Massachusetts v. EPA’s Regulatory Interest Theory: A Victory for the Climate, Not Public Law Plaintiffs

Standing doctrine’s development is often framed as a struggle between two competing models of adjudication. The private law model views the court’s role as the adjudicator of individual rights and conditions access to the court on a party’s showing of a discrete injury at the hands of another party. The opposing public law model favors congressional power to create causes of action that confer standing without requiring a showing of differentiated injury, and conceives of the judiciary’s role as integral to ensuring executive compliance with the law. Many commentators view Massachusetts v. EPA, a recent Supreme Court decision addressing global climate change, as liberalizing standing doctrine and as a significant victory for the public law model of adjudication.

This Note departs from this commentary by arguing that, on the whole, the standing theory advanced in Massachusetts places the case within the Court’s trend towards a more restrictive interpretation of the case-and-controversy requirement. This Note first analyzes the Massachusetts opinion, the history of state standing doctrine, and subsequent judicial treatment of the decision, in order to show that the Court’s standing decision is based on a finding of injury to Massachusetts’ governing interest: the ability of Massachusetts to regulate a harm that threatens the Commonwealth’s territorial integrity. The Note then argues that this “regulatory interest theory” creates a standing regime that may be a variation of the public law model, but one that is potentially highly restrictive of both state and individual standing. In fact, the regulatory interest theory may create a standing regime where state attorneys general have monopoly power over public law adjudication, a possibility that threatens both core public and private law model values. This Note concludes that a Positivist approach to standing that predicates state and citizen standing on positive statutory enactment provides a relatively straightforward, far more workable approach to the case-and-controversy requirement.

Restoring Restitution

The law of restitution received its decisive impetus in the United States in the First Restatement of Restitution (1937), but over the last half-century it has more or less died as a distinct area of American private law. By contrast, the law of restitution has flourished in the common law jurisdictions of the British Commonwealth. The death of restitution in the United Stated has been ascribed to the influence of the Legal Realists, whose intrumentalism subverted the kind of reasoning that is needed to sustain and develop a sophisticated regime of private law liability. Hanoch Dagan’s book, The Law and Ethics of Restitution (the first book on the law of restitution addressed to an American academic audience in many decades), attempts to show how a Realist approach to law, far from being destructive of the law of restitution, can assist in elucidating this branch of liability.

This Review first outlines the assumptions implicit in the Restatement and Commonwealth approaches to restitution. The Restatement begins with the basic principle of unjust enrichment, that a person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is liable to make restitution to that other. The first assumption is express: that this principle is the unifying theme of what were previously considered to be separate pockets of liability, and that we can understand the these separate instances of liability only when we appreciate the principle that they all instantiate. The principle thus acts as to make the law coherent across different transactions. The second assumption is tacit: that liability under unjust enrichment works justice as between the parties, i.e., that, in the language of contemporary legal theory, it exemplifies corrective justice. This means that the principle provides a fair and coherent ordering within each transaction that it governs. In order for the principle of unjust enrichment to do this, it must represent a justification that normatively links the parties into a unified relationship, where the injustice that liability corrects is the same from the viewpoint of both parties. This can be done only through the non-instrumental reasoning of a system of rights: the plaintiff must be understood as claiming that what was rightfully the plaintiff’s has been ineffectively transferred to the defendant and therefore should be restored. These two assumptions are related, because coherence across transactions does not make sense unless there is also coherence within each transaction.

The peculiar feature of Dagan’s book is that, while purporting to resurrect the law of restitution, he is repudiating the two assumptions on which it is based. He does not think that it makes sense to a general principle of restitution, because such a principle is just circular and conclusory. Instead he favors a “contextual normative” inquiry where the particular normative considerations of different types of situation are elucidated. He thereby expressly repudiates the impulse to unify across transactions that was always the driving force in developing the law of restitution. He also repudiates the corrective justice approach, in favor of the instrumentalist promotion and balancing of different values, such as autonomy, utility, and community.

Dagan’s book is dense, full of detailed argument across the whole field of restitution. This Review focuses on his account of two occasions for restitution: mistaken payments and unrequested benefits. (Most contemporary restitution scholars regard these two contexts as the most basic cases of unjust enrichment.) My argument is that the values that Dagan deploys in each of these contexts attach separately to one or the other of the parties and therefore do not provide a reason for a court’s taking money from the defendant and giving it to the plaintiff. The values that Dagan invokes, although laudable in their own terms, are structurally incapable of elucidating restitution as a species of private law liability. In order to get his “values” project off the ground at all, he must (and occasionally does) implicitly smuggle into the account the very idea of corrective justice that he repudiates. Once he does this, there is no need to invoke his out-of-place values.

Finally, the Review turns to the reason for Dagan’s rejection of corrective justice. His argument (which in the book he specifically directs against me) is that corrective justice has a distributive basis because it must work with a notion of property that has distributive consequences. This argument is wrong on several grounds. First, whether a legal operation is distributive does not depend on the fact that it has an effect on what a party has or does not have (any operation in private law of course has an effect) but depends on the structure of the reason that grounds the effect. Second, if Dagan’s claim is to succeed, it must be that property is necessarily justifiable only on the basis of distributive justice. This is a popular academic claim, but in fact it is mistaken, as the history of political theory is full of arguments that put property on a non-distributive basis. The stongest of these arguments was made by Kant, who shows that Grotius’s idea of private property as a distribution of property held by the community in common simply misses the point. What the argument has to justify is how property as a right that is external to oneself can exist at all, whether held individually or in common. Grotius’s approach (and that of his modern heirs such as Dagan) simply assumes that property exists, and therefore does not explain how this existence is possible. The only way to resolve the problem is to show how property presupposes the very ideas of right and freedom that are integral to corrective justice.

Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The Ascendance of “Social Frameworks”

In Dukes v. Wal-Mart, the Ninth Circuit recently upheld the certification of the largest employment discrimination class in history, with more than 1.5 million women employees seeking over $1.5 billion in damages. A crucial piece of evidence supporting class certification came from a sociologist who testified that he performed a “social framework analysis” to evaluate Wal-Mart “against what social science research shows to be factors that create and sustain bias” and found the company wanting. As authority for introducing this analysis, the expert—and the Ninth Circuit—relied on our prior work introducing the concept of social framework to refer to the use of general social science research to provide a context for the determination of specific factual issues in litigation. In this article, we review and recast the procedures originally proposed for apprising juries of general research results to assist in resolving the case before them. We then apply these updated procedures to the expert testimony in Dukes v. Wal-Mart, which promises to be a template for future employment discrimination litigation.

Experience over the past 20 years has shown that that courts will typically allow general contextual information from social science research to be conveyed to the jury by expert witnesses rather than via instructions, as originally envisioned. Where this occurs, we believe it essential that courts limit expert testimony to a description of the findings of relevant and reliable research and of the methodologies that produced those findings, and preclude the witness from linking the general research findings to alleged policies and practices of a specific firm. The landmark class action of Dukes v. Wal-Mart illustrates the centrality of social framework evidence to modern employment litigation, as well as the need for courts to clarify and circumscribe the role of the experts who introduce them.