Article

Standing for the Public: A Lost History

This Article recaptures a now-anachronistic approach to standing law that the Supreme Court followed in the middle decades of the 20th Century and explains how and when it died. It then speculates about why the federal courts retreated from the doctrine when they did.

The now-anachronistic view of the permissible scope of standing, which is called here “standing for the public,” permitted Congress to authorize parties who had no cognizable legal rights to challenge government action, in order to, as the Supreme Court itself said “represent the public” and bring the government’s legal errors before the courts. Ironically, the federal courts retreated from this approach to standing law in the 1960s and 1970s, the very period that is best known for its doctrinal innovations that liberalized standing law. The Article tells the (complicated) tale of how the courts erased the standing for the public principle from the case law, places those actions action in context by looking at contemporaneous developments in the legal profession and Congress, and speculates about why this approach to standing law died when it did.

Reasonable Agencies

THIS Article argues that the complex doctrine of judicial review of administrative action—containing no less than six separate tests depending on the sort of agency action to be reviewed—both descriptively is and normatively should be simplified into a “reasonable agency” standard. Courts, following step two of the Chevron doctrine, have started to sneak a reasonableness standard into their review in lieu of making the difficult distinctions required by current doctrine. Scholars evaluating the difference among the various doctrinal tests have started to note the increasing similarity among the tests, at least as applied by the courts. Empirical research, to which this Article contributes an additional study, suggests that regardless of the standard of review, courts affirm agencies’ actions slightly more than two thirds of the time; the variance of the validation rates of agency action, regardless of the standard of review, is small. A reasonable agency standard would simplify and clarify administrative law, better describe what courts actually do when confronted with agency action, and better explain the judicial role in the administrative state.

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