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Prosecuting Federal Crimes in State Courts

May state courts entertain federal criminal prosecutions? Many scholars assume that the answer is “yes.” From the Progressive era to the present, scholars have urged that state courts be allowed to entertain federal criminal prosecutions—prosecutions now within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. These proposals aim to alleviate pressures on the federal courts caused by Congress’s unabated federalization of ostensibly local crimes, by returning many such crimes to local courts for local enforcement. While scholars debate the utility of such proposals, this article focuses on a different and less well explored problem: whether such proposals are constitutional.

A close review of the evidence—including the Constitution’s framing and ratification, the early practices of Congress and the state courts, as well as more modern developments—suggests that there is far less support for the possibility of concurrent state court jurisdiction over federal crimes than is often assumed. In addition to these jurisdictional concerns, doubts would surround the question whether state prosecutors could be compelled or even authorized to exercise federal prosecutorial power, absent compliance with the Constitution’s Appointments and Take Care Clauses. Even assuming such compliance, cross-jurisdictional prosecutions also raise the question whether criminal defendants facing federal charges in state court would enjoy various constitutional protections still applicable only in federal courts, as well as questions respecting the operation of double jeopardy and the location of the pardon power. While the constitutional problems may not be insurmountable, this article concludes that they are sufficiently pervasive and difficult that proposals for state court prosecutions of federal crimes should be rejected.

Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by Dumping Sick Employees?

This Article argues that federal health care reform may induce employers to redesign their health plans to encourage high-risk employees to opt out of employer-provided coverage and instead acquire coverage on the individual market. It shows that such a strategy can reduce employer health care expenditures without substantially harming either high-risk or low-risk employees. Although largely overlooked in public policy debates, employer dumping of high-risk employees may threaten the sustainability of health care reform. In particular, it potentially exposes individual insurance markets and insurance exchanges to adverse selection caused by the entrance of a disproportionately high-risk segment of the population. This risk, in turn, threatens to indirectly increase the cost to the federal government of subsidizing coverage for qualified individuals and to exempt more individuals from complying with the so-called individual mandate. The Article concludes by offering several potential solutions to the threat of employer dumping of high-risk employees.

Original Habeas Redux

In Original Habeas Redux, I map the modern dimensions of the Supreme Court’s most exotic jurisdiction, the original habeas writ. The Court has not issued such relief since 1925 and, until recently, had not ordered a case transferred pursuant to that authority in over fifty years. In August 2009, by transferring a capital prisoner’s original habeas petition to a federal district court rather than dismissing it outright, In re Davisabruptly thrust this obscure power back into mainstream legal debate over both the death penalty and the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. 

Scrambling to understand how the authority has evolved since its nineteenth-century heyday, commentators have been severely limited by the absence of any data reporting the attributes of the original petitions themselves. I have filled that empirical void by collecting and organizing the only modern original habeas data, and this Article presents those results for the first time. The data shows that the vast majority of original petitioners are criminally confined, but that they are not collaterally challenging that confinement in their initial habeas proceedings. Original writ procedure is now primarily a vehicle for litigating “successive” habeas corpus petitions that are otherwise subject to severe jurisdictional limits in the federal courts.

I argue that, in light of the writ’s history and the data I have compiled, Davis is not a blip in an otherwise constant state of original habeas inactivity. I observe that the availability of original habeas relief has historically exhibited two over-arching characteristics: (1) that the Supreme Court’s Article III appellate power to grant it is basically coextensive with Article III judicial power common to all federal courts; and (2) that the Court does not actually exercise that authority when it may avail itself of jurisdictional alternatives. I also present data confirming that the availability of conventional appellate jurisdiction exerts the dominant influence on the modern original habeas docket’s composition. I ultimately advance what I call the “capital safety valve paradigm”—the idea that original habeas should and likely will emerge as a means to ensure that the death penalty is not erroneously imposed.

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