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Confronting and Adapting: Intelligence Agencies and International Law

Intelligence activity is—or, more accurately, was—the last bastion of foreign relations unconstrained by international law. States could steal diplomatic secrets, covertly assess rivals’ military capabilities, and disseminate propaganda inside other states without fear of international legal sanction. This absence of regulation made sense as long as a state’s intelligence activities were primarily directed at foreign states and their officials. However, intelligence activity now implicates private actors as never before, as states engage in bulk data collection, steal secrets from corporations, and expand their focus on non-state actors such as terrorist groups. As a result, some states and advocates are now pressing for a formalist approach to international law, claiming that states should interpret various bodies of existing international law as applicable to state intelligence activities. Others contend that intelligence activities will and should remain untouched by international legal constraint. Both approaches are flawed: The realpolitik view of the (nonexistent) relationship between intelligence and international legal constraints is unsustainable and creates troubling legal black holes. The formalist view fails to acknowledge important reasons why state-on-state intelligence activities are distinct from diplomatic and military actions that states view as constrained by international law.

This Article identifies a better way to mediate the relationship between intelligence and international law. Rather than rejecting international law altogether or, alternatively, imposing a rigid legal framework on intelligence activity, it argues that states should differentiate between international laws that protect individuals against tangible harm (such as international humanitarian law and human rights treaties) and those that protect states against harms that are often dignitary (such as respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity). The Article proposes a sliding interpretive scale whereby states engaged in intelligence activity have less freedom to interpret and apply individually-focused international rules and more freedom to interpret state-protective rules.  It also illustrates how several states have begun to pursue this approach in practice.  Ultimately, this Article argues that states and human rights advocates both must adapt—in different ways—their expectations about the proper role of international law in the world of intelligence operations.

Waiver by Removal? An Analysis of State Sovereign Immunity

The Supreme Court has never definitively outlined the theoretical un- derpinnings of state sovereign immunity. The unresolved circuit split over whether a state waives immunity that it would otherwise retain by removing a case from state court to federal court provides a helpful lens to consider the broader doctrinal strands of state sovereign immunity. Under any conception of sovereign immunity, courts should reject a blanket waiver by removal rule that would require states to give up all immunity upon removal. It is imperative that courts make a distinction between substantive immunity and jurisdictional immunity. Even if removal is sufficient to waive jurisdictional immunity, it should not affect the underlying presence (or absence) of a cause of action. Additionally, courts should be careful to distinguish between personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction aspects of immunity, because the way courts conceive of sovereign immunity can impact how they answer the waiver by removal question. Correspondingly, states must take care to protect their sovereign immunity. Merely forbidding state courts from hearing causes of action brought against a state may not be sufficient to protect state immunity upon removal to federal court. States need to protect their immunity with both substantive and jurisdictional means. 

When Thirteen is (Still) Greater Than Fourteen: The Continued Expansive Scope of Congressional Authority Under the Thirteenth Amendment in a Post-City of Boerne v. Flores World

This Note argues that any disconnect between the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding Congress’s broad power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment and its much narrower power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment does not compel a reduction in the former. Several scholars have observed such tension, and they claim that it requires curbing Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment authority. This Note contends that even if that viewpoint is correct, focusing solely on the disjunction misses fundamental factors that preserve the Thirteenth Amendment as a vibrant font of congressional authority.

This Note grounds its argument in several sources. First, it discusses Congress’s broad authority, under any regime, to legislate against direct violations of the Thirteenth Amendment, and how this authority has gone unutilized. Next, it argues that unlike the Free Exercise Clause context that spawned the famed “congruence and proportionality” test for Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment power, which saw Congress and the Court literally clashing over that provision’s meaning, no such adversarial clash exists over the Thirteenth Amendment. Third, it demonstrates how the Thirteenth Amendment, due to the lack of a state-action requirement, presents fewer federalism problems than its counterpart.

Finally, this Note uses a case study to make the argument come to life. Examining the federal civil remedy for victims of gender-based violence that the Court struck down in United States v. Morrison, in part because it exceeded Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment authority, this Note argues how Congress, even under a congruence and proportionality test, could adopt that same legislation under the Thirteenth Amendment.

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