Direct relations between the federal government and local governments—what this article calls “cooperative localism”—play a significant and underappreciated role in areas of contemporary policy as disparate as homeland security, law enforcement, disaster response, economic development, social services, immigration, and environmental protection. Despite the ubiquity of this practice, a jurisprudential conflict threatens this important facet of intergovernmental relations. Historically, courts have allowed local governments to invoke federal authority as a source of local autonomy, despite the prevailing view of local governments as powerless instrumentalities of the state. The Supreme Court is increasingly suggesting, however, that state control over local governments is a fundamental aspect of state sovereignty triggering judicial limits on federal power. When this confrontation comes to a head, limiting federal authority to empower local governments would be a mistake. This article instead proposes a new framework for conceptualizing federal empowerment of local governments that is not only consistent with the Court’s contemporary view of federal structure, but in fact advances the Court’s normative and pragmatic goals. The core concerns animating the Court’s current move to devolve and decentralize power are forcefully served by enhancing the autonomy of local governments in the constitutional structure. In short, the very values of federalism on which the Court has relied to enhance state sovereignty provide a compelling localist grounding for the particular exercise of national power represented by cooperative localism.
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Structural Reform Prosecution
In what I call a structural reform prosecution, prosecutors secure the cooperation of an organization in adopting internal reforms. No scholars have considered the problem of prosecutors seeking structural reform remedies, perhaps because until recently organizational prosecutions were themselves infrequent. In the past few years, however, federal prosecutors have adopted a bold new prosecutorial strategy under which dozens of leading corporations have entered into demanding settlements, including AIG, American Online, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Computer Associates, HealthSouth, KPMG, MCI, Merrill Lynch & Co., and Monsanto. To situate the DOJ’s latest strategy, I frame alternatives to the pursuit of structural reform remedies as well as five alternative ways prosecutors can pursue structural reform. To better understand what the DOJ accomplished by choosing to pursue structural reform and then doing so at the charging stage, I conducted an empirical study of the terms in all agreements the DOJ has negotiated to date. My study reveals imposition of deep governance reforms, consistent with the purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines, but also perceived prosecutorial abuses and some indications of overreaching. I conclude that given the breadth of prosecutorial discretion and the deferential, limited nature of judicial review, the guidance that the DOJ provides will chiefly define the future development of its emerging structural regime for deterring organizational crime.
Treaties’ Domains
When and why do American judges enforce treaties? Today’s dominant theory of treaty enforcement is the doctrine of “self-execution,” which suggests that judicial enforcement of treaties is deduced from the nature of the treaties signed. The theory holds that some treaties are written so as to be directly enforceable, just like a statute, with full domestic effects, while other treaties are written so as to create duties only under international law. Unfortunately, as most scholars recognize, the doctrine is perplexing and of limited predictive value.
This Article, based on a new study of the history and record of treaty enforcement, provides a different theory as to when treaties are actually enforced in American courts. It finds that the question of whether a treaty is “self-executing” is acting as a proxy for questions of institutional deference. A good guide to treaty enforcement across the history of the United States is whether it is Congress, the Executive, or a State accused of breach.
The basic treaty enforcement question is, and has been, whether the alleged act of treaty breach justifies a judicial remedy. Judicial deference to Congressional action with respect to a treaty is to be expected. Conversely, the judiciary will continue to use treaty law to prevent States from putting the United States in violation of its international obligations. As to the Executive, the judiciary should begin to explain why, in terms of deference, it is or is not choosing to enforce a treaty against Executive breach.