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The Empty Promise of Compassionate Conservatism: A Reply to Judge Wilkinson

In his recent essay, Why Conservative Jurisprudence Is Compassionate, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson defends conservative jurisprudence against a claim that he believes unfairly derogates the normative attractiveness of conservative jurisprudence—specifically that conservative jurisprudence lacks compassion. To Judge Wilkinson, conservative jurisprudence, properly understood, can “more than hold [its] own” against its liberal counterpart in the compassion debate. 

This essay responds to Judge Wilkinson’s thesis. It first articulates the arguments advanced by Judge Wilkinson in support of his thesis but then suggests that, even if his contentions hold some resonance, they still fall short of the goal of defending contemporary conservative jurisprudence as compassionate. 

To begin with, Judge Wilkinson’s arguments are essentially only negative points about the purported overuse of compassion in liberal jurisprudence; they are not positive propositions suggesting that conservatism has its own unique vision or understanding of compassion. Moreover, Judge Wilkinson’s attempt to defend conservative jurisprudence is misplaced because the conservatism he describes is not contemporary conservative jurisprudence. Rather contemporary conservative jurisprudence, in order to achieve its desired results, is marked with the exact same jurisprudential deficiencies that Judge Wilkinson condemns in liberal jurisprudence. Finally, Judge Wilkinson’s attempt to defend contemporary conservative thought against liberal attack is misdirected because the liberal/conservative dichotomy he describes is not the primary line that currently divides the conservative and liberal camps. The division is not between a jurisprudence that inappropriately responds to individual poignancies and one that relies on sharp lines and collective concerns. Rather the essential division is between a liberal jurisprudence geared to protecting the marginalized groups in society versus a conservative jurisprudence that tends to reinforce the existing powers of dominant groups. As this essay demonstrates, conservatives have taken their role in protecting entrenched interests quite seriously. They have expanded the constitutional rights of already powerful interests. They have opposed liberal attempts to increase the constitutional protections accorded marginalized groups. They have invalidated legislative attempts that would reduce the disparities between the powerful and the marginalized in the political marketplace. They have consistently resisted both constitutional and legislative attempts to increase the access of disadvantaged litigants to courts of justice. Accordingly, the essay contends that the claim that such a jurisprudence is “compassionate” is difficult to sustain.

Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State

Despite the administrative state’s extensive scope, we know little about how it operates as an empirical matter. This Article provides the first comprehensive empirical examination of agency rulemaking, with and without prior public comment, from President Ronald Reagan to President George W. Bush. Using a large new dataset constructed from twenty years’ (1983–2003) worth of federal agencies’ semi-annual reports in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, this Article analyzes variation in agency rulemaking activities with an emphasis on rulemaking at the beginning and end of presidential administrations and around shifts in party control of Congress—midnight and crack-of-dawn regulatory activity—while also assessing some patterns outside those periods. 

The empirical results offer new insights into the rulemaking process and the interplay of politics and regulation. Some of these insights are surprising. For example, certain agencies withdrew more proposed rules after political transitions in Congress than after a new President took office. Rather than capitalizing quickly on their electoral mandates, Presidents generally started fewer, not more, rules in the first year of their terms than in later years. Agencies generally did complete more rules in the final quarter of each presidential administration, but cabinet departments (as a group), finished slightly more actions after the 1994 election changed control of Congress than in President Clinton’s last quarter. And although the press highlighted President Clinton’s spate of midnight regulatory activity, President George H.W. Bush began nearly 50 percent more notice-and-comment rulemakings in the final quarter of his term than did President Clinton and nearly 40 percent more than President Reagan. 

The results have potentially far-reaching normative and doctrinal implications for the functioning and oversight of the administrative state. Politics aside, many agencies have engaged in considerable notice-and-comment rulemaking, suggesting that the traditional regulatory process may not be significantly ossified. Nevertheless, binding rulemaking without prior comment has increased across a wide range of agencies. Focusing on politics, these patterns of regulatory activity during political transitions undermine theories of judicial deference based entirely on agency expertise. But, at the same time, they do not support a political accountability theory based solely on the President. Rather, the regulatory trends call attention to the importance of Congress, in addition to the President, for bureaucratic oversight. In sum, the timing of rulemaking raises interesting questions about the effectiveness and legitimacy of the administrative state.

A Theory of Procedural Common Law

Debates about the common lawmaking power of the federal courts focus exclusively on substantive common law. But federal common law is not limited to matters of substance; it reaches matters of procedure as well. Federal law includes a robust body of what might be called procedural common law—common law primarily concerned with the regulation of internal court processes rather than substantive rights and obligations. This body of law includes many doctrines that are fixtures in the law of procedure and federal courts. For example, abstention, forum non conveniens, remittitur, stare decisis, and preclusion can all fairly be characterized as procedural common law. This body of law does not fit easily into the traditional account of federal common lawmaking power, because it generally lacks certain features thought characteristic of federal common law: It does not bind state courts, it falls outside of the recognized enclaves of federal common law, and it is not entirely subject to congressional abrogation.

This Article offers a tentative account of the power of the federal courts to make procedural common law. One explanation for this power is a variation on the enclave theory advanced in the context of substantive common law: the constitutional structure preempts the state’s ability to regulate federal-court procedure, and, if Congress fails to specify procedural rules, federal courts must. This theory rings partly true insofar as it recognizes that federal-court procedure lies beyond state control. It is unsatisfying, however, insofar as it conceives of the procedural power of the federal courts as entirely derivative of and subservient to that of Congress. The Article thus considers an alternate theory: that procedural common lawmaking authority derives not from congressional default, but from Article III’s grant of judicial power. This theory has more force insofar as it accounts for the fact that the power of the courts sometimes, even if rarely, exceeds that of Congress in matters of procedure. It depends, however, on the widely assumed but largely untested proposition that federal courts possess inherent procedural authority. The Article canvasses Founding-era history to determine whether the Constitution can fairly be understood to confer this power, concluding that the historical evidence, while far from overwhelming, supports the claim that federal courts possess inherent procedural authority. Building from this notion of inherent procedural authority, the Article then sketches a theory to explain the power of the federal courts to make procedural common law.

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