This Article offers a theory of nuisance law based on information costs. Like trespass, much of the law of nuisance relies on a strategy of exclusion in which rights are defined using low-cost signals like boundary crossings that are only indirectly tied to particular uses. Nuisance law also supplements and fine-tunes this Blackstonian package of entitlements by means of a governance strategy, which relies on signals more directly tailored to particular uses. The information-cost advantage of strategies close to the exclusion end of the spectrum helps explain why, despite repeated calls for more balancing, nuisance law focuses on who caused invasions of whose land. Also consistent with an exclusion strategy are the staying power of traditional nonreciprocal notions of causation and the virtual nonexistence in nuisance of Rule 4 liability rules, under which plaintiffs would be permitted to invoke the law to force the polluter either to abate or shut down upon payment of the polluter’s damages. Applying Hohfeldian analysis, the Article shows that the common law gives polluters at most a privilege to pollute and that Rule 4 does not refine the basic exclusion regime but rather undermines it. The general question becomes when to soften exclusion with governance and the Article concludes by arguing that, in situations such as oil and gas fields and Boomer-style pollution cases with numerous victims, only small judicial governance-style safety valves are necessary, especially if legislative and administrative solutions are forthcoming. More generally, the information-cost theory of nuisance brings the utilitarian and corrective justice approaches to nuisance closer together. Nuisance law is not a mess or mystery but does contain within it the inflection point between exclusion and governance.
Crossroads in Cambodia: The United Nations’ Responsibility to Withdraw Involvement from the Establishment of a Cambodian Tribunal to Prosecute the Khmer Rouge
For almost twenty-five years, the former leaders of the Khmer Rouge, responsible for the deaths of over 1.7 million of their fellow Cambodians, have enjoyed freedom absent domestic and international accountability for their actions. Since 1997, the United Nations and Cambodia have engaged in contentious negotiations for the establishment of a criminal tribunal to try the former leaders of the Khmer Rouge. In March 2003, the United Nations and Cambodia agreed on an internationally supported, yet Cambodian-controlled, tribunal to prosecute the former members of the Khmer Rouge for genocide and crimes against humanity that occurred between 1975 to 1979. The U.N. General Assembly is awaiting its expected ratification by the Cambodian National Assembly. While these developments appear to signal a shift toward international justice and domestic reconciliation, the presence of widely asymmetrical goals and intentions between the U.N. and the Cambodian government poses unfortunate risks both to the Cambodian people and to the international community.
This Note will argue that the agreed-upon proposal will both fail to meet international standards of justice and prove to be a greater risk than complete withdrawal of international involvement. To this end, the Note will argue that the U.N. should either demand the establishment of an ad hoc international tribunal for Cambodia (with goals and structure similar to existing tribunals created for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda), or completely withdraw from any involvement in the adjudication of the Khmer Rouge crimes. Any alternative would compromise the best interests of the international community, the development and enforcement of international law, and the stability and rehabilitation of Cambodia.
“Happy” Birthday, Brown v. Board of Education? Brown’s Fiftieth Anniversary and the New Critics of Supreme Court Muscularity
Professor Michael Klarman’s book, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality, covers the entire corpus of Supreme Court case decisions concerning race, from the infamous Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896 to Brown v. Board of Education in 1954. Klarman addresses three principal questions: What factors explain the dramatic changes in racial attitudes and practices that occurred between 1900 and 1950? What factors explain judicial rulings such as Plessy and Brown? How much did such Court decisions influence the larger world of race relations? Klarman argues that, in regard to whether state-imposed segregation of the races violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court only reconsidered the meaning of the Constitution once public attitudes had already changed. He writes that the Supreme Court “did not invalidate racial segregation until after public opinion on race had changed dramatically as a result of various forces that originated in, or were accelerated by, World War II.”
This Review explicates the interpretive sweep of Klarman’s book: its treatment of the Jim Crow decades, of the World War II years, of the Brown decision, and of the civil rights movement. It then critically considers Klarman’s overarching argument concerning the Supreme Court’s supposedly minimal role and influence in American politics and society. Lastly, the Review contends that Klarman’s analysis, when understood in conjunction with recent writings by Professors Rosenberg, Tushnet, and Rosen, represents both a potent and a potentially dangerous new political critique of the Supreme Court’s traditional power of constitutional judicial review.