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Trade Administration

At the core of public debates about trade policy making in the United States and the so-called “trade war” is a controversy over who should be responsible for making U.S. trade law: Congress or the President. What these important conversations miss is that underlying much of our trade policy in recent decades is a widespread executive-branch-lawmaking apparatus with monitoring, rulemaking, adjudicative, and enforcement features that operates in considerable shadow. Executive branch agencies are now the primary actors in trade lawmaking. This Article excavates that critical underbelly: what I call our “trade administrative state.” It maps the trade administrative state’s statutory and institutional ascent, which I maintain was the product of considerable experimentation in governance schemes developed in response to diverging market trends and normative priorities, the absence of judicial mechanisms to monitor its borders, and a deficiency of administrative law disciplines to respond to its fortification.

This unearthing reveals that the trade administrative state does not operate like the rest of the regulatory state either in form or in process, despite that its actors engage in several conventional regulatory functions. Rather, trade lawmaking is predominantly managed by a single agency, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, and, procedurally, it lacks the hallmarks traditionally associated with administrative law. The Article then evaluates this model in light of administrative law’s aspirations. It demonstrates how our present model of trade administration and its self-policing control mechanisms clash with commonly held scholarly and doctrinal understandings of executive governance.

This assessment of modern trade governance also prescribes certain lessons for how administrative law operates when it comes to certain specialized areas of administration. Surprisingly, despite the fact that trade administration challenges established positivist and process-oriented values, it does so in such a way that may enhance compliance with international law. At a moment when critics raise concern about the President’s disfavor of international trade law and institutions, this study reveals that certain norms may be entrenched in our trade administrative state to counteract those concerns.

Taken together, the Article makes three contributions: First, it identifies and illustrates the experimental history of trade administration. Second, I unpack the distinct features of trade lawmaking as managed by executive branch agencies and draw conclusions about its functions for the way we conceive of trade actors and trade action in our constitutional framework. Finally, the Article analyzes the implications of this revealed structure for administrative law both in process and in content and shows how trade law serves as an unexpected administrative constraint.

Introduction

Legal debates over allocations of power in trade lawmaking have focused on the shift in power from Congress to the President.¹1.See, e.g., Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade and the Separation of Powers, 107 Calif. L. Rev. 583, 586–97 (2019); Kathleen Claussen, Separation of Trade Law Powers, 43 Yale J. Int’l L. 315, 316–20 (2018) [hereinafter Claussen, Separation of Trade Law Powers]; John Linarelli, International Trade Relations and the Separation of Powers under the United States Constitution, 13 Dick. J. Int’l L. 203, 204–05 (1995); Harold Hongju Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking After I.N.S. v. Chadha, 18 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1191, 1191–92 (1986).Show More But beneath the surface of our separation of trade law powers is a vast trade-lawmaking administrative apparatus with understudied implications. It is the executive branch beyond the President that wields considerable control over trade law outcomes and policy actions. The true driving forces of U.S. trade lawmaking are sited inside the executive and are often out of sight. This Article seeks to precipitate a turn away from thinking about the imposition of congressional controls in trade lawmaking in favor of greater consideration for administrative controls. I argue that the modern trade-lawmaking process is not one shaped by the separation of powers as much as it is by agency administration.

This study considers the work of what I call the “trade administrative state”²2.As I explain further below, the “trade administrative state” refers to a vast landscape of executive branch agencies that write trade rules, monitor the implementation of those rules, adjudicate disputes over their content, and subsequently enforce them in three dimensions—horizontal, vertical, and diagonal. See Subsection II.A.1.Show More—and with some urgency. As recent events have brought the features of our trade administration once again to the fore,³3.See, e.g., Josh Zumbrun, Feliz Solomon & Jeffrey Lewis, U.S.-China Trade War Reshaped Global Commerce, Wall St. J. (Feb. 9, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-china-trade-war-reshaped-global-commerce-11581244201 [https://perma.cc/CGZ2-3CGX]; Ana Swanson & Jeanna Smialek, U.S. Manufacturing Slumps as Trade War Damage Lingers, N.Y. Times (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/business/manufacturing-trump-trade-war.html [https://perma.cc/3ZC2-2BT9]; Shawn Donnan, Trade Won’t Fade as a Big Disrupter in 2020, Bloomberg (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/‌2020-01-02/trade-war-latest-trump-2020-china-tariffs-election-polls [https://perma.cc/7ZQW-FXCZ].Show More commentators have argued for better balance between the President and Congress as a means of correction.⁴4.See, e.g., Philip Wallach, James Wallner & Clark Packard, Is Congress Willing To Assert Responsibility for Trade?, Bulwark (Feb. 3, 2020), https://thebulwark.com/is-congress-willing-to-assert-responsibility-for-trade/ [https://perma.cc/254H-AL5M]; Daniel Griswold, Only Congress Can End the China Trade War Quagmire, Hill (Sept. 11, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/international/460920-only-congress-can-end-the-china-trade-war-quagmire [https://perma.cc/D2WK-QQJM]; Jennifer A. Hillman, How To Stop Trump’s Trade War Madness, N.Y. Times (Aug. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/11/–opinion/trump-china-trade.html [https://perma.cc/N4XX-583F]; Clark Packard, Congress Should Take Back Its Authority Over Tariffs, Foreign Pol’y (May 4, 2019) [hereinafter Packard, Congress Should Take Back Its Authority Over Tariffs], https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/04/congress-should-take-back-its-authority-over-tariffs-trump/ [https://perma.cc/BME2-XV9C].Show More While those assessments underscore important conversations about the democratic separation of powers generally, they tend to discount the normative and practical entrenchment of trade lawmaking among executive branch agencies.⁵5.To be sure, a considerable literature on the political economy of trade policy has identified this important shift. See, e.g., Douglas A. Irwin, U.S. Trade Policy in Historical Perspective, 6–7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26,256, 2019) (referring to additional work in the field). Legal scholarship relating to domestic trade institutions, on the other hand, has been more limited, especially in recent years. This Article builds off the foundation of the former to build a conversation in the latter.Show More The delegations from Congress to the President are just the tip of the iceberg with respect to our trade topography. U.S. trade lawmaking is embedded in a much larger administrative structure—parts of which are hidden from Congress, despite its constitutional primacy, and from even the White House. But the story is not just one of structure. Administration is also largely about process. Executive agencies play the most important role in trade lawmaking, and they do so according to sui generis processes subject to little supervision.

This Article provides a thorough descriptive review of modern U.S. trade administration and then evaluates whether our form of trade administration is appropriate or preferred. In so doing, one key feature surfaces: the managerial role played by a single agency created in 1962 called the Office of the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”).⁶6.Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 101 et seq., 76 Stat. 872 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.).Show More Today, USTR supervises most of our modern trade-lawmaking enterprise, acting as a super-agency similar to the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”).⁷7.See Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 Yale L.J. 2182, 2194–99 (2016) (describing the role of OMB); Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 1239, 1243 (2017) (discussing the OMB’s super-styled role without using the term); see also David C. Vladeck, O.M.B.: A Dangerous Superagency, N.Y. Times (Sept. 6, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/‌1989/09/06/opinion/omb-a-dangerous-superagency.html [https://perma.cc/9PVV-XYFM] (warning that OMB “exercises cradle-to-grave control over all regulatory initiatives”).Show More USTR oversees other agency rulemaking and, strikingly, can compel action from other parts of the government.

It was not always this way. The present arrangement is only the latest iteration in a history of experimental trade governance. At the nation’s founding, the regulation of foreign commerce consisted primarily of the issuance of tariff schedules and the negotiation of commercial treaties.⁸8.See infra Section I.A.Show More Congress relied on the President to adjust tariffs in respect of carefully circumscribed situations and counted on the Bureau of Customs to apply the tariff rates on goods at the border.⁹9.Id.Show More These activities involved little discretion by the executive branch. A progressively aggressive delegation of authorities to the President and a movement toward reciprocal arrangements with trading partner countries empowered the executive branch to take on greater authority from the 1890s through the 1930s.¹⁰10.See infra Section I.C.Show More By the middle of the twentieth century, trade lawmaking had become an exercise of an extensive legal machinery—not just in content but also in institutional form. While Congress continued to guide its substance, the diminished congressional role eventually heralded a new mode of governance with distinct features that have since characterized the way U.S. trade law is made.

This Article presents the details of this structural change. It demonstrates how the trade administrative state today is deeply entrenched and remarkably complex. To practice in this area is to develop a niche specialization in a distinctive administrative universe. Thus, one purpose of this Article is to review the undervalued legal system of foreign trade regulation: to chronicle the statutory and institutional rise of this multifarious system and to situate it empirically at the core of modern trade law.

This functional appraisal illuminates another layer of trade administration: its characteristic administrative law traits—or rather, the lack of administrative disciplines that apply. At first glance, one might think the positive story of trade lawmaking just mirrors that of either regular administrative lawmaking or of foreign affairs lawmaking. Some observers may see this as a sort of extension of the work of the OMB.¹¹11.OIRA Pages, The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-regulatory-affairs/ [https://perma.cc/5G4J-SYYV] (last visited Jan. 29, 2021); see also Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudence—at OIRA and Beyond, 103 Geo. L.J. 259, 268–70 (2015) (examining Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) practice as a form of executive lawmaking).Show More But in ways unlike other areas of executive branch lawmaking, trade-lawmaking agencies are sites of administrative innovation. They make law not through the standard administrative law playbook but regularly rework it from the ground up. Only some features of trade lawmaking are subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).¹²12.See 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–04, 551–59, 561–84, 591–96, 701–06. I return to the question of whether trade falls within the APA’s foreign-affairs exception infra at note 219 and accompanying text.Show More A great deal of trade agency action is not subject to either conventional notice-and-comment procedures or judicial review.¹³13.See infra Section III.A.Show More In many trade-related congressional delegations to agencies, the form and content of administrative process, if any is specified, is left to the agency’s discretion. These notable omissions raise questions both for administrative law’s reach as well as for trade law’s accountability, transparency, and legitimacy. The result is a form of administrative governance that is characterized more by experimentation and haphazardness than by accountability and rule-of-law values.

Most surprising about this account is that USTR intervenes in the domestic rulemaking process where it finds that rules proposed by other agencies are not compliant with international trade law. Thus, one overlooked feature of the trade administrative state is that it has elements that both reject administrative law features and inject international law primacy into the administrative process. At a moment when critics raise concern about the future of international trade law and institutions, this study reveals that certain norms are entrenched in our trade administrative state to counteract those concerns.

The stakes of trade administration have only continued to grow. Congress has delegated vast authorities of different types to these agencies such that the choice between a “free trade” policy or a more “protectionist” policy is left almost entirely to the executive.¹⁴14.For an overview of the delegations made by Congress to the executive with respect to both free trade and protectionism, see generally Kathleen Claussen, Trade’s Security Exceptionalism, 72 Stan. L. Rev. 1097, 1109–26 (2020) [hereinafter Claussen, Trade’s Security Exceptionalism].Show More Take, for example, the Trump administration’s so-called “trade war.” Under the current model, the process for imposing tariffs on products is an administrative process. Agencies carry out investigations, make determinations, and either act on the President’s direction or provide their findings to the President for his ultimate decision. Those agencies also implement the tariffs and adjudicate which products and industries will be exempted from those tariffs. Critically, and unexpectedly, the trade war has illustrated that when these agencies engage in trade lawmaking, they are subject to a different set of rules and regulations and processes than many agencies that act exclusively domestically.¹⁵15.This is not to suggest that all domestic agencies subscribe to a singular process, but rather to capture how the typical agency controls are not as salient as they would be in the traditional domestic administrative law textbook depiction.Show More Our recent extensive tariff exercise has helped bring to light this discrepancy in practice and may provide a guide to how stakeholders can advocate for change or an end to the warring tariffs. Thus, shifting the lens of our focus to trade administration helps us to deconstruct the trade war and contextualize it within broader notions of regulatory authority.

The study’s descriptive content motivates its positive and normative conclusions. From a policy perspective, modern trade administration has both benefits and drawbacks. The costs of trade administration—such as its lack of transparency and democratic inputs—may be outweighed by its international-law-enhancing functions. But the costs and benefits are not mutually exclusive. The absence of traditional administrative law mandates may provide necessary expertise, flexibility, and compliance with international law, but they can also be abused in the way that administrative law’s proponents have feared. This dilemma raises the question whether it is possible to create a principled approach to trade lawmaking that fosters compliance and coherence, but that also addresses the fundamental participatory and democratic principles that administrative law endorses.¹⁶16.Again, this question is one with which the political economy literature has wrestled, but which legal scholarship has not confronted in detail in some time. The picture of trade administration has evolved since those prior accounts as discussed further below. See infra Section II.A.Show More

I argue that a different way forward is possible, even if handicapped by a certain degree of path dependence and entrenchment, and that more ought to be done to consider administrative principles in trade law. We can strengthen administrative law values in trade law without losing the important coordinating and rule-enforcing features of the present system. When done well, an administrative law approach to trade could lessen the pressure on congressional-executive politics and take advantage of agency expertise while also creating an opportunity for administrative review. Judicial review is an important check on agency rulemaking that could be enhanced without considerable overhaul of the present system. Administrative law structures can hold agencies accountable for providing appropriate justifications and abiding by statutory requirements.

Finally, a critical examination of trade administration is of pressing importance as Congress, courts, and legal scholars debate new forms of trade governance and institutional frameworks for trade law and lawmaking.¹⁷17.See, e.g., Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel v. United States, 806 Fed. App’x 982, 990–91 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Invenergy Renewables LLC v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 3d 1255, 1281–83 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019); Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1272–76 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019); Rep. DelBene Introduces Bill To Prohibit the Use of IEEPA To Impose Tariffs, Inside U.S. Trade (June 28, 2019), https://insidetrade.com/trade/rep-delbene-introduces-bill-prohibit-use-ieepa-impose-tariffs [https://perma.cc/TU7F-8CPT]; Rep. Murphy Introduces Bill To Give Congress a Say in National Security Tariffs, Inside U.S. Trade (June 25, 2019), https://insidetrade.com/trade/rep-murphy-introduces-bill-give-congress-say-national-security-tariffs [https://perma.cc/UB69-KWG7]; GOP Bill Would Require Congressional Approval of IEEPA Declarations, Inside U.S. Trade (June 20, 2019), https://insidetrade.com/trade/gop-bill-would-require-congressional-approval-ieepa-declarations [https://perma.cc/7YFK-663U]; Isabelle Hoagland, Sens. Lankford, Coons Divided on USMCA Timing, United on Need for Tariff Legislation, Inside U.S. Trade (June 13, 2019), https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/sens-lankford-coons-divided-usmca-timing-united-need-tariff-legislation [https://perma.cc/BC79-KDJH]; New Kaine-Carper Bill Would Give Congress Broader Trade Authorities, Influence, Inside U.S. Trade (Mar. 27, 2019), https://insidetrade.com/trade/new-kaine-carper-bill-would-give-congress-broader-trade-authorities-influence [https://perma.cc/XFV2-AAD2]; Lawmakers Introduce Bill To Delay Potential Auto Tariffs, Inside U.S. Trade (Mar. 14, 2019), https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/lawmakers-introduce-bill-delay-potential-auto-tariffs [https://perma.cc/XF6P-QG2Z].Show More This evaluation allows policy makers to assess the practical operation and costs and benefits of changing or abandoning the existing model, which may be especially important in periods of political transition.

The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the anterior three eras of trade-lawmaking governance in historical perspective and theorizes the foundations of the trade administrative state. It analyzes the evolution both structurally and functionally by identifying key statutes and institutional moves made by all three branches. As this Part demonstrates, a confluence of factors led to the increased responsibility for a variety of agencies in trade lawmaking.

Part II introduces the idea of modern trade administration and maps out major institutional design choices. The bulk of this Part presents newly gathered legislative and executive materials to establish the breadth of agency and sub-agency involvement in trade lawmaking and its hierarchical, expansive, and multifaceted structure of today’s foreign commercial regulatory framework. I document the ways in which the executive branch trade apparatus has flourished to the point of making USTR a manager, rather than an agent as is traditionally believed, when it comes to U.S. trade law. This Part captures the hallmarks of managerial trade administration that set USTR apart from other agencies. Taken individually, each of USTR’s many roles is not especially noteworthy, but taken together, they make USTR distinctive in under-explored ways.

Part III turns to normative issues, analyzing doctrinal, practical, and policy benefits and drawbacks. I argue that this managerial model exacerbates concerns about interest group capture in some ways by removing such engagements from judicial review and the public eye. But it also has the unexpected benefit of enhancing U.S. commitments to international trade law. Thus, on the one hand, such an approach to trade governance improves U.S. adherence to international law and streamlines a considerable array of cross-border economic policy, but, on the other, it does so at the expense of traditional positivist and process-oriented values.

Finally, Part IV considers lessons for why the trade administrative state and its legal limits matter for ongoing structural and doctrinal debates. I refer to this as trade law’s “unfinished business.”

Two caveats are in order. First, this Article tries to capture the most important pieces of trade lawmaking. There are some areas where the managerial model has less salience, but the Article seeks to confront why and how that fragmentation in trade governance surfaced. Second, given its breadth and opacity, no single essay could fully canvass trade administration. I intend to set out a preliminary review and to note areas that cannot be addressed in this space.

* Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law, and Senior Fellow, Georgetown University Law Center Institute of International Economic Law. I am grateful for helpful comments from and conversations with Curt Bradley, Elena Chachko, Steve Charnovitz, Harlan Cohen, Charlton Copeland, Evan Criddle, Michael Froomkin, Jean Galbraith, James Gathii, Monica Hakimi, Oona Hathaway, Larry Helfer, Duncan Hollis, Gary Horlick, Sharon Jacobs, Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Anne Joseph O’Connell, Lili Levi, Tim Meyer, Jide Nzelibe, Eloise Pasachoff, Shalev Roisman, Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Andres Sawicki, Gabriel Scheffler, Steve Schnably, Lisa Schultz Bressman, Peter Shane, Ganesh Sitaraman, Kevin Stack, Elizabeth Trujillo, Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Marcia Weldon, Bill Widen, Ingrid Wuerth, David Zaring, and participants in the Duke Journal of International and Comparative Law Symposium, Georgetown University Law Center IIEL Workshop, University of Colorado School of Law Faculty Workshop, Vanderbilt Law Faculty Workshop, the World Trade Institute Summer Lunchtime Workshop, and the Junior Administrative Law Scholars Workshop hosted by Yale Law School. Special thanks to my former government colleagues who offered their time and expertise, sharing views on unwritten aspects of the internal workings of today’s U.S. trade-lawmaking system, and to UM Law Librarians Bianca Anderson and Pam Lucken for their extensive assistance hunting down legislative and executive documents. Finally, I am grateful to the Virginia Law Review editorial team, especially Christopher Baldacci, Katherine Graves, and Jordan Walsh. ↑
See, e.g., Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade and the Separation of Powers, 107 Calif. L. Rev. 583, 586–97 (2019); Kathleen Claussen, Separation of Trade Law Powers, 43 Yale J. Int’l L. 315, 316–20 (2018) [hereinafter Claussen, Separation of Trade Law Powers]; John Linarelli, International Trade Relations and the Separation of Powers under the United States Constitution, 13 Dick. J. Int’l L. 203, 204–05 (1995); Harold Hongju Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking After I.N.S. v. Chadha, 18 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1191, 1191–92 (1986). ↑
As I explain further below, the “trade administrative state” refers to a vast landscape of executive branch agencies that write trade rules, monitor the implementation of those rules, adjudicate disputes over their content, and subsequently enforce them in three dimensions—horizontal, vertical, and diagonal. See Subsection II.A.1. ↑
See, e.g., Josh Zumbrun, Feliz Solomon & Jeffrey Lewis, U.S.-China Trade War Reshaped Global Commerce, Wall St. J. (Feb. 9, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-china-trade-war-reshaped-global-commerce-11581244201 [https://perma.cc/CGZ2-3CGX]; Ana Swanson & Jeanna Smialek, U.S. Manufacturing Slumps as Trade War Damage Lingers, N.Y. Times (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/business/manufacturing-trump-trade-war.html [https://perma.cc/3ZC2-2BT9]; Shawn Donnan, Trade Won’t Fade as a Big Disrupter in 2020, Bloomberg (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/‌2020-01-02/trade-war-latest-trump-2020-china-tariffs-election-polls [https://perma.cc/7ZQW-FXCZ]. ↑
See, e.g., Philip Wallach, James Wallner & Clark Packard, Is Congress Willing To Assert Responsibility for Trade?, Bulwark (Feb. 3, 2020), https://thebulwark.com/is-congress-willing-to-assert-responsibility-for-trade/ [https://perma.cc/254H-AL5M]; Daniel Griswold, Only Congress Can End the China Trade War Quagmire, Hill (Sept. 11, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/international/460920-only-congress-can-end-the-china-trade-war-quagmire [https://perma.cc/D2WK-QQJM]; Jennifer A. Hillman, How To Stop Trump’s Trade War Madness, N.Y. Times (Aug. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/11/–opinion/trump-china-trade.html [https://perma.cc/N4XX-583F]; Clark Packard, Congress Should Take Back Its Authority Over Tariffs, Foreign Pol’y (May 4, 2019) [hereinafter Packard, Congress Should Take Back Its Authority Over Tariffs], https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/04/congress-should-take-back-its-authority-over-tariffs-trump/ [https://perma.cc/BME2-XV9C]. ↑
To be sure, a considerable literature on the political economy of trade policy has identified this important shift. See, e.g., Douglas A. Irwin, U.S. Trade Policy in Historical Perspective, 6–7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26,256, 2019) (referring to additional work in the field). Legal scholarship relating to domestic trade institutions, on the other hand, has been more limited, especially in recent years. This Article builds off the foundation of the former to build a conversation in the latter. ↑
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 101 et seq., 76 Stat. 872 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.). ↑
See Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 Yale L.J. 2182, 2194–99 (2016) (describing the role of OMB); Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 1239, 1243 (2017) (discussing the OMB’s super-styled role without using the term); see also David C. Vladeck, O.M.B.: A Dangerous Superagency, N.Y. Times (Sept. 6, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/‌1989/09/06/opinion/omb-a-dangerous-superagency.html [https://perma.cc/9PVV-XYFM] (warning that OMB “exercises cradle-to-grave control over all regulatory initiatives”). ↑
See infra Section I.A. ↑
Id. ↑
See infra Section I.C. ↑
OIRA Pages, The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-regulatory-affairs/ [https://perma.cc/5G4J-SYYV] (last visited Jan. 29, 2021); see also Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudence—at OIRA and Beyond, 103 Geo. L.J. 259, 268–70 (2015) (examining Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) practice as a form of executive lawmaking). ↑
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–04, 551–59, 561–84, 591–96, 701–06. I return to the question of whether trade falls within the APA’s foreign-affairs exception infra at note 219 and accompanying text. ↑
See infra Section III.A. ↑
For an overview of the delegations made by Congress to the executive with respect to both free trade and protectionism, see generally Kathleen Claussen, Trade’s Security Exceptionalism, 72 Stan. L. Rev. 1097, 1109–26 (2020) [hereinafter Claussen, Trade’s Security Exceptionalism]. ↑
This is not to suggest that all domestic agencies subscribe to a singular process, but rather to capture how the typical agency controls are not as salient as they would be in the traditional domestic administrative law textbook depiction. ↑
Again, this question is one with which the political economy literature has wrestled, but which legal scholarship has not confronted in detail in some time. The picture of trade administration has evolved since those prior accounts as discussed further below. See infra Section II.A. ↑
See, e.g., Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel v. United States, 806 Fed. App’x 982, 990–91 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Invenergy Renewables LLC v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 3d 1255, 1281–83 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019); Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1272–76 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019); Rep. DelBene Introduces Bill To Prohibit the Use of IEEPA To Impose Tariffs, Inside U.S. Trade (June 28, 2019), https://insidetrade.com/trade/rep-delbene-introduces-bill-prohibit-use-ieepa-impose-tariffs [https://perma.cc/TU7F-8CPT]; Rep. Murphy Introduces Bill To Give Congress a Say in National Security Tariffs, Inside U.S. Trade (June 25, 2019), https://insidetrade.com/trade/rep-murphy-introduces-bill-give-congress-say-national-security-tariffs [https://perma.cc/UB69-KWG7]; GOP Bill Would Require Congressional Approval of IEEPA Declarations, Inside U.S. Trade (June 20, 2019), https://insidetrade.com/trade/gop-bill-would-require-congressional-approval-ieepa-declarations [https://perma.cc/7YFK-663U]; Isabelle Hoagland, Sens. Lankford, Coons Divided on USMCA Timing, United on Need for Tariff Legislation, Inside U.S. Trade (June 13, 2019), https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/sens-lankford-coons-divided-usmca-timing-united-need-tariff-legislation [https://perma.cc/BC79-KDJH]; New Kaine-Carper Bill Would Give Congress Broader Trade Authorities, Influence, Inside U.S. Trade (Mar. 27, 2019), https://insidetrade.com/trade/new-kaine-carper-bill-would-give-congress-broader-trade-authorities-influence [https://perma.cc/XFV2-AAD2]; Lawmakers Introduce Bill To Delay Potential Auto Tariffs, Inside U.S. Trade (Mar. 14, 2019), https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/lawmakers-introduce-bill-delay-potential-auto-tariffs [https://perma.cc/XF6P-QG2Z]. ↑
See, e.g., Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 1, at 597–612 (discussing how delegations shifted authority from Congress to the President); Jide O. Nzelibe, The Illusion of the Free-Trade Constitution, 19 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 2–3 (2016); Koh, supra note 1, at 1192–93 (“[T]he President has historically asserted dominance over international trade . . . .”). ↑
Compare Nzelibe, supra note 18, at 8 (“legislative altruism”), with Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 1, at 609 (“abdication”). ↑
To be sure, some would say it does. See, e.g., I.M. Destler, American Trade Politics 33 (4th ed. 2005). They point to the fact that Congress is the only constitutionally empowered branch. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. But those same scholars do not deny that Congress has the opportunity to delegate its authority as necessary. Destler, supra note 20, at 32. ↑
Cf. Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 1, at 586–612 (describing only two paradigms). My analysis does not take issue with the two paradigms that Meyer and Sitaraman set out; rather, it intends to complement that important project and take up the explicit and implicit structural modes within those governing paradigms. ↑
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3. ↑
See Cory Adkins & David Singh Grewal, Two Views of International Trade in the Constitutional Order, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 1495, 1516 (2016) (referring to authorizations made to Washington, Adams, and Jefferson to embargo ships). At that time and for many years trade was related to war. The United States fought wars over trade and fought wars through trade. Trade was inextricably linked to the existence of the nation. Id. at 1517. ↑
In July 1789, the second Act of Congress established a system of tariffs on imported “goods and merchandises” while the third Act established tariffs on the tonnage of ships. Already in Congress’ earliest days, there was a debate about the proper objectives of a tariff, but most salient was the need for revenue. Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24; Act of July 20, 1789, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 27. ↑
Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29. ↑
Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 53. ↑
Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, §§ 62–64, 1 Stat. 145. ↑
Act of May 27, 1796, ch. 31, 1 Stat. 474. ↑
Act of July 16, 1798, ch. 77, 1 Stat. 605. ↑
Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65. ↑
John F. Coyle, The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in the Modern Era, 51 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 302, 307 (2013). Although these FCN treaties were popular into the twentieth century, their impact on foreign commerce diminished. In fact, most FCN treaty provisions were incorporated into other areas of U.S. law. Id. at 341–43 (describing the ways the treaty provisions “fade[d] into near-irrelevance”). ↑
See, e.g., Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between His Majesty the King of Prussia, and the United States of America, Prussia-U.S., art. 4, Sept. 10, 1785, 8 Stat. 84. ↑
See Jean Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers, 99 Va. L. Rev. 987, 1013–14 (2013). ↑
See, e.g., Message Transmitting a Report of the Secretary of State on the Spoliations Committed on the Commerce of the United States (Mar. 5, 1794), in 1 American State Papers: Foreign Relations 423, 423–24 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., 1833) (describing with concern the attacks on U.S. merchants and the need for greater authority to combat such attacks). ↑
Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 799, 820–29 (1995) (“Early statutes imposed this duty on the President, typically requiring him to issue a proclamation giving each complying country a clean bill of health. We call these ‘proclamation statutes,’ and they have been very common.”). ↑
Act of Feb. 9, 1799, ch. 2, § 4, 1 Stat. 613. ↑
Act of Dec. 19, 1806, ch. 1, § 3, 2 Stat. 411. ↑
Act of June 4, 1794, ch. 41, 1 Stat. 372 (authorizing the President to lay an embargo on ships as necessary “whenever . . . the public safety shall so require”); Act of Feb. 9, 1799, ch. 2, § 4, 1 Stat. 613 (making it lawful for the President to draw back restrictions on trade that Congress enacted “if he shall deem it expedient and consistent with the interest of the United States” or “whenever, in his opinion, the interest of the United States shall require”); Act of Dec. 19, 1806, ch. 1, § 3, 2 Stat. 411; Act of April 22, 1808, ch. 52, 2 Stat. 490 (authorizing the President to suspend a trade embargo for certain vessels “on such bond and security being given as the public interest . . . require”). ↑
Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 77, 3 Stat. 224 (emphasis added). ↑
For a more robust discussion of the President’s tariff-related fact-finding in the context of fact-finding more generally, see Shalev Roisman, Presidential Factfinding, 72 Vand. L. Rev. 825, 849 (2019). ↑
Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 39, 3 Stat. 361–62; Act of Jan. 7, 1824, ch. 4, § 4, 4 Stat. 2; Act of May 24, 1828, ch 111, § 1, 4 Stat. 308; Act of May 31, 1830, ch. 219, § 2, 4 Stat. 425; Act of June 26, 1884, ch. 121, § 14, 23 Stat. 53. ↑
See, e.g., Act of Mar. 6, 1866, ch. 12, 14 Stat. 3 (allowing suspension of the prohibition “whenever the Secretary of the Treasury shall officially determine” that importation of certain cattle would not spread infectious disease). ↑
See S. Rep. No. 73-871, at 1–2 (1934) (“The committee has inserted the words ‘as a fact’ following the words in subsection (a) ‘the President, whenever he finds.’ This is to make clear that Congress under the proposed bill is establishing a policy and directing the Executive to act in accordance with the congressional policy only when he finds as a fact that existing duties or other import restrictions are unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the United States. In the same provision, to the words ‘existing duties or other import restrictions’ the words ‘of the United States or any foreign country’ have been added to clarify the meaning.”). ↑
See Alfred E. Eckes, Opening America’s Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776, at 70–74 (1995). ↑
Id. (noting that Secretary of State Blaine revives the idea and urges President Harrison to request authority). ↑
Act of Oct. 1, 1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567. ↑
Section 3 of the Act provided that certain commodities would be admitted free of duties, but that the President could impose specified rates against nations charging “unequal and unreasonable” duties on U.S. commodities. Id. § 3; see also Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 680–91 (1892) (holding that Section 3 was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative and treaty-making authority to the President); Douglas A. Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce: A History of U.S. Trade Policy 304 (2017) [hereinafter Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce]; H.R. Rep. No. 73-1000, at 9 (1934) (recognizing the President’s power under Section 3 and noting the Field decision); Francis B. Sayre, The Constitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act, 39 Colum. L. Rev. 751, 761–62 (1939) (discussing presidential action in protectionist trade policy generally); Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 Yale L.J. 140, 173–74 (2009) (noting this started a transformation in U.S. international lawmaking). ↑
143 U.S. at 694; see also id. at 699–700 (Lamar, J., dissenting) (commenting that this Act ought to be distinguished as it is clearly lawmaking). Interestingly, and somewhat ironically, the Court has developed major principles of administrative law through trade-related cases such as Field and others taken up below. In the twenty-first century, trade-related administrative law has been significantly curtailed. ↑
Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 71, 28 Stat. 509, 569; see also Harold U. Faulkner, The Decline of Laissez Faire, 1897–1917, 59–60 (1977) (discussing the politics of tariffs in the years after the Wilson-Gorman Act); Eckes, supra note 44, at 70 & 70 n.39 (discussing congressional opposition to executive reciprocity agreements in 1884). ↑
The Dingley Tariff Act of 1897 authorized the President again to negotiate reciprocal tariff agreements with an eye to lowering tariffs with trading partners. Dingley Tariff Act of 1897, ch. 11, § 3, 30 Stat. 151, 203. The 1922 Fordney McCumber Tariff Act again empowered the President to adjust tariff rates under the condition that the Tariff Commission so advised. Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 315, 42 Stat. 858, 941–46. ↑
In President Taft’s inauguration in 1909, he called for Congress to give him still greater authority, but also noted that any such action was a congressional prerogative. William Howard Taft, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1909), in 1 Presidential Addresses and State Papers of William Howard Taft: From March 4, 1909 to March 4, 1910, at 53, 55 (1910) (“It is imperatively necessary, therefore, that a tariff bill be drawn . . . and as promptly passed as due consideration will permit. . . . I venture this as a suggestion only, for the course to be taken by Congress, upon the call of the Executive, is wholly within its discretion.”). Warren G. Harding, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1921), in Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States: From George Washington 1789 to George Bush 1989 237, 243–44 (1989). ↑
H.R. Rep. No. 73-1000, at 10 (1934). ↑
Id. ↑
Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 2, 36 Stat. 11, 82–83. ↑
See U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, The Economic Effects of Significant U.S. Import Restraints 65 (6th ed. 2009) (“Prior to the 1930 act, tariff changes were viewed as entirely the domain of Congress.”); see also Hal Shapiro & Lael Brainard, Trade Promotion Authority Formerly Known As Fast Track: Building Common Ground on Trade Demands More Than a Name Change, 35 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 6 (2003) (“Prior to the twentieth century U.S. regulation of foreign commerce was almost exclusively a congressional prerogative . . . .”); Ian F. Fergusson, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy 2–3 (2015). (“For roughly the first 150 years of the United States, Congress exercised its authority over foreign trade by setting tariff rates on all imported products.”). ↑
As the Supreme Court confirmed in Field v. Clark: “There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation.” 143 U.S. 649, 694 (1892). ↑
Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, ch. 463, § 700, 39 Stat. 756, 795. ↑
On several different occasions since 1865, tariff boards were set up by Congress or in some instances by executive order for specific studies, but none would be permanent. For example, a tariff commission was established in 1882 with nine members. It was appointed to report to Congress on recommended tariff rate changes. Report of the Tariff Commission, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 47-6, pt. 1., at 1, 5, 7 (1882). Upon doing so, it ceased to function. The Trade Act of 1971: A Fundamental Change in United States Foreign Trade Policy, 80 Yale L.J. 1418, 1424 n.31 (1971); Act of May 15, 1882, Pub. L. No. 47-145, ch. 145, 22 Stat. 64; see also U.S. Tariff Comm’n, The Tariff and Its History 97–100 (1934) (describing nine non-permanent bodies created between 1865 and 1922 to study tariff-related issues). Likewise, in 1911, a three-member Tariff Board was established pursuant to congressional funding thereof to look into the tariff schedule for wool and woolens. Act of Mar. 4, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-525, ch. 285, 36 Stat. 1363. Other non-permanent agencies were created in 1865, 1866, 1888, 1909, and 1912. See generally J. Bernhardt, The Tariff Commission: Its History, Activities and Organization 3–14 (1922) (providing an overview of the activities of seven government bodies tasked with studying tariff-related issues between 1865 and 1912). ↑
Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce, supra note 47, at 356–57. ↑
Id. at 356–57, 362–64. ↑
Anti-Dumping Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-10, ch. 14, § 201-202, 42 Stat. 9, 11–12. ↑
James Pomeroy Hendrick, The United States Antidumping Act, 58 Am. J. Int’l L. 914, 932 (1964) (noting just 73 findings of dumping between 1921 and 1964). From 1934 to 1954 there were only seven findings of dumping. Douglas A. Irwin, The Rise of US Anti-dumping Activity in Historical Perspective, 28 World Econ. 651, 659 (2005). In 1954, this responsibility was transferred to the ITC. Irwin, supra, at 659. ↑
CBP Timeline, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., https://www.cbp.gov/about/history/‌timeline-static-view [https://perma.cc/W7BP-7LEF] (last visited Mar. 8, 2021). ↑
See Act of May 15, 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-72, 12 Stat. 387, 387 (establishing USDA to “procure . . . and distribute . . . valuable seeds and plants”). ↑
See Eckes, supra note 44, at 99. ↑
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 410–11 (1928). In that case, an importer contested the imposition of a duty of six cents per pound on barium dioxide, two cents more than in the 1922 statute, after a 1924 proclamation by President Calvin Coolidge. The Supreme Court ruled that the delegation of authority was constitutional because the President was carrying out the will of Congress in changing the duty. Id. at 400, 411. ↑
The use of a principal-agent framework as an analytical tool for understanding congressional-executive relations in foreign affairs is not entirely novel in practice or scholarship. Ed Swaine has described that there was a time when:

[D]iplomats were regarded as personal agents of a head of state, and could be viewed in terms of a conventional principal-agent relationship, but identifying the principal (conceivably, the head of state, a legislature, or the state itself), the agent . . . , and the nature and consequences of delegated authority became less straightforward.

Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 2061, 2068 (2003). Daniel Abebe has proposed viewing Congress as principal and the President as its agent in foreign affairs generally. In contrast to my study, Abebe seeks to determine “the appropriate level of deference to the President” based on a balancing of internal and external constraints to “ensure that the President is a faithful agent” while also ensuring the President has enough “latitude to achieve congressional goals.” Daniel Abebe, The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign Affairs Law, 49 Stan. J. Int’l L. 1, 53 (2013). ↑
See, e.g., Claussen, Trade’s Security Exceptionalism, supra note 14, at 1109. For example, Section 3(e) of the National Industrial Recovery Act gave the President the power to use import quotas or fees to regulate any imports found to “render ineffective or seriously to endanger the maintenance of any code or agreement.” Pub. L. No. 73-67, § 3, 48 Stat. 195, 197 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 703, terminated by Exec. Order 7252). ↑
As early as 1923, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes sent a confidential circular to American diplomatic officers notifying them that the President had authorized the Secretary of State to negotiate commercial treaties with other countries by which to accord each other unconditional most-favored-nation treatment. 1 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923, H.R. Doc. No. 68-397, at 131 (1938). ↑
U.S. Tariff Comm’n, Sixth Annual Report 2 (1922). ↑
Id. ↑
Presidential Press Conference (June 9, 1933), in 1 Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1933, 364, 368–70 (1972). ↑
Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce, supra note 47, at 425. ↑
Nzelibe, supra note 18, at 7 (“For many scholars, congressional delegation was the crucial constitutional innovation that ultimately overcame interest group capture.”) (noting also that political economy scholars are skeptical). As David Lake has commented, the important difference of the RTAA as compared to prior delegations was that it delegated multiple authorities simultaneously. David A. Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887–1939, at 205 (1988). ↑
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-316, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). ↑
Id. at 945. ↑
Harry C. Hawkins & Janet L. Norwood, The Legislative Basis of United States Commercial Policy, in Studies in United States Commercial Policy 69, 100 (William B. Kelly, Jr. ed., 1963). ↑
Id. at 101. See also Harry C. Hawkins, Administration of the Trade Agreements Act, 1944 Wis. L. Rev. 3, 8–9 (1944); Henry J. Tasca, The Reciprocal Trade Policy of the United States: A Study in Trade Philosophy 49–50 (1938). ↑
Some temporary advisory positions came and went. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 6,651, 3 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 158, 158–60 (Mar. 23, 1934) (creating a special trade advisor). ↑
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 9,832, 3 C.F.R. Supp. 126, 127 (1947) (creating the Committee); Exec. Order No. 6,651, 3 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 158, 158–60 (Mar. 23, 1934) (creating the Office of the Special Adviser to the President on Foreign Trade). ↑
For greater detail, see Daniel K. Tarullo, Law and Politics in Twentieth Century Tariff History, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 285, 286 (1986). ↑
Historically, “neither the Bureau of Customs nor any other agency was empowered to set or change tariff rates as such.” Id. ↑
Stephen D. Cohen, The Making of United States International Economic Policy: Principles, Problems, and Proposals for Reform 17 (5th ed. 2000). One can speculate if this was due to capture or for some other reason. Compare to the experience in interstate commerce or public utilities. ↑
Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-318, ch. 356, § 315, 42 Stat. 858, 941–43. ↑
Tarullo, supra note 81, at 319 (noting that it was structured to be scientific). ↑
Id. at 313. ↑
From 1922 to 1929, more than 600 petitions covering 375 commodities were filed with the Commission and only 47 investigations covering 55 commodities were completed. U.S. Tariff Comm’n, Thirteenth Annual Report 10 (1929). ↑
Lake, supra note 74, at 196. ↑
Tarullo, supra note 81, at 350–51. ↑
Id.; see also Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act: Hearings on H.J. Res. 407 Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 76th Cong. 491–500 (1940) (statement of A. Manuel Fox, Member, U.S. Tariff Comm’n) (describing the State Department’s role in overseeing the Tariff Commission and its procedures for cooperation with other agencies); Grace Beckett, The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program 18 (1941) (describing the State Department’s role in initiating new trade agreements with countries). ↑
The State Department ran the Committee for Reciprocity Information, for one. U.S. Dep’t of State, 41 Dep’t of State Bull. No. 1,054, at 354–55 (Sept. 7, 1959). ↑
William A. Foster & Co. v. United States, 20 C.C.P.A. 15, 22 (1932). ↑
The idea of identifying managers in the law is not new either in the domestic or international context. I adopt the term here as a further extension and new application of the concept—one that I believe more aptly captures what is happening in trade. I do not subsequently adopt all the same consequences that prior commentators have identified in their spaces, but I draw on them for inspiration. For other iterations, see, e.g., Bijal Shah, Congress’s Agency Coordination, 103 Minn. L. Rev. 1961, 2058 (2019) (referring to the President as a manager of the executive branch); Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements 3 (1995) (examining international law compliance through a managerial model); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374, 378 (1982) (referring to judges as managers of their cases). ↑
Jeff Dunoff identified some of the same trends as they began. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, “Trade and”: Recent Developments in Trade Policy and Scholarship—And Their Surprising Political Implications, 17 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 759, 760 (1997). ↑
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 14, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf [https://perma.cc/MG9R-CTQK]. ↑
Id. ↑
Dispute Settlement, WTO, https://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e–/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm [https://perma.cc/7U6A-4T76]. ↑
See, e.g., Simon Lester, The Role of the International Trade Regime in Global Governance, 16 UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign Affs. 209, 211–12, 221–38 (2011) (providing an overview of the expansion of trade agreements). ↑
This “problem” could be considered a feature more than a bug by those that use trade law to regulate and enforce international commitments in newfound areas. I have explored this double-edged sword in other work. See Kathleen Claussen, Our Trade Law System, 73 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 195, 198–201 (2020). ↑
146 Cong. Rec. 6,805–06 (2000). ↑
Id. at 6,806. Most of USTR’s offices were established this way. Only three are mentioned in statute: two in “sense of Congress” statements and one referring to the responsibilities of the Assistant United States Trade Representative for Industry and Telecommunications (a role that no longer exists as such). 19 U.S.C. §§ 3724, 4208, 3812. For example, the Trade and Development Act of 2000 included a “sense of Congress” statement, making note of the importance of having an Assistant United States Trade Representative for African Affairs. Pub. L. No. 106-200, § 117, 114 Stat. 251, 267 (2000) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3724). More recently, Congress has created specific positions at the ambassador rank such as the Chief Agricultural Negotiator, Chief Innovation and Intellectual Property Negotiator, and Chief Transparency Officer. Id. at 293. ↑
Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-26, § 102, 129 Stat. 320 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 4201). USTR likewise indicates that it is monitoring agreements for compliance in topics as diverse as financial services and tomato paste. See, e.g., Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2020 Trade Policy Agenda and 2019 Annual Report 8, 165 (2020) [hereinafter 2019 Annual Report], https://ustr.gov/‌sites/default/files/2020_Trade_Policy_Agenda_and_2019_Annual_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKT7-4M3E]. ↑
Authorizing Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Border & Mar. Sec. of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 113th Cong. 18 (2014) (statement of Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting Deputy Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot.). At least seventeen agencies, engaged in some exercise of trade policy making, regularly conduct U.S. trade and international economic functions under various statutory and administrative authorities. U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., GAO-00-76, Strategy Needed to Better Monitor and Enforce Trade Agreements 4 (2000) [hereinafter GAO-00-76]. ↑
For example, the Commerce Department facilitates the trade remedies program as set out in 19 U.S.C. chapter 4. See 19 U.S.C. § 1339. The Treasury also engages in major economic regulation through engagement in international affairs. See David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 187, 212–13 (2010). ↑
See generally Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125, 130 Stat. 122 (2016) (scattered sections). ↑
See generally U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Trade Policies and Procedures, https://www.usda.gov/topics/trade/trade-policies-and-procedures (providing an overview of the various trade programs that the USDA has in place for “commodities and agricultural products”) [https://perma.cc/P9JQ-HKHX] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). ↑
See Shayerah I. Akhtar, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF11016, U.S. Trade Policy Functions: Who Does What? (2020). We could add more to this executive trade landscape such as the Export-Import Bank, which “finances and insures U.S. exports of goods and services”; the Small Business Administration, which administers grants in support of trade; or the agencies that support trade capacity building or that promote economic growth in developing countries, such as United States Agency for International Development, United States International Development Finance Corporation, and the Trade and Development Agency. See id. ↑
See Thomas R. Graham, The Reorganization of Trade Policymaking: Prospects and Problems, 13 Cornell Int’l L.J. 221, 228 & n.38 (1980). Even the Federal Emergency Management Agency took on new trade tasks during the COVID-19 pandemic. See Export Allocation Rule on Medical Supplies and Equipment for COVID-19, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/fema-implementation-allocation-order-exports-scarce-ppe-and-notice-exemptions [https://perma.cc/R5ER-YZ8S] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). ↑
Cohen, supra note 83, at 46 (discussing the “crowding out” of the State Department). ↑
See About the USITC, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/‌about_usitc.htm [https://perma.cc/8EPB-7FY7] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). ↑
Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, Charter of the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/about/ACTPN%‌20Charter%202018-2022%20USTR.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR5J-X5FK]. ↑
Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, Advisory Committees, https://ustr.gov/about-us/advisory-committees [https://perma.cc/24US-G53A] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). ↑
Daniel K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 546, 595–96 (1987) (noting that lower-level committees composed chiefly of civil servants develop information). ↑
Id. ↑
See Kathleen Claussen, Trade Executive Agreements 10–14 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Claussen, Trade Executive Agreements] (describing a category of trade lawmaking—trade executive agreements—that is a mix of free trade agreements, solo executive agreements, and rules issued by agencies, has largely grown out of recent practice, and is thus understudied). ↑
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 241, 76 Stat. 872, 878 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1801). ↑
Graham, supra note 108, at 224–25 (describing the role of the trade representative in the early years of the position); H.R. Rep. No. 93-571, at 40 (1973) (“[T]he position was created to provide both better focus and centralized direction for treating trade negotiations and trade problems from an overall commercial point of view—and to downplay the strictly foreign policy orientation . . . of the Department of State.”). ↑
H.R. Rep. No. 93-571, at 40 (1973) (declaring that the USTR was created “with the implicit intention of providing the Congress with a focal point in the executive branch”). ↑
Exec. Order No. 11,075, 3 C.F.R. 692–96 (1963); Trade Expansion Act § 242. ↑
Trade Expansion Act § 241(a). ↑
Id. ↑
Id. § 241(b), 76 Stat. at 878. ↑
History of the United States Trade Representative, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, https://ustr.gov/about-us/history [https://perma.cc/3YYL-DX6B] (last visited Apr. 19, 2021). ↑
Id. ↑
Fred O. Boadu & Jie Shen, An Empirical Analysis of the Growth and Autonomy of the Office of the United States Trade Representative, 6 Currents: Int’l Trade L.J. 3, 9 (1997). ↑
Id. ↑
Id. ↑
See Exec. Off. of the President, Office of the United States Trade Representative: Fiscal Year Budget 2021, at 6 (2020), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/foia–/USTR%20FY%20‌2021%20Congressional%20Budget%20Submission.pdf [https://perma.cc/KGP6-LT4T]. ↑
In a recent symposium, I summarized the historical and legal foundations for fast-track. Kathleen Claussen, Trading Spaces: The Changing Role of the Executive in U.S. Trade Lawmaking, 24 Ind. J. Glob. Legal Stud. 345, 351–52, 351 n.18 (2017). ↑
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 141, 88 Stat. 1978, 1999 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2171). These moves reflected a congressional interest in enhancing executive authority while also maintaining control on the executive’s work in the trade space: “We have also endeavored to articulate an appropriate cooperative role for the Congress and the executive branch in an effort to come to grips with these very complex problems and issues in which delegation of congressional authority is needed.” H.R. Rep. No. 93-571, at 15 (1973); see also Claussen, Trading Spaces, supra note 129, at 350–54 (providing an overview of the balancing of the trade-policy roles and responsibilities that Congress and the executive branch hold); 15 C.F.R. § 2001.3 (2020) (establishing that the U.S. Trade Representative reports to and is responsible to both the executive branch and Congress). ↑
See, e.g., To Create a Department of International Trade and Investment: Hearing on S. 1990 Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affs., 95th Cong. 1 (1978) (statement of Sen. William V. Roth, Member, Comm. on Governmental Affs.); Reorganizing the Government’s International Trade and Investment Functions: Hearing on S. 377, S. 891, S. 937, S. 1471, and S. 1493 Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affs., 96th Cong. 2, 44, 47 (1979) (statements of Sen. Robert C. Byrd and Adlai E. Stevenson); Proposed Foreign Trade Reorganization: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 96th Cong. 2–4 (1979) (statement of Rep. Frank Horton); Federal Government International Trade Function Reorganization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 96th Cong. 114–16 (1979) (statement of William N. Walker, Vice Chairman, Com. Pol’y Comm., U.S. Council of the Int’l Chamber of Com.); International Trade and Investment Reorganization Act, H.R. 3859, 96th Cong. § 2(b) (1979). ↑
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (proposed Sept. 25, 1979); see Graham, supra note 108, at 222 & n.5 (1980) (discussing inter-branch communications on reorganization). ↑
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, § 1(b), 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (proposed Sept. 25, 1979). ↑
Shayerah Ilias, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R42555, Trade Reorganization: Overview and Issues for Congress 11 (2012). ↑
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, §§ 411, 413, 93 Stat. 144, 243–44 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2541, 2543). ↑
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1601(a)(1), 102 Stat. 1107, 1260 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c)). ↑
See id. § 1601(a)(2), 102 Stat. at 1261. ↑
See, e.g., id. § 1301(a), 102 Stat. at 1164 (granting the USTR authority to respond to the denial or violation of U.S. trade rights under any trade agreement, subject only to any “specific direction” from the President). ↑
See, e.g., Memorandum, 70 Fed. Reg. 43,251 (July 21, 2005) (delegating authority under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930); Proclamation 6,942, 61 Fed. Reg. 54,719 (Oct. 17, 1996) (delegating authority related to the Generalized System of Preferences); Exec. Order No. 12,964, 60 Fed. Reg. 33,095 (June 21, 1995) (stating that the USTR shall perform the functions of the President under the Federal Advisory Committee Act); Exec. Order No. 12,661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779 (Dec. 27, 1988) (delegating the authority of the President to the USTR under the 1988 Act). This is especially true up until the early 2000s when USTR grew in influence and size. Many statutory delegations to USTR come from statutes enacted in the last 30 years. See, e.g., Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 122(b), 108 Stat. 4809, 4829 (Dec. 8, 1994) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3532) (specifying that the USTR has lead responsibility on matters related to the World Trade Organization). ↑
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,964, 60 Fed. Reg. at 33,095 (creating a Commission on United States-Pacific Trade and Investment Policy); Exec. Order No. 12,870, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,753 (Sept. 30, 1993) (creating the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee); Exec. Order No. 12,905, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,733 (Mar. 25, 1994) (creating the Trade and Environment Policy Advisory Committee within the Office of the United States Trade Representative). ↑
This arrangement was part of the point of creating the USTR in the first place: to take this power away from Congress where interest groups dominated. ↑
See, e.g., USTR Announces New Office to Monitor China Deal’s Implementation, Handle Disputes, Inside U.S. Trade (Feb. 14, 2020), https://insidetrade.com/trade/ustr-announces-new-office-monitor-china-deals-implementation-handle-disputes [https://perma.cc/AU6J-955Q]. ↑
Cf. 15 C.F.R. § 2001.2 (1975) (establishing the Office as consisting of the United States Trade Representative and two Deputy Trade Representatives). ↑
H.R. Rep. No. 93-571, at 40–41 (1973) (noting that there has not been enough coordination with Congress from 1962 to 1973 and expecting that the USTR would be “speaking for the United States and the Congress in the forthcoming multilateral trade negotiations”). ↑
For a sampling of relevant statutes, see Staff of H.R. Comm. on Ways & Means, 113th Cong., Compilation of U.S. Trade Statutes, at v–xi (Comm. Print 2013). ↑
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 141(c), 88 Stat. 1978, 1999. ↑
Nor is USTR subject to the levels of litigation that other agencies are subject to as discussed in Parts III and IV, but it does hold hearings on some of its investigations. By comparison, CBP has issued 289 rules, 91 proposed rules, and 2,673 notices since it was created in 2003; the ITC issued 44 rules, 30 proposed rules, and 8,194 notices in the same period (1995–2019); the ITA issued 72 rules, 57 proposed rules, and 18,937 notices in the same period. ↑
Trade Act § 301 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411). ↑
19 U.S.C. § 2411. See also Erwin P. Eichmann & Gary N. Horlick, Political Questions in International Trade: Judicial Review of Section 301?, 10 Mich. J. Int’l L. 735, 742 (1989) (explaining both the mandatory and discretionary actions that the USTR must take for violations of trade agreements or harm to U.S. commerce). ↑
Trade Act § 301(b) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)). This authority was shifted to USTR and away from the President in the 1988 Act. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411). ↑
Section 301 addresses the activities of U.S. firms abroad and interference by foreign governments to the detriment of U.S. firms. See Judith Hippler Bello & Alan F. Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series #10: Significant Recent Developments in Section 301 Unfair Trade Cases, 21 Int’l Law. 211, 213–15 (1987). ↑
Whether USTR’s imposition of tariffs under Section 301 is subject to the APA despite the statute’s lack of a clear statement is under consideration at the CIT at the time of writing. HMTX Indus. LLC v. United States, No. 20-00177 (Ct. Int’l Trade filed Sept. 10, 2020). Section 301 sets out a process for USTR to reach its determination but whether that supersedes USTR’s obligations under the APA and whether the application of Section 301 falls within the APA’s foreign-affairs exception are live questions. ↑
To be sure, the statute does provide for a public hearing in certain circumstances. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 2412(a)(4), 2414(b)(1)(A). But that is not always the case in USTR’s actions nor does the statute set out procedures for how the public hearing is conducted. The statute provides a type of functional notice and comment. ↑
This has occurred most recently in USTR’s exclusion process related to the Section 301 tariffs on products from China. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Zhiyao Lu, The USTR Tariff Exclusion Process: Five Things to Know About These Opaque Handouts, Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ. (Dec. 19. 2019), https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/ustr-tariff-exclusion-process-five-things-know-about-these [https://perma.cc/33N8-QJUZ]. ↑
See, e.g., Isabelle Icso, White House Requests $6 Million Boost for USTR in FY2021 Budget Proposal, Inside U.S. Trade (Feb. 11, 2020, 2:47 PM), https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/white-house-requests-6-million-boost-ustr-fy2021-budget-proposal [https://perma.cc/5B3R-MFFT]. ↑
See, e.g., Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-26, § 103, 129 Stat. 320, 333 (codified as amended 19 USC § 4202). ↑
See, e.g., U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement Text, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/japan-korea-apec/japan/us-japan-trade-agreement-negotiations/us-japan-trade-agreement-text [https://perma.cc/2Q2E-ST6X ] (last visited Apr. 19, 2021) (“eliminat[ing] or reduc[ing] tariffs on certain agricultural and industrial products”). The term “trade executive agreement” is mine and the subject of a separate project, a manuscript of which is on file with the author. See Claussen, Trade Executive Agreements, supra note 115, at 3. ↑
This is a matter of debate. See Claussen, Trade Executive Agreements, supra note 115, at 10–12. ↑
See Claussen, Trade’s Security Exceptionalism, supra note 14, at 1149–51. ↑
For some past relevant commentary insofar as international economic negotiations are concerned, see David Zaring, Sovereignty Mismatch and the New Administrative Law, 91 Wash. U. L. Rev

.

59, 84 (2013) (discussing how there is no role for the process requirements of the APA where agencies negotiate rules with foreign counterparts). ↑
Id. at 83 (commenting that the threat of judicial review may have led to an expansion in detail in administrative agencies’ work). ↑
While administrative constraints need not be the only types of constraints on an agency, USTR also is subject to limited congressional or presidential oversight as I and others have noted in previous work. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 1, at 1204–06, 1213–14. ↑
Monitoring and Enforcement Actions, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/monitoring-and-enforcement-actions [https://perma.cc/6ASE-SD2H] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). ↑
Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125, § 604, 130 Stat. 122, 185–87 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2171(h)) (establishing the Interagency Center on Trade Implementation, Monitoring, and Enforcement). ↑
It does most of this work through the Trade Policy Staff Committee. See Interagency Role, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, https://ustr.gov/about-us/interagency-role [https://perma.cc/27SR-KXSC] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021) (noting that 20 agencies and offices participate under USTR’s oversight, reviewing hundreds of lawmaking documents each year); see also Akhtar, supra note 107 (“Cabinet-level review on trade issues is through the Trade Policy Committee (TPC).”). ↑
As noted by a U.S. General Accounting Office (today called the Government Accountability Office, GAO) study, USTR is mandated to “identify[] compliance problems, set[] priorities, gather[] and analyze[] information, develop[] and implement[] responses, and tak[e] actions.” GAO-00-76, supra note 103, at 15–16. ↑
You can see this increase in the number of attorneys rather than economists. Id. at 18. ↑
Much of this work is done behind the scenes but occasionally USTR’s work with other agencies in their rulemaking may come out in litigation as the other agencies note their international trade law constraints. See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Dep’t of Agric., 613 F.3d 76, 85–86 (2d Cir. 2010) (in which the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service of USDA contextualizes its rulemaking within international trade law); Miss. Poultry Ass’n v. Madigan, 992 F.2d 1365, 1362 (5th Cir. 1993), amended by, 9 F.3d 1113 (5th Cir. 1993), on reh’g, 31 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 1994) (in which the Secretary of Agriculture’s interpretation of a standard was informed not just by the U.S. commitments under the World Trade Organization but also under free trade agreement rules); Nat’l Coal Against the Misuse of Pesticides v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 875, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (describing changes in the Environmental Protection Agency’s rulemaking in light of international trade concerns). ↑
See, e.g., Foreign Supplier Verification Programs for Importers of Food for Humans and Animals, 79 Fed. Reg. 58,574 (Sept. 29, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1). ↑
See Interview with USTR official (Nov. 10, 2020). This is one of several interviews and conversations carried out with USTR officials during research for this Article. ↑
See Claussen, Trade’s Security Exceptionalism, supra note 14, at 1107. ↑
Other enforcers of different aspects of trade law include CBP, Commerce, the ITC, and the Court of International Trade (“CIT”). ↑
19 U.S.C. § 2171(e). ↑
19 U.S.C. § 2171(f). ↑
A 1934 congressional report described its intended delegation to the Executive as “Congress Determines the Policy—The President Executes.” H.R. Rep. No. 73-1000, at 14 (1934). Little today in trade policy follows that heading, which epitomizes how trade governance worked in prior eras. ↑
See, e.g., Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce, supra note 47, at 435 fig.9.1. ↑
Not even the GAO has a clear organizational chart to capture this engagement. It has tried. Compare GAO-00-76, supra note 103, at 48–50 tbl.3 (table indexing lead responsible agencies with reporting mechanisms) with U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-06-167, USTR Would Benefit from Greater Use of Strategic Human Capital Management Principles 6 fig.1 (2000) (using a hierarchical chart to illustrate USTR organizational structure). ↑
See, e.g., Bureau of Int’l Labor Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 15-2378-NAT, US and Honduras Sign Landmark Labor Rights Agreement (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ilab/ilab20151209 [https://perma.cc/GKE7-RGLQ]. ↑
See, e.g., United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. 116-113, §§ 202A(b), 711, 134 Stat. 11, 34, 81 (2020) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 4532). ↑
Robert E. Hudec, Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in Aggressive Unilateralism: America’s 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System 113, 122 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990) (asserting that one needs a diagram to trace all the authorities of Section 301 that makes up an “intricate maze” with “extremely wide loopholes”). Again, some commentators may find this to be precisely what was intended as Congress built this system. The political economy literature has covered that territory well. ↑
It is perhaps closest to a blend between the White House Office of Legal Counsel and the Office of Management and Budget—just trade-specific. ↑
Cf. Pasachoff, supra note 7, at 2207–08 (describing how OMB controls policy making through its budget process in ways somewhat similar to USTR’s controls over trade-related policy making). ↑
See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 533, 546–52 (1989); Charles F. Bingman, The President as Manager of the Federal Government, 35 Proc. Acad. Pol. Sci. 146, 147–49 (1985). ↑
Jean Galbraith, From Treaties to International Commitments: The Changing Landscape of Foreign Relations Law, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1675, 1692 (2017). ↑
That is, USTR can choose to impose tariffs or it can negotiate free trade agreements. See Claussen, Trade’s Security Exceptionalism, supra note 14, at 1163. ↑
See, e.g., Press Release, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States and China Reach Phase One Trade Agreement (Dec. 13, 2019), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/december/united-states-and-china-reach [https://perma.cc/UAE2-DSTR]. ↑
See infra Section II.C. ↑
See, e.g., Sylvan Lane, Five Key Players in Trump’s Trade Battles, Hill (Aug. 20, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/trade/458016-five-key-players-in-trumps-trade-battles [https://perma.cc/Z379-HTY9] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). ↑
Discussing one of these options, see Graham, supra note 108, at 230 n.41; see also I.M. Destler, Making Foreign Economic Policy 213–14 (1980) (explaining why that option was not viable). ↑
See, e.g., Stuart E. Eizenstat, Unsettling a Delicate Balance, N.Y. Times, (June 19, 1983), https://www.nytimes.com/1983/06/19/business/business-forum-unsettling-a-delicate-balance.html [https://perma.cc/AK7Y-MDT2]. ↑
See, e.g., id. (discussing attempts to change during the Kennedy, Carter, and Reagan administrations); Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces Proposal to Reform, Reorganize and Consolidate Government (Jan. 13, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/13/president-obama-announces-proposal-reform-reorganize-and-consolidate-gov [https://perma.cc/WZR6-WWD8]; see also Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, It’s Economic Strategy, Stupid, Am. Affs. J. (Feb. 20, 2019), https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2019/02/its-economic-strategy-stupid/ [https://perma.cc/HX6Z-ZRCP] (noting that the Obama administration proposed merging the Department of Commerce, Small Business Administration, USTR, Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and U.S. Trade and Development Agency). ↑
Executive reorganizations are no longer legally facilitated, which has shifted pressure within the White House to find other ways to make structural changes and to deal with personalities. See Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1789, 1818–22 (2015). ↑
There are also some smaller processes that do not envision a strong role for USTR like Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, especially if they were created simultaneously with or before USTR’s creation. Pub. L. 87-794, § 232, 76 Stat. 872, 877 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1862). ↑
See 28 U.S.C. § 1581. ↑
See, e.g., 19 C.F.R. § 201.7 (2020). ↑
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 341, 88 Stat. 1978, 2053–54. ↑
This empowerment was much slower than other empowerments of other commissions which is why it is unusual—most could regulate, but not so with ITC until 1974. Tarullo, supra note 113, at 581 & n.109. ↑
John M. Dobson, Two Centuries of Tariffs: The Background and Emergence of the U.S. International Trade Commission 119 (1976). ↑
Id. at 132. ↑
These concerns bear some resemblance to the problems we see in other EOP super-agencies. See, e.g., Pasachoff, supra note 7, at 2250–71. ↑
See, e.g., Patrice McDermott & Emily Manna, Secrecy, Democracy and the TPP: Trade Transparency Is What the Public Wants—and Needs, Hill (Sept. 12, 2016, 7:30 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/295365-secrecy-democracy-and-the-tpp-trade-transparency-is-what [https://perma.cc/2PA3-N7DG]. ↑
Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-26, § 104(f), 129 Stat. 320, 342 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 4203). Some members of Congress expressed concern that the role has been vacant during the Trump administration. See, e.g., Press Release, Rep. Debbie Dingell, Dingell, Pascrell Demand Increased Transparency at USTR (Mar. 29, 2018), https://debbiedingell.house.gov/news/‌documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=1359 [https://perma.cc/RT2Y-YU5P]. ↑
Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 1, at 635. ↑
Off. of the Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Com., OIG-20-003-M, Management Alert: Certain Communications by Department Officials Suggest Improper Influence in the Section 232 Exclusion Request Review Process (2019). ↑
See, e.g., David Shepardson, Trump Administration Won’t Turn Over Auto Import Probe Report, Defying Congress, Reuters (Jan. 21, 2020, 12:56 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade/trump-administration-wont-turn-over-auto-import-probe-report-defying-congress-idUSKBN1ZK2A1 [https://perma.cc/W86W-HYLV]. ↑
See David Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law, 46 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 563, 565 (2008). ↑
I draw here from Jerry Mashaw’s foundational work on the subject. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance, in Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences 115, 121 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006). ↑
Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 2073, 2135 (2005). ↑
See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 47, 52 (2006). This study provides additional support for the phenomena that Bressman and Vandenbergh describe in their important work. For one, there is much more happening in OIRA review than meets the eye. ↑
And it did. For some examples, see Claussen, Trade Executive Agreements, supra note 115. ↑
Missing from the literature is a comprehensive study of the congressional consultation power—its scope, meaning, and implication. Other scholars have likewise noted its prevalence. See, e.g., Lucas Issacharoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Constitutional Implications of the Cost of War, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 169, 185 & n.81 (2016) (discussing and citing sources on congressional oversight in war powers as requiring consultation). In the case of USTR, this responsibility primarily involves reporting to congressional committees. Different statutes also provide for members of Congress to be designated congressional advisors, accredited to advise USTR particularly with respect to negotiations. See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 161, 88 Stat. 1978, 2008. ↑
See Frederick Davis, The Regulation and Control of Foreign Trade, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1428, 1459–60 (1966). ↑
A third difficulty that I will take up further below in the context of reform is the challenge of establishing standing. ↑
As Davis puts it, it is “[p]residential button-pushing.” Davis, supra note 212, at 1458. ↑
Administrative Procedure Act § 2, 5 U.S.C. § 551; see also Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992) (holding that the President was not an “agency” within the meaning of the APA). ↑
For a recent application, see Invenergy Renewables LLC v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 3d 1255, 1281–83 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019). ↑
Interestingly, it is more often the statutes that pre-date the APA that were amended to refer to the APA than those that came after. But bear in mind again that only a fraction of USTR’s authority comes from statute. Where powers are subdelegated, presidents rarely specify process. Courts may find determinative a difference between authorities for direct action delegated to USTR by Congress, authorities subdelegated by the President, or authorities for making recommendations to the President delegated by Congress. For example, compare Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2141–42 (subdelegated by President), and id. § 201, 88 Stat. at 2011–12 (delegated by Congress), with Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 361, § 337, 46 Stat. 590, 703–04 (delegated by Congress). ↑
Under such generally applicable statutes as the Federal Records Act and the Freedom of Information Act, USTR is considered an “agency.” Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Instruction 511.2, USTR Records Mgt. Program (2010) https://ustr.gov/sites/‌default/files/uploads/gsp/speeches/reports/IP/ACTA/about%20us/reading%20room/USTR%20Instruction%20511-2%20Records%20Management%20Program.pdf [https://perma.cc/NBY5-VRGZ] (internal guidance recognizing USTR as an “agency” subject to the Federal Records Act); Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, FOIA Reference Guide, https://ustr.gov/about-us/reading-room/freedom-information-act-foia/foia-reference-guide [https://perma.cc/CEC8-CT29] (last visited Mar. 8, 2020) (indicating that USTR is an “agency” subject to FOIA requests). ↑
Invenergy is one of the very few cases that has confronted the question at all. In a preliminary injunction order and opinion in that case, Judge Katzmann concludes that administrative law in its traditional tenets applies broadly to trade law, although it remains to be seen how far this conclusion may stretch and what sorts of USTR rulemaking it sweeps in. 422 F. Supp. 3d 1255, 1288 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019). As Ganesh Sitaraman has noted, the foreign-affairs exception is itself limited and agencies engaged in foreign-affairs work are still subject to the APA’s protections. Ganesh Sitaraman, Foreign Hard Look Review, 66 Admin. L. Rev. 489, 492–93 (2014). ↑
See Exec. Off. of the President, Memorandum of March 22, 2018: Actions by the United States Related to the Section 301 Investigation of China’s Laws, Policies, Practices, or Actions Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 83 Fed. Reg. 13,099, 13,100 (Mar. 27, 2018). ↑
See Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, Procedures to Consider Requests for Exclusion of Particular Products From the Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,181, 32,182 (July 11, 2018) (outlining the process for requesting a product be excluded from proposed tariffs). ↑
Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, China Section 301—Tariff Actions and Exclusion Process, https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301-investigations/tariff-actions [https://perma.cc/5Z3V-BEAA] (last visited Apr. 19, 2021) (listing numerous exclusions granted and extended). The Court of International Trade in a recent case decided that USTR’s withdrawal of an exclusion from tariffs imposed by the President under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 was insufficient for administrative law norms. See Invenergy, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 1286–88. It left open the question of what process USTR ought to have used to implement the exclusions in the first place. ↑
Advanced search conducted in Westlaw using party name: “trade /5 representative,” removing FOIA cases, and limiting results to reported cases using a Westlaw filter. Sample cases found with this search include: Forest Stewardship v. USTR, 405 F. App’x 144, 146 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Essentially, the best the Appellants hope for is that a judgment will somehow encourage USTR to renegotiate the SLA with Canada, even though the court lacks the power to direct the executive branch’s conduct of foreign negotiations directly.”); U.S. Ass’n of Importers of Textiles & Apparel v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1344, 1350–51 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004) (granting a preliminary injunction against an interagency committee with USTR only as one of several named defendants while noting only the “seriousness” of the question whether the APA’s rulemaking procedures applied to the committee), rev’d sub nom. U.S. Ass’n of Importers of Textiles & Apparel v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 413 F.3d 1344, 1345–46, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (reversing on ripeness grounds and a failure to show likelihood of success on the merits); Silfab Solar, Inc. v. United States, 892 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (involving USTR, but only in relation to a presidential proclamation). ↑
See Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 211, 259–61, 272–73 (2015) (describing legal and political theories that support this claim). ↑
See, e.g., Eamonn Butler, Public Choice—A Primer 88 (2012) (noting public choice theorists who formulated the theory that government bureaucrats have a strong interest in expanding the size and scope of the government sector). ↑
Even if USTR’s actions were to be considered reviewable, many consider it futile to challenge its decisions. Interviews with Trade Pracs. (Jan. 2020) (some even appear to fear retaliation from the government). Beyond the scope of this Article is a further discussion to be had about how trade lawmaking could influence what commentators mean by “rules.” This Article appropriates the term for its explanatory force, but its invocation may also have legal force and therefore may be used selectively by advocates in this context. ↑
See supra Part I. ↑
Press Release, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Statement on Successful Conclusion of Steel Negotiations with Mexico (Nov. 5, 2020), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/november/ustr-statement-successful-conclusion-steel-negotiations-mexico [https://perma.cc/VC9W-Q4VK]. ↑
See Claussen, Trade Executive Agreements, supra note 115, at 33–34. ↑
In other forthcoming work, I present original empirical research on more than 1,220 agreements of similar nature. Hundreds of trade executive agreements suffer from the same questionable legality—but the present state of the law permits no challenge to their conclusion and implementation. See Claussen, Trade Executive Agreements, supra note 115, at 7. ↑
Hawkins & Norwood, supra note 77, at 86. ↑
Id. ↑
As it did with the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. See Kimberly Ann Elliott, Trump and Pelosi Both Claim Victory on the USMCA. Who Really Won?, World Pol. Rev. (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28451/trump-and-pelosi-both-claim-victory-on-the-new-nafta-who-really-won [https://perma.cc/EH8P-3NRD]. ↑
For an example of easy manipulation, see the situation with the Section 232 tariff exclusion process noted above. Lydia DePillis, How Trump’s Trade War Is Making Lobbyists Rich and Slamming Small Businesses, ProPublica (Jan. 6, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-trump-trade-war-is-making-lobbyists-rich-and-slamming-small-businesses [https://perma.cc/T786-DY5S]. I have not taken up here questions of accessibility which are among the non-transparent aspects of USTR’s work, but which may benefit certain actors. ↑
Some have said that the statutory language today still permits action against “virtually any trade practice the USTR wishes to attack.” Alan O. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial Relations: The Limited Case for Section 301, 23 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 263, 306 (1992). ↑
Notably, while Congress could legislate to restrict this type of movement or to re-assign these authorities, it rarely does so. ↑
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,141, 64 Fed. Reg. 63,169 (Nov. 18, 1999) (setting policy to do environmental reviews); Exec. Order No. 13,786, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,721 (Apr. 5, 2017) (calling for a report on deficits); Exec. Order No. 13,601, 77 Fed. Reg. 12,981 (Mar. 5, 2012) (creating the Interagency Trade Enforcement Center); Exec. Order No. 13,785, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,719 (Apr. 5, 2017) (establishing enhanced collection of anti-dumping and countervailing duties); Exec. Order No. 13,796, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,819 (May 4, 2017) (dictating how every trade agreement should uphold certain principles). ↑
See Tarullo, supra note 81, at 317–18 n.114. ↑
This “single responsible authority” concept has been hailed as an improvement. Stanley D. Metzger, Trade Agreements and the Kennedy Round 92 (1964). For the same point in the OIRA context, see Michael A. Livermore, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 609, 613 (2014); Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1838, 1841–42 (2013). These positive accounts have led some scholars to call for an expansion or extension of OIRA-type agencies. See Jennifer Nou, Agency Coordinators Outside of the Executive Branch, 128 Harv. L. Rev. F. 64, 65 (2015). ↑
The foreign relations literature is rife with one-voice doctrine analyses. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the “One-Voice” Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 975, 979 (2001) (describing “[t]he ‘one-voice’ doctrine” as “a familiar mantra of U.S. foreign relations jurisprudence”). As I point out below, having USTR at the center helps, but it is insufficient to ensure that the United States speaks with just one voice in its foreign engagements—in some ways, it has the opposite effect. A more horizontal trade landscape means more agencies are engaged in diagonal rulemaking. ↑
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928). ↑
Caroline Freund & Christine McDaniel, How Long Does It Take To Conclude a Trade Agreement with the US?, Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ. (July 21, 2016), https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/how-long-does-it-take-conclude-trade-agreement-us [https://perma.cc/VAP2-GJKJ]. ↑
For an elaboration and list of these agreements, see Claussen, supra note 115. For one illustration: the USDA, together with USTR, negotiated details around trade in sheep offals with China—directly and without congressional review. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Economic and Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China Fact Sheet: Agriculture and Seafood Related Provisions 4 (2020), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/phase%20one%20agreement/Phase_One_Agreement-Ag_Summary_Long_Fact_Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/TCK9-G9ND]; see also Lighthizer: China Deal Will Be an Executive Agreement, Not Submitted to Congress, Inside U.S. Trade (Feb. 27, 2019, 11:15 AM), https://insidetrade.com/trade/lighthizer-china-deal-will-be-executive-agreement-not-submitted-congress [https://perma.cc/KSQ8-XES3] (noting lack of congressional review). ↑
USTR compiles these in an annex to its annual report. See 2019 Annual Report, supra note 102, Annex II. ↑
The Section 232 investigations by the Commerce Department are one example. The statute provides no role for USTR and indeed the steel and aluminum Section 232 investigations began before Ambassador Lighthizer was confirmed by the Senate. See Jacob M. Schlesinger & Natalie Andrews, Senate Confirms Robert Lighthizer as Trump’s U.S. Trade Representative, Wall St. J. (May 11, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/senate-confirms-robert-lighthizer-as-trumps-u-s-trade-representative-1494529048 [https://perma.cc/TD6Q-KC6R]; Bureau of Indus. & Sec. Off. of Tech. Evaluation, U.S. Dep’t of Com., The Effect of Imports of Steel on the National Security 18 (2018), https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/steel/2224-the-effect-of-imports-of-steel-on-the-national-security-with-redactions-20180111/file [https://perma.cc/AEC6-MA3H] (noting the 232 investigations began in April 2017). ↑
Interview with Trade Prac., Washington, D.C. (Nov. 21, 2019). These differences can be seen in the jurisprudence of the Court of International Trade. Id. ↑
U.S.-China Trade: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 116th Cong. (2020) (testimony of Robert Lighthizer, Ambassador, U.S. Trade Rep.) [hereinafter Lighthizer Testimony] (repeating that the Section 232 national security tariffs were not in “[his] lane”). ↑
See Hawkins & Norwood, supra note 77, at 93–95 (discussing the Hull-Peek controversy in 1934 in which Peek, a special advisor on foreign trade, negotiated an agreement with Germany for cotton but Secretary Hull urged the President to disapprove); see also Ellery C. Stowell, Editorial Comment: Secretary Hull’s Trade Agreements, 29 Am. J. Int’l L. 280, 283 (1935) (discussing allocation of power between State and Commerce). ↑
See, e.g., Sabrina Rodriguez, Lighthizer, Mnuchin and Liu Play Telephone, Politico (Nov. 26, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-trade/2019/‌11/26/lighthizer-mnuchin-and-liu-play-telephone-783072 [https://perma.cc/TM2G-MA9T]; Damian Paletta, Top Trump Trade Officials Still at Odds After Profane Shouting Match in Beijing, Wash. Post (May 16, 2018, 6:42 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/‌business/wp/2018/05/16/top-trump-trade-officials-still-at-odds-after-profane-shouting-match-in-beijing/ [https://perma.cc/F5ZJ-DC63]; Logan Pauley, Consistent Inconsistency Crippling Trump’s China Trade Ambitions, Hill (May 31, 2018, 8:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/390085-consistent-inconsistency-crippling-trumps-china-trade-ambitions [https://perma.cc/7YNX-8A9S]. ↑
Claussen, Separation of Trade Law Powers, supra note 1, at 326 (describing how this occurs in trade). ↑
Eizenstat, supra note 190 (noting that the administration’s reorganization proposal “would weaken and even further fragment trade policy” putting USTR in a “bulky Commerce Department bureaucracy,” and that the USTR’s “most important asset” is direct access to the President). ↑
USTR cannot be “both a trade advocate and an interagency coordinator.” Id. ↑
Additional work is needed to unpack where the expertise should be and where and how coherence may be valuable in trade institutional design. Administrative law scholars have long studied issues related to capture and expertise. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 51, 94 (2008) (explaining that the Supreme Court has considered whether an administrative actor utilized their expertise in deciding whether to apply Skidmore deference); Steven P. Croley, Regulation and Public Interests: The Possibility of Good Regulatory Government 3–4 (2008) (arguing administrative procedures help to insulate agencies against capture). But see Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 Duke L.J. 1321, 1325 (2010) (arguing that transparency requirements in the rulemaking process without proper filtration of information have facilitated what she calls “information capture”—where well-resourced parties inundate regulators with information as a means of influencing them). Little of this work has extended these explorations to traditional trade domains. ↑
This is a flip side of administrative scholars’ critique of OMB and OIRA as selective. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1260, 1266–69 (2006) (criticizing OIRA for its overly narrow focus on regulatory costs); Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 209, at 92–96 (critiquing OIRA’s lack of transparency, selectivity, and narrow focus on costs based on interviews with agency officials who have participated in OIRA review). USTR’s review is legalized in contrast. ↑
As Tom Merrill has noted, “to allow the EOP to displace the myriad agencies by becoming the ‘decider’ would weaken legal constraints on administrative action, and deprive affected interests and individuals from having an effective voice in the implementation of regulatory policy.” Thomas W. Merrill, Presidential Administration and the Traditions of Administrative Law, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1953, 1979–80 (2015). ↑
See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 104, at 212–16 (describing the role of the Treasury Department in international economic lawmaking shaping policies as needed in coordination with international organization). ↑
On the longstanding transmission belt idea in administrative law, see Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1675 (1975). ↑
See generally Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 1, at 598–601. ↑
See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1897, 1919–24 (2015). ↑
See Lighthizer Testimony, supra note 249, at 18–19; Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 16–17, Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel v. United States, 806 Fed. App’x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (No. 19-1727). ↑
Invenergy Renewables LLC v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 3d 1255, 1288–89 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019). ↑
Doug Palmer, Secrecy Needed in Trade Talks: USTR Kirk, Reuters (May 13, 2012, 1:56 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-kirk-idUSBRE84C0AQ20120513 [https://perma.cc/TZ9G-CU4J]. ↑
Lighthizer Testimony, supra note 249, at 18–19. ↑
The Case-Zablocki Act (Case Act for short) requires executive branch agencies to report their international agreements to Congress through the State Department. 1 U.S.C. § 112b. ↑
See Cleveland, supra note 242, at 979. ↑
See, e.g., Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 20, Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel v. United States, 806 Fed. App’x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (No. 19-1727). ↑
See, e.g., Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel v. United States, 806 F. App’x 982, 988–89 (Fed. Cir. 2020). ↑
Graham, supra note 108, at 235. ↑
See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 261, at 1901. ↑
Tim Meyer has discussed the dangers of disjunctions in our trade law. See Timothy Meyer, Misaligned Lawmaking, 73 Vand. L. Rev. 151, 154–55 (2020). ↑
See Sitaraman, supra note 219, at 492. ↑
See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 47, 239–68 (2009) (broadly re-balancing in foreign affairs including trade). Important recent contributions in the latter category include: Timothy Meyer, Local Liability in International Economic Law, 95 N.C. L. Rev. 261, 269 (2017) (“[D]irect liability for subnational governments should replace strict vicarious liability and immunity in international economic law.”); Alexia Brunet Marks, The Right to Regulate (Cooperatively), 38 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 1, 8 (2016) (“[W]hen it comes to food safety, the harms caused by regulatory pluralism outweigh the benefits.”); Gregory Shaffer, Alternatives for Regulatory Governance Under TTIP: Building from the Past, 22 Colum. J. Eur. L. 403, 403–04 (2016) (proposing six alternative paradigms to evaluate negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership). ↑
See, e.g., Henry Olsen, Opinion, The President Has Too Much Power Over on Tariffs. Congress Should Reclaim That Authority., Wash. Post (June 14, 2019, 3:17 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/06/14/president-has-too-much-power-over-tariffs-congress-should-reclaim-that-authority/ [https://perma.cc/88DQ-BD6Y]; Glenn Altschuler, How Congress Can Take Back Control Over Tariffs, Hill (June 2, 2019, 12:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/446513-how-congress-can-take-back-control-over-tariffs [https://perma.cc/3SYX-B75Z]; Packard, Congress Should Take Back Its Authority Over Tariffs, supra note 4. ↑
See, e.g., Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 1169, 1230 (2019) (arguing that “executive power” was originally understood as “a discrete subset of . . . substantive authorities”). ↑
See, e.g., Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 1, 5, Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel v. United States, 806 Fed. App’x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (No. 19-1727). ↑
Compare Almond Bros. Lumber Co. v. United States, No. 10-37, 2010 WL 1409656, at *1–*3 (Ct. Int’l Trade Apr. 4, 2010) (concluding that the CIT lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review the Softwood Lumber Agreement because plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence that the agreement was negotiated under Section 301) with Invenergy Renewables LLC v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 3d 1255, 1263–70 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019) (concluding that the CIT had jurisdiction under Section 201 to review USTR’s withdrawal of its prior exclusion of a product from safeguard duties). ↑
See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (“[T]he President . . . shall take all appropriate and feasible action . . . which the President determines will facilitate efforts by the domestic industry to make a positive adjustment to import competition and provide greater economic and social benefits than costs.”). ↑
Interviews with Trade Pracs. (Jan. 2020) (commenting that they do not believe USTR’s actions qualify for APA review). But see infra text accompanying note 288. ↑
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). ↑
Cf. Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 441, 453–56 (2010) (reviewing presidential administration and the roles of OMB and OIRA). ↑
See Claussen, supra note 115, at 3 (describing agency practice). ↑
See Cary Coglianese, Administrative Law: The United States and Beyond, in International Encyclopedia of Social & Behavioral Sciences 109 (James D. Wright ed., 2d ed. 2015). ↑
See, e.g., Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1319–20 (11th Cir 2001) (finding the question whether NAFTA was appropriately concluded as a congressional-executive agreement to be a “nonjusticiable political question”). ↑
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic 5 (2011) (arguing that while there is no guarantee that an unbound executive will “pursue the public interest,” there is also “no pragmatically feasible alternative” and that “politics and public opinion . . . block the most lurid forms of executive abuse”). ↑
Outdatedly, see William D. Araiza, Note, Notice-and-Comment Rights for Administrative Decisions Affecting International Trade: Heightened Need, No Response, 99 Yale L.J. 669 (1989); Davis, supra note 212; George Bronz, The Tariff Commission as a Regulatory Agency, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 463 (1961). ↑
In fiscal year 2018, 242 new cases were filed with CIT. U.S. Cts., U.S. Court of International Trade—Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month Periods Ending September 30, 2017 and 2018, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default–/files/data_tables/jb_g1_0930.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/XMY9-KTGP]. ↑
Id. Exceptionally, in autumn 2020, more than 3600 complaints were filed at the CIT against USTR for its Section 301 activities. See Standard Procedure Order, In Re Section 301 Cases, No. 21-01 (U.S. Ct. Int’l Trade, 2021). ↑
Existing accounts are dated. Frederick Davis and Daniel Tarullo each penned their reviews of trade administrative concerns in 1966 and 1986 respectively. See Davis, supra note 212; Tarullo, supra note 81. That there is such a dearth is surprising given that some of the most important administrative law and nondelegation cases from the twentieth century are related to trade law (e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928)). ↑
Sitaraman, supra note 219, at 496–97. ↑
David Zaring makes this point, relying on earlier work by Jerry Mashaw. See Zaring, supra note 104, at 194. ↑
For a broader critique of this point, see Emily S. Bremer, The Exceptionalism Norm in Administrative Adjudication, 2019 Wis. L. Rev. 1351, 1352–53 (2019) (arguing that, in agency adjudications, “Congress and individual agencies have . . . create[d] unique adjudicatory proceedings designed to meet the individual needs of different administrative agencies and programs”). ↑
More work is needed to consider both how and whether it may be possible to change conventional ideas of administrative law to “accommodate” trade law and both how and whether trade law might adopt more conventional administrative law processes. ↑
See generally Patrick C. Reed, Expanding the Jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of International Trade: Proposals by the Customs and International Trade Bar Association, 26 Brook. J. Int’l L. 819 (2017) (discussing the limitations on the CIT’s jurisdiction); accord Devin S. Sikes, Why Congress Should Expand the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the United States Court of International Trade, 6 S.C. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 253, 254 (2010) (“The federal statutes vesting the CIT with jurisdiction over international trade disputes do not account for the evolution of international trade into new areas.”). ↑
Galbraith, supra note 184, at 1693 (noting that the executive branch agencies’ loyalty is “divided”). ↑
For an overview of these proposals, see Kathleen Claussen, Trade War Battles: Congress Reconsiders Its Role, Lawfare (Aug. 5, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com–/trade-war-battles-congress-reconsiders-its-role [https://perma.cc/D5R2-T8HP]. ↑

Taxing Nudges

Governments are increasingly turning to behavioral economics to inform policy design in areas like health care, the environment, and financial decision-making. Research shows that small behavioral interventions, referred to as “nudges,” often produce significant responses at a low cost. The theory behind nudges is that, rather than mandating certain behaviors or providing costly economic subsidies, modest initiatives may “nudge” individuals to choose desirable outcomes by appealing to their behavioral preferences. For example, automatically enrolling workers into savings plans as a default, rather than requiring them to actively sign up, has dramatically increased enrollment in such plans. Similarly, allowing individuals to earn “wellness points” from attendance at a gym, redeemable at various retail establishments, may improve exercise habits.

A successful nudge should make a desired choice as simple and painless as possible. Yet one source of friction may counteract an otherwise well-designed nudge: taxation. Under current tax laws, certain incentives designed to nudge behavior are treated as taxable income. At best, people are ignorant of taxes on nudges, an outcome that is not good for the tax system. At worst, taxes on nudges may actively deter people from participating in programs with worthy policy goals. To date, policymakers have generally failed to account for this potential obstacle in designing nudges.

This Article sheds light on the tax treatment of nudges and the policy implications of taxing them. It describes the emergence of a disjointed tax regime that exempts private party nudges, but taxes identical incentives that come from the government. What is more, an incentive structured as a government grant may be taxable while an economically identical tax credit is not. The Article then proposes reforms that would unify the tax treatment of nudges and enhance their effectiveness. Specifically, lawmakers should reverse the default rule that all government transfers are taxable, and instead exclude government transfers from income unless otherwise provided by the Tax Code.

Introduction

Imagine that every ten years, a flood decimates the banks of a river, destroying homes and other buildings in its wake. Each time, the flood causes millions of dollars of damage and leaves some people homeless or jobless. The local government incurs enormous costs in the aftermath to clean up damage and provide subsidies to victims.

Now imagine that experts determine that a measure can be taken to “flood proof” homes and other buildings. The measure costs several thousand dollars per building, but this pales in comparison to the cost of cleaning up flood damage. Naturally, policymakers would be eager to encourage residents along the riverbank to undertake the improvements. But people tend to be present-biased and discount future harms, and the residents are unmotivated to make the improvements.¹1.See infra Subsection I.B.6.Show More What can policymakers do?

One option would be to mandate flood proofing and penalize those who do not do it. But this would be politically unpopular and entail enforcement costs. Another option would be simply to pay for the flood proofing for each resident; but this may be cost prohibitive.

There may be a third option, however. Suppose that lawmakers decide to offer a small carrot—a “nudge”—to encourage people to flood proof their homes. They might, for example, offer a modest cash reward—say $300—for doing so. Or they might offer to provide a warranty for any flood damage incurred after the improvement is made. The small nudge may be enough to motivate people to flood proof their homes. If the nudge is effective, the government might succeed in protecting its residents’ homes at a fraction of the cost of using penalties or paying for the improvements outright.

Nudges are an increasingly popular policy tool in many contexts. Insights from behavioral economics reveal that people’s irrational tendencies may lead them to make suboptimal decisions, such as failing to flood proof their homes, opting not to save for retirement, or not applying to college. For example, people’s failure to save for retirement is often just due to sheer inaction—what researchers call “status quo bias,” ²2.See infra note 15 and accompanying text.Show More rather than any rational decision about how to spend one’s money. Making retirement savings easier by defaulting people into savings plans is an example of a simple nudge that achieves a desired policy at a low cost.

The term “nudge” was famously coined by Professors Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein to describe an intervention that “alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.”³3.Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness 6 (2d ed. 2009).Show More Nudges might make a desired choice easier or simpler for people, they might help people overcome bad habits like procrastination, or they may simply provide people with better information.⁴4.Cass R. Sunstein, Misconceptions About Nudges, 2 J. Behav. Econ. for Pol’y 61, 61 (2018).Show More Governments around the world have increasingly used nudges to enact cost-effective policies to improve the welfare of their citizens.

Nudges come in many forms: shifting defaults, like in the case of savings plans; sending people text message reminders to apply for college financial aid; or simplifying instructions on forms. Other nudges provide small incentives, like cash rewards or “wellness points” one might earn for achieving health goals. Regardless of the form of a particular nudge, it should make a desired choice as simple and painless as possible.

Yet one source of friction may counteract an otherwise well-designed nudge: taxation.

Under current tax laws, certain incentives aimed at nudging behavior are treated as taxable income. While nudges like defaults or text message reminders do not have tax consequences, nudges that provide an economic benefit to the recipient may be taxable. This is true regardless of whether the benefit comes in the form of cash, property, or services. For example, if a local government offers its citizens a $300 reward for flood proofing their homes, that grant would be subject to federal income taxation.

At best, people are ignorant of taxes on nudges, an outcome that is not good for the tax system. It may be particularly counterintuitive to people that government grants would be subject to tax. At worst, taxes on nudges may actively deter people from participating in programs with worthy policy goals. For example, homeowners may decide to forego a cash reward for flood proofing their home because they do not want to deal with the hassle of reporting it or because they do not want to attract scrutiny from the IRS. To date, policymakers have generally failed to account for this potential obstacle in designing nudges.

This Article sheds light on the tax treatment of nudges and the policy implications of taxing them. It first describes the emergence of a disjointed tax regime that often exempts nudges that come from private parties, but taxes identical incentives that come from the government. As a default, the tax law generally treats all economic benefits as taxable income. However, broad exceptions exist for certain incentives provided by employers to their employees, which are often classified as nontaxable fringe benefits. Similarly, incentives paid by nonprofits to individuals are likely to be treated as nontaxable gifts. Nudges provided by businesses to paying customers are also exempt from tax under the judicially created “purchase price adjustment” doctrine.

When it comes to identical incentives provided by governments, however, none of the fringe benefit, gift, or purchase price adjustment exclusions apply. Furthermore, while many government transfers are exempt from tax under other exclusions—for example, welfare assistance, veterans’ benefits, Social Security, and Medicare—those rules do not cover most nudges. Without a special exclusion, incentive-based nudges provided by governments are generally subject to tax under current laws. This regime does not appear to be a product of design, but is more likely the result of a piecemeal system of tax exemptions that has developed over time. Perhaps even more confounding is that an incentive structured as a government grant may be taxable, while an economically identical tax credit is not.

After examining the tax treatment of the most common types of nudges, this Article proposes reforms that would unify the tax treatment of nudges and enhance their effectiveness. It argues that lawmakers should reverse the default rule that all government transfers are taxable, and instead provide a rule that government transfers are excluded from income unless otherwise provided by the Tax Code. This would ensure that nudges designed to promote worthy policy goals would be exempt from tax as a default matter, unless Congress specifically decides otherwise. As an alternative to this broad proposal, the Article also proposes legislation that would exempt specific nudges from tax in the areas of health and environmental protection. Under either approach, exempting nudges from tax will make them more effective and should not pose serious revenue consequences.

This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the concept of a nudge and categorizes the most common types of nudges. Part II provides an overview of the tax system and discusses the current tax treatment of nudges. Part III discusses policy implications of the current tax regime, including proposals to reform the tax treatment of nudges. Part IV concludes that the simplest, yet most effective, way to unify the tax treatment of nudges would be for Congress to provide a default of nontaxability for government transfers.

* George R. Ward Term Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. I am grateful to Andrew Benton for excellent research assistance, and to helpful comments from Ellen Aprill, Peter Barnes, Fred Bloom, Michelle Drumbl, Heather Field, Brian Galle, Brant Hellwig, Andy Hessick, Carissa Hessick, Ed McCaffery, Pat Oglesby, Leigh Osofsky, Gregg Polsky, Katie Pratt, Rich Schmalbeck, Ted Seto, Jay Soled, Sloan Speck, Manoj Viswanathan, Larry Zelenak and workshop participants at University of Colorado Law School, Duke Law School, Loyola Law School, Washington & Lee University School of Law, and UC Hastings College of Law. For Tessie DeLaney. ↑
See infra Subsection I.B.6. ↑
See infra note 15 and accompanying text. ↑
Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness 6 (2d ed. 2009). ↑
Cass R. Sunstein, Misconceptions About Nudges, 2 J. Behav. Econ. for Pol’y 61, 61 (2018). ↑
See, e.g., George Loewenstein & Nick Chater, Putting Nudges in Perspective, 1 Behav. Pub. Pol’y. 26, 29 (2017) (“Traditional economic interventions include taxes, subsidies and mandatory disclosure of information . . . .”). ↑
See, e.g., David Halpern, Inside the Nudge Unit: How Small Changes Can Make a Big Difference 4 (2015). ↑
See, e.g., Bruno S. Frey, A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues, 107 Econ. J. 1043, 1044–45 (1997). ↑
Cass R. Sunstein, Nudging: A Very Short Guide, 37 J. Consumer Pol’y 583, 583 (2014) (Nudges “generally cost little and have the potential to promote economic and other goals . . . .”). ↑
Halpern, supra note 6, at 22. ↑
Brian Galle argues that, in some circumstances, nudges are the most efficient choice of instrument. See Brian Galle, The Problem of Intrapersonal Cost, 18 Yale J. Health Pol’y, L., & Ethics 1, 32–50 (2018). ↑
Sunstein, supra note 8, at 585. However, for a critique of savings defaults, see Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1593, 1607–37 (2014). ↑
Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 110–11. ↑
Id. at 111. ↑
See, e.g., id. at 111–13 (automatic enrollment increased employee participation in savings plans from 65% to 90%, and could notably increase per-capita contribution percentages); Loewenstein & Chater, supra note 5, at 27. ↑
Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. Econ. Persp. 193, 197–98 (1991). ↑
See About SBST, SBST, https://sbst.gov/#report [https://perma.cc/S3YM-35MC] (last visited June 14, 2019). ↑
William J. Congdon & Maya Shankar, The White House Social & Behavioral Sciences Team: Lessons Learned from Year One, 1 Behav. Sci. & Pol’y 77, 83 (2015), https://behavioralpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/BSP_vol1is2_Congdon.pdf [https://perma.cc/EXF9-RWMV]. ↑
Id. ↑
See About Us, Behavioural Insights Team, https://www.bi.team/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/6BUF-95PA] (last visited Nov. 7, 2020) (“We have run more than 750 projects to date, including 400 randomised controlled trials in dozens of countries.”). ↑
See Christopher Larkin, Michael Sanders, Isabelle Andresen & Felicity Algate, Testing Local Descriptive Norms and Salience of Enforcement Action: A Field Experiment to Increase Tax Collection, 2 J. Behav. Pub. Admin. 1, 9–10 (2019); Dominic King et al., Redesigning the “Choice Architecture” of Hospital Prescription Charts: A Mixed Methods Study Incorporating In Situ Simulation Testing, 4 BMJ Open 1, 8–9 (2014); Peter John, Elizabeth MacDonald & Michael Sanders, Targeting Voter Registration with Incentives: A Randomized Controlled Trial of a Lottery in a London Borough, 40 Electoral Stud. 170, 175 (2015). ↑
See Zeina Afif, William Wade Islan, Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez & Abigail Goodnow Dalton, World Bank Group, Behavioral Science Around the World: Profiles of 10 Countries 6 (2019), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/710771543609067500/pdf/132610-REVISED-00-COUNTRY-PROFILES-dig.pdf [https://perma.cc/JDX2-R9UK]. ↑
See, e.g., Congdon & Shankar, supra note 17, at 84 (finding that letters sent to physicians comparing their prescribing rates with those of their peers had no measurable impact on prescription rates). ↑
See Afif et al., supra note 21, at 8–9. ↑
See, e.g., Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 12, 85. ↑
See, e.g., Johan Egebark & Mathias Ekström, Can Indifference Make the World Greener? 11–13 (Rsch. Inst. of Indus. Econ., IFN Working Paper No. 975, 2013). ↑
Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives? 302 Science 1338, 1338–39 (2003). ↑
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 8, at 585. ↑
Eric P. Bettinger, Bridget Terry Long, Philip Oreopoulos & Lisa Sanbonmatsu, The Role of Simplification and Information in College Decisions: Results from the H&R Block FAFSA Experiment 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 15361, 2009), https://www.nber.org/papers/w15361.pdf [https://perma.cc/XBV6-DL2U]. ↑
Id. at 26–27. ↑
Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349, 1372–73 (2011). ↑
Id. at 1373. ↑
See, e.g., New Text Message Reminders for Summons Recipients Improves Attendance in Court and Dramatically Cuts Warrants, Ideas42, https://www.ideas42.org/new-text-message-reminders-summons-recipients-improves-attendance-court-dramatically-cuts-warrants/ [https://perma.cc/5SMM-PPFH] (last visited June. 17, 2019) (finding that text message reminders in New York City reduced “failure to appear” rates by 26%). ↑
See Congdon & Shankar, supra note 17, at 83. ↑
See, e.g., Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 Am. Econ. Rev. 1145, 1165 (2009). ↑
Lisa L. Shu, Nina Mazar, Francesca Gino, Dan Ariely & Max H. Bazerman, Signing at the Beginning Makes Ethics Salient and Decreases Dishonest Self-Reports in Comparison to Signing at the End, 109 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 15197, 15197–98 (2012), http://www.pnas.org/content/109/38/15197.full.pdf+html [https://perma.cc/436E-DGL2] ↑
Id. at 15198. ↑
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 30, at 1381; Kate Phillips, Applying Behavioral Science Upstream in the Policy Design Process, Behav. Scientist (Sept. 17, 2018), https://behavioralscientist.org/applying-behavioral-science-upstream-in-the-policy-design-process/ [https://perma.cc/UWJ5-BBC7] (describing new laws implemented in Australia, requiring graphic images on cigarette labels, to reduce smoking rates). ↑
Michael Hallsworth, John A. List, Robert D. Metcalfe & Ivo Vlaev, The Behavioralist as Tax Collector: Using Natural Field Experiments to Enhance Tax Compliance 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20007, 2014), https://www.nber.org/papers/w20007 [https://perma.cc/W7LN-F2T2]. ↑
Hunt Allcott, Social Norms and Energy Conservation, 95 J. Pub. Econ. 1082, 1082–83 (2011). ↑
Sunstein, supra note 4, at 61 (distinguishing between nudges, which “must preserve freedom of choice,” and subsidies or other interventions, which “impose[] significant material costs on choosers”). ↑
This is assuming economically rational decision making on behalf of the homeowner, without factoring in other (realistic) costs, such as hassle costs and present bias. ↑
Sunstein, supra note 4, at 61. ↑
See Robert Münscher, Max Vetter & Thomas Scheuerle, A Review and Taxonomy of Choice Architecture Techniques, 29 J. Behav. Decision Making 511, 518 (2016) (defining micro-incentives as “changes of the consequences of decision options that are insignificant from a rational choice perspective”). ↑
Id. ↑
The small size of the payment makes it particularly less likely to function as a true subsidy, although it could. For example, if paying for bus fare to a local clinic was the impediment to a person obtaining a free flu shot, the $5 may operate as an economic subsidy free of behavioral considerations. For further discussion of the distinction between nudges and subsidies, see Brian Galle, Tax, Command . . . or Nudge?: Evaluating the New Regulation, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 837, 854–56 (2014) (explaining that “surprising and asymmetric incentives” are one factor distinguishing nudges from subsidies, and using a five-cent tax on plastic bags as an example of a financial consequence that is most likely a nudge, given that alternatives are generally more costly than the bag tax). ↑
Bronwyn McGill, Blythe J. O’Hara, Anne C. Grunseit & Philayrath Phongsavan, Are Financial Incentives for Lifestyle Behavior Change Informed or Inspired by Behavioral Economics? A Mapping Review, 33 Am. J. Health Promotion 131, 131 (2019) (“Since the 1960s, financial incentives (FIs) have been used in behavior change interventions, targeting a broad spectrum of health issues such as blood donation, medication adherence, and health and wellness programs.”). ↑
Soeren Mattke et al., Workplace Wellness Programs Study: Final Report, at xiv (Rand Corp. ed. 2013); see also Laura A Linnan, Laurie Cluff, Jason E. Lang, Michael Penne & Maija S. Leff, Results of the Workplace Health in America Survey, 3 Am. J. Health Promotion 652, 655 (2019) (over 46% of worksites surveyed had wellness programs). ↑
See Ha T. Tu & Ralph C. Mayrell, Employer Wellness Initiatives Grow, But Effectiveness Varies Widely, Nat’l Inst. for Health Care Reform, July 2010, at 2 (concluding that employers offer wellness programs to contain medical costs, to improve productivity, and to “position themselves as ‘employers of choice’”). ↑
Id. ↑
Id. at 2–3. ↑
Id. at 3–4. ↑
Mattke et al., supra note 47, at xv. ↑
Tu & Mayrell, supra note 48, at 5; Bahaudin G. Mujtaba & Frank J. Cavico, Corporate Wellness Programs: Implementation Challenges in the Modern American Workplace, 1 Int’l J. Health Pol’y & Mgmt. 193, 194 (2013) (mentioning gym reimbursements as a part of corporate wellness programs). ↑
See, e.g., Mujtaba & Cavico, supra note 53, at 194 (listing seminars as a part of corporate wellness programs). ↑
These wellness program incentives are regulated by several laws. For example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) imposes multiple nondiscrimination requirements. See Tu & Mayrell, supra note 48, at 6. ↑
Mattke et al., supra note 47, at 73 fig.5.3. ↑
Tu & Mayrell, supra note 48, at 5; see also Mujtaba & Cavico, supra note 53, at 196 (referencing “[h]ealth insurance discounts and reimbursements for employees who meet health standards and maintain a healthy lifestyle”). ↑
One report found that “[m]ost benefits consultants and wellness vendors believed that $100 is the ‘sweet spot’ for an incentive for a ‘single instance of behavior,’ such as HRA completion or participation in a specific wellness activity.” See Tu & Mayrell, supra note 48, at 5. ↑
John Cawley & Joshua A. Price, A Case Study of a Workplace Wellness Program That Offers Financial Incentives for Weight Loss, 32 J. Health Econ. 794, 795 (2013). ↑
Mattke et al., supra note 47, at xxi. ↑
But see Katherine Pratt, A Constructive Critique of Public Health Arguments for Anti-Obesity Soda Taxes and Food Taxes, 87 Tul. L. Rev. 73, 77–94 (2012) (discussing economic, externality-based justifications for anti-obesity taxes and subsidies). ↑
Present bias describes the tendency to value immediate rewards over future rewards, even if the future rewards are larger. See, e.g., Richard Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 Econ. Letters 201, 201 (1981). In the context of weight loss, it is hard for people to forego immediate benefits (a tasty meal, for example) in exchange for a future benefit (lower weight). ↑
See Cawley & Price, supra note 59, at 794 (“[P]eople may want to do what is in their long-run interest (lose weight), but consistently succumb to the temptation to eat and be sedentary.”). ↑
Id. ↑
Tu & Mayrell, supra note 48, at 5. ↑
Id. ↑
Sahil Gupta, Opinion, Earning Prizes for Fighting an Addiction, N.Y. Times (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/opinion/earning-prizes-for-fighting-an-addiction.html [https://perma.cc/58CN-DT45]. ↑
Id. ↑
Id. ↑
Id. ↑
Scott D. Halpern et al., Randomized Trial of Four Financial-Incentive Programs for Smoking Cessation, 372 N. Eng. J. Med. 2108, 2108 (2015). Another intervention explored in the study was a deposit program in which participants would put up their own funds and earn them back if they successfully quit. Although the deposit was very effective for those who chose it, the cash incentive was more successful overall at reducing smoking, because significantly more participants opted for the cash intervention over the deposit. Id. at 2114. ↑
See, e.g., Kevin G. Volpp et al., A Randomized, Controlled Trial of Financial Incentives for Smoking Cessation, 360 New Eng. J. Med. 699, 707 (2009) (finding that a group who received financial incentives to refrain from smoking had “significantly higher” rates of “prolonged abstinence” than did a control group, who did not receive the same incentives). ↑
See, e.g., Jody Sindelar, Opinion, Should We Pay People to Stop Smoking?, CNN (Oct. 5, 2011), https://www.cnn.com/2011/10/05/opinion/sindelar-smoking-medicaid/index.html [https://perma.cc/C3Y6-39H8]. ↑
Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 236. ↑
Joshua Rhett Miller, North Carolina Program Pays Girls a Dollar a Day Not to Get Pregnant, Fox News (June 25, 2009), https://www.foxnews.com/story/north-carolina-program-pays-girls-a-dollar-a-day-not-to-get-pregnant [https://perma.cc/L6JJ-7CVW]. The payment was contingent on attending a ninety-minute lesson each week, where the women learned about abstinence and contraception use. Id. ↑
Id. ↑
Dyan Zaslowsky, Denver Program Curbs Teen-Agers’ Pregnancy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1989, at A8. ↑
Economic Incentives, Environmental Protection Agency, https://www.epa.gov/‌environmental-economics/economic-incentives [https://perma.cc/UCT5-4JJB] (last visited Dec. 21, 2020) (explaining that market-based incentives, like taxes and subsidies, are “becoming increasingly popular as tools for addressing a wide range of environmental issues”). ↑
Christian Schubert, Green Nudges: Do They Work? Are They Ethical?, 132 Ecological Econ. 329, 329 (2017). ↑
See Howard Kunreuther & Elke U. Weber, Aiding Decision Making to Reduce the Impacts of Climate Change, 37 J. Consumer Pol’y 397, 397–98 (2014). ↑
See, e.g., Schubert, supra note 79, at 330 (defining green nudges as “nudges that aim at promoting environmentally benign behavior”). ↑
Id. ↑
See Hunt Allcott & Dmitry Taubinsky, Evaluating Behaviorally Motivated Policy: Experimental Evidence from the Lightbulb Market, 105 Am. Econ. Rev. 2501, 2501–02 (2015) (exploring the phenomenon and finding that moderate subsidies for energy-efficient lightbulbs may be effective in addressing this underinvestment). ↑
Free LED Program, Duke Energy, https://www.duke-energy.com/home/products/free-leds [https://perma.cc/FY93-D5L5] (last visited June 19, 2019); see also Commercial Retrofit, Puget Sound Energy, https://www.pse.com/rebates/business-incentives/commercial-retrofit-grants [https://perma.cc/R578-FS72] (last visited July 5, 2019) (providing coverage for up to 70% of the cost for energy efficient upgrades). ↑
Smart $aver: Home Improvement Rebate Program, Duke Energy, https://www.duke-energy.com/home/products/smart-saver [https://perma.cc/GAT6-GC5L] (last visited June 19, 2019). ↑
HVAC Install, Duke Energy, https://www.duke-energy.com/home/products/smart-saver/hvac-install [https://perma.cc/BE7P-YTJQ] (last visited June 19, 2019). ↑
Insulate & Seal, Duke Energy, https://www.duke-energy.com/home/products/smart-saver/insulate-and-seal [https://perma.cc/RC5K-V89W] (last visited June 19, 2019). ↑
Toshio Fujimi & Hirokazu Tatano, Promoting Seismic Retrofit Implementation Through “Nudge”: Using Warranty as a Driver, 33 Risk Analysis 1858, 1873 (2013). ↑
See id. at 1859–60. ↑
Id. at 1863. ↑
Id. at 1859. ↑
Id. at 1873. ↑
See supra note 62. ↑
See Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, The Modern Case for Withholding, 53 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 81, 124 (2019). ↑
See id. at 114. ↑
See Loewenstein & Chater, supra note 5, at 29–30. ↑
See Fujimi & Tatano, supra note 88, at 1872. ↑
Earthquake Brace + Bolt, https://www.earthquakebracebolt.com [https://perma.cc/‌5WPS-7X73] (last visited June 20, 2019). ↑
See, e.g., Cesarini v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 3, 4 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (“The starting point in determining whether an item is to be included in gross income is, of course, Section 61(a) of Title 26 U.S.C.”). ↑
I.R.C. § 61(a). The statute goes on to provide a non-exclusive list of items of gross income, such as compensation for services, interest, rents, royalties, and dividends. Id. ↑
348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). ↑
See, e.g., Cesarini, 296 F. Supp. at 4 (holding that cash found in a used piano constituted taxable income under I.R.C. § 61(a)); Turner v. Comm’r, 13 T.C.M. 462, 463 (1954) (holding that cruise tickets received as a prize from a radio station constituted taxable income, with the only issue being valuation); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14 (as amended in 1993) (expanding § 61(a) definition of gross income to include illegal gains and treasure troves, while clarifying that “[i]n addition to the items enumerated in section 61(a), there are many other kinds of gross income”). ↑
See I.R.C. § 74 (a). ↑
See Topic No. 420 Bartering Income, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc420 [https://perma.cc/4XMQ-EASH] (last visited June 20, 2019). ↑
The discussion omits other exclusions not relevant for this purpose, such as the non-taxation of imputed income under the Code, the realization requirement (§ 1001), and statutory exclusions like § 101 (life insurance proceeds) and § 103 (interest on state and local bonds). ↑
I.R.C. § 102. ↑
363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960). ↑
Id. ↑
Id. at 280, 291–92 (The transfer was “at bottom a recompense for Duberstein’s past services, or an inducement for him to be of further service in the future.”). ↑
Specifically, Code section 139 and the general welfare doctrine, both of which are discussed below. Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 283–84. ↑
Rev. Rul. 2005-46, 2005-2 C.B. 120. ↑
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2003-12, supra note 110, at 283. ↑
The exception is that certain employee achievement awards are excludable under I.R.C§ 74(c) (2018). ↑
Rev. Rul. 2003-12, supra note 110, at 284–85. ↑
Id. at 283–84. ↑
Rev. Rul. 99-44, 1999-44 I.R.B. 549–50. The matching contributions were gifts even though the savings accounts were established pursuant to a federal government program, which was administered by the charitable organization. ↑
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200442023 (Oct. 15, 2004). ↑
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200529004 (July 22, 2005). Although payments from charities to individuals are likely to receive gift treatment in most situations, the Duberstein standard must still be satisfied for the gift exclusion to apply. For example, the IRS has stated in informal guidance that if a charity makes a payment to a for-profit business, “[t]he IRS will evaluate whether . . . . the payment was made out of a moral or legal obligation, an anticipated economic benefit or in return for services . . . .” Internal Revenue Service, Disaster Relief20, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3833.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQ2W-R83D]. Generally, payments made to individuals that are part of a “charitable class” (i.e., “large enough or sufficiently indefinite that the community as a whole, rather than a pre-selected group of people, benefits when a charity provides assistance”) should qualify for gift treatment. Id. at 9. I am grateful to Ellen Aprill for bringing this limitation to my attention. ↑
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 132. ↑
See Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Revisiting the Taxation of Fringe Benefits, 91 Wash. L. Rev. 761, 770 (2016). ↑
See id. at 766–68. ↑
Id. at 769–70. ↑
I.R.C. § 132(d), (e). ↑
See Soled & Thomas, supra note 120, at 770. ↑
However, if an employee is a shareholder or owner of the employer, payments made to employees may be treated as dividends rather than as compensation. See, e.g., Andrew W. Stumpff, The Reasonable Compensation Rule, 19 Va. Tax. Rev. 371, 377 (1999). ↑
I.R.C. § 132(a)(4), (e). ↑
In a similar context but outside the employment setting, a court allowed for exclusion of an all-expenses-paid business trip to Germany because the payment was made for the convenience of the payer, rather than for the recipient’s benefit. United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118, 119, 122 (5th Cir. 1968). Neither courts nor the IRS have explicitly extended the line of reasoning in Gotcher to other settings, particularly to non-business settings. However, the line of reasoning in the case could arguably apply to exclude many nudges from income. The argument would be that payments made primarily for the payer’s benefit (e.g., a government grant program) are not taxable income to the payee. Thanks to Ted Seto for this observation. ↑
See, e.g., Pittsburgh Milk Co. v. Comm’r, 26 T.C. 707, 717 (1956); Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Comm’r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1755, 1758–59 (1977); Rev. Rul. 76-96, 1976-1 C.B. 23. ↑
See Rev. Rul. 76-96, 1976-1 C.B. 23. The taxpayer must reduce his basis in the property purchased by the amount of the rebate, resulting in a basis of $19,000 in this example. ↑
Freedom Newspapers, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1756–57. But see I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201004005 (Jan. 29, 2010) (ruling that grants paid by a third party were not excludable from income, even when the net effect was to reduce the buyer’s cost on a purchase transaction). In the private ruling, the IRS distinguished payments involving broker commissions, which are dependent upon the sales transactions, from third-party grants that are independent of the transaction. Id. ↑
The taxpayer received “Thank You Points” that were redeemable for airline miles. Shankar v. Comm’r, 143 T.C. 140, 148 (2014). The court also noted that the miles were not earned during business travel, which the IRS has singled out for non-enforcement in Announcement 2002-18, 2002-1 C.B. 621. ↑
Shankar, 143 T.C. at 148. ↑
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201027015, at 3 (July 9, 2010) (ruling that cash-back rebates are excluded from gross income as purchase price reductions). ↑
For taxpayers that are corporations, Code § 118 historically exempted “contributions to capital,” which covered many government grants to corporations. However, section 118 was amended in 2017 and currently does not exempt contributions to capital made by “any governmental entity.” I.R.C. § 118(b). Regardless, this Article is concerned with incentives provided to individual taxpayers, not corporations.
There are other special exclusions applicable to businesses not discussed in detail here. For example, Code § 48(d)(3) excludes grants made to developers and producers of renewable energy, pursuant to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. ↑
Greisen v. United States, 831 F.2d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1987). The Alaska Permanent Fund is funded by the state’s mineral royalties; it distributes earnings in the form of dividends to each resident of the state on an annual basis. Id. at 916–17; see also About Us, Alaska Department of Revenue: Permanent Fund Dividend Division, https://pfd.alaska.gov/Division-Info/About-Us [https://perma.cc/QHG2-M67C] (last visited July 1, 2019) (explaining the Alaska Permanent Fund eligibility and dividend calculation functions). ↑
Greisen, 831 F.2d at 919–20 (“According to the statement of purpose, the 1980 Act was intended: (1) to allow equitable distribution of part of the state’s wealth to Alaskans; (2) to encourage people to remain Alaska residents; and (3) to encourage awareness and interest in the management of the fund.”). ↑
See, e.g., Graff v. Comm’r, 673 F.2d 784, 785 (5th Cir. 1982). For a comprehensive discussion of the doctrine, see Theodore P. Seto & Sande L. Buhai, Tax and Disability: Ability to Pay and the Taxation of Difference, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1053, 1106–14 (2006); see generally Robert W. Wood & Richard C. Morris, The General Welfare Exception to Gross Income, 109 Tax Notes 203, 204–08 (2005) (describing the development of the General Welfare Exception and the prongs of the test determining whether a payment qualifies). ↑
Rev. Rul. 2005-46, 2005-2 C.B. 120; see also Rev. Rul. 74-205, 1974-1 C.B. 20 (ruling that housing payments to displaced families qualified under the general welfare exception, and were not includible in gross incomes of the recipients); Rev. Rul. 98-19, 1998-1 C.B. 840 (ruling that a relocation payment made to an individual moving from a flood-damaged residence qualified for the general welfare exception). ↑
I.R.S. Notice 99-3, 1999-1 C.B. 271, 272. ↑
Rev. Rul. 2005-46, supra note 138. ↑
Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 283; Rev. Rul. 76-144, 1976-1 C.B. 17. However, the IRS has ruled that payments to businesses do not qualify for the doctrine, because the need must be “individual or family” based. See Rev. Rul. 2005-46, supra note 138. ↑
Rev. Rul. 74-74, 1974-1 C.B. 18. ↑
Rev. Rul. 76-395, 1976-2 C.B. 16. ↑
88 T.C. 1293, 1301 (1987), acq. 1989-2 C.B. 1. The court excluded the grant from income on other grounds, however, finding that the taxpayer “lacked complete dominion” over the funds, which were paid directly to the contractor who did the work. ↑
Id. (noting that the only requirements to receive the grant “were ownership of the property and compliance with the building code”). ↑
The exclusion applies to “qualified disaster[s],” which also includes events involving terrorism or common carrier accidents. See I.R.C. § 139(c). For a critique of limiting the exclusion to qualified disasters only, see Ellen P. Aprill & Richard Schmalbeck, Post-Disaster Tax Legislation: A Series of Unfortunate Events, 56 Duke L.J. 51, 95 (2006). ↑
I.R.C. § 139(g). ↑
I.R.C. § 401(k). ↑
I.R.C. § 61. ↑
I.R.C. § 132(e). ↑
I.R.C. § 106(a). ↑
Rev. Rul. 2002-3, 2002-1 C.B. 316 (“Under §106(a), an employee may exclude premiums for accident or health insurance coverage that are paid by an employer.”). ↑
I.R.C. § 105(b). ↑
See, e.g., Office of Chief Counsel Internal Revenue Service Memorandum 201622031, at 1 (Apr. 14, 2016) [hereinafter “IRS Memo 201622031”]. ↑
I.R.C. § 61. ↑
Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(c) (as amended in 1992). ↑
I.R.C. § 132(e). ↑
Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(c) (as amended in 1992). The exception to this rule is cash for occasional overtime meals or transportation fare can be excluded as de minimis. See Treas. Reg. § 132-6(d)(2) (as amended in 1992). ↑
Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1) (as amended in 1992) (“Benefits excludable from income”). ↑
IRS Memo 201622031 at 4. ↑
Id. at 4. ↑
See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1)–(2) (as amended in 1992). ↑
See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. ↑
See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (as amended in 2003). ↑
I.R.C. § 132(e)(1). ↑
Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1)–(2) (as amended in 1992). ↑
See IRS Memo 201622031 at 2, 4–5. “Medical care” is defined in section 105(b) by reference to section 213(d) of the Code, which provides that medical care includes amounts paid “for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body.” I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(A). ↑
See IRS Memo 201622031 at 2, 5. ↑
See id. For examples of medical care under section 213, including smoking cessation programs, see IRS Publication 502, Medical and Dental Expenses, https://www.irs.gov/‌pub/irs-pdf/p502.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GGF-RMV3] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021). ↑
Medical expenses include payments for a weight-loss program “for a specific disease diagnosed by a physician,” so it is unlikely that a weight-loss program would qualify in the absence of a diagnosis. See IRS Publication 502, supra note 169. ↑
See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1) (as amended in 1992) (citing examples of “occasional” events, such as sports games or cocktail parties, as ones that qualify as de minimis). ↑
In an analogous context, it appears many service-type benefits offered by Silicon Valley companies, such as free dry cleaning, haircuts, or yoga classes, are likely not reported as taxable by those employers. See Soled & Thomas, supra note 120, at 779–86. ↑
Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(2) (as amended in 1992). However, onsite gyms operated by the employer qualify for exclusion. See I.R.C. § 132(j)(4). ↑
See IRS Memo 201622031 at 4–5. ↑
I.R.C. § 132(a)(2). ↑
I.R.C. § 132(c)(4). ↑
It follows that a private gym could offer discounted gym services to its own employees. ↑
See supra note 57 and accompanying text. ↑
See supra note 128 and accompanying text. ↑
See supra note 152. ↑
See IRS Memo 201622031 at 5. ↑
See id. at 2–5. ↑
See Rev. Rul. 2002-3, supra note 152. ↑
See supra note 73 and accompanying text. ↑
See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. ↑
See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text; 75–77 and accompanying text. ↑
See supra note 140 and accompanying text. ↑
See supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text. ↑
See IRS Publication 502, supra note 169. However, the deduction is only available to itemizers (those who do not claim the standard deduction) and is limited to the excess of 10% of the individual’s adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 213(a). ↑
I.R.C. § 105(b). ↑
I.R.C. § 104(a). ↑
Another exception, which would be irrelevant in this circumstance, is section 102, which would exclude from income medical care paid for by family members or friends. See I.R.C. § 102(a). ↑
See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. ↑
See, e.g., supra note 87. ↑
See supra note 129 and accompanying text. ↑
For example, in Freedom Newspapers v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1755 (1977), the Tax Court held that even a payment received by a third party broker several years after the original purchase “was sufficiently tied to the purchase that its characterization must be made by reference to the original transaction.” ↑
I.R.C. § 139(g). ↑
See supra note 141 and accompanying text. ↑
See supra note 98 and accompanying text. ↑
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201816004 (Jan. 11, 2018). See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201815005 (Jan. 11, 2018) (describing similar facts).
One theory that the IRS did not appear to consider is the purchase price adjustment doctrine. See supra Subsection II.A.2. Arguably, a state grant paid to a state taxpayer could be considered a non-taxable adjustment to the amount of taxes owed to the state by the grant recipient. (This assumes the grant recipient earns enough income to owe state taxes in excess of the grant.) While it is hard to distinguish a state grant from a seller rebate on economic grounds, it appears neither courts nor the IRS have extended the purchase price adjustment doctrine to this context. I am grateful to Heather Field for this observation. ↑
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201816004 (Jan 11. 2018). ↑
See Earthquake Mitigation Incentive and Tax Parity Act of 2017, H.R. 1691, 115th Cong. (2017); Earthquake Mitigation Incentive and Tax Parity Act of 2017, S. 2104, 115th Cong. (2017). ↑
See Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal Policy 50 (1938); Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income–Economic and Legal Aspects, in The Federal Income Tax 1, 7 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921). The definition is commonly referred to as the Haig-Simons definition of income. See, e.g., John R. Brooks, The Definitions of Income, 71 Tax L. Rev. 253, 262 (2018); Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 925, 932 (1967). For a comprehensive discussion of the difficulty of defining income and a description of several other approaches, see generally Brooks, supra; see also Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 Tax L. Rev. 45, 47 (1990) (describing the Haig-Simons definition vis-à-vis the general difficulty in defining income). ↑
See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 203, at 935; Jonathan Barry Forman, The Income Tax Treatment of Social Welfare Benefits, 26 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 785, 799 (1993). ↑
Bittker, supra note 203, at 935–37. ↑
The legal scholarship on this point is too voluminous to cite, but for some of the earliest work, see, e.g., id. at 932; R. A. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 44 (1967); Joseph A. Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment, 81 Harv. L. Rev 63 (1967); Charles O. Galvin, More on Boris Bittker and the Comprehensive Tax Base: The Practicalities of Tax Reform and the ABA’s CSTR, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1016 (1968). For a discussion of the debate over the use of a “comprehensive tax base,” see Brooks, supra note 203, at 270–74. ↑
See, e.g., Dep’t of Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, Tax Expenditures (2017), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Tax-Expenditures-FY2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UVR-9ZKJ] [hereinafter “Tax Expenditures]. ↑
Id. at 9, 18. ↑
Although the tax-free receipt of a gift by the donee is not labeled as an expenditure, the carryover basis provided by section 1015 for appreciated gifts is considered a tax expenditure. See J. Comm. on Tax’n, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2018–2022, 26 (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.jct.gov/publications/2018/jcx-81-18/ [https://perma.cc/33XY-P3EB] [hereinafter “JCT Tax Expenditures”]. ↑
See Tax Expenditures, supra note 207, at 3 (“The normal tax baseline also excludes gifts between individuals from gross income.”). ↑
See, e.g., Richard Schmalbeck, Gifts and the Income Tax—An Enduring Puzzle, 73 Law & Contemp. Probs. 63, 65 (2010) (arguing that “although it is intuitively appealing to regard value received by gift as an element of the income of the individual receiving it, it is completely unappealing to regard value received by gift as an increment to income in the aggregate”). ↑
Id. This of course assumes that the donor and the donee have the same tax rate. In reality, donors likely have higher tax rates than donees, in which case the net effect would be revenue loss to the government. For example, if the donor had a 30% marginal tax rate and the donee had a 10% marginal tax rate, the donor’s deduction for a $100 gift would be worth $30 (30% of $100), while the donee’s tax liability would be $10 (10% of $100), resulting in a $20 revenue loss. ↑
For income tax purposes, the gift is a non-event and need not be reported. However, the gift may need to be valued and returns filed if the gift tax applies. Currently, transfers under $15,000 are exempt from the gift tax. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions on Gift Taxes, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/frequently-asked-questions-on-gift-taxes [https://perma.cc/23XD-GDZC] (last visited July 11, 2019). ↑
E.g., Schmalbeck, supra note 211, at 65. ↑
The counterargument is that the gift represents consumption purchased by the donor. For a discussion of this theory, see id. at 68–69. ↑
See supra Subsection II.A.2. ↑
For a similar argument, see Charlotte Crane, Government Transfer Payments and Assistance: A Challenge for the Design of Broad-Based Taxes, 59 SMU L. Rev. 589, 611–12 (2006) (pointing out that government transfers do not create new value). ↑
See, e.g., supra notes 134–135 and accompanying text. ↑
See supra note 154 and accompanying text. ↑
Either way, the payment is deductible under Code section 162. ↑
JCT Tax Expenditures, supra note 209, at 27. The characterization of an exclusion as an expenditure depends on how Congress defines the tax base, and this has changed over time. See, e.g., Julie Roin, Truth in Government: Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget, 54 Hastings L.J. 603, 608–10 (2003) (providing an overview of the development of the federal tax expenditure budget).
The characterization of scholarships depends particularly on varying definitions of the tax base, and Treasury has noted that:

From an economic point of view, scholarships and fellowships are either gifts not conditioned on the performance of services, or they are rebates of educational costs. Thus, under the baseline tax system of the reference law method, this exclusion is not a tax expenditure . . . . The exclusion, however, is considered a tax expenditure under the normal tax method, which includes gift-like transfers of Government funds in gross income (many scholarships are derived directly or indirectly from Government funding).

See Tax Expenditures, supra note 207 at 13. ↑
See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Scholarships Under the Income Tax, 46 Tax Law. 697, 698–99 (1993) (examining arguments for excluding scholarships from the tax base and for making them a tax preference); Charlotte Crane, Scholarships and the Federal Income Tax Base, 28 Harv. J. on Legis. 63, 113 (1991) (same). ↑
The exclusion in section 117 only covers scholarships paid for tuition and related expenses. Although some scholarship funds are conditioned on the performance of services like teaching or research, those funds are explicitly excluded from section 117 and are taxable. I.R.C. § 117(c)(1). ↑
The value of the educational benefit likely exceeds the cost of tuition because higher educational institutions receive substantial funding from other sources besides tuition, including government subsidies. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 222, at 71. ↑
See generally sources cited at note 222 (observing the difficulty of assessing educational value as justification for exempting academic scholarships from taxable income under the federal tax code). ↑
See supra note 221; see also Dodge, supra note 222, at 701–02. ↑
See Dodge, supra note 222, at 711. ↑
See Freedom Newspapers v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1755, 1758–59 (1977). ↑
JCT Tax Expenditures, supra note 207, at 27–28. ↑
Because retrofit grants and similar payments must be applied towards the specified property improvements, they are better viewed as the provision of property, rather than as a receipt of cash by the taxpayer. There is precedent for this approach, although it is not the approach the IRS has taken specifically with retrofit grants. For example, in Bailey v. Commissioner, the taxpayer wasn’t taxed on an urban renewal grant for his property because the grant went directly to the general contractor, and the court found the taxpayer never had sufficient control over the funds to warrant taxation. See 88 T.C. 1293, 1301 (1987), acq., 1989-2 C.B. 1.
Arguably, any time an individual receives an incentive-based nudge or BBS in the form of cash that must be spent on specified property or services, the taxability of such funds should be based on the ultimate purchase, rather than on the temporary receipt of cash. ↑
For example, if a taxpayer owns an asset that appreciates in value (e.g., a stock or a house), she has a positive change in net wealth. However, the Code will not tax her until she “realize[s]” a gain, such as by making a sale. See I.R.C. § 1001. ↑
For a discussion of the legislative history behind the section 132 fringe benefit rules, see infra notes 261–67 and accompanying text. ↑
See Scott Greenberg, Reexamining the Tax Exemption of Municipal Bond Interest, Tax Found. Fiscal Fact No. 520 (July 2016), https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/‌docs/TaxFoundation_FF520.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZY7A-QS3M]. (observing that state and local bonds are justified as a basis for incentivizing investments in projects that benefit nonresidents, but concluding that “[a] tax exclusion is an unideal policy design for subsidizing state and local debt”). ↑
In that case, 20% or $250 would be tax, and $1,000 would remain. ↑
If the federal government increases a federal subsidy from $1,000 to $1,250 to account for federal income tax, it will pay $250 more for the subsidy and collect $250 in tax. ↑
See, e.g., Christopher C. Fennell & Lee Ann Fennell, Fear and Greed in Tax Policy: A Qualitative Research Agenda, 13 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 75, 79 (2003) (“A functional definition of . . . tax aversion . . . is the amount by which one’s aversion to a tax exceeds the economic cost of the tax.”); Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12 Psych., Pub. Pol’y & Law 106, 117 (2006); Abigail B. Sussman & Christopher Y. Olivola, Axe the Tax: Taxes Are Disliked More than Equivalent Costs, 68 J. Mktg. Rsch. S91, S91 (2011). ↑
See, e.g., Sussman & Olivola, supra note 236, at S93 (describing experiments that found people change their behavior to avoid taxes, but not reacting in a similar manner to comparable non-tax costs). ↑
McCaffery & Baron, supra note 236, at 117–18 (recounting an experiment the authors conducted where individuals were confronted with a policy labeled as a tax or comparable economic policy not labeled as a tax, which “found that labels mattered”); David J. Hardisty, Eric J. Johnson & Elke U. Weber, A Dirty Word or a Dirty World? Attribute Framing, Political Affiliation, and Query Theory, 21 Psych. Sci. 86, 91 (2010) (finding in an experiment that “framing the cost increase as a tax differentially affected the structure and content of thoughts generated by Democrats and Republicans, leading to different preferences”). ↑
Sussman & Oliviola, supra note 236, at S94–96, S100. ↑
Id. at S95. ↑
Id. ↑
Id. ↑
Id. ↑
Id. at S95–96. ↑
Id. at S94. ↑
One source of variation appears to be political affiliation. Studies show that Republicans and Independents are sensitive to “tax” labels in decision making, but Democrats generally are not. See id. at S96–97; Hardisty et al., supra note 238, at 91 (finding “that the power of a framing manipulation can depend on participants’ preexisting individual differences”). ↑
Of course, tax aversion will not deter participants who are unaware of the tax, which may be the case when there is no information reporting required. For incentives subject to information reporting (discussed more below), participants will likely have to provide tax information at the outset (e.g., a Form W-9), and are more likely to be aware of tax consequences. Other programs may disclose tax consequences on their website or in related materials, as is the case with California’s Earthquake Mitigation program. See infra note 272. ↑
See generally Kay Blaufus & Axel Möhlmann, Security Returns and Tax Aversion Bias: Behavioral Responses to Tax Labels, 15 J. Behav. Fin. 56, 63–65 (2014) (finding that people have tax aversion bias toward infrequent, unfamiliar financial decisions). ↑
See I.R.C. § 6041(a). ↑
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201816004 (Apr. 20, 2018); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201815005 (Apr. 13, 2018). ↑
Marianne Bertrand, Sendhil Mullainathan, & Eldar Shafir, Behavioral Economics and Marketing in Aid of Decision Making Among the Poor, 25 J. Pub. Pol’y & Mktg. 8, 16 (2006). ↑
Id. ↑
Saurabh Bhargava & Dayanand Manoli, Psychological Frictions and the Incomplete Take-Up of Social Benefits: Evidence from an IRS Field Experiment, 105 Am. Econ. Rev. 3489, 3490 (2015). ↑
Id. at 3524. ↑
Id. at 3492. ↑
See Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, User-Friendly Taxpaying, 92 Ind. L.J. 1509, 1512 (2017). ↑
Tax withholding is required on payments of employee compensation, but not for other payments. See I.R.C. § 3402(a). ↑
See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 94, at 84. ↑
See supra note 249 and accompanying text. ↑
Penalties are up to $270 per information return (up to $550 in the case of intentional disregard) and may be assessed separately for both failure to issue to the payee and failure to file with the IRS. For a summary of these penalties, see Increase in Information Return Penalties, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/government-entities/federal-state-local-governments/‌increase-in-information-return-penalties [https://perma.cc/F2NZ-K4CL] (last visited July 17, 2019). ↑
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 499 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). ↑
See Staff of J. Comm. on Tax’n, 98th Cong., General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, at 840 (Comm. Print 1984). ↑
Id. ↑
Id. at 841. ↑
Id. ↑
Id. ↑
Id. at 843. ↑
Equally important, but beyond this Article’s scope, are potential federalism and comity concerns that may arise when the federal government seeks to tax state programs, to the extent the tax hinders the state’s ability to implement the program. ↑
See Earthquake Mitigation Incentive and Tax Parity Act of 2017, H.R. 1691, 115th Cong. (2017); Earthquake Mitigation Incentive and Tax Parity Act of 2017, S. 2104, 115th Cong. (2017). ↑
Id. ↑
Press Release, Senator Dianne Feinstein, Feinstein and Harris Introduce Legislation to Protect Earthquake Loss Mitigation Incentive Ahead of Senate GOP Tax Bill Release (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ContentRecord_‌id=78BD9E69-4090-4E62-AE1A-08A01870F3AB [https://perma.cc/L7UZ-BY8G]. ↑
The Brace + Bolt program mentions potential consequences in an FAQ on its website, stating, “The homeowner of a retrofit House under the Program will receive an IRS Form 1099, if applicable, reporting the amount of incentive payments as taxable income to the homeowner for federal income tax purposes.” See Earthquake Brace+Bolt FAQs, https://www.earthquakebracebolt.com/FAQ [https://perma.cc/GXF5-HMEU] (last visited July 24, 2019). ↑
Although state tax credits are generally not taxable, to the extent they reduce a taxpayer’s state tax liability, the refundable portion (if any) of a state tax credit is taxable. See, e.g., Ginsburg v. United States, 922 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (holding that the refundable portion of a New York State tax credit was includible in income for federal income tax purposes). ↑
See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text. ↑
I.R.C. § 85. However, prior to the enactment of section 85, the IRS treated unemployment payments as excludable. See Rev. Rul. 70-280, 1970-1 C.B. 13. ↑
Failing to tax unemployment compensation also favors such compensation over wages, which may distort decisions to work. ↑
See I.R.C. § 86. Previously, the IRS treated all Social Security benefits as exempt from tax. See Rev. Rul. 70-217, 1970-1 C.B. 13. ↑
See, e.g., Forman, supra note 204, at 795. But see Brian Galle, How to Save Unemployment Insurance, 50 Ariz. St. L.J. 1009, 1062–64 (2018) (arguing for repeal of taxes on unemployment benefits). ↑
Professor Charlotte Crane has observed that this appears to have been the IRS’s historical approach prior to the evolution of the general welfare doctrine. Crane, supra note 217, at 594. ↑
Examples include current exclusions for educational grants, veterans’ benefits, and worker’s compensation payments. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 104(a)(1) (worker’s comp), I.R.C. § 117 (scholarships), 38 U.S.C. § 5301 (veterans’ benefits). Similarly, Medicare benefits, which are not specifically excluded by statute but are treated as such by the IRS, would continue to be excluded. See Rev. Rul. 70-341, 1970-2 C.B. 31–32. ↑
See supra note 167. ↑
See supra notes 261–67 and accompanying text. ↑
See supra note 172. ↑
See Soled & Thomas, supra note 120, at 763–64, 776. ↑
Id. at 814–15. ↑
While section 132 contains a list of specific exclusions in the statute, section 132(o) does delegate authority to Treasury to implement the statute and numerous regulations exist, such as those clarifying what types of benefits qualify as de minimis fringes. See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6 (as amended in 1992). ↑
Cf. Crane, supra note 217, at 612–13 (discussing the exclusion of transfer payments that do not create new value, regardless of source). ↑
Withholding could be set at a default rate (e.g., 5%), or taxpayers could fill out a form that would determine their withholding rate. These possibilities are discussed in Thomas, supra note 94, at 131–34. ↑
See id. at 111. ↑
Id. at 128. ↑

Lockstepping Through Stop-And-Frisk: A Call to Independently Assess Terry Under State Law

Fifty-two years ago, in Terry v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court upheld stop-and-frisk under the Fourth Amendment. At that time, stop-and-frisk had provoked substantial disagreement at the state level—leading to divergent opinions and repeat litigation. But after Terry, the state courts became silent. Since 1968, every state court has lockstepped with Terry in interpreting its own constitutional provisions.

This presents a puzzle, since state courts are free to provide more expansive (or less expansive) rights protections in interpreting their own state constitutions. And in other contexts, they have not been shy in doing so. In roughly a quarter of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment cases, state courts have read their state guarantees to exceed the U.S. Constitution’s protections.

Terry’s suspect pedigree further complicates the puzzle. Over the past few decades, stop-and-frisk has helped spark a breakdown in police-community relations. Multiple federal investigations have uncovered its connection to systemic racism. By many accounts, both the stop and the frisk have disproportionately targeted minorities. Terry has also led to nationwide unrest. A Terry stop precipitated the deaths of Eric Garner, Michael Brown, and Freddie Gray.

This Note proposes a change in perspective: that litigants challenge stop-and-frisk under state law. It also lays the groundwork for such challenges. It examines the history of stop-and-frisk at the state level before Terry. It analyzes the Terry litigation, relying especially on the NAACP’s briefing, which accurately predicted stop-and-frisk’s perverse potential. And it synthesizes this analysis into three arguments that should be raised against stop-and-frisk under state law.

Introduction

In November 2019, former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg launched his campaign for the presidency in unprecedented fashion—with an apology.¹1.Shane Goldmacher, Michael Bloomberg Pushed ‘Stop-and-Frisk’ Policing. Now He’s Apologizing, N.Y. Times (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/17/us/politics/michael-bloomberg-speech.html [https://perma.cc/3H8Y-M4QD] (“It is almost unheard-of for a former chief executive to renounce and apologize for a signature policy that helped define a political legacy.”).Show More Speaking at a predominantly Black evangelical church in Brooklyn, Bloomberg renounced the stop-and-frisk policing strategy that had served as a “pillar of his 12-year mayoralty.”²2.Id.Show More “The fact is, far too many innocent people were being stopped while we tried to do that,” Bloomberg said, later adding, “I got something important really wrong.”³3.Nick Timiraos, Michael Bloomberg Apologizes for ‘Stop-and-Frisk’ Policing, Wall St. J. (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/michael-bloomberg-apologizes-for-stop-and-frisk-policing-11574017238 [https://perma.cc/67ZL-4AZB].Show More

Despite his contrition, Bloomberg was unable to shake the stigma of the city’s stop-and-frisk policy. “It’s not whether he apologized or not,” argued Joe Biden.⁴4.Roll Call, Candidates Attack Bloomberg’s Record on Stop-and-Frisk Policy, YouTube (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4R1lhgBwCMs [https://perma.cc/8BQ7-E3KT].Show More “It’s the policy. The policy was abhorrent. And it was in fact a violation of every right people have.”⁵5.Id.Show More Elizabeth Warren echoed these sentiments: “It targeted Black and brown men from the beginning . . . You need a different apology here, Mr. Mayor.”⁶6.Id.Show More The denunciations only escalated after a 2015 video emerged in which Bloomberg expounded a racist methodology for targeting minority communities. “[W]e put all the cops in the minority neighborhoods,” he said.⁷7.Bobby Allyn, ‘Throw Them Against the Wall and Frisk Them’: Bloomberg’s 2015 Race Talk Stirs Debate, NPR (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/02/11/804795405/throw-them-against-the-wall-and-frisk-them-bloomberg-s-2015-race-talk-stirs-deba [https://perma.cc/DL3E-C4B3].Show More “Why’d we do it? Because that’s where all the crime is. And the way you should get the guns out of the kids’ hands is throw them against the wall and frisk them.”⁸8.Id.Show More The soundbite went viral and Bloomberg’s candidacy floundered thereafter.

The repercussions of stop-and-frisk extend beyond Bloomberg’s mayoralty in New York City. In 2015, the Department of Justice released its Ferguson Report, investigating the practices that contributed to riots in the St. Louis suburb. Among the DOJ’s cause-and-effect findings was this: an unchecked “pattern of suspicionless, legally unsupportable stops.”⁹9.U.S. Dep’t of Just. C.R. Div., Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, at 18 (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments–/2015/‌03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MVL-RMH7].Show More The Ferguson Police Department “must fundamentally change the way it conducts stops and searches,” the DOJ concluded.¹⁰10.Id. at 91.Show More Other jurisdictions have faced similar controversies. After 250,000 stops in 2009, the Philadelphia Police Department pledged to appoint an independent monitor and retrain officers as part of a settlement agreement with the ACLU.¹¹11.Michael D. White & Henry F. Fradella, Stop and Frisk: The Use and Abuse of a Controversial Policing Tactic 5 (2016).Show More The ACLU has been similarly assertive in critiquing the “troubling frequency” of stops in Newark, and it has identified “similar controversies” in Miami, Baltimore, Chicago, and Detroit.¹²12.Id. at 5–6.Show More

Americans have heard a lot of stop-and-frisk-related apologies from their elected officials over the past decade.¹³13.This is not to say that all are in unison. There is a sharp divide between those who support the practice and those who denounce it. All the better, this paper argues. Sharp divisions make the perfect battleground for state court decision making—allowing states to fill their role as laboratories of experimentation in contentious times.Show More But state court judges—many of whom are elected officials in their own right¹⁴14.See, e.g., Brennan Ctr. for Just., Judicial Selection: Significant Figures (May 8, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/judicial-selection-significant-figures [https://perma.cc/948W-VTAJ].Show More—have been conspicuously silent during this time in interpreting their state constitutions. How have they avoided this explosive controversy? In short, they have shielded themselves for decades behind federal precedent. In 1968, the United States Supreme Court constitutionalized stop-and-frisk under the Fourth Amendment in Terry v. Ohio.¹⁵15.392 U.S. 1 (1968).Show More And ever since, state courts have interpreted search-and-seizure protections in their own constitutions in lockstep with Terry.

This Note demands a change. State courts are free to do what they wish, but they should not hide under the umbrella of federal precedent in construing the search-and-seizure guarantees found in their own constitutions. The Supreme Court and state courts alike recognize that “[i]t is an established principle of our federalist system that state constitutions may be a source of ‘individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.’”¹⁶16.State v.Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 849 (N.J. 1987) (quoting PruneyardShopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980)).Show More Indeed, over the past few decades, state courts have adopted muscular interpretations of their state provisions to reject controversial criminal procedure decisions like California v. Hodari D.,¹⁷17.499 U.S. 621 (1991) (holding that a Fourth Amendment “seizure” of a person only occurs upon application of physical force to the person or the person’s submission to an officer’s “show of authority”). For examples of state court decisions that independently assessed a Supreme Court decision interpreting the Fourth Amendment, seeLaKeith Faulkner & Christopher R. Green, State-Constitutional Departures from the Supreme Court: The Fourth Amendment, 89 Miss. L.J. 197 (2020).Show More Illinois v. Gates,¹⁸18.462 U.S. 213 (1983) (replacing the previous two-part test to evaluate whether an informant’s tip constitutes probable cause with a “totality of the circumstances” balancing test).Show More and United States v. Leon.¹⁹19.468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule, which renders evidence inadmissible when it is the product of an unreasonable search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, does not apply when an officer reasonably relies on a warrant issued by a magistrate that is later found to be invalid).Show More As Mayor Bloomberg (and the millions of citizens subjected to stop-and-frisk) can attest to, Terry may be the most controversial of all. And it is time that it receives reassessment in America’s state court systems.

Part I of this Note examines the societal forces that shaped Terry and the state-level decision making that contributed to its enshrinement as Supreme Court precedent. Part II analyzes the Terry litigation, focusing on the problems Terry was designed to solve and the courts’ different methodologies. Part III argues that state courts play a crucial role as guardians of individual rights and, thus, should not lockstep with Supreme Court precedent. Relying upon this analysis, Part IV raises three arguments that could be marshalled against stop-and-frisk under state law. Finally, Part V offers this Note’s conclusion. Michael Bloomberg is on the record. The citizens of New York City, Philadelphia, and other American cities are too. It is time for state courts and state constitutions to have their turn. It is time to reassess stop-and-frisk under state law.

* J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, 2021. I am grateful to Professor Anne Coughlin for her patience and guidance throughout this project. I am also indebted to Louis Capozzi, Justin Aimonetti, Olivia Roat, and the members of the Virginia Law Review for their thoughtful feedback. Thank you to my dear friends Josh Hanley, Drew Mackenzie, Janessa Mackenzie, Blake Page, Anna Cecile Pepper, and Avery Rasmussen for always believing in me. I will miss you next year. Finally, I am deeply blessed to have such a supportive family. John, Margaret, Marlise, Nala, Mom, and Dad, I love you.This Note was inspired by and is dedicated to my father, Jeffrey Sutton. ↑
Shane Goldmacher, Michael Bloomberg Pushed ‘Stop-and-Frisk’ Policing. Now He’s Apologizing, N.Y. Times (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/17/us/politics/michael-bloomberg-speech.html [https://perma.cc/3H8Y-M4QD] (“It is almost unheard-of for a former chief executive to renounce and apologize for a signature policy that helped define a political legacy.”). ↑
Id. ↑
Nick Timiraos, Michael Bloomberg Apologizes for ‘Stop-and-Frisk’ Policing, Wall St. J. (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/michael-bloomberg-apologizes-for-stop-and-frisk-policing-11574017238 [https://perma.cc/67ZL-4AZB]. ↑
Roll Call, Candidates Attack Bloomberg’s Record on Stop-and-Frisk Policy, YouTube (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4R1lhgBwCMs [https://perma.cc/8BQ7-E3KT]. ↑
Id. ↑
Id. ↑
Bobby Allyn, ‘Throw Them Against the Wall and Frisk Them’: Bloomberg’s 2015 Race Talk Stirs Debate,

NPR

(Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/02/11/804795405/throw-them-against-the-wall-and-frisk-them-bloomberg-s-2015-race-talk-stirs-deba [https://perma.cc/DL3E-C4B3]. ↑
Id. ↑
U.S. Dep’t of Just. C.R. Div., Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, at 18 (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments–/2015/‌03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MVL-RMH7]. ↑
Id. at 91. ↑
Michael D. White & Henry F. Fradella, Stop and Frisk: The Use and Abuse of a Controversial Policing Tactic 5 (2016). ↑
Id. at 5–6. ↑
This is not to say that all are in unison. There is a sharp divide between those who support the practice and those who denounce it. All the better, this paper argues. Sharp divisions make the perfect battleground for state court decision making—allowing states to fill their role as laboratories of experimentation in contentious times. ↑
See, e.g., Brennan Ctr. for Just., Judicial Selection: Significant Figures (May 8, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/judicial-selection-significant-figures [https://perma.cc/948W-VTAJ]. ↑
392 U.S. 1 (1968). ↑
State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 849 (N.J. 1987) (quoting Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980)). ↑
499 U.S. 621 (1991) (holding that a Fourth Amendment “seizure” of a person only occurs upon application of physical force to the person or the person’s submission to an officer’s “show of authority”). For examples of state court decisions that independently assessed a Supreme Court decision interpreting the Fourth Amendment, see LaKeith Faulkner & Christopher R. Green, State-Constitutional Departures from the Supreme Court: The Fourth Amendment, 89 Miss. L.J. 197 (2020). ↑
462 U.S. 213 (1983) (replacing the previous two-part test to evaluate whether an informant’s tip constitutes probable cause with a “totality of the circumstances” balancing test). ↑
468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule, which renders evidence inadmissible when it is the product of an unreasonable search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, does not apply when an officer reasonably relies on a warrant issued by a magistrate that is later found to be invalid). ↑
The Nat’l Advisory Comm’n on Civ. Disorders (The Kerner Comm’n), The Kerner Report 32 (Princeton University Press 2016) (1968). ↑
Risa Goluboff, Vagrant Nation: Police Power, Constitutional Change, and the Making of the 1960s, at

194, 267–68

(2016). ↑
The Kerner Comm’n, supra note 20, at 37. ↑
See, e.g., Marcus Casey & Bradley Hardy, 50 Years After the Kerner Commission Report, the Nation is Still Grappling with Many of the Same Issues, Brookings (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/09/25/50-years-after-the-kerner-commission-report-the-nation-is-still-grappling-with-many-of-the-same-issues/ [https://perma.cc/R3UW-C9S5]. ↑
Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering, the Court, and Some Realism About Police Patrol, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 141, 178. ↑
Gisske v. Sanders, 98 P. 43, 44–45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1908). ↑
Id. at 45. ↑
Id. at 44. ↑
State v. Hatfield, 164 S.E. 518, 519 (W. Va. 1932). ↑
54 P.2d 211, 214 (Okla. Crim. App. 1935). ↑
Hatfield, 164 S.E. at 519; Hargus, 54 P.2d at 213. ↑
White & Fradella, supra note 11, at 36. ↑
A few other cases addressed the stop-and-frisk practice during these decades. In State v. Gulczynski, 120 A. 88, 89 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1922), a Delaware court held that an officer could stop and question a suspect without probable cause, as cited in John A. Ronayne, The Right to Investigate and New York’s “Stop and Frisk” Law, 33 Fordham L. Rev. 211, 215–16 (1964). See also People v. Henneman, 10 N.E.2d 649, 650–51 (Ill. 1937) (holding that police officers had a right to stop and question the plaintiff even though he was not committing any crime at the time of arrest, nor did the officers have reason to believe he had committed a crime); State v. Zupan, 283 P. 671, 675 (Wash. 1929) (holding that police officers were justified in stopping the plaintiff without probable cause to inquire about his business). ↑
Henry F. Fradella & Michael D. White, Reforming Stop-and-Frisk, 18 Criminology, Crim. Just., L. & Soc’y 45, 46–47 (2017) (citing Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev.

315, 317 (1942)). ↑
Id. at 47. ↑
Goluboff, supra note 21, at 198 (citing Uniform Arrest Act § 2, in Interstate Comm’n on Crime, The Handbook on Interstate Crime Control 87 (4th prtg. 1942)). ↑
Uniform Arrest Act § 3, in Interstate Comm’n on Crime, The Handbook on Interstate Crime Control 87 (4th prtg. 1942). ↑
Warner, supra note 33, at 316–17. ↑
Id. at 317. ↑
Ronayne, supra note 32, at 215 (noting statutes enacted in California, Illinois, Missouri, and Wisconsin). ↑
Frank J. Remington, The Law Relating to “On the Street” Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General, 51 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 386, 387 n.4 (1960). ↑
Warner, supra note 33, at 320; Goluboff, supra note 21, at 199. ↑
Warner, supra note 33, at 320; Goluboff, supra note 21, at 199; see also Goluboff, supra note 21, at 198 (noting that a number of scholars argued that “[d]etention was shorter and thereby less liberty depriving or stigmatizing than arrest for vagrancy”). ↑
Remington, supra note 40, at 391. ↑
Warner, supra note 33, at 324. ↑
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 18.2 Uniform Crime Reports 75, 122 (1947). ↑
Id. at 124. ↑
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 27.2 Uniform Crime Reports 67, 113 (1956). These statistics probably failed to capture the full gravity of “reasonable suspicion” seizures nationwide. As Caleb Foote asked: “What proportion of the total number of arrests is made up of persons abruptly arrested, investigated for minutes or hours or days, and as abruptly released without booking?” Caleb Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest?, 51 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 402, 406 (1960). ↑
William O. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 Yale L.J. 1, 12 (1960). ↑
Id. at 13. ↑
White & Fradella, supra note 11, at 40. ↑
Id. ↑
Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 34, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67) [hereinafter Brief for the NAACP]. ↑
So did the pages of law journals. The NAACP’s brief provides nearly two full pages of critiques of stop-and-frisk doctrine. Among those mentioned are Foote, supra note 47, at 406 (arguing for a “reassess[ment]” of “the role the police should play in our society” focused on “stricter compliance with the [F]ourth [A]mendment”); Theodore Souris, Stop and Frisk or Arrest and Search—The Use and Misuse of Euphemisms, 57 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 251, 262 (1966) (arguing that the country should look to other means of preventing crime “which do not require that we tamper with the most fundamental of our constitutional rights as citizens, our right to be free”); Comment, Police Power to Stop, Frisk, and Question Suspicious Persons, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 848, 866 (1965) (contending that “the Court must proceed to develop rules on the power to stop, frisk and question suspicious persons which, based on analysis, will properly protect the individual’s right to be free from unreasonable imposition by the police”). Brief for the NAACP, supra note 52, at 10–11. ↑
293 P.2d 52, 53 (1956). ↑
Id. Few state court decisions comprehensively addressed the frisk power before People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32 (N.Y. 1964). In State v. Collins, 191 A.2d 253, 255 (1963) the Supreme Court of Connecticut was unable to squarely address the frisk power because “[n]othing found as a result of the frisking was offered in evidence.” But in dicta, the court adopted a reasonableness approach under the Fourth Amendment of the federal Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Connecticut Constitution. Id. And in People v. Jones, 176 Cal. App. 2d 265, 267 (1959), a California appeals court held that “[w]here reasonable under the circumstances, an officer may run his hands over a person’s clothing to protect himself from attack with a hidden weapon.” ↑
Martin, 293 P.2d at 54 (Carter, J., dissenting). ↑
Id. ↑
Id. ↑
Id. ↑
Harvey E. Henderson Jr., Note, Stop and Frisk in California, 18 Hastings L.J. 623, 625 (1967) (citing People v. Davis, 222 Cal. App. 2d 75, 78 (1963), People v. Hilliard, 221 Cal. App. 2d 719, 723 (1963), People v. Beverly, 200 Cal. App. 2d 119, 125 (1962), and People v. Porter, 196 Cal. App. 2d 684, 686 (1961)). ↑
163 A.2d 244, 247 (Del. 1960). ↑
Id. at 249. ↑
171 N.E.2d 5 (Ill. 1960). ↑
Id. at 7; see also Wayne R. LaFave & Frank J. Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge’s Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 987, 1005–06 (1965) (noting that the decisions of a judge may vary based upon the nature of the crime. For example, what is reasonable in a narcotics case is different than what is reasonable in a gambling case). ↑
364 U.S. 253 (1960). ↑
Id.; see also Remington, supra note 40, at 390–91. ↑
Goluboff, supra note 21, at 202. ↑
Evelle J. Younger, Stop and Frisk: “Say It Like It Is,” 58 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 293, 295 (1967). ↑
Goluboff, supra note 21, at 202 (quoting A. Fairfield Dana, ed., New York State Legislative Annual 67 (1964)). ↑
Ronayne, supra note 32, at 211–12. ↑
Goluboff, supra note 21, at 203. The law became effective on July 1, 1964. See Emanuel Perlmutter, New ‘Frisk’ Law Goes into Effect: Police Are Dubious About Curbs That Go with It, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1964, at 52, https://www.nytimes.com/1964/07/02/archives/new-frisk-law-goes-into-effect-police-are-dubious-about-curbs-that.html [https://perma.cc/ZSW8-HK5H]. Only two weeks later, the Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant Race Riots “got their impetus from the killing of a black youngster by a police officer.” Daniel J. Monti, Patterns of Conflict Preceding the 1964 Riots: Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant, 23 J. of Conflict Resol

.

41, 43–44 n.1 (1979). ↑
Perlmutter, supra note 71. ↑
Josh Segal, Note, “All of the Mysticism of Police Expertise”: Legalizing Stop-and-Frisk in New York, 1961–1968, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.

573, 585

(2012) (citing Nelson A. Rockefeller, Annual Message to the Legislature (Jan. 8, 1964) in Public Papers of Nelson A. Rockefeller: Fifty-Third Governor of the State of New York 17–18 (1964)). ↑
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits prosecutors from using evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search or seizure in a state court). ↑
See, e.g., Richard H. Kuh, Reflections on New York’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Law and Its Claimed Unconstitutionality, 56 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 32, 36 (1965); Arlen Specter, Mapp v. Ohio: Pandora’s Problems for the Prosecutor, 111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 4, 42 (1962). ↑
Goluboff, supra note 21, at 203. ↑
Douglas Dales, Rockefeller Signs Bills Increasing Powers of Police; Bar and Civil Rights Groups Call ‘Stop-and-Frisk’ and ‘No-Knock’ Laws Illegal; Harassment is Feared; But Governor Says Judicial Safeguards Are Provided—Calls Bills Imperative, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1964, https://www.nytimes.com/1964/03/04/archives/rockefeller-signs-bills-increasing-powers-of-police-bar-and-civil.html [https://perma.cc/F7YH-WPP2] [hereinafter Rockefeller Signs Bills]. ↑
Id. ↑
And where did New York’s state courts look when they faced this constitutional question? They looked to other state courts. Among the decisions cited by the majority and dissent in People v. Rivera include those mentioned earlier: State v. Collins, 191 A.2d 253 (Conn. 1963); People v. Martin, 293 P.2d 52 (Cal. 1956); Hargus v. State, 54 P.2d 211 (Okla. Crim. App. 1935); State v. Hatfield, 164 S.E. 518 (W. Va. 1932); Gisske v. Sanders, 98 P. 43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1908). People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32, 35–37 (N.Y. 1964). ↑
People v. Rivera, 38 Misc. 2d. 586, 589 (N.Y. Misc. 1963). ↑
Id. ↑
Id. ↑
Rivera, 201 N.E.2d at 34. ↑
Id. at 35–36. ↑
Id. at 35. ↑
Id. at 36. Justice Traynor had used similar language in a 1962 article: “Such a minor interference with personal liberty would touch the right to privacy only to serve it well.” Roger J. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States,

1962

Duke L.J. 319, 334. After fifty years of stop-and-frisk, one has to imagine the New York state courts would like another look at this constitutional assessment. As Judge Scheindlin lamented in Floyd v. City of New York, “[w]hile it is true that any one stop is a limited intrusion in duration and deprivation of liberty, each stop is also a demeaning and humiliating experience.” 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). ↑
Rivera, 201 N.E.2d at 37 (Fuld, J., dissenting). ↑
Id. at 38 (citing Douglas, supra note 48, at 12, 13). ↑
Id. at 39. ↑
Id. The ACLU cited Justice Fuld’s “stirring language” as a conclusion to its amicus brief in Terry: “The loss of liberty entailed in authorizing a species of search on the basis of mere suspicion is too high a price to pay for the small measure of added security it promises.” Brief of ACLU, et al. as Amici Curiae, at 33, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67). ↑
Rivera, 201 N.E.2d. ↑
Right to Frisk Gets Supreme Court OK, Cleveland Press, June 10, 1968, at A1, A12, available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?‌article=1003&‌con‌text‌‌=‌terryvohio_newspaper [https://perma.cc/LG2Y-VAX7]. ↑
Id. at A12. ↑
State v. Chilton, 95 Ohio L. Abs. 321, 325 (1964). ↑
Bus Bergen, Illegal Search is Charged at Concealed Weapons Trial, Cleveland Press, Sept. 22, 1964, available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent–.cgi?article=1005&context=terryvohio_newspaper [https://perma.cc/Z5SW-XYT3]. ↑
Id.; Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 Miss. L.J. 423, 431 (2004). Accounts dispute the number of times the suspects “repeated this ritual.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6 (1968). The United States Supreme Court believed that “roughly a dozen trips” were taken. Id. But the Court of Appeals of Ohio claimed the suspects walked past the store “two to five times by both men.” State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966). It turns out Officer McFadden’s memory was particularly fuzzy on this point. In his police report from the day of the incident, he claimed they looked into the store “about three times each.” Katz, supra, at 431. Later, at a suppression hearing, he upped the ante to “four or five times apiece” and eventually to “four to six trips each.” Id. Finally, at trial, he confessed “maybe four to five trips, maybe a little more, it might be a little less. I don’t know, I didn’t count the trips.” Id. For some, this pointed to a potential problem with the reasonable suspicion standard. Ambiguous evidence like the number of times a suspect walked by a store or their “mumbled response” to a question could foster suspicion when all an officer had to go on was “they didn’t look right to me.” Id. at 430, 434. Tellingly, these nuances were largely lost on the trial court judge, who noted, “There is no question about the facts in this case.” Chilton, 95 Ohio L. Abs. at 322. ↑
Terry, 392 U.S. at 6. ↑
Id. at 6–7. ↑
Id. ↑
Id. ↑
Id. at 7. ↑
Id. This is a familiar story, so for the sake of brevity I have omitted many of the details. For a more comprehensive account, see, for example, id. at 5–8; Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 911, 912–14 (1998); Katz, supra note 96, at 430–34. ↑
See Saltzburg, supra note 102, at 914–15. ↑
State v. Chilton, 95 Ohio L. Abs. 321, 322 (1964). ↑
Id. at 323. Indeed, Judge Friedman cited both People v. Rivera and People v. Martin in his opinion, demonstrating that the laboratories of democracy were aware of each other’s precedent. Id. at 324. ↑
Id. at 322. ↑
Id. at 323. ↑
The name of the defendant changed because Richard Chilton was killed in a drug store holdup in Columbus in June 1867. James T. Cox, Bullets Write Finish to Chilton Case, Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 18, 1967, available at https://engagedscholarship.‌csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=terryvohio_newspaper [https://perma.cc/C343-P2YJ]. ↑
Brian Albrecht, Hough Riot, 50 Years Ago, Couldn’t Destroy a Neighborhood, Cleveland.com (July 24, 2016), https://www.cleveland.com/metro/2016/07/hough_riot_–50_years_ago_couldn.html [https://perma.cc/Z9ZN-ZCZ9]. ↑
Marc E. Lackritz, The Hough Riots of 1966, 1, 8 (Apr. 10, 1968) (B.A. thesis, Princeton Univ.). ↑
Id. at 9. Another policeman described the riots as “like the part in an old western where you’re caught in crossfire in a box canyon.” Id. at 8. ↑
State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 117 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966). The citations included Gisske, Faginkrantz, Rivera, and Martin. Id. ↑
Id. at 118 (looking to various other state tribunals because “[t]he courts of Ohio do not appear to have been squarely presented with this problem before”). ↑
Id. The NAACP took particular exception to this phrase in its amicus brief. Over the course of five pages, the Association explained how even the most discrete of police encounters—a “hey, there”—might be interpreted as a threat by “the man in the ghetto.” Brief for the NAACP, supra note 52, at 35. Compounding the injustice was the fact that these stops would occur “day in day out, and for the same reasons.” Id. ↑
Terry, 214 N.E.2d at 120. ↑
Id. at 120. See also Saltzburg, supra note 102, at 916 (“The court was careful to distinguish a frisk for dangerous weapons from a ‘search for contraband, evidentiary material, or anything else in the absence of reasonable grounds to arrest.”). ↑
Goluboff, supra note 21, at 200. ↑
Id.; see, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule against the states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–40 (1963) (mandating the appointment of counsel under the Sixth Amendment in all state court prosecutions); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 479, 484 (1964) (holding that Illinois denied a suspect in custody the assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (holding that a defendant “must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent . . . .”). ↑
Earl Warren, The Memoirs of Chief Justice Earl Warren 316 (Madison Books 2001) (1977); see also Michal R.

Belknap, The Supreme Court under Earl Warren, 1953–1969, at 218 (2005) (detailing the Warren court’s creation of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure applicable to the states); Paul Moke, Earl Warren and the Struggle for Justice 209–11 (2015). ↑
Jack H. Pollack, Earl Warren: The Judge Who Changed America 267–68 (1979); see also Leo Katcher, Earl Warren: A Political Biography 440 (1967) (noting Chief Justice Warren’s concern about abusive police practices). ↑
Goluboff, supra note 21, at 201 (citing 2 Albert J. Reiss, Studies of Crime and Law Enforcement in Major Metropolitan Areas 112 (1967)). ↑
Goluboff, supra note 21, at 205. McFadden had thirty-nine years of experience at the time of the arrest. ↑
Brief for the ACLU, supra note 90, at 31 (citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)). ↑
Id. at 31–32. ↑
Brief for the NAACP, supra note 52, at 24. ↑
Id. at 21. Demonstrating its complete distrust of the local officer, the NAACP drew a clear line: “Concerning both the occasions and extent of police intrusion upon the individual, ‘nothing is left to the discretion of the officer.’” Id. (citing Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967)). Part IV addresses the NAACP’s analytical approach to the Fourth Amendment and probable cause in more detail. ↑
Brief for the NAACP, supra note 52, at 22–24. In fact, the NAACP already had evidence of the malleability of the stop-and-frisk framework. Simultaneously, litigation was ongoing regarding whether the police could seize contraband from a suspect “wholly within” an officer’s control, whether a policeman could reach into a suspect’s pocket to grab evidence without first frisking the defendant, and whether a frisk could “encompass the search of an automobile in which the ‘stopped’ suspect is riding.” Id. at 49–50. ↑
Id. at 51, 58. ↑
Id. at 62. The NAACP tried to convey to the Justices how stop-and-frisk played out in practice, citing to specific police manuals and instructions. See, e.g., id. at 45–46. One such manual encouraged officers to: “Be suspicious. This is a healthy police attitude . . . .” Id. at 45. Another provided a list of individual qualities that might justify field interrogation, like “known trouble-makers” or “unescorted women or young girls in public places.” Id. at 46. In case the list was not exhaustive enough, number twenty conferred complete discretion: “Many others. How about your own personal experiences?” Id. Goluboff, supra note 21, at 207 called my attention to this part of the brief. ↑
Brief for the NAACP, supra note 52, at 62. (As the New York Times noted: “[T]he script was familiar. Some minor incident begins it all, often the arrest of a Negro by a policeman.”). Americans outside the ambit of the Court’s briefing also understood the stakes. The Cleveland Plain Dealer would note after oral arguments that the case was heard “against a background of day-by-day stop-and-frisk actions by police that are increasingly resented by Negroes and others in the big-city ghettos.” Sanford Watzman, High Court Sifts Street Search Arguments, Cleveland Plain Dealer 5 (1967), available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu–/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=terryvohio_newspaper [https://perma.cc/Y97X-YC6E]. ↑
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting). ↑
Earl C. Dudley, Terry v. Ohio, the Warren Court, and the Fourth Amendment: A Law Clerk’s Perspective,

72

St. John’s L. Rev. 891, 892 (1998). ↑
Id. Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, which included provisions designed to overturn Miranda, was also passed in 1968. Belknap

,

supra note 119, at 255. ↑
In 1967, the year before Terry was decided, “one out of eight policemen across the country was assaulted.” Goluboff, supra note 21, at 268. ↑
Dudley, supra note 132, at 892. ↑
Katz, supra note 96, at 440 n.88 (citing Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. Ill. L.F. 518, 538). ↑
Belknap

,

supra note 119, at 256. ↑
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 300 (1967). ↑
Id. at 304. ↑
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 294, 307–08 (1967). ↑
Goluboff, supra note 21, at 206. Between 1960 and 1965, the national violent crime rate jumped 24.4%. Katz, supra note 96, at 435 n.79. Then, from 1965 to 1970, it spiked 81.6%. Id. This was precisely what the government felt that field interrogations were designed to solve. ↑
Brief for the State of Ohio at 40, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67). ↑
Id. at 15. ↑
Id. at 41. ↑
Id. ↑
Id. ↑
Dudley, supra note 132, at 893. ↑
Goluboff, supra note 21, at 210. Around this time, the Court expressed a similar concern about unbounded police discretion in the context of the vagueness doctrine. See Joel S. Johnson, Vagueness Attacks on Searches and Seizures, 107 Va. L. Rev. 347, 356 (2021) (observing that the Court invalidated an ordinance prohibiting loitering in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965) “because of the excessive authority it granted to police” and “enabled them to make their own decisions about when loitering would and would not be allowed”). ↑
Id. ↑
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968). ↑
David A. Harris, Addressing Racial Profiling in the States: A Case Study of the “New Federalism” in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 367, 373–74 (2001). ↑
Terry, 392 U.S. at 17. Dudley recalls that Chief Justice Warren was also skeptical of the “scope of the authority claimed by the police.” The power to “detain” on suspicion seemed “susceptible of major abuse” given the Kerner Commission’s reports about “aggressive patrol” tactics and the “political tensions” that “ran high” during the Cold War. Dudley, supra note 132, at 893. ↑
Terry, 392 U.S. at 10. ↑
Id. ↑
Id. at 22. ↑
Id. at 23. As Dean Goluboff notes, “[c]ertainly, the guns McFadden found on Terry and Chilton illustrated the need for the police to have authority to protect their own lives.” Goluboff, supra note 21, at 209–10. ↑
Dudley, supra note 132, at 895; see also Saltzburg, supra note 102, at 922 (“This analysis virtually ignored the potential ‘stop’ aspect of the case . . . . Were they free to leave? Was this a seizure? The Court neither asked nor answered these questions.”). ↑
Terry, 392 U.S. at 26. In other words, the officer had to limit the scope of his search to a protective “pat-down” “reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.” Id. at 29–30. He could not conduct a full-on search incident to arrest for contraband or evidence relevant to the crime. Moreover, the officer could not “place his hands in their pockets or under the outer surface of their garments until he had felt weapons.” Id. ↑
Terry, 392 U.S. at 28. ↑
Id. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring); Dudley, supra note 132, at 895. ↑
Terry, 392 U.S. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring). ↑
Id. ↑
Id. at 33–34. ↑
But see Katz, supra note 96, at 457 n.144. Harlan’s assessment that the right to frisk flowed automatically from the stop has not been adopted by courts. The two remain separate inquiries. ↑
Terry, 392 U.S. at 38 (Douglas, J., dissenting). ↑
Id. at 37, 38. ↑
Id. at 39. In Terry, the Chief Justice cited statistics demonstrating the assaults, injuries, and deaths that policemen had incurred over the past decade. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24 n.21. These were the same type of statistics cited by the law enforcement associations in their briefs. ↑
Id. at 39. ↑
Id. ↑
Dudley, supra note 132, at 893. ↑
While the state courts agreed with the Justices’ evaluation of the frisk, none of them had uncoupled the frisk and the stop like the Chief Justice. ↑
E.J. Kissell, Court Ruling is Gratifying to Detective in Frisk Case, Cleveland Press (June 11, 1968), https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&–context=terryvohio_newspaper [https://perma.cc/84MB-XPYU]. ↑
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540. (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). ↑
U.S. Const., art. III, § 1. ↑
This section draws generally on insights from Jeffrey Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions (2018). ↑
Justice Kavanaugh offered this reminder to litigants in a recent Establishment Clause blockbuster, American Legion v. American Humanist Association, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2094 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Even though the individuals challenging the Bladensburg cross had lost at the federal level, Justice Kavanaugh reminded them that they still could appeal to their state constitution. Maryland courts were free to provide more expansive protections for religious liberty under their founding document. The Supreme Court “is not the only guardian of individual rights in America.” Id. (citing Sutton, supra note 175). Both sides of the Court are in agreement on this point. In Robinette v. Ohio, 519 U.S. 33, 42 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring), a Fourth Amendment case, Justice Ginsburg agreed that “a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards.” (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975)). ↑
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447, 455 (1990). ↑
Id. at 455. ↑
The Michigan Supreme Court reminded litigants that the “appropriate analysis of our constitution does not begin from the conclusive premise of a federal floor.” Sitz v. Dep’t of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209, 217 (Mich. 1993). ↑
Id. at 225. ↑
Id. at 223–24. ↑
The Federalist No. 51 at 339 (James Madison); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev.

489

, 504 (1977) (“[W]e may be confident that [Madison] would welcome the broadening by state courts of the reach of state constitutional counterparts beyond the federal model . . . .”). ↑
The Federalist No. 51 at 339 (James Madison); see also The Federalist No. 10 at 61 (James Madison) (“The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States.”). ↑
Stephen Kanter, Sleeping Beauty Wide Awake: State Constitutions as Important Independent Sources of Individual Rights 15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 799, 801–02 (2011). (quoting James Wilson, Of Government, in The Works of the Honorable James Wilson, L.L.D. 383, 398 (1804)). ↑
The Federalist No. 46 at 305 (James Madison). ↑
Id. at 307. ↑
Id. Professor Micah Schwartzman deserves credit for many of the insights in this paragraph. The organization of the virtues of federalism section into the categories of individual choice, competition, experimentation, prevention against tyranny, and protection of liberty stems from one of his class lectures. ↑
The Federalist No. 51 at 337 (James Madison). ↑
The Federalist No 46 at 305 (James Madison). ↑
For instance, one can imagine a jurisdiction that strikes down stop-and-frisk under its state constitution proving particularly appealing for minorities who have been the subject of profiling or allies who hope to live in a jurisdiction that embraces their concern for social justice. Independent interpretation of state constitutions also is neutral, as it applies equally to liberty and property rights, individual rights, and structural rights. ↑
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). ↑
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev.

489

, 503 (1977). ↑
Id. at 495, 503. ↑
Robert Williams, The Law of American State Constitutions 137 (2009); Goodwin Liu, State Constitutions and the Protections of Individuals Rights: A Reappraisal, 2018 Forum for State Appellate Court Judges, Pound Civil Justice Institute 51 (2019), http://www.poundinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/2018_forum-report_2.26.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2QY-AHVR]; see also, State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 800 (N.J. 1990) (“Cognizant of the diversity of laws, customs, and mores within its jurisdiction, the United States Supreme Court is necessarily ‘hesitant to impose on a national level far-reaching constitutional rules binding on each and every state.’” (citing State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 962 (N.J. 1982) (Pashman, J., concurring))). ↑
Furthermore, as Justice Brandeis warned, “[d]enial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation.” New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311. Indeed, one of the benefits of state experimentation is that it would serve as an essential check against tyranny and a separate source of liberty for the people. State courts can prevent tyranny by serving as an intermediary against federal overreach—a separate forum for Americans to air their grievances. And they can protect liberty by enforcing separate state legal regimes to protect Americans from laws passed in excess of governmental power. For a cautionary story of how state courts have served this role, see Sutton, supra note 175, at 84–132 (describing how state courts initially voided a number of early eugenics laws as unconstitutional, before ceding the field to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the federal Constitution in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)). ↑
In the words of Jacob Landynski, the Fourth Amendment has “both the virtue of brevity and the vice of ambiguity.” Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 197, 247 (1993) (quoting Jacob W. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court 42 (1966)). ↑
Compare Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 759 (1994) (“We need to read the Amendment’s words and take them seriously: they do not require warrants, probable cause, or exclusion of evidence, but they do require that all searches and seizures be reasonable.”); Telford Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 91–92 (1969) (critiquing the Court for “treat[ing] warrantless searches as disreputable second cousins” while recognizing that “I am swimming against the current of opinion.”); Richard Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 49, 75 (“Probable cause, a phrase from the second clause of the Fourth Amendment, is a limitation on the issuance of warrants; it is not part of the definition of reasonableness”), with Maclin, supra note 196, at 202 (“At a minimum, the Fourth Amendment commands compelling reasons, or at least a substantial justification, before a warrantless search or seizure is declared reasonable.”); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“When the Fourth Amendment outlawed ‘unreasonable searches’ and then went on to define the very restricted authority that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate could give, the framers said with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is ‘unreasonable’ unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute necessity.”); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[N]o search of premises, as such, is reasonable except the cause for it be approved and the limits of it fixed and the scope of it particularly defined by a disinterested magistrate.”). ↑
Which may not always be a given, although state protections do closely mirror the Fourth Amendment. ↑
In the context of the right to counsel, for instance, states that provided broader protections than the United States Supreme Court cited historical evidence from their state ratifying conventions to justify their interpretation. See Louis J. Capozzi III, Sixth Amendment Federalism, 43 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 645, 684 (2020) (observing that the Iowa Supreme Court studied the debates surrounding the state’s right-to-counsel provision to “justify the court’s holding that the state constitution guaranteed the right to counsel to all defendants charged with a jailable offense”). Originalist judges should do the same with respect to their state search and seizure provisions. ↑
People v. Sundling, 395 N.W.2d 308 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). Many of the state cases I cite in the next few pages were found in: Faulkner & Green, supra note 17. ↑
State v. Quino, 840 P.2d 358, 362 (Haw. 1992). ↑
Id. at 365 (Levinson, J., concurring). ↑
Id. ↑
See, e.g., State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 671 (Idaho 1992) (rejecting Leon’s deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule. Under state law “this Court has held that the exclusionary rule does more than merely deter police misconduct.” It is also “a constitutionally mandated remedy for illegal searches and seizures.”); State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 651 (Conn. 1992) (“We are persuaded that the distinction made by the United States Supreme Court between an arrest and an attempted arrest at common law does not guide our determination of what constitutes a seizure under . . . our state constitution.”); In re E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 781 (Minn. 1993) (“[W]e reject [Hodari] because . . . we are not persuaded by the arguments favoring the Hodari approach, and . . . we are persuaded that there is no need to depart from the pre-Hodari approach.”); Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 373 (1985) (stating that the Gates totality-of-the-circumstances test “is flexible, but [it] is also ‘unacceptably shapeless and permissive.’ The Federal test lacks the precision that we believe can and should be articulated in stating a test for determining probable cause.” (citation omitted)); State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 324 (Alaska 1985) (“After carefully reviewing the majority’s reasoning in Gates, we conclude [it] does not provide the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures required by [the Alaska constitution].”). ↑
State courts, after all, can weigh geographic and demographic considerations unique to their jurisdictions. Crime rates and police practices vary between cities and states. For a thoughtful study of this factor in the context of the right to appointed counsel, see Capozzi III, supra note 199, at 709–10, 712–13. ↑
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988). ↑
Id. at 36, 43. ↑
In Greenwood, police acquired the garbage from a trash collector. 486 U.S. at 37. In Hempele, the police themselves removed the garbage. State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 796 (N.J. 1990). ↑
State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 807–08 (N.J. 1990). ↑
Id. at 808. ↑
Id. ↑
Id. ↑
Id. at 814. ↑
See, e.g., State v. Brown, 930 N.W.2d 840, 847 (Iowa 2019) (quoting State v. Brooks, 888 N.W.2d 406, 410–11 (Iowa 2016)) (“We jealously guard our right to construe a provision of our state constitution differently than its federal counterpart, though the two provisions may contain nearly identical language and have the same general scope, import, and purpose.”); Interest of B.C., 683 A.2d 919, 926 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (“[I]t is well settled that our courts are free to establish greater protection of such rights in the provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution.”); State v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d 1300, 1309 (Conn. 1992) (“[W]e have at times determined that the state constitution affords greater protections to the citizens of Connecticut than does the federal constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.”). ↑
Faulkner & Green, supra note 17, at 198. ↑
I use Green’s estimate, taken from Harold Spaeth’s databases (available at http://scdb.wustl.edu/index.php), of 342 “Fourth Amendment” cases. Id. ↑
Id. at 200. Faulkner & Green cite one case, State v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 889 (Haw. 1995), in which they contend Hawaii departed from Terry. But the case is not about stop-and-frisk; it is about the unconstitutional search of a home. Moreover, in cases like State v. Ugalino, 107 Haw. 144, 150 (2000), Hawaii courts have “applied the standards set forth in Terry in determining whether police conduct complied with” the Hawaii constitution. ↑
Benjamin Zycher, Michael Bloomberg and the Stop-and-Frisk About Face, Am. Enter. Inst. (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.aei.org/politics-and-public-opinion/‌michael-bloomberg-and-the-stop-and-frisk-about-face/ [https://perma.cc/B47W-YBEX]. ↑
Maclin, supra note 196, at 202. ↑
Terry, 392 U.S. at 17, 26. ↑
Id. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring). ↑
See Kavanagh v. Stenhouse, 174 A.2d 560, 562 (1961); People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32, 34–35 (1964). ↑
See Brief for the NAACP, supra note 52, at 26–27. ↑
This is not to say that the NAACP was at all comfortable with the current state of criminal procedure or the functioning of probable cause in American society. Asking if the standard “function[ed] unerringly, or with perfect clarity,” the brief responded sharply: “Of course, it does not.” Even in the progressive sixties, Black and brown Americans were still fighting a rearguard action to protect “the only standard which [the] Court ha[d] ever developed under the Fourth Amendment for judicial regulation of the police.” Id. at 29–30. ↑
Id. at 27. ↑
Id. at 29. ↑
Id. at 39. ↑
Id. at 39–40. ↑
Id. at 40 (citing Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 Geo. L.J. 1, 22 (1958)). ↑
People v. Martin, 293 P.2d 52, 55 (1956) (Carter, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Simon, 290 P.2d 531, 534 (1955)). ↑
See Rockefeller Signs Bills, supra note 77. ↑
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). ↑
Id. at 558–59. ↑
Id. at 578. ↑
Id. at 559. In fact, this trend was only increasing when Floyd was decided. From 2004 to 2009, “the percentage of stops where the officer failed to state a specific suspected crime rose from 1% to 36%.” Id. ↑
See, e.g., The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

,

Born Suspect: Stop-and-Frisk Abuses & the Continued Fight to End Racial Profiling in America, (2014), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/naacp/Born_Suspect_Report_final_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/MML3-HUVV]. ↑
Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 559. ↑
Id. ↑
Ashley Southall & Michael Gold, Why ‘Stop-and-Frisk’ Inflamed Black and Hispanic Neighborhoods, N.Y. Times (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/17/–nyregion/bloomberg-stop-and-frisk-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/F67P-Y29X]. ↑
Ray Rivera, Al Baker, & Janet Roberts, A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police Stops, N.Y. Times (July 11, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/nyregion/12frisk.html [https://perma.cc/W4EE-8JVB]. ↑
Id. ↑
Id. ↑
One reason that state constitutions provide a helpful mechanism to question stop-and-frisk is that the practice’s ramifications differ across the country. The examples below are from major cities, where Black Americans have been disproportionately stopped. Perhaps stop-and-frisk would be more palatable in a rural state where the same discriminatory practices are not as common. ↑
Chad Pradelli & Cheryl Mettendorf, Racial Disparities in Philadelphia Police’s Use of Stop-and-Frisk, Data Shows, 6 ABC Philadelphia (Sept. 9, 2020), https://6abc.com/stop-and-frisk-philadelphia-data-philly/6413942/ [https://perma.cc/8H9R-8ATC].Black residents make up 40% of Philadelphia’s population, but roughly 70% of the stops targeted Black Americans. Id. ↑
A.D. Quiq & Sarah Zimmerman, ‘Stop and Frisk’ Still Disproportionately Impacting Black Chicagoans: Study, Crain’s Chicago Business

(

Oct

. 24, 2019)

, https://www.chicagobusiness.com/government/stop-and-frisk-still-disproportionately-impacting-black-chicagoans-study [https://perma.cc/Z2S7-FPUC]. But see Monu Bedi, Commentary: Stop-and-Frisk Is Not Racist, and We Need to Stop Saying It Is, Chicago Tribune (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-opinion-stop-and-frisk-police-bloomberg-20200302-6skrfrw5ujcppjdmq2jkqwmnya-story.html [https://perma.cc/5YPE-3MZX]. ↑
Elliot C. Williams, New Stop-And-Frisk Data Still Shows Wide Racial Disparities in D.C., DCist

(Mar. 5, 2020), https://dcist.com/story/20/03/05/new-stop-and-frisk-data-still-shows-wide-racial-disparities-in-d-c/ [https://perma.cc/RT5X-F4HJ]. See also Brianne K. Nadeau, Opinion, End Stop and Frisk in D.C., Wash. Post (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/localopinions/end-stop-and-frisk-in-dc/2019/02/14/cdd59c2c-2fab-11e9-8ad3-9a5b113ecd3c_story.html [https://perma.cc/FY9F-78YV] (calling on officials to “end the practice of stop and frisk in the District.”). But see Peter Newsham, Opinion, Yes, D.C. Police Use Stop and Frisk, but in a Legal Manner, Wash. Post (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/yes-dc-police-use-stop-and-frisk-but-in-a-legal-manner/2019/02/22/b85f6518-35f9-11e9-8375-e3dcf6b68558_story.html [https://perma.cc/GLA2-SFML]. ↑
NAACP

,

supra note 236. ↑
See discussion supra Part III. ↑
Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 1097, 1125 (1998). ↑
Brief for the NAACP, supra note 52, at 22–23; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 366 (1974) (“[T]he primary abuse thought to characterize the general warrants and the writs of assistance was their indiscriminate quality, the license that they gave to search Everyman without particularized cause . . .”). For a more in-depth study, see generally William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning 602–1791 (2009) (surveying the history of unreasonable searches and seizures stemming from the traditional British maxim of privacy within the home and shaped by early use of the general warrant). ↑
See Cuddihy

,

supra note 250, at 602 (“[T]he laws and constitutions of most states abrogated general warrants and searches years before the Fourth Amendment did so.”). Cuddihy also noted,

“

Not only did those [state] constitutions disallow general warrants, they also elevated specific warrants, probable cause, and the idea of unreasonable search and seizure to the position of higher law.” Id. at 603. In particular, “John Adams articulated the most far-reaching repudiation of general warrants in the constitutions of 1776–84.” Id. at 609. ↑
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968); see also Brief for the NAACP, supra note 52, at 35–38. ↑
People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32, 36 (1964) (Fuld, J., dissenting). ↑
Terry, 392 U.S. at 29. ↑
Id. at 27. ↑
A study by the New York Civil Liberties Union showed a frisk occurring in 66% of stops. NYCLU, Stop-and-Frisk in the De Blasio Era 14 (2019), https://www.nyclu.org/–en/publications/stop-and-frisk-de-blasio-era-2019 [https://perma.cc/5U2X-QHAT]. ↑
White & Fradella, supra note 11, at 110. ↑
Brief for the NAACP, supra note 52, at 50. ↑
Id. (quoting People v. Taggart, 229 N.E.2d 581, 586 (N.Y. 1967)). ↑
White & Fradella, supra note 11, at 63. A more recent study in the De Blasio era found weapons discovered in 7% of frisks. NYCLU, supra note 256. ↑
White & Fradella, supra note 11, at 104 (citing Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., at 4, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). ↑
Id. See also Benjamin Mueller, It Wasn’t a Crime to Carry Marijuana. Until the Police Found a Loophole., N.Y. Times (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/–nyregion/marijuana-police-nyc.html [https://perma.cc/8QE9-VCUV] (describing how “police officers stopping and frisking people [would] ask[] them to empty their pockets, and when marijuana fell out, [the police officers would] arrest[] them because their hidden stash had suddenly become ‘open to public view’”). ↑
Mueller, supra note 262; see Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness

170

(2010) (noting that stop-and-frisk operations “amount to much more than humiliating, demeaning rituals for young men of color” and “often serve as the gateway into the criminal justice system”). ↑
Stop-and-Frisk: The Facts, ACLU N.J., https://www.aclu-nj.org/theissues/–police‌practices/newark-stop-and-frisk-data/stop-and-frisk-facts [https://perma.cc/KH7K-722K]. ↑
Pradelli & Mettendorf, supra note 244. ↑
Eric Flack & Jordan Fischer, DC Police Search and Frisk Black People 6 Times More Often During Stops, Data Shows,

WUSA9

(June 15, 2020), https://www.wusa9.com/article/–news/crime/stop-and-frisk/blacks-6-times-more-likely-to-be-searched-in-dc-than-whites-stop-and-frisk-black-lives-matter/65-379ed07f-bc94-45c0-a7a8-2193601c6df0 [http://perma.cc/VH47-V3U2]. ↑
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“In 23% of the stops of blacks, and 24% of the stops of Hispanics, the officer recorded using force. The number for whites was 17%.”); see also ACLU of Ill., Stop and Frisk in Chicago 23 (2015), https://www.aclu-il.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ACLU_–StopandFrisk_6.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJL2-ZKHV] (“A study prepared for the ACLU of Southern California found that during a one-year period from 2003 to 2004, black and Hispanic residents were far more likely to be stopped, frisked, searched and arrested than white residents, and that black and Hispanic residents who were searched were less likely to have contraband than white residents.”). ↑
White & Fradella, supra note 11, at 110. ↑
Id. (“88 percent of young people surveyed believe that residents of their neighborhood do not trust the police.”). ↑
Id. at 109. ↑
Center for Constitutional Rights, Stop and Frisk: The Human Impact 5 (2012), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/08/the-human-impact-report.pdf [perma.cc/7DEF-WWK4]; see also Jason Meisner, Chicago Sued Over Police Department’s Alleged Stop-and-Frisk Practices, L.A. Times (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/–nation/ct-stop-and-frisk-lawsuit-met-20150421-story.html (describing alleged constitutional abuses like excessive force) [https://perma.cc/N2G7-2JZG]. ↑
Center for Constitutional Rights, supra note 271, at 5. These are a few accounts of NYPD encounters during the Floyd era. “It’s the difference between frisking somebody and going in [their] underwear or like putting gloves on outside, checking other people’s private areas, and people’s rectal area to see if they have drugs in them. It’s just too much, outside—that’s embarrassing.” Id. (alteration in original). Another said:My jeans were ripped. I had bruises on my face. My whole face was swollen . . . . I felt like I couldn’t defend myself, didn’t know what to do. No witnesses there to see what was going on. I just wish someone was there to witness it. I felt like no one would believe me. I couldn’t tell anyone. I kept it in till now . . . I still am scared.
Id. (second alteration in original). ↑
ACLU of Ill., supra note 267, at 21. ↑
Id. at 22–23. ↑
Center for Constitutional Rights, supra note 271, at 5–6. ↑
Id. at 6. ↑
White & Fradella, supra note 11, at 10–11. ↑
508 U.S. 366, 381 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). ↑
Id. ↑
Id. at 380. ↑
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting). ↑
Brief for the NAACP, supra note 52, at 38. ↑
See Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. 108, 118 (2016) (“The state courts may experiment all they want with their own constitutions, and often do in the wake of this Court’s decisions.”) (citing Jeffrey S. Sutton, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and Its Aftermath, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1963, 1971–77 (2008)). ↑
Terry, 392 U.S. at 29; see also People v. Faginkrantz 171 N.E.2d 5, 7 (1960) (“What the constitution prohibits is an unreasonable search and seizure, and the circumstances of this case do not establish that the search was unreasonable.”). ↑
See supra note 86 and accompanying text. ↑
Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 257, 264 (1984). ↑
Amar, supra note 249, at 1098. ↑
Id. ↑
Id. ↑
Brief for the NAACP, supra note 52, at 45. ↑
See, e.g., Opinion, Stop Talking and Start Listening, White People, Wash. Post (June 9, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/stop-talking-and-start-listening-white-people/2020/06/09/7071da24-a9a2-11ea-a43b-be9f6494a87d_story.html [perma.cc/Q8J6-M5NU]. ↑
White & Fradella, supra note 11, at 10–11. ↑
Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2094 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). ↑
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Amy Coney Barrett To Be an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2020) (statement of Amy Coney Barrett, Judge). ↑
Id. ↑
Brennan, supra note 182, at 503. ↑
Sutton, supra note 175, at 212. ↑

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