louis Kaplow, Lewis Kornhauser, Kory Kroft, Day Manoli, Ruth Mason, Patricia McCoy, Alex Raskolnikov, Kyle Rozema, Emily Satterthwaite, David Schizer, Kathryn Spier, Rory Van Loo, David Walker, George Yin, workshop participants at the American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, the Columbia Law School-Hebrew University Tax Conference, the University of Toronto, Boston University, Cardozo Law School, New York University, and Harvard Law School. Thanks to the Brookings Institution and AggData LLC for providing data. I am especially indebted to Kent Olson of the UVA Law Library for exceptional research assistance.
  2. See, e.g., Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1593, 1644–47 (2014).
  3. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress, 1 Pub. Papers 145, 147 (Feb. 24, 2009).
  4. For a discussion of the importance of complexity and faulty borrower comprehension in consumer credit markets, see Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 Md. L. Rev. 707, 766–98 (2006) [hereinafter Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure]. Unfortunately, interventions to increase consumer financial literacy do not appear to help remedy these problems. Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 197, 201 (2008); Lauren E. Willis, The Financial Education Fallacy, 101 Am. Econ.

    Rev. 429, 429 (2011). Because financial education and disclosure have proven to be largely ineffective, Professor Willis has provocatively argued for an alternative known as “performance-based consumer law.” Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1309, 1311 (2015).

  5. See Ian M. McDonald, The Global Financial Crisis and Behavioural Economics, 28 Econ. Papers 249, 251 (2009).
  6. I am unaware of any data about the intuitive appeal of complexity and impatience as explanations for why people struggle to evaluate credit contracts. Nevertheless, I trust that most readers, particularly those with home mortgages, will be inclined to agree that understanding all the terms of a secured loan, even when one is trained in law or economics, demands a great deal of time and effort. It is unsurprising then that some do not even make the effort. Judge Posner famously declined to read the “boilerplate” on his own home mortgage. David Lat, Do Lawyers Actually Read Boilerplate Contracts?, Above the Law (June 22, 2010, 2:42 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/06/do-lawyers-actaully-read-boilerplate-contracts-judge-richard-posner-doesnt-do-you/ [https://perma.cc/R574-VCQS]. I also expect that most of us identify with the present-biased individual, who procrastinates when it comes to unpleasant tasks and acts impulsively when it comes to food or leisure. For a review of the literature, see Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower and Legal Policy, 5 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 91 (2009).
  7. Some researchers do think it is broadly relevant what consumers do with the loan proceeds, but none evaluate the bundled loan and purchase together from the perspective of a biased consumer. See, e.g., Shmuel I. Beecher, Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, Poor Consumer(s) Law: The Case of High-Cost Credit and Payday Loans, in Legal Applications of Marketing Theory (Jacob Gersen & Joel Steckel eds.) (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 10), http://ssrn.com/abstract = 3235810 [https://perma.cc/2ZRB-QQ44].
  8. See discussion infra Section I.A.
  9. Chris Edwards & Veronique de Rugy, Earned Income Tax Credit: Small Benefits, Large Costs, Cato Inst. (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.cato.org/publications/tax-budget-bulletin/earned-income-tax-credit-small-benefits-large-costs [https://perma.cc/5L9L-RHX9].
  10. On the difficulties of filing for the EITC, see Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Beyond Polemics: Poverty, Taxes, and Noncompliance, 14 eJournal Tax Res. 253, 275–77 (2016); Francine J. Lipman, The Working Poor Are Paying for Government Benefits: Fixing the Hole in the Anti-Poverty Purse, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 461, 464; George K. Yin et al., Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals to Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit Program, 11 Am. J. Tax Pol’y 225, 254–56 (1994). In her latest annual report to Congress, however, the National Taxpayer Advocate noted that the IRS has been working to improve EITC outreach and education. Internal Revenue Serv., Nat’l Taxpayer Advoc.,

    Ann. Rep. to Congress 144 (2017).

  11. I say that a loan is exploitative if only biased borrowers want to borrow on its terms. This definition does not imply anything about the profitability of these loans to the lender or about the division of the gains from trade. For a philosophical treatment of exploitation, see Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation 7–8

    (1996).

  12. Law and economics scholars will recognize this as an application of the general theory of the second best to intra-personal choice. R.G. Lipsey & R.K. Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 Rev. Econ. Stud. 11, 11–12 (1956).
  13. See discussion infra Section I.A.
  14. See discussion infra Section I.A.
  15. See discussion infra Section II.D.
  16. Chi Chi Wu & Jean Ann Fox, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. & Consumer Fed’n of Am., The Party’s Over for Quickie Tax Loans: But Traps Remain for Unwary Taxpayers 2 (2012), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-ral-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9QX-QM­XK] (“While an occasional fringe lender may make a tax-time loan, the sale of RALs as a widespread industry-wide practice is over. RALs will no longer drain the tax refunds of millions of mostly low-income taxpayers.”).
  17. See discussion infra Part II.
  18. Tax RALs are resurgent, albeit in smaller amounts than before. For a sense of the magnitude of this resurgence, there were 35,000 refund loans made in 2014 and approximately one million loans made in 2016. Kevin Wack, Tax Refund Loans Get a Second Life, Am. Banker (June 15, 2016, 2:49 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/tax-refund-loans-get-a-second-life [https://perma.cc/ZG58-WG4M].
  19. Overly optimistic borrowers may borrow too much or too little. See Richard M. Hynes, Overoptimism and Overborrowing, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 127, 131.
  20. See, e.g., Saurabh Bhargava & George Loewenstein, Behavioral Economics and Public Policy 102: Beyond Nudging, 105 Am. Econ. Rev. 396, 396 (2015) (arguing that behavioral economics should leverage gaps in the traditional economic approach that assume fully rational and informed individuals to deliver policy solutions).