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Constitutionalism in Unexpected Places

Before, during, and after the ratification of the Federal Constitution of 1787, Americans believed that they were governed under an unwritten constitution, a constitution that described an arrangement of power, confirmed ancient rights, and restricted government action. The existence of this unwritten constitution, and particularly its continuity, is something legal scholars have not adequately understood. Instead, both originalists and scholars of the “living” constitution think of 1787 as a hard break from the past and a starting point for their investigations.

But Americans of the Founding generation did not share our view that the only constitution that mattered was the one the Framers designed. This Article focuses on a feature of American colonial life that reappeared with striking continuity for three generations after Independence—the vindication of unwritten constitutional rights by mob action, and specifically, the tradition of mobs turning to Indian costume to express a specific series of constitutional grievances. During the age of the Revolution, many Americans believed that mobs in the streets performed a legitimate role in the enforcement of their unwritten constitution. These mob actions involved ritualistic violence and consistent, non-linguistic symbolism. The endurance of this form of constitutional engagement, employing the same symbols to assert the same suite of legal claims, is simply astonishing. It is evidence of the tenacity of a series of constitutional commitments predating the Founding that were not encompassed by, or replaced with, a written constitution.

This Article also makes a methodological point. An exclusive focus on official texts and the words, pamphlets, and letters of great men robs historical investigation of its depth and risks missing crucial insights about the past. Important evidence revealing how Americans conceived of their constitution and of themselves as legal actors can be found in their customs, in behavior, in performances in public spaces, and in the life of important ideas in literature and art. This Article focuses on a peculiar phenomenon as a way of modeling this point. The white protestor in Indian costume may seem like an oddity, but a deeper investigation reveals him to be a missing link, a key to how Americans believed their society was constituted, how they thought about justice, and how they understood the obligations the Revolution laid upon its inheritors.

Introduction

What every schoolchild learns about the Boston Tea Party is that a group of men dressed themselves as Indians and dumped tea into the Boston Harbor. If the social studies teacher is good and the child is paying attention, the lesson will also connect those actions to the proto-Revolutionary slogan, “no taxation without representation.” But why do we teach the Boston Tea Party this way? We do not remember what other men were wearing when they did other historically significant things. For this event, however, the choice of costume has always been an integral element of the story. In the 1830s, an old shoemaker looking back on his role in the Tea Party began his recollections of that night this way:

It was now evening, and I immediately dressed myself in the costume of an Indian, equipped with a small hatchet, which I and my associates denominated the tomahawk, with which, and a club, after having painted my face and hands with coal dust in the shop of a blacksmith, I repaired to Griffin’s wharf, where the ships lay that contained the tea. When I first appeared in the street after being thus disguised, I fell in with many who were dressed, equipped and painted as I was, and who fell in with me, and marched in order to the place of our destination.1 1.A Citizen of New York, A Retrospect of the Boston Tea Party, with a Memoir of George R.T. Hewes, a Survivor of the Little Band of Patriots Who Drowned the Tea in Boston Harbour in 1773, at 38 (New York, S.S. Bliss 1834).Show More

A legal scholar reading this should immediately have a few questions. He dressed as an Indian, complete with a symbolic weapon that was not a tomahawk but that he decided to call a tomahawk. He painted his skin, and not just his face in order to disguise himself, but his hands, too. This was a performance meant to express something. If the shoemaker’s recollection is accurate, then the blacksmith from whom he borrowed coal dust would have understood its message and so would all of the men out that night in the streets of Boston. And whether accurate in every detail or not, there is significance in his choice to remember it that way. Those mechanics, artisans, and labor organizers who discovered and elevated this shoemaker in the 1830s as one of the last surviving members of a heroic generation, and who promoted his memoir as part of an elaborate Independence Day commemoration, must have understood the message he conveyed by making Indian costume so central to the story.2 2.See Alfred F. Young, George Robert Twelves Hewes (1742–1840): A Boston Shoemaker and the Memory of the American Revolution, 38 Wm. & Mary Q. 561, 619–20 (1981).Show More They must, in fact, have meant to amplify it. But from this distance of time, we no longer understand it.

Scholars know (or should know) the Boston Tea Party as a legal event. The Tea Party protestors asserted that their constitutional rights had been violated and demanded redress. But what we have failed to appreciate is that the Bostonians believed that their costumes added something to that claim.3 3.For another consideration of the importance and legal significance of clothing in early America, see Laura F. Edwards, James and His Striped Velvet Pantaloons: Textiles, Commerce, and the Law in the New Republic, J. Am. Hist. (forthcoming) (arguing that “[t]extiles . . . mattered” and that “[w]hen draped in this form of property, people of marginal status assumed distinct legal forms that were difficult to ignore”).Show More It is important that Americans dressed up to assert their rights and it is just as important that Americans remembered the costume as integral, although we may not understand why. And the mystery of it grows in importance when we realize that the costume element of the Boston Tea Party demonstration was far from unique to that event. From the 1760s through at least the 1840s, this was a common element in many protests against sheriffs bearing eviction notices or threatening action from a creditor. White Americans would dress up in Indian costume, make up their faces with their idea of Indian war paint, and participate in destructive and sometimes violent demonstrations.

This is a strange fact about the past, and difficult to square with our lionization of that group of ordinary men now ennobled by the title, “the Founding generation.” But this oddity, and others like it, are critical evidence if we are to understand the constitutional ideas and legal imaginations of men of that generation and those that followed. The Boston Tea Party participants thought they were making a constitutional argument and so did the all of the protestors dressing in costume to assert their claims in the decades that followed. But what did “constitution” mean? We are accustomed to using that word in one way before the Founding-era, and in a completely different sense as soon as Americans began writing their plans of government down. But the longevity and apparent power of this protest symbol attests to the endurance of a British North American form of constitutional expression that did not die out at the Founding and that was not successfully replaced by written constitutions for several generations.

Before, during, and after the ratification of the Federal Constitution of 1787, Americans believed that they were governed under an unwritten constitution, a constitution that confirmed ancient rights and that restricted government action. In discussing an “unwritten constitution,” this Article does not draw the distinction that some scholars have between the text of the written Constitution and the policies and principles that underlie it. Nor does it mean to invoke the distinction between the text of the Constitution and the penumbra that has developed around it since. To Americans of the Founding generation, the unwritten constitution was simply the fundamental law: the law of their forefathers, the law justifying their pride in their English heritage, the law that they fought to defend in the Revolution.

The existence of this unwritten constitution, and particularly its continuity, is something legal scholars have not adequately understood.4 4.In discussing the existence of an unwritten constitution at the Founding, I do not take sides in debates over “popular constitutionalism,” the idea that “the public generally should participate in shaping constitutional law more directly.” Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 194 (1999); see also Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1594, 1616 (2005) (reviewing Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (2004)); Larry Kramer, Response, 81 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1173, 1182 (2006); Suzanna Sherry, Putting the Law Back in Constitutional Law, 25 Const. Comment. 461, 462–63 (2009). Those debates focus on how the written Constitution is implemented—and specifically on the role of “the people,” in ensuring it is “properly interpreted.” Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 5–7 (2004). This Article, by contrast, focuses on a separate source of law entirely, an unwritten constitution, and how citizens both understood and enforced it during the Founding period.Show More Originalists have missed its importance because of their focus on the meaning of ratified constitutional text. They believe that the moment of ratification “fixed” constitutional rights and obligations, and that these may be found in the Constitution’s words. The main branches of originalist debate concern where to find the meaning of those words, whether in convention debates or in the ratification debates or elsewhere.5 5.It has become commonplace to remark on the size of the literature on originalism. See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085, 1085 (1989) (systemizing the “voluminous” literature in existence thirty years ago); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2009) (citing Farber and noting the literature’s multi-fold growth in the ensuing twenty years). I cannot convey the nuances of this literature here, but for an overview, see, e.g., Robert W. Bennett & Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Originalism: A Debate (2011). I mention originalism here only to bring out what I see as its undisputed premise: that its goal is to discover the content of a constitution created at a single moment in time—at its “origination.”Show More A premise underlying this view is that Founding-era Americans would have agreed that the written Constitution was the be-all-end-all, at least as far as constitutions go.6 6.See generally Antonin Scalia, Judicial Adherence to the Text of Our Basic Law: A Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, Address at the Catholic University of America (Oct. 18, 1996), transcript available at https://www.proconservative.net/PCVol5Is225ScaliaTheory​ConstlInterpretation.shtml; see also Randy E. Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 Const. Comment. 405, 413 (2007) (“To remain faithful to the Constitution when referring to underlying principles, we must never forget it is a text we are expounding.”).Show More

Non-originalist scholars, on the other hand, have sought to identify values that have come into the Constitution over its two hundred year “life.”7 7.Bruce Ackerman is perhaps the most prominent current theorist of “living constitutionalism.” See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1737 (2007). Bill Eskridge, who has argued that certain “super-statutes” have become so essential that they are now within the “working constitution,” also belongs among the greats. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 Duke L.J. 1215, 1216–17 (2001); see also Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 Yale L.J. 408, 413–14 (2007) (defining the “functional” constitution to include formal practices, norms, and structures of government). My project departs from these now familiar forms of living constitutionalism. It is not about a written Constitution that evolves because it is “alive,” but about a separate and supplementary unwritten constitution that existed before and persisted through the social and legal changes of the 1780s. Some of the values of that unwritten constitution were also reflected in our written Constitution and some of them were not.Show More Building on the concept of a “penumbra” around constitutional terms, these scholars observe that the Constitution’s words have thickened with meaning over time and through their use by an evolving society.8 8.This idea’s scholarly heritage goes back at least to Karl Llewellyn, see K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 28 (1934), and its judicial heritage is arguably much older, see Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 1089, 1092–93 (1997) (arguing that McCulloch v. Maryland is “the quintessential example of penumbral reasoning”).Show More Akhil Amar’s recent book, America’s Unwritten Constitution, is a prime example of this genre: he argues that that through court cases and rights movements, Americans have built interstitial meanings into the Constitution.9 9.Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and Principles We Live By, at ix–xi (2012).Show More But even those scholars start from the premise that all of this development began in 1787.

In short, originalist and non-originalist scholars share a perspective on the written Constitution: that it operated as a hard break.10 10.See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (2015) (explaining that a “core idea[]” of originalist constitutional theory is that “the original meaning . . . of the constitutional text is fixed at the time each provision is framed and ratified”). The originalist shares this focus on that one moment with, for instance, Akhil Amar’s premise in America’s Unwritten Constitution. There, too, the critical question is, “[h]ow can Americans be faithful to a written Constitution”? Amar, supra note 9, at x. The difference between them is the belief that as Americans “venture beyond” the writing, they create what Amar calls an “unwritten Constitution” that “supports and supplements the written Constitution without supplanting it.” See id. at x–xi. This brand of “living constitutionalism” agrees with the premise that the only important American constitution was “born” in 1787 and began to develop from there. It does not address the topic of this Article: a strong heritage of constitutional values that were not included in the text, but that Americans continued to defend as their fundamental rights in the years after 1787.Show More Even when scholars and jurists look back further than the 1780s, they do so largely to learn whether certain terms contained in constitutional text incorporated a pre-existing common law meaning.11 11.See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Time, Institutions, and Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 1745, 1756–57 (2015) (“The Seventh Amendment and the Habeas Corpus Clause have consistently been interpreted in light of the common law as of 1791.”); Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 551, 552 (2006) (“[O]riginalists urge that particular terms and phrases—including ‘law of nations,’ ‘habeas corpus,’ ‘privileges and immunities,’ ‘otherwise re-examined,’ and ‘assistance of counsel’—should be interpreted in light of their connotations under the common law.”); see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 524 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The colonists’ repeated assertions that they maintained the rights, privileges, and immunities of persons ‘born within the realm of England’ and ‘natural born’ persons suggests that, at the time of the founding, the terms ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ (and their counterparts) were understood to refer to those fundamental rights and liberties specifically enjoyed by English citizens and, more broadly, by all persons.”).Show More They do not look back to a constitution that exists separately from our written one. They share a view that whatever American colonial subjects believed a “constitution” was before the Revolution, Americans altered that idea completely once the property-holding gentlemen among them met and decided to write something down.

This Article starts from a different premise: that Americans of the Founding generation did not share our view that the only “constitution” that mattered was the one the Framers designed. Instead, having grown up as Britons, and having lost friends and family in a war to defend their rights as such, they still thought of themselves as the beneficiaries of a constitution of customary right. This is not to deny the importance of the written Constitution, or to dispute that it was significant that the Founders decided to write something down.12 12.See Nikolas Bowie, Why the Constitution Was Written Down, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1397, 1400 (2019).Show More It is only to assert, as does the written Constitution itself, that the Founders did not intend that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution[] of certain rights” would “be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”13 13.U.S. Const. amend. IX.Show More

The way legal scholars ask historical questions has hindered our ability to appreciate the endurance and the continuity of unwritten constitutional­ism. It is common for a legal scholar to plumb the historical record to either confirm or deny a theory about what the Constitution means for us right now. But the archive does not function well as a magic eight ball. The yes/no/maybe/ask again approach to historical research, by fixating on narrow questions about constitutional text, forecloses really interesting questions about what a constitution is.

The problem with the way legal scholars use history is not only the questions we ask, it is also our methodology.14 14.Even a small sampling of the most recent articles doing originalist work reveals the sources they find relevant. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 Stan. L. Rev. 443, 445 (2018) (canvassing legal dictionaries, convention debates, “The Federalist Papers,” and “Correspondence and Writings from Founding-Era Figures”). So closely tied is the project of originalism to these types of sources that there is a secondary literature debating how best to use each of them. See, e.g., Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era to Determine the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 358, 360 (2014); cf. Jennifer L. Mascott, The Dictionary as a Specialized Corpus, 2017 BYU L. Rev. 1557, 1561.Show More As any historian can tell you, going into an archive can be a humbling experience. What one finds in a historical record provides a small window onto the past, through which we can dimly perceive only a part of the action. When a legal scholar goes into the archive with a fixed question in mind, she must dismiss as irrelevant anything that is not responsive, along with anything that she does not understand. But given the very limited view the historical record provides, dismissing any evidence at all risks missing important truths. The puzzles one encounters during primary research are actually the archives’ greatest prizes. Instead of skipping over these to chase after hints in the records that might confirm a favorite hunch or cherished thesis, it is worthwhile to linger on the oddities. Exploring these reveals the past on its own terms, allowing the record to propose its own questions, and suggest its own answers.

This Article is about a protester that I will call the “white Indian,” because that is what this man would have called himself. He emerged again and again from archival research while I was hunting for something else. Wherever conflicts arose over the fairness of a law pitting owners or creditors against renters and debtors, whether in staid newspaper debates or in all-too-frequent armed insurrections, this white man in moccasins, or with a blanket around his shoulders, or with a painted face, or wielding a tomahawk, appeared as the avatar of the honest debtor or the dispossessed squatter. I was so puzzled by him that I stopped what I was doing and gave this recurring figure a closer look. I found that at least two scholarly works had already lingered over white Indians: an elegant short essay by Alan Taylor, written when he was still a graduate student, and a thoughtful full-length intellectual history by Philip Deloria.15 15.Philip J. Deloria, Playing Indian 5 (1998); Alan Taylor, “Stopping the Progres of Rogues and Deceivers”: A White Indian Recruiting Notice of 1808, 42 Wm. & Mary Q. 90, 94 (1985).Show More But given my preoccupations as a legal historian, I read these figures in a different light. I came to understand that they represented a series of interconnected ideas about authentic American identity and virtue.16 16.This Article does not fully explore import of this custom to the history of American racism, or its connections, such as they are, to the blackface tradition. For a cultural history starting point, see Dressing in Feathers: The Construction of the Indian in American Popular Culture 2–3 (S. Elizabeth Bird ed., 1996); Deloria, supra note 15, at 5.Show More And more than this, the Indian dress was a potent legal symbol, both for the people who wore the costume and the people who saw it.

I came to see the white man in Indian dress as an assertion of rights under America’s unwritten constitution. This Article will explain why, and in the process, model an alternative way of bringing history into legal scholarship. To take Americans’ unwritten constitution seriously, one has to see as relevant behaviors, norms, and cultural practices typically invisible to the legal scholar. Scholars parsing and reparsing text, opinions, dictionaries, and the like have missed the unwritten constitution because its defenders often made their claims out of court. My goal is not to resolve the relationship between the unwritten constitution and the written one. My goal is simply to convince you that it exists, to suggest that the relationship between it and the written Constitution is important, and to begin looking for this constitutionalism, which appears more often than not in unexpected places.

This Article proceeds in three parts. First, it explains why this strange artifact, mob action by white men in Indian costume, should be read as an expression of unwritten constitutionalism. Then, it will sound a theory on some of the specific constitutional rights this costume invoked. And finally, it will show how long this form of constitutional expression persisted and discuss some of the implications of this long life for how we should understand our legal past.

  1. * Associate Professor of Law and History, University of Virginia School of Law. I would like to thank Bridget Fahey, Risa Goluboff, Sally Gordon, Hendrik Hartog, Tony Kronman, Bill Nelson, Rich Schragger, and Eugene Sokoloff for helpful comments on an earlier draft. I am also grateful to the participants in the faculty workshop at Georgetown University Law Center and at the University of Pennsylvania School of Law’s Legal History Workshop. ↑
  2. A Citizen of New York, A Retrospect of the Boston Tea Party, with a Memoir of George R.T. Hewes, a Survivor of the Little Band of Patriots Who Drowned the Tea in Boston Harbour in 1773, at 38 (New York, S.S. Bliss 1834). ↑
  3. See Alfred F. Young, George Robert Twelves Hewes (1742–1840): A Boston Shoemaker and the Memory of the American Revolution, 38 Wm. & Mary Q. 561, 619–20 (1981). ↑
  4. For another consideration of the importance and legal significance of clothing in early America, see Laura F. Edwards, James and His Striped Velvet Pantaloons: Textiles, Commerce, and the Law in the New Republic, J. Am. Hist. (forthcoming) (arguing that “[t]extiles . . . mattered” and that “[w]hen draped in this form of property, people of marginal status assumed distinct legal forms that were difficult to ignore”). ↑
  5. In discussing the existence of an unwritten constitution at the Founding, I do not take sides in debates over “popular constitutionalism,” the idea that “the public generally should participate in shaping constitutional law more directly.” Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 194 (1999); see also Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1594, 1616 (2005) (reviewing Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (2004)); Larry Kramer, Response, 81 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1173, 1182 (2006); Suzanna Sherry, Putting the Law Back in Constitutional Law, 25 Const. Comment. 461, 462–63 (2009). Those debates focus on how the written Constitution is implemented—and specifically on the role of “the people,” in ensuring it is “properly interpreted.” Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 5–7 (2004). This Article, by contrast, focuses on a separate source of law entirely, an unwritten constitution, and how citizens both understood and enforced it during the Founding period. ↑
  6. It has become commonplace to remark on the size of the literature on originalism. See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085, 1085 (1989) (systemizing the “voluminous” literature in existence thirty years ago); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2009) (citing Farber and noting the literature’s multi-fold growth in the ensuing twenty years). I cannot convey the nuances of this literature here, but for an overview, see, e.g., Robert W. Bennett & Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Originalism: A Debate (2011). I mention originalism here only to bring out what I see as its undisputed premise: that its goal is to discover the content of a constitution created at a single moment in time—at its “origination.” ↑
  7. See generally Antonin Scalia, Judicial Adherence to the Text of Our Basic Law: A Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, Address at the Catholic University of America (Oct. 18, 1996), transcript available at https://www.proconservative.net/PCVol5Is225ScaliaTheory​ConstlInterpretation.shtml; see also Randy E. Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 Const. Comment. 405, 413 (2007) (“To remain faithful to the Constitution when referring to underlying principles, we must never forget it is a text we are expounding.”). ↑
  8.  Bruce Ackerman is perhaps the most prominent current theorist of “living constitutionalism.” See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1737 (2007). Bill Eskridge, who has argued that certain “super-statutes” have become so essential that they are now within the “working constitution,” also belongs among the greats. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 Duke L.J. 1215, 1216–17 (2001); see also Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 Yale L.J. 408, 413–14 (2007) (defining the “functional” constitution to include formal practices, norms, and structures of government). My project departs from these now familiar forms of living constitutionalism. It is not about a written Constitution that evolves because it is “alive,” but about a separate and supplementary unwritten constitution that existed before and persisted through the social and legal changes of the 1780s. Some of the values of that unwritten constitution were also reflected in our written Constitution and some of them were not. ↑
  9. This idea’s scholarly heritage goes back at least to Karl Llewellyn, see K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 28 (1934), and its judicial heritage is arguably much older, see Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 1089, 1092–93 (1997) (arguing that McCulloch v. Maryland is “the quintessential example of penumbral reasoning”). ↑
  10. Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and Principles We Live By, at ix–xi (2012). ↑
  11. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (2015) (explaining that a “core idea[]” of originalist constitutional theory is that “the original meaning . . . of the constitutional text is fixed at the time each provision is framed and ratified”). The originalist shares this focus on that one moment with, for instance, Akhil Amar’s premise in America’s Unwritten Constitution. There, too, the critical question is, “[h]ow can Americans be faithful to a written Constitution”? Amar, supra note 9, at x. The difference between them is the belief that as Americans “venture beyond” the writing, they create what Amar calls an “unwritten Constitution” that “supports and supplements the written Constitution without supplanting it.” See id. at x–xi. This brand of “living constitutionalism” agrees with the premise that the only important American constitution was “born” in 1787 and began to develop from there. It does not address the topic of this Article: a strong heritage of constitutional values that were not included in the text, but that Americans continued to defend as their fundamental rights in the years after 1787. ↑
  12. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Time, Institutions, and Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 1745, 1756–57 (2015) (“The Seventh Amendment and the Habeas Corpus Clause have consistently been interpreted in light of the common law as of 1791.”); Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 551, 552 (2006) (“[O]riginalists urge that particular terms and phrases—including ‘law of nations,’ ‘habeas corpus,’ ‘privileges and immunities,’ ‘otherwise re-examined,’ and ‘assistance of counsel’—should be interpreted in light of their connotations under the common law.”); see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 524 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The colonists’ repeated assertions that they maintained the rights, privileges, and immunities of persons ‘born within the realm of England’ and ‘natural born’ persons suggests that, at the time of the founding, the terms ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ (and their counterparts) were understood to refer to those fundamental rights and liberties specifically enjoyed by English citizens and, more broadly, by all persons.”). ↑
  13. See Nikolas Bowie, Why the Constitution Was Written Down, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1397, 1400 (2019). ↑
  14. U.S. Const. amend. IX. ↑
  15. Even a small sampling of the most recent articles doing originalist work reveals the sources they find relevant. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 Stan. L. Rev. 443, 445 (2018) (canvassing legal dictionaries, convention debates, “The Federalist Papers,” and “Correspondence and Writings from Founding-Era Figures”). So closely tied is the project of originalism to these types of sources that there is a secondary literature debating how best to use each of them. See, e.g., Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era to Determine the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 358, 360 (2014); cf. Jennifer L. Mascott, The Dictionary as a Specialized Corpus, 2017 BYU L. Rev. 1557, 1561. ↑
  16. Philip J. Deloria, Playing Indian 5 (1998); Alan Taylor, “Stopping the Progres of Rogues and Deceivers”: A White Indian Recruiting Notice of 1808, 42 Wm. & Mary Q. 90, 94 (1985). ↑
  17. This Article does not fully explore import of this custom to the history of American racism, or its connections, such as they are, to the blackface tradition. For a cultural history starting point, see Dressing in Feathers: The Construction of the Indian in American Popular Culture 2–3 (S. Elizabeth Bird ed., 1996); Deloria, supra note 15, at 5. ↑

Redefining the Relationship Between Stone and AEDPA

This Note challenges the current conception of the availability of federal habeas corpus relief for state prisoners claiming a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Since the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Stone v. Powell, federal courts have analyzed Fourth Amendment violations under a different legal regime than that used for other constitutional violations challenged on habeas corpus. This has persisted despite passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which amended the federal habeas corpus statute for state prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Federal courts have largely held that AEDPA has not changed the relationship between Stone’s holding and Section 2254. This Note argues that the current conception of federal habeas corpus review of Fourth Amendment claims is fundamentally inconsistent and asserts that the AEDPA standard should be applied to Fourth Amendment claims brought by state prisoners.

Introduction

On June 17, 2013, the Baton Rouge Police Department received an unconfirmed anonymous tip that Cedric Spears was trafficking cocaine and in possession of a firearm in his home.1 1.Spears v. Vannoy(Spears I), Civ. No. 15-495-SDD-RLB, 2018 WL 2423017, *1 (M.D. La. Apr. 30, 2018).Show More Two police officers obtained Spears’s criminal history, confirmed only that he was a convicted felon, and, without a warrant, proceeded to his apartment complex.2 2.Id.Show More The officers waited in the parking lot until just before midnight to approach the apartment, when, coincidentally, Spears opened the door.3 3.Id.Show More The officers spotted a gun in his apartment.4 4.Id.Show More After officers gathered Spears and the apartment’s other occupants into a central location and patted them down, Spears was handcuffed and read his rights.5 5.Id.Show More

Spears admitted to owning the gun.6 6.Id.Show More On November 4, 2013, he was convicted on one count of felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to eighteen years of hard labor without benefit or probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.7 7.Id.Show More Spears filed a pro se appeal to the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the First Circuit, arguing that the trial court wrongly denied his motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the illegal warrantless search.8 8.Id.Show More His appeal was denied.9 9.Id.Show More He then petitioned for supervisory review in the Louisiana Supreme Court.10 10.Id.Show More His petition was denied.11 11.Id.Show More Spears then filed a pro se petition for federal habeas corpus relief in the Middle District of Louisiana.12 12.Id.Show More This petition was denied, as well.13 13.Spears v. Vannoy(Spears II), Civ. No. 15-495-SDD-RLB, 2018 WL 2422749, *1 (M.D. La. May 29, 2018) (adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation).Show More

In denying Spears’s habeas petition, the federal court simply stated that Fourth Amendment violations are “generally not cognizable on federal habeas review.”14 14.Spears I,2018 WL 2423017, at *2.Show More This categorical denial is based on the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in Stone v. Powell,15 15.428 U.S. 465 (1976).Show More which held that a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief based on a Fourth Amendment violation “where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of [that] Fourth Amendment claim.”16 16.Id. at 482, 494.Show More Despite Spears’s claim of a “defective warrant”—or lack of a warrant—the court held that the Fifth Circuit only requires the trial court to provide “an opportunity” to litigate one’s claim, nothing further.17 17.Spears I, 2018 WL 2423017, at *2–3.Show More A mere opportunity to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim in state court is all that is required for a federal court to refuse to even consider a state prisoner’s habeas petition.18 18.Id.at *2 (citing Carver v. Alabama, 577 F.2d 1188, 1192 (5th Cir. 1978)).Show More In Spears’s case, the federal district court went on to deny him a certificate of appealability, terminating his one remaining option.19 19.Spears v. Vannoy(Spears II), Civ. No. 15-495-SDD-RLB, 2018 WL 2422749, *1 (M.D. La. May 29, 2018).Show More Despite no search warrant and arguably no probable cause to approach the house, Cedric Spears was searched, tried, convicted, and sentenced to eighteen years in prison.20 20.Spears I,2018 WL 2423017, at *1, *3–4.Show More And the federal court would not even entertain his petition for habeas corpus.

As displayed in Spears’s case, federal courts currently hold Stone v. Powell to be controlling when state prisoners allege a Fourth Amendment violation on habeas. All other constitutional violations, on the other hand, are adjudicated under a different standard provided by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).21 21.Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1218. AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the sole statute governing habeas corpus review for state prisoners; thus, “the AEDPA standard” refers to the standard of review enacted as a result of the passage of AEDPA and is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).Show More The two regimes have at least one primary difference. While Stone restricts the cognizance of such habeas petitions, AEDPA at least allows federal courts to review the petitioner’s claim. Fourth Amendment violations are the only constitutional violations not litigated under the AEDPA standard. Therefore, if Spears was alleging a due process violation or bringing a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, his case would at least have been heard by a federal court rather than dismissed as not cognizable.

This Note argues that the current approach adopted by the federal courts is incorrect in light of AEDPA. Instead of looking to Stone for guidance, federal courts should adopt the AEDPA standard for habeas review in the context of alleged Fourth Amendment violations. This presents a rare opportunity to right the current course of the federal courts. With this approach, federal courts would treat Fourth Amendment violations the same as every other constitutional violation with respect to federal habeas petitions, instead of relegating Fourth Amendment claims to a lower tier.

Adopting the AEDPA standard will provide four primary benefits. First, this change will simplify the process for state prisoners. This is especially important for those representing themselves pro se, like Cedric Spears. Holding alleged Fourth Amendment violations to a different standard than all other constitutional harms only further complicates an already complex area of law that affects many criminal defendants.22 22.According to a study funded by the United States Department of Justice, state prisoners file about 16,000 to 18,000 habeas petitions every year. Unfortunately, a breakdown by constitutional violation is not available. See Nancy J. King et al., Habeas Corpus Litigation in United States District Courts: An Empirical Study, 2000–2006, at ii, iv (2013), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR21200.v1 [https://perma.cc/Z7RS-AECM].Show More Second, it would resolve a split among the federal circuits as to how to interpret the meaning of the Court’s language in Stone, and thereby create a uniform, national standard of review. A uniform, national standard is vitally important because where one’s claim is brought should not determine whether that state prisoner has access to federal habeas review. Third, adopting the AEDPA standard will allow state prisoners to actually have their federal habeas petitions reviewed, rather than denied without consideration, as Spears’s was. As a matter of procedural justice, all habeas petitioners deserve the right to be heard, regardless of the nature of their claim. Litigants, especially pro se litigants, can use this Note as a roadmap to challenge the current legal regime and, hopefully, have their petitions heard by the federal courts.

Finally, adopting this approach will allow any future statutory reform to current habeas corpus law to include claims alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment, rather than continue to leave them behind. Fourth Amendment violations are treated differently than all other constitutional violations. While all other constitutional violations are governed by AEDPA, Fourth Amendment violations are treated as outside the statutory scheme. Adopting this approach, however, brings Fourth Amendment violations back into the fold of AEDPA alongside all other constitutional violations. If federal courts continue to treat Fourth Amendment violations as outside of the AEDPA statutory scheme,23 23.See infra Part III.Show More then future habeas reform will not affect habeas petitions alleging Fourth Amendment violations. Thus, if the language of AEDPA is amended, under this proposed approach, the statutory reform would not further widen the gap between how Fourth Amendment claims are treated and how all other constitutional claims are treated.

As explained below, the two regimes—review under AEDPA and review under Stone—currently produce similar outcomes;24 24.See infra Section II.C, Part III.Show More however, future changes to the AEDPA standard could yield different outcomes for Fourth Amendment violations and all other constitutional violations. Adopting the AEDPA standard will have truly tangible benefits to defendants, practitioners, and judges even if it may not have an enormous impact on the number of federal habeas petitions ultimately granted for state prisoners.25 25.See infra Part III.Show More As one commentator has put it, habeas corpus has played an “important role . . . as a postconviction remedy” and has the “unique nature and suitability . . . to bring about transformative change.”26 26.LeRoy Pernell, Racial Justice and Federal Habeas Corpus as Postconviction Relief from State Convictions,69 Mercer L. Rev. 453, 453 (2018).Show More

Surprisingly, despite the significant academic attention dedicated to federal habeas corpus, little attention has been focused on the collateral review of alleged Fourth Amendment violations. Much of the post-AEDPA academic literature identifies and defines the standard set forth in AEDPA,27 27.See e.g.,John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and The “Bite,” 91 Cornell L. Rev. 259, 272–73 (2006); Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the Federal Habeas Statute: Is It Beyond Reason?, 56 Hastings L.J. 283, 283 (2004); Adam N. Steinman, Reconceptualizing Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: How Should AEDPA’s Standard of Review Operate After Williams v. Taylor?, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 1493, 1495.Show More further defines the standard set forth in Stone independent from AEDPA, 28 28.See e.g.,Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather Than the Result, 69 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 85, 141 (2012); Justin F. Marceau, Don’t Forget Due Process: The Path Not (Yet) Taken in § 2254 Habeas Corpus Adjudications, 62 Hastings L.J. 1, 17, 26–27 (2010).Show More or argues for an overhaul of the current federal habeas system altogether.29 29.See e.g.,Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 791, 797 (2009).Show More Some of the nation’s leading federal courts textbooks do not even specifically address this issue.30 30.See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett & Lee Kovarsky, Federal Habeas Corpus: Executive Detention and Post-Conviction Litigation 141–50 (2013) (failing to discuss the issue); Peter W. Low et al., Federal Courts and the Law of Federal-State Relations 966 (9th ed. 2018)(speculating only that AEDPA “may have introduced a subtle but not fundamental change in the meaning of Stone v. Powell”).Show More

Only one scholar has touched on the relationship between Stone and AEDPA. In a 2006 article, Professor Steven Semeraro argued that the historical changes in the treatment of the exclusionary rule, which is the primary vehicle by which courts remedy Fourth Amendment violations, coupled with the changes to habeas practice generally, require that Stone be overruled.31 31.Steven Semeraro, Enforcing Fourth Amendment Rights Through Federal Habeas Corpus, 58 Rutgers L. Rev. 983, 1016–18 (2006). Professor Semeraro also notes that “there has been remarkably little historical analysis directed at the judicial treatment of collateral search-and-seizure claims.” Id. at 984–85.Show More Professor Semeraro’s argument is primarily focused on Stone’s deficiencies in modern litigation and the reasons that decision should be overturned rather than, as this Note argues, the reasons why AEDPA specifically should replace it.32 32.See id. at 986.Show More This Note examines the various possible solutions to reconciling the language of Stone with the text of AEDPA and argues for a clear, simple, statutory text-based rule for the federal courts to follow.

Part II of this Note reviews the legal history of the availability of habeas corpus relief for violations of the Fourth Amendment. It summarizes the evolution of federal habeas corpus law from the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Brown v. Allen,33 33.344 U.S. 443 (1953).Show More to its Fourth Amendment carve out in Stone v. Powell, to the enactment of AEDPA. Part III describes the current approach taken to federal habeas petitions brought by state prisoners alleging a violation of the Fourth Amendment and why there is a need for change. Part IV analyzes two possible solutions to reconciling the standard set forth by AEDPA with the Stone decision. Finally, Part V proposes that federal district courts adopt a third solution and hold that the AEDPA standard replace Stone’s framework with respect to Fourth Amendment claims going forward.

  1. * J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, 2019. I would like to extend a special thanks to Professor Peter W. Low for supervising my research, for without his help, this would not be possible. Thanks are also owed to Olivia Vaden, Zachary Ingber, Spencer Ryan, and Jessie Michelin for their helpful feedback and unwavering support throughout this process. ↑

  2. Spears v. Vannoy (Spears I), Civ. No. 15-495-SDD-RLB, 2018 WL 2423017, *1 (M.D. La. Apr. 30, 2018). ↑
  3. Id. ↑
  4. Id. ↑
  5. Id. ↑
  6. Id. ↑
  7. Id. ↑
  8. Id. ↑
  9. Id. ↑
  10. Id. ↑
  11. Id. ↑
  12. Id. ↑
  13. Id. ↑
  14. Spears v. Vannoy (Spears II), Civ. No. 15-495-SDD-RLB, 2018 WL 2422749, *1 (M.D. La. May 29, 2018) (adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). ↑
  15. Spears I, 2018 WL 2423017, at *2. ↑
  16. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). ↑
  17. Id. at 482, 494. ↑
  18. Spears I, 2018 WL 2423017, at *2–3. ↑
  19. Id. at *2 (citing Carver v. Alabama, 577 F.2d 1188, 1192 (5th Cir. 1978)). ↑
  20. Spears v. Vannoy (Spears II), Civ. No. 15-495-SDD-RLB, 2018 WL 2422749, *1 (M.D. La. May 29, 2018). ↑
  21. Spears I, 2018 WL 2423017, at *1, *3–4. ↑
  22. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1218. AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the sole statute governing habeas corpus review for state prisoners; thus, “the AEDPA standard” refers to the standard of review enacted as a result of the passage of AEDPA and is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). ↑
  23. According to a study funded by the United States Department of Justice, state prisoners file about 16,000 to 18,000 habeas petitions every year. Unfortunately, a breakdown by constitutional violation is not available. See Nancy J. King et al., Habeas Corpus Litigation in United States District Courts: An Empirical Study
    , 2000–2006,

    at ii, iv (2013), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR21200.v1 [https://perma.cc/Z7RS-AECM]. ↑

  24. See infra Part III. ↑
  25. See infra Section II.C, Part III. ↑
  26. See infra Part III. ↑
  27. LeRoy Pernell, Racial Justice and Federal Habeas Corpus as Postconviction Relief from State Convictions
    ,
    69

    Mercer L. Rev.

    453

    , 453 (2018). ↑

  28. See e.g., John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and The “Bite,” 91 Cornell L. Rev. 259, 272–73 (2006); Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the Federal Habeas Statute: Is It Beyond Reason?, 56 Hastings L.J. 283, 283 (2004); Adam N. Steinman, Reconceptualizing Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: How Should AEDPA’s Standard of Review Operate After Williams v. Taylor?, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 1493, 1495. ↑
  29. See e.g., Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather Than the Result, 69 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 85, 141 (2012); Justin F. Marceau, Don’t Forget Due Process: The Path Not (Yet) Taken in § 2254 Habeas Corpus Adjudications, 62 Hastings L.J. 1, 17, 26–27 (2010). ↑
  30. See e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 791, 797 (2009). ↑
  31. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett & Lee Kovarsky, Federal Habeas Corpus: Executive Detention and Post-Conviction Litigation
    141–50

    (2013) (failing to discuss the issue); Peter W. Low et al., Federal Courts and the Law of Federal-State Relations

    966

    (9th ed. 2018) (speculating only that AEDPA “may have introduced a subtle but not fundamental change in the meaning of Stone v. Powell”). ↑

  32. Steven Semeraro, Enforcing Fourth Amendment Rights Through Federal Habeas Corpus,
    58

    Rutgers L. Rev. 983, 1016–18 (2006). Professor Semeraro also notes that “there has been remarkably little historical analysis directed at the judicial treatment of collateral search-and-seizure claims.” Id. at 984–85. ↑

  33. See id. at 986. ↑
  34. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). ↑

The New Gatekeepers: Private Firms as Public Enforcers

The world’s largest businesses must routinely police other businesses. By public mandate, Facebook monitors app developers’ privacy safeguards, Citibank audits call centers for deceptive sales practices, and Exxon reviews offshore oil platforms’ environmental standards. Scholars have devoted significant attention to how policy makers deploy other private sector enforcers, such as certification bodies, accountants, lawyers, and other periphery “gatekeepers.” However, the literature has paid insufficient attention to the emerging regulatory conscription of large firms at the center of the economy. This Article examines the rise of the enforcer-firm through case studies of the industries that are home to the most valuable companies in technology, banking, oil, and pharmaceuticals. Over the past two decades, administrative agencies have used legal rules, guidance documents, and court orders to mandate that private firms in these and other industries perform the duties of a public regulator. More specifically, firms must write rules in their contracts that reserve the right to inspect third parties. When they find violations, they must pressure or punish the wrongdoer. This form of governance has important intellectual and policy implications. It imposes more of a public duty on the firm, alters corporate governance, and may even reshape business organizations. It also gives resource-strapped regulators promising tools. If designed poorly, however, the enforcer-firm will create an expansive area of unaccountable authority. Any comprehensive account of the firm or regulation must give a prominent role to the administrative state’s newest gatekeepers.

Introduction

In 2018, Facebook Chairman and CEO Mark Zuckerberg faced senators on national television regarding conduct that prompted the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to seek its largest ever fine.1 1.Cecilia Kang, A Facebook Settlement with the F.T.C. Could Run into the Billions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 2019, at B6.Show More The main issue was not what Facebook did directly to its users. Instead, the hearing focused on the social network’s failure to restrain third parties. Most notably, the political consulting firm Cambridge Analytica had accessed millions of users’ accounts in an effort to support election candidates.2 2.Katy Steinmetz, Mark Zuckerberg Survived Congress. Now Facebook Has to Survive the FTC, Time (Apr. 13, 2018, 12:42 PM), https://time.com/5237900/facebook-ftc-privacy-data-cambridge-analytica/ [https://perma.cc/4SJJ-YHP9].Show More Before Zuckerberg’s Senate testimony, the FTC had already sued Google and Amazon to force them to monitor third parties for privacy violations and in-app video game purchases by children that sometimes reached in the thousands of dollars.3 3.See FTC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C14-1038-JCC, 2016 WL 10654030, at *8 (W.D. Wash. July 22, 2016) (finding Amazon accountable for in-app charges); Agreement Containing Consent Order at 5, Google Inc., No. 102-3136, (F.T.C. Mar. 30, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/03/110330googlebuzzagreeorder.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R6W-5VNP] (ordering Google to require “service providers by contract to implement and maintain appropriate privacy protections”).Show More In other words, the FTC is requiring large technology companies to act in ways traditionally associated with public regulators—by policing other businesses for legal violations.

Over time, policy makers have enlisted a large array of private actors in their quest for optimal regulatory design.4 4.See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 Duke L.J. 377, 453 (2006) (conceiving of regulators’ decisions to let regulated entities fill in vague mandates as delegation); Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 Law & Soc’y Rev. 691, 691, 726 (2003) (describing the “intertwining of the public and private sectors”); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 549–56 (2000) (surveying the great diversity of private governance actors); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1367, 1369 (2003) (conceiving of privatization of health care, welfare provision, prisons, and public education as delegation); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1229, 1237–42 (2003) (exploring implications of privatization for public values).Show More Scholarship on the private role in public governance has focused on third-party enforcers whose main function is to provide a support service. Those enforcers include self-regulatory organizations formed by industry and independent auditors mandated by regulators.5 5.See Bamberger, supra note 4, at 452–58; Freeman, supra note 4, at 635, 644. As another example, in policing stock exchanges, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) relies heavily on self-regulatory organizations to monitor wrongdoing and propose rules. Jennifer M. Pacella, If the Shoe of the SEC Doesn’t Fit: Self-Regulatory Organizations and Absolute Immunity, 58 Wayne L. Rev. 201, 202 (2012). Courts also order third-party monitors. See Veronica Root, The Monitor-“Client” Relationship, 100 Va. L. Rev. 523, 531–33 (2014).Show More The corporate law strand of this enforcement literature emphasizes a network of “gatekeepers,” such as lawyers, accountants, and certifiers who guard against compliance and governance failures.6 6.See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance 2–3 (2006) (chronicling the evolution of auditors, attorneys, securities analysts, and credit-rating agencies in guarding against corporate governance failures); Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 53, 117–18 (2003) (discussing the need to expand gatekeeper liability in the wake of the Enron fraud scandal); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 53, 54 (1986) (contrasting whistleblowers with gatekeepers, who are third parties that can “prevent misconduct by withholding support”).Show More For instance, before releasing annual reports, a publicly traded company must obtain the signoff of a certified accountant.7 7.15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2018) (“Every issuer of a security . . . shall file with the Commission . . . such annual reports (and such copies thereof), certified if required by the rules and regulations of the Commission by independent public accountants . . . .”).Show More In these more familiar private enforcement contexts, the private “cops on the beat”8 8.Kraakman, supra note 6, at 53 n.1 (attributing to Jeremy Bentham the “cop-on-the-beat” metaphor and using it to describe gatekeepers).Show More are ancillary actors rather than core market participants.9 9.The literature has also extensively analyzed self-regulation as part of a broader new governance that arose in recent decades. Administrative agencies now pursue collaborative and responsive models of public governance designed to encourage the business sector to self-regulate. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 3 (1992); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (1997). Additionally, large businesses have dramatically grown their compliance departments to police the firm from within. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2075, 2077 (2016); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 571, 572 (2005); Veronica Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 Cornell L. Rev. 1003, 1004 (2017). This important and nascent literature on corporate compliance has remained focused on the firm’s role in overseeing internal operations, or on traditional gatekeepers doing so.Show More

This Article demonstrates how policymakers have enlisted a new class of more powerful third-party enforcers: the businesses at the heart of the economy. The ten largest American companies by valuation operate in information technology, finance, oil, and pharmaceuticals.10 10.Fortune 500 List, Fortune (last visited Oct. 18, 2019), http://fortune.com/fortune­500/list/filtered?sortBy=mktval (identifying the ten most valuable American companies as Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway, Facebook, JPMorgan Chase, Johnson & Johnson, Exxon Mobil, and Bank of America). One of these companies, Berkshire Hathaway, is a conglomerate operating in diverse industries, including finance, while Johnson & Johnson sells pharmaceuticals in addition to consumer goods. Berkshire Hathaway, Fortune (updated Mar. 29, 2018), https://fortune.com/fortune500/2018/berkshire-hathaway/; Johnson & Johnson, Fortune (updated Mar. 29, 2018), https://fortune.com/fortune500/2018/johnson-johnson/.Show More A regulator has put leading firms in each of these industries on notice about their responsibilities for third-party oversight.11 11.See infra Part II.Show More In addition to the FTC, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—along with the Department of Justice (DOJ)—requires BP Oil and other energy companies to audit offshore oil platform operators for environmental compliance.12 12.Consent Decree Among Defendant BP Exploration & Production Inc., the United States of America, and the States of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas at 32–33, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 5, 2015), ECF No. 15436-1 [hereinafter BP Consent Decree].Show More The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) expects Pfizer and other drug companies to ensure suppliers and third-party labs follow the agency’s health and safety guidelines.13 13.21 C.F.R. § 211.22(a) (2018) (explaining best practices for quality control of contractors); FDA Warning Letter from Cheryl A. Bigham, Dist. Dir., Kan. City Dist., Office of Regulatory Affairs, to Thomas Handel, President & Gen. Manager, Meridian Med. Techs., Inc., a Pfizer Co. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/iceci/enforcementactions/warningletters/2017/ucm­574981.htm [https://perma.cc/JMX9-V7VL].Show More The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) orders financial institutions, such as American Express, to monitor independent debt collectors and call centers for deceptive practices.14 14.Am. Express Centurion Bank, CFPB No. 2012-CFPB-0002 (Oct. 1, 2012) (joint consent order).Show More

The widespread conscription of businesses as enforcers—also called “enforcer-firms” below—shares characteristics with, but differs meaningfully from, prior iterations of third-party regulation. For instance, the FTC’s original administrative order required Facebook to hire a third-party auditor—an example of the old gatekeeper model—to certify Facebook’s compliance.15 15.Facebook, Inc., FTC File No. 0923184, No. C-4365, at 3–4 (F.T.C. July 27, 2012) (decision and order).Show More In that arrangement, refusing to sign off on Facebook’s biennial reports to the FTC constituted the auditor’s main sanction.16 16.See id. at 6.Show More Facebook could, however, respond to that sanction by bringing its business elsewhere.17 17.The consent order does not prevent such a response. See id.Show More That ability to retaliate weakens traditional gatekeepers’ power and independence.18 18.See Joel S. Demski, Corporate Conflicts of Interest, 17 J. Econ. Persp. 51, 57 (2003).Show More

In contrast, the enforcer-firm is usually the client—or at least a crucial business partner—of the third parties it regulates. Its main sanction is to cease doing business with those third parties, which can prove devastating.19 19.See infra Section IV.A.Show More The client relationship that weakens traditional gatekeepers thus strengthens the enforcer-firm. In short, policymakers have begun relying on third-party enforcement by the real gatekeepers of the economy: the firms who control access to core product markets.20 20.A diversified firm may play both a new and traditional gatekeeper role. For instance, by allowing a company to serve as both a commercial bank and investment bank, the law enables large financial institutions to operate as both traditional gatekeepers—overseeing their clients by underwriting securities, prompted by liability avoidance under the Securities Act of 1933—and as new gatekeepers, being the clients who hire third-party businesses. See infraSection II.A; Kraakman, supranote 6, at 82–83.Show More

In highlighting an overlooked enforcement model, this Article builds on the literature scrutinizing the increasingly narrow divide between private businesses and the administrative state.21 21.See supra note 4 and accompanying text.Show More Although that scholarship has yet to examine the enforcer-firm in any sustained manner,22 22.To the extent scholars have discussed mandated third-party governance it has been in passing or in narrower contexts such as in criminal or international law. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing Corporate Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 327, 433–34 (2004) (referencing how the Bank Secrecy Act causes a larger number of businesses to become “part of the network of the state’s eyes and ears”); John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies, 34 World Dev. 884, 889–90 (2006) (exploring how domestic firms can serve as a means of reaching foreign actors); Stavros Gadinis & Colby Mangels, Collaborative Gatekeepers, 73 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 797, 910–11 (2016) (focusing on money laundering); Itai Grinberg, The Battle over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 304, 304 (2012) (referencing a “growing consensus that financial institutions should act as cross-border tax intermediaries”). For other ways that scholars have recognized that businesses regulate other firms, see infra Part I.Show More mandated third-party governance raises some similar accountability issues as previous generations of third-party enforcement. In particular, as a new area of quasi-regulatory activity unlikely to be overturned by judicial review, conscripted enforcement lacks transparency and traditional measures of public involvement, such as notice and comment rulemaking.23 23.See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1129, 1130 (2016) (“Most aspects of agency enforcement policy generally escape judicial review.”); Freeman, supra note 4, at 647 (“Most self-regulatory programs lack the transparency and public involvement that characterize legislative rulemaking.”); Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 3–4 (2012) (identifying accountability challenges with third-party enforcement models).Show More

However, if designed well, the enforcer-firm offers some hope for improving upon prior regulatory models’ accountability. Because enforcer-firms often sell directly to consumers, they may prove more responsive to public concerns when compared to traditional gatekeepers, which interact most closely with regulated entities.24 24.See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 6, at 15–18 (describing gatekeeper shortcomings).Show More And because the enforcer-firm is itself a prime target of public regulation, it would be easier for an administrative agency to oversee it than to add a whole new category of firms as required for oversight of traditional gatekeepers.25 25.See infra Section IV.B.Show More The conscription of businesses proved crucial in other administrative contexts, including the implementation of a personal income tax.26 26.Ajay K. Mehrotra, Making the Modern American Fiscal State: Law, Politics, and the Rise of Progressive Taxation, 1877–1929, at 282–83 (2013).Show More The enforcer-firm could, by analogy, enable the regulatory state to bring dispersed business actors into compliance.

None of this should be taken as an endorsement of the enforcer-firm, which is too new and understudied to yield strong normative conclusions. However, an openness to the upsides of the enforcer-firm responds to the critique that administrative law scholars have too often portrayed private actors as an intrusion into legitimacy, which prevents “imagining the means by which private actors might contribute to accountability.”27 27.Freeman, supra note 4, at 675. Numerous scholars have taken up this call in other contexts. See, e.g., Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 137, 139–41 (2019) (calling for a holistic view of corporations’ role in promoting environmental goals).Show More

Mandated third-party governance also speaks to vibrant corporate law inquiries. Scholars have paid considerable attention to the duties of directors and officers, personal liability for corporate wrongdoing, and organizational structure.28 28.See generally Nicolai J. Foss et al., The Theory of the Firm, in 3 Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 631 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000); infra Part III.Show More Conscripted enforcement shapes each of these areas and pushes against depictions of the firm emphasizing its private nature. Those depictions are rooted in the influential metaphor—sometimes described as the most dominant theory of the firm—that the firm is a “nexus of contracts” among owners, managers, laborers, suppliers, and customers.29 29.See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. Corp. L. 819, 820 (1999); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 310 (1976); Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 26 (2016).Show More The firm remains exceedingly private. But by directing businesses to write enforcement-oriented contract clauses and monitor external relationships for legal violations, as a descriptive matter the state is pushing the firm toward a larger public role.30 30.See infra Section III.A.Show More

That insight is relevant beyond theory and institutional design. In the highest legislative circles and corporate boardrooms, debates are unfolding about what duties corporations owe to society, with some taking particular aim at the idea that shareholders should come above all other stakeholders.31 31.See Elizabeth Warren, Companies Shouldn’t Be Accountable Only to Shareholders, Wall St. J., Aug. 15, 2018, at A17; Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, BlackRock, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fin­k-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/P9X6-HN85] (last visited Jan. 13, 2020); Martin Lipton et al., It’s Time to Adopt the New Paradigm, Harv. L. Sch. F. Corp. Governance, https://corpgov.­law.harvard.edu/2019/02/11/its-time-to-adopt-the-new-paradigm [https://perma.cc/3XH9-SSRS] (last visited Jan. 13, 2020); Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans,’ Business Roundtable (Aug. 19, 2019), [https://perma.cc/9K2F-2HLG]. On shareholder primacy, see infra note 189 and accompanying text.Show More Conscripted enforcement marks a significant uptick in federal regulatory involvement in the firm by imposing more of an affirmative public duty to act.32 32.See infra Section III.D.Show More Cast against the backdrop of the firm as public enforcer, calls for business leaders to do more for society appear less disconnected from reality than would be the case under a largely private conception of the firm.33 33.There is arguably a gap between rhetoric and reality. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 1997, 2042 (2014).Show More

The Article is structured as follows. Part I provides an overview of the well-studied ways that private entities serve as enforcers. Part II offers four case studies of how regulators have implemented mandated enforcement of third parties in some of the largest U.S. industries: the FTC and technology, the CFPB and banking, the EPA and oil, and the FDA and pharmaceuticals. Part III examines how mandated enforcement alters the firm’s contracts, relationships, and governance. It also explores shifts in liability at the personal and entity level, which could influence organizational structure. Part IV concludes by considering implications for the effectiveness and accountability of the administrative state.

  1. * Associate Professor of Law, Boston University; Affiliated Fellow, Yale Law School Information Society Project. For extremely valuable input, I am grateful to Hilary Allen, William Eskridge, George Geis, Anna Gelpern, Jonathan Lipson, Nicholas Parrillo, Carla Reyes, Kevin Schwartz, Andrew Tuch, Michael Vandenbergh, David Walker, and Jay Wexler, and to workshop participants at Boston University, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Virginia, and Yale ISP. Special thanks to Eric Talley for unusually formative early comments. Jacob Axelrod, Sam Burgess, Omeed Firoozgan, Christopher Hamilton, Allison Mcsorley, Tyler Stites, Kelsey Sullivan, and Gavin Tullis provided excellent research assistance. The Virginia Law Review editors, and particularly Mark Russell, were tremendously thorough and helpful throughout. ↑
  2. Cecilia Kang, A Facebook Settlement with the F.T.C. Could Run into the Billions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 2019, at B6. ↑
  3. Katy Steinmetz, Mark Zuckerberg Survived Congress. Now Facebook Has to Survive the FTC, Time (Apr. 13, 2018, 12:42 PM), https://time.com/5237900/facebook-ftc-privacy-data-cambridge-analytica/ [https://perma.cc/4SJJ-YHP9]. ↑
  4. See FTC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C14-1038-JCC, 2016 WL 10654030, at *8 (W.D. Wash. July 22, 2016) (finding Amazon accountable for in-app charges); Agreement Containing Consent Order at 5, Google Inc., No. 102-3136, (F.T.C. Mar. 30, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/03/110330googlebuzzagreeorder.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R6W-5VNP] (ordering Google to require “service providers by contract to implement and maintain appropriate privacy protections”). ↑
  5. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 Duke L.J. 377, 453 (2006) (conceiving of regulators’ decisions to let regulated entities fill in vague mandates as delegation); Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 Law & Soc’y Rev. 691, 691, 726 (2003) (describing the “intertwining of the public and private sectors”); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 549–56 (2000) (surveying the great diversity of private governance actors); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1367, 1369 (2003) (conceiving of privatization of health care, welfare provision, prisons, and public education as delegation); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1229, 1237–42 (2003) (exploring implications of privatization for public values). ↑
  6. See Bamberger, supra note 4, at 452–58; Freeman, supra note 4, at 635, 644. As another example, in policing stock exchanges, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) relies heavily on self-regulatory organizations to monitor wrongdoing and propose rules. Jennifer M. Pacella, If the Shoe of the SEC Doesn’t Fit: Self-Regulatory Organizations and Absolute Immunity, 58 Wayne L. Rev. 201, 202 (2012). Courts also order third-party monitors. See Veronica Root, The Monitor-“Client” Relationship, 100 Va. L. Rev. 523, 531–33 (2014). ↑
  7. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance 2–3 (2006) (chronicling the evolution of auditors, attorneys, securities analysts, and credit-rating agencies in guarding against corporate governance failures); Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 53, 117–18 (2003) (discussing the need to expand gatekeeper liability in the wake of the Enron fraud scandal); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 53, 54 (1986) (contrasting whistleblowers with gatekeepers, who are third parties that can “prevent misconduct by withholding support”). ↑
  8. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2018) (“Every issuer of a security . . . shall file with the Commission . . . such annual reports (and such copies thereof), certified if required by the rules and regulations of the Commission by independent public accountants . . . .”). ↑
  9. Kraakman, supra note 6, at 53 n.1 (attributing to Jeremy Bentham the “cop-on-the-beat” metaphor and using it to describe gatekeepers). ↑
  10. The literature has also extensively analyzed self-regulation as part of a broader new governance that arose in recent decades. Administrative agencies now pursue collaborative and responsive models of public governance designed to encourage the business sector to self-regulate. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 3 (1992); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (1997). Additionally, large businesses have dramatically grown their compliance departments to police the firm from within. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2075, 2077 (2016); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 571, 572 (2005); Veronica Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 Cornell L. Rev. 1003, 1004 (2017). This important and nascent literature on corporate compliance has remained focused on the firm’s role in overseeing internal operations, or on traditional gatekeepers doing so. ↑
  11. Fortune 500 List, Fortune (last visited Oct. 18, 2019), http://fortune.com/fortune­500/list/filtered?sortBy=mktval (identifying the ten most valuable American companies as Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway, Facebook, JPMorgan Chase, Johnson & Johnson, Exxon Mobil, and Bank of America). One of these companies, Berkshire Hathaway, is a conglomerate operating in diverse industries, including finance, while Johnson & Johnson sells pharmaceuticals in addition to consumer goods. Berkshire Hathaway, Fortune (updated Mar. 29, 2018), https://fortune.com/fortune500/2018/berkshire-hathaway/; Johnson & Johnson, Fortune (updated Mar. 29, 2018), https://fortune.com/fortune500/2018/johnson-johnson/. ↑
  12. See infra Part II. ↑
  13. Consent Decree Among Defendant BP Exploration & Production Inc., the United States of America, and the States of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas at 32–33, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 5, 2015), ECF No. 15436-1 [hereinafter BP Consent Decree]. ↑
  14. 21 C.F.R. § 211.22(a) (2018) (explaining best practices for quality control of contractors); FDA Warning Letter from Cheryl A. Bigham, Dist. Dir., Kan. City Dist., Office of Regulatory Affairs, to Thomas Handel, President & Gen. Manager, Meridian Med. Techs., Inc., a Pfizer Co. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/iceci/enforcementactions/warningletters/2017/ucm­574981.htm [https://perma.cc/JMX9-V7VL]. ↑
  15. Am. Express Centurion Bank, CFPB No. 2012-CFPB-0002 (Oct. 1, 2012) (joint consent order). ↑
  16. Facebook, Inc., FTC File No. 0923184, No. C-4365, at 3–4 (F.T.C. July 27, 2012) (decision and order). ↑
  17. See id. at 6. ↑
  18. The consent order does not prevent such a response. See id. ↑
  19. See Joel S. Demski, Corporate Conflicts of Interest, 17 J. Econ. Persp. 51, 57 (2003). ↑
  20. See infra Section IV.A. ↑
  21. A diversified firm may play both a new and traditional gatekeeper role. For instance, by allowing a company to serve as both a commercial bank and investment bank, the law enables large financial institutions to operate as both traditional gatekeepers—overseeing their clients by underwriting securities, prompted by liability avoidance under the Securities Act of 1933—and as new gatekeepers, being the clients who hire third-party businesses. See infra Section II.A; Kraakman, supra note 6, at 82–83. ↑
  22. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. ↑
  23. To the extent scholars have discussed mandated third-party governance it has been in passing or in narrower contexts such as in criminal or international law. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing Corporate Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 327, 433–34 (2004) (referencing how the Bank Secrecy Act causes a larger number of businesses to become “part of the network of the state’s eyes and ears”); John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies, 34 World Dev. 884, 889–90 (2006) (exploring how domestic firms can serve as a means of reaching foreign actors); Stavros Gadinis & Colby Mangels, Collaborative Gatekeepers, 73 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 797, 910–11 (2016) (focusing on money laundering); Itai Grinberg, The Battle over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 304, 304 (2012) (referencing a “growing consensus that financial institutions should act as cross-border tax intermediaries”). For other ways that scholars have recognized that businesses regulate other firms, see infra Part I. ↑
  24. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1129, 1130 (2016) (“Most aspects of agency enforcement policy generally escape judicial review.”); Freeman, supra note 4, at 647 (“Most self-regulatory programs lack the transparency and public involvement that characterize legislative rulemaking.”); Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 3–4 (2012) (identifying accountability challenges with third-party enforcement models). ↑
  25. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 6, at 15–18 (describing gatekeeper shortcomings). ↑
  26. See infra Section IV.B. ↑
  27. Ajay K. Mehrotra, Making the Modern American Fiscal State: Law, Politics, and the Rise of Progressive Taxation, 1877–1929, at 282–83 (2013). ↑
  28. Freeman, supra note 4, at 675. Numerous scholars have taken up this call in other contexts. See, e.g., Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 137, 139–41 (2019) (calling for a holistic view of corporations’ role in promoting environmental goals). ↑
  29. See generally Nicolai J. Foss et al., The Theory of the Firm, in 3 Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 631 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000); infra Part III. ↑
  30. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. Corp. L. 819, 820 (1999); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 310 (1976); Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 26 (2016). ↑
  31. See infra Section III.A. ↑
  32. See Elizabeth Warren, Companies Shouldn’t Be Accountable Only to Shareholders, Wall St. J., Aug. 15, 2018, at A17; Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, BlackRock, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fin­k-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/P9X6-HN85] (last visited Jan. 13, 2020); Martin Lipton et al., It’s Time to Adopt the New Paradigm, Harv. L. Sch. F. Corp. Governance, https://corpgov.­law.harvard.edu/2019/02/11/its-time-to-adopt-the-new-paradigm [https://perma.cc/3XH9-SSRS] (last visited Jan. 13, 2020); Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans,’ Business Roundtable (Aug. 19, 2019), [https://perma.cc/9K2F-2HLG]. On shareholder primacy, see infra note 189 and accompanying text. ↑
  33. See infra Section III.D. ↑
  34. There is arguably a gap between rhetoric and reality. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 1997, 2042 (2014). ↑
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