Concurrent Damages

In areas as diverse as copyright, pollution, consumer protection, and electronic privacy, statutory damages have become a familiar form of civil remedy. Yet judges are discovering that these formulaic awards can swing by orders of magnitude for arbitrary reasons—resulting in windfalls for some but little relief for others—due to the rigidly linear way in which the awards stack up, count by count. The irony is that too much structure, rather than too little, is what generates such capricious outcomes.

This Article proposes a solution: allow courts to run damages concurrently. As with concurrent criminal sentencing, the judge would recognize every act of violation, and yet group the nominal counts so that the effective penalties do not stack up arbitrarily. This simple option enables judges to tailor the structure of damages to match more closely how the harms actually add up (“Should the copyright damages accumulate per song, per album, per artist, or per playlist—in this case?”). Moreover, it can displace the troubling fudges—such as fictional awards—that some courts use when bound by the rigidity of statutory damages. Creating a concurrent damages option may thus make possible not only more accurate and consistent compensation but also clearer, truer signals for future actors and future courts.

Immigration’s Family Values

This Article takes an institutional approach to analyzing how the law determines parentage in diverse doctrinal contexts. We argue that immigration and citizenship law use different parentage tests than family law not because lawmakers have failed to properly incorporate family law principles but because lawmakers’ interests are not the same in the immigration context. State family law’s primary interests are protecting children, preserving well-functioning parent-child relationships, and ensuring that each child has two parents who are designated as legally and financially responsible. Immigration and citizenship law, in contrast, implicate the federal government’s interest in achieving optimal numbers of immigrants and citizens. In addition, because the benefits of lawful immigrant status and U.S. citizenship are so extensive, an important state interest in determining parentage in the immigration and citizenship context is the ferreting out and prevention of fraud. As a general rule, the context in which parentage disputes arise in immigration and citizenship cases differs greatly from the circumstances that lead to custody or divorce proceedings. Thus, the “family values” espoused by immigration and citizenship law are very different from those we are accustomed to seeing in family court.

Where immigration and citizenship law fail, they fail on their own terms, and we must understand their core values in order to critique them and to offer workable solutions. For example, current federal policy privileges interests in optimal citizenship and immigration and in fraud prevention at the expense of allowing U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents to exercise their own liberty interests in preserving parent-child relationships. We critique this policy, however, not because it deviates from state family law principles but because it fails to recognize the government’s interests in preserving the family relationships of its citizens.

A Market-Based Tool to Reduce Systematic Undervaluation of Collateral in Residential Mortgage Foreclosures

This Note addresses the problem of the systematic undervaluation of collateral in residential mortgage foreclosures. Public policymakers have been wrestling with this problem for nearly a century. As a result of the perceived flaws in the typical foreclosure auction, public authorities have tried to supplement the auctions with various rules intended to encourage higher sale prices or to protect against substantial undervaluation. While each of the supplemental devices promulgated by public policymakers has its strengths and weaknesses, none of them has completely solved the undervaluation problem.

This Note uses the underlying principles of credit bidding in bankruptcy proceedings to develop a new market-based tool that can deter the systematic undervaluation of collateral in residential mortgage foreclosures. Deficiency forfeiture sales options—the tool developed in this Note—target the two main problems with foreclosure auctions: (1) accurately determining the fair market value of the underlying property and (2) incentivizing lenders to bid that value at the auction. Similar to credit bidding, the new tool proposed by this Note will result in a transfer of wealth from lenders to borrowers, but only if lenders bid or collude with or tolerate third-party bidders who bid below the fair market value of the underlying property at the foreclosure auction. The threat of this permanent transfer of wealth from the lender to the borrower should be an effective and efficient deterrent of systematic undervaluation of collateral in residential mortgage foreclosures, just as the threat of a transfer of value from a bankrupt estate to a secured creditor as a result of credit bidding deters undervaluation in bankruptcy proceedings.