Equality in criminal sentencing often translates into equalizing outcomes and stamping out variations, whether race-based, geographic, or random. This approach conflates the concept of equality with one contestable conception focused on outputs and numbers, not inputs and processes. Racial equality is crucial, but a concern with eliminating racism has hypertrophied well beyond race. Equalizing outcomes seems appealing as a neutral way to dodge contentious substantive policy debates about the purposes of punishment. But it actually privileges deterrence and incapacitation over rehabilitation, subjective elements of retribution, and procedural justice, and it provides little normative guidance for punishment. It also has unintended consequences for the structure of sentencing. Focusing on outcomes centralizes power and draws it up to higher levels of government, sacrificing the checks and balances, disaggregation, experimentation, and localism that are practically baked into sentencing’s constitutional framework. More flexible, process-oriented notions of equality might better give effect to a range of competing punishment considerations while still policing punishments for bias or arbitrariness. They also could bring useful nuance to equality debates that swirl around restorative justice, California’s Realignment experiment, federal use of fast-track plea agreements, and other contemporary sentencing practices.
The New Antitrust Federalism
“Antitrust federalism,” or the rule that state regulation is not subject to federal antitrust law, does as much as—and perhaps more than—its constitutional cousin to insulate state regulation from wholesale invalidation by the federal government. For most of the last century, the Court quietly tinkered away with the contours of this federalism, struggling to draw a formal boundary between state action (immune from antitrust suits) and private cartels (not). But with the Court’s last three antitrust cases, the tinkering has given way to reformation. What used to be a doctrine with deep roots in constitutional federalism is now a doctrine with close ties to the federal administrative state where courts sit in judgment of an agency’s decision-making procedure.
The new antitrust federalism conditions antitrust immunity not on the fact of state regulation but on the process of that regulation. Now, only regulation created by a politically accountable process is beyond the reach of federal antitrust suits, exposing vast areas of state regulation to new antitrust scrutiny. This Article argues that the new antitrust federalism is an improvement on the old, both because the old boundary model was unworkable and because the new regime addresses the “inherent capture” problems at the heart of modern state regulation. But this Article also warns that if the Court does not give accountability review real bite, it may have to abandon the new antitrust federalism and opt for a nuclear option that could portend the end of antitrust federalism altogether.
Mature Minors, Medical Choice, and the Constitutional Right to Martyrdom
Since the mid-twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court has acted to preserve and define civil rights. When states fail to protect the rights of minority groups, the courts step in by creating constitutional safeguards for minorities, juveniles, and religious objectors. In the context of juvenile rights, the Supreme Court has consistently relied on scientific data to define the rights attributed to people under the age of majority. Since the greater psychological community has accepted that a minor’s cognitive abilities reach a state of maturity around age sixteen, the Supreme Court may be poised to clear up a century-old controversy regarding a minor’s right of self-determination. This Note explores whether a minor can exercise her First Amendment Free Exercise rights to make medical treatment choices.