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Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford

Professor Tom Lininger examines the impact of Crawford v. Washington on prosecutions of domestic violence. Prior to Crawford, these prosecutions relied heavily on hearsay, in part because accusers often recant or refuse to testify. Crawford has raised significant doubts about the admissibility of such evidence unless the government provides the accused with an opportunity for cross-examination. 

Professor Lininger surveyed 64 district attorneys’ offices in California, Oregon and Washington to determine the effect of Crawford on domestic violence cases. The counties involved in this survey make up approximately 90 percent of the population in the three states. Nearly two-thirds of the respondents indicated that the Crawford decision significantly impeded prosecutions of domestic violence in their jurisdictions. Moreover, 76 percent of respondents indicated that after Crawford, their offices are more likely to drop domestic violence charges when the accusers recant or refuse to cooperate.

The article suggests legislative reforms that would adapt the states’ evidence codes to the new constitutional requirements of Crawford in order to facilitate effective prosecutions of domestic violence. One category of proposals would maximize opportunities for pretrial cross-examination of accusers. Another set of proposals would expand certain statutory hearsay exceptions. Finally, the author suggests miscellaneous reforms that would better protect battered women before trial, would help juries to understand the psychology of recanting accusers, and would diversify the charges brought by prosecutors so that hearsay statements are not indispensable. 

Choice of Law, the Constitution, and Lochner

The rise and fall of constitutional limits on state choice of law coincides almost perfectly with the so-called Lochner era in Supreme Court history and the connection is by no means accidental. This Note reveals that nearly half of all of the decisions in which the Court used “liberty of contract” reasoning to invalidate state or federal action—including the very first case to do so—dealt not with fundamental economic rights but with choice of law issues. After explaining how the Court’s choice of law doctrines worked, this Note concludes that for the most part they are not susceptible to the traditional criticisms of Lochner. This Note also concludes, however, that although Lochner may not teach us about the choice of law cases, the choice of law cases may help us better understand Lochner. Notions of consent-based political obligation evident in the choice of law cases can reconcile competing interpretations of the Lochner Court’s more controversial substantive due process decisions, while the embrace of legal realism that led the Court in the 1930s to discard its choice of law doctrines suggests that nonpolitical explanations for the abandonment of “Lochnerism” have been underappreciated in accounts of the New Deal Era Constitutional revolution. Choice of law theorists and legal historians alike would do well to revisit the complexities of the Supreme Court’s now-forgotten attempt to address the constitutional limits on the reach of state laws.

The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment

When is a death sentence, a sentence of imprisonment, or a fine so “excessive” or “disproportionate” in relation to the crime for which it is imposed that it violates the Eighth Amendment? Despite the urgings of various commentators and the Supreme Court’s own repeated, albeit uncertain, gestures in the direction of proportionality regulation by the judiciary, the Court’s answer to this question within the past few decades is a body of law that is messy and complex, yet largely meaningless as a constraint. In the core of this ineffectual and incoherent proportionality jurisprudence lies a conceptual confusion over the meaning of proportionality. The Court’s latest statement on this question, Ewing v. California, is symptomatic of the Court’s confusion. This Article seeks to prepare the ground for a more coherent and potent jurisprudence of proportionality to develop by clarifying the concept of proportionality. First, this Article describes the way in which the Court’s confusion over the meaning of “proportionality” has been the source of the problem by discussing four different ways in which the Court has understood the term. Second, this Article proposes “retributivism as a side constraint” as a conception of proportionality that would bring together the disparate elements of the case law to establish a more coherent and effective constitutional doctrine. Third, this Article specifies the meaning of retributivism as a side constraint, emphasizing the distinction between comparative and noncomparative aspects of retributivism and the significance of the distinction for understanding not only what it means for one to “deserve” a punishment, but also the Supreme Court case law on excessive punishment.

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