This Note analyzes the development of interspousal tort liability for personal harms following the enactment of the married women’s property acts. The case law is broken down into three periods (1) the 1860s through 1913, when all courts hearing interspousal torts barred them; (2) 1914 through 1920, when a trend permitting the claims developed; and (3) 1921 through 1940, a period in which the seemingly inevitable evolution toward allowing the suits stalled. The existing literature characterizes the law as illustrating a continuing judicial desire to impose patriarchal restrictions on women’s rights and blames the third-period reversal on the stagnation of the women’s movement following ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. In contrast, this Note removes the case law from the realms of conventional feminist analysis and women’s history. The women’s movement had no direct influence over judicial construction of the married women’s acts, and the alleged post-suffrage stagnation is itself questionable. Instead, this Note suggests that the trend allowing interspousal torts was complicated by the emergence of a new fact pattern: negligent automobile accidents. Following decades of willful tort suits, automobile negligence suits brought the risk of insurance fraud and collusion, which consequently halted judicial willingness to allow them. Because willful and negligent torts were legally indistinguishable based on the text of the statutes, judicial refusal to allow negligent torts translated into a complete bar on interspousal liability.
Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity Constraint on the Commerce Power
Employing a straightforward textual reading of the Commerce Clause, which, unlike other constitutional clauses, does not expressly mandate uniform regulation, the Supreme Court has recently declared that Congress is free to enact commercial regulations that apply in some states, but not in others, or that explicitly treat some states differently than others. This Article seeks to call that conclusion into question, and in the course of doing so, to explore the proper roles of history and text in constitutional decisionmaking.
From a historical perspective, the desire for uniformity was both the precipitating factor in the creation of the federal commerce power and a fundamental limitation upon that power. Fearing that Congress would use the commerce power as a means of discriminating in favor of some states at the expense of others, the Constitutional Convention ratified a provision intended to preclude Congress from enacting nonuniform regulations of commerce. For purely stylistic reasons, that provision was ultimately broken into two different clauses: the Port Preference Clause and the Uniformity Clause, but the framers understood those clauses to be one in purpose, and to have the combined effect of categorically prohibiting the nonuniform exercise of the commerce power.
Because the framers narrowly conceived the commerce power as extending only to the imposition of excises and duties and the regulation of navigation and shipping, their decision to divide the mandate against the nonuniform regulation of commerce into two, more narrowly drawn clauses seemed inconsequential. The Uniformity Clause, which requires all excises and duties to be uniform throughout the United States, and the Port Preference Clause, which precludes Congress from enacting regulations of navigation or shipping that favor the ports of one state over those of another, were sufficient in their day to fully protect against the nonuniform exercise of the commerce power. In today’s world, however—a world in which the commerce power has achieved a drastically broader ambit—if we continue to read the Uniformity and Port Preference Clauses narrowly and literally, and if we fail to imply a general uniformity constraint on the commerce power, then we fatally undermine the fundamental constitutional principle that pervaded the Constitutional Convention that Congress must not be permitted to use the commerce power to favor some states at the expense of others. This Article contends that we should interpret the Constitution in a manner that preserves this fundamental precept and ensures that it remains relevant and vital in the twenty-first century and beyond.
Patent Claim Construction
In 1998, the Federal Circuit decided Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, holding that patent claim construction was a purely legal issue subject to de novo appellate review. This highly controversial decision has since become the focus of intense scrutiny and empirical studies exposing the problematic nature of de novo review. In November 2006, the Federal Circuit issued a divided opinion indicating its most significant movement towards reconsidering Cybor, prompting some observers to forecast the impending demise of de novo review.
This Note introduces Chevron deference as the proper standard of review for patent claim construction. A default rule adopting the narrowest reasonable claim interpretation would serve as a valuable information-forcing adjunct. Together, these rules would simultaneously address the inefficiency, indeterminacy, and information costs that currently plague the patent system. Ultimately, this proposal would achieve sweeping, multi-institutional patent reform from both ex ante and ex post perspectives.