Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty

Most state court judges are elected to office, and thus must be attentive to voter preferences just like other elected officials. Critics of judicial elections fear that subjecting judges to majoritarian pressures jeopardizes the rights of disfavored groups and undermines the rule of law, and accordingly call for their abolition. The reality, however, is that judicial elections are firmly entrenched in thirty-eight states, and thus appear to be a permanent part of the legal landscape. 

This article suggests that the so-called “majoritarian difficulty” posed by elected judges can be tempered by regular interactions with appointed, life-tenured federal judges, who are better insulated from public opinion. By constitutional design, the federal courts work closely with their state counterparts, overseeing state court decisions and sharing jurisdiction over questions of both state and federal law. As a result, federal courts have the potential to offset majoritarian influences on state courts by reviewing state court decisions, issuing binding and persuasive precedent on questions of federal and state law, and providing state courts with political cover for unpopular decisions. Most important, litigants can often frame their cases to get into federal court when they fear that an elected state court judge would be likely to rule against them. 

After describing the important role that federal courts can play in diluting majoritarian influences on elected state court judges, the article then examines empirical evidence suggesting that federal courts are, in fact, more involved in overseeing elected state court judges than their appointed counterparts. The article concludes by asserting that federal courts should assume a more proactive role in mitigating the majoritarian difficulty by taking a state’s judicial selection method into account when making jurisdictional choices. 

Warrantless Searches in a Digital World: Limiting the Private Search Exception for Computer Investigations

The “Private Search” exception to the Fourth Amendment allows law enforcement officers to re-create, without a warrant, a search conducted by a private individual, provided two conditions are met. First, the individual may not act at the behest of the government (the agency prong) and second, officers may not search beyond what was already discovered by the private searcher (the scope prong). The exception is premised on the theory that the private searcher destroyed whatever expectation of privacy the suspect had in his information, thereby eliminating any Fourth Amendment protection. In applying this otherwise well-understood exception to searches of computers, however, courts have adopted widely varying approaches based on divergent assumptions and leading to dramatically different results. This Note argues that, because of the nature of computer storage, courts should narrow the application of the private search exception by broadly interpreting the “agency” prong and narrowly interpreting the “scope” prong. Such an approach maintains the purpose of the exception without unduly sacrificing informational privacy or law enforcement efficacy.

Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright Law

Digital technology enables individuals to create and communicate in ways that were previously possible only for well-funded corporate publishers. These individual creators are increasingly harnessing copyright law to insist on ownership of the rights to control their musical works, scholarly research, and even Facebook musings.

When individual creators claim, retain, and manage their own copyrights, they exercise a degree of authorial autonomy that befits the Internet Age. But they simultaneously contribute to a troubling phenomenon I call “copyright atomism”—the proliferation, distribution, and fragmentation of the exclusive rights bestowed by copyright law. An atomistic copyright system is crowded with protected works and rights, owned by rights-holders who are numerous and far-flung. This situation can raise information and transaction costs for participants in the creative marketplace, hampering future generations of creativity and thus undermining the very purpose of copyright: to encourage the creation and dissemination of works of authorship for the ultimate benefit of the public.

This article introduces and articulates the copyright atomism concept. It then places atomism in historical and doctrinal context by documenting copyright law’s encounters with proliferated, distributed, and fragmented copyright ownership from medieval monasteries to the Internet age. This history demonstrates the enduring relevance of anxiety about atomism within copyright policy, highlights countervailing concerns, and provides a framework for thinking about how to alleviate the unfortunate contemporary consequences of atomism—and how not to.