This article questions one of the most deeply-rooted taxonomies of modern legal thought, that dividing civil and criminal procedure. It highlights a fundamental shortcoming of our legal system that stems from its failure to provide adequate procedural protections to individuals who are sued by the government or large organizational entities and face severe civil sanctions, while ensuring sweeping procedural safeguards for people and institutions facing only trivial criminal sanctions. Many justifications have been offered for the civil-criminal rift in procedure. Some argue that the distinction rests on utilitarian grounds, while others point to egalitarian rationales. Still others invoke the expressive role played by procedure, with others focusing on the unique role of the state in a liberal democracy. The article challenges each of these rationales, showing that they are obsolete, if not completely unfounded, and proposes a simple alternative: cutting the Gordian knot binding substance to procedure and replacing the current bifurcated civil-criminal procedural regime with a model running along two axes: the balance of power between the litigating parties and the severity of the potential sanction or remedy. The balance of power axis refers to the model’s two sets of procedural rules, aimed at remedying asymmetry problems inherent to litigation. One set of rules would govern symmetrical litigation, that is, where both parties are either institutional entities (comprised of both governmental bodies and large organizational entities such as big corporations and financial institutions) or else individuals (including small businesses); a second set of rules would govern asymmetric litigation, involving an individual on one side and an institutional entity on the other. The model’s second axis focuses on the degree of harm that would be generated by an adverse decision for the litigating parties, irrespective of whether the substantive legal regime governing the dispute is civil or criminal. Applying these two parameters, our proposed procedural regime maps out the entire procedural landscape. The resulting redistribution of procedural protections diverges significantly from the current regime. The article shows that the proposed model, as a regime based on the true goals of procedure, in fact, better realizes the ends underlying the rationales used to justify the current procedural regime. It concludes with some remarks about the feasibility of such a reform.
Information and the Market for Union Representation
In its oversight of union representation elections, the National Labor Relations Board seeks to create “laboratory conditions” to determine “the uninhibited desires” of employees. Despite its comprehensive regulation of union and employer campaign conduct, the Board fails to insure that employees get basic information relating to their decision. This Article proposes a new paradigm for the representation decision: that of a purchase of representation services. This “purchase of services” model demonstrates that the market for union representation lacks the standard features required under economic theory to drive information into the marketplace. The resulting information deficiencies may render employees poorly equipped to make their representation decision.
Better a Catholic Than a Communist
In 1948, the Supreme Court in McCollum v. Board of Education declared a “released time” program for religious instruction in the Champaign, Illinois, public schools unconstitutional. Four years later in Zorach v. Clauson, the Court upheld an almost identical program in the New York City public schools. The Court distinguished the two programs on the grounds that the instruction in Champaign occurred in the school building, while the instruction in New York occurred off school grounds.
It is clear this factual distinction was persuasive to at least one justice, yet Justice Douglas inexplicably included in his opinion for the Court another justification for finding the New York plan constitutional. He wrote that Americans “are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”
This Note offers an explanation for Justice Douglas’s appeal to Americans as a religious people and contends that the argument was persuasive to the majority, save for Justice Burton. It argues that increasing post-war anti-Catholicism and the Court’s decision in Everson created a climate in 1948 where the country was concerned with a growing Catholic influence in the public schools. Following Everson, McCollum provided the Court with an opportunity to draw a line and establish Mr. Jefferson’s high wall, so much discussed in Everson, between the church and state sponsored education.
Following McCollum, however, the country’s concern shifted to Communism. With this shift, the country’s perception of “released time” public education changed. Instead of viewing these programs as opportunities for Catholic influence in the public schools, the country viewed public religious education as an opportunity to oppose the spread of “Godless Communism,” and opposition to “released time” education was characterized as support for totalitarianism.
This Note posits that Justice Douglas’s appeal to the religious character of America reflected the changed historical context from McCollum to Zorach, namely, that by 1952 it was better to be a Catholic than a Communist.