Letter to the Editor: Remembering Charlottesville 2017 and Engaging Black-Jewish Alliances

To the Editor:

In September 2018, the Virginia Law Review co-hosted a symposium entitled “One Year After Charlottesville: Replacing the Resurgence of Racism with Reconciliation.”[1] The event convened scholars to reflect upon and move past the “Unite the Right” rally, the act of domestic terrorism that shook Charlottesville, Virginia on August 11 and 12, 2017. The Symposium’s organizers aimed to gather national experts and thought leaders who would introduce new tools to theorize, measure, and assess this nation’s longstanding history of and current struggle against racism, nationalism, and white supremacy. Remarkably, however, the Symposium seemed to almost completely ignore the historic hatred of Jews that fueled Charlottesville’s marchers. This was more than an oversight. It was a significant missed opportunity to reaffirm the enduring importance and impact of the alliance between Black and Jewish advocates for equality.

The Symposium could and should have used the marchers’ hateful chants to reflect on the role that unified activism among Jews and Blacks plays in protecting civil rights. Moreover, the Virginia Law Review’s editors should have commemorated the first anniversary of the violence and mayhem with recognition of the tragic surge in hate crimes across the United States that continues to principally target Blacks and Jews.[2] This letter is submitted to begin to address these omissions.

The August 2017 rally—which drew about five to six hundred participants from across the country[3]—sought to unify white supremacist and white nationalist movements. Members from a variety of anti-Semitic and racist organizations alighted on the college town, including the Ku Klux Klan and David Duke, the Atomwaffen Division (“AWD”),[4] Proud Boys, Vanguard America, and Identity Evropa.[5]

Supremacist organizers Jason Kessler and Richard Spencer planned the event ostensibly to oppose removal of a statue of Confederate General Robert E. Lee from Charlottesville’s Market Street Park.[6] But the aims of those gathered for the event was grander; some participants’ stated purpose was to regain control of America, a country they believe was founded by white people, as an inheritance for white people, and destined to remain under the exclusive control of white people.[7] Even more alarmingly, rally participants planned to ignite a race war against Jews, Blacks, immigrants, and “anti-white vermin.”[8]

They sought to intimidate and terrorize the Charlottesville community by shouting statements that denigrated Blacks and Jews. They sang “Dixie,” the Confederate anthem, and shouted, “The South Will Rise Again.”[9] Larry Sabato, the director of the University of Virginia Center for Politics, heard shouts for Jews to be thrown “[i]nto the ovens,”[10] and one banner proudly asserted, “Jews are Satan’s children.”[11] They wielded torches claiming, “White lives matter” and proclaimed “Dylann Roof was a hero!”[12] Duke told the crowd that Jews control the news media, the Federal Reserve, and American politics.[13] Finally, participants’ central slogan was, “The Jews will not replace us!”[14]

This mix of violent racism with Nazi-inspired anti-Semitism not only whipped the mob into a deadly fervor, but should have reminded us all that racism and anti-Semitism are inextricably linked in the white supremacist mind. In 1952, renowned psychoanalyst Frantz Fanon wrote:

At first glance it might seem strange that the attitude of the anti-Semite can be equated with that of the negrophobe. It was my philosophy teacher from the Antilles who reminded me one day: “When you hear someone insulting the Jews, pay attention; he is talking about you.” And I believed at the time he was universally right, meaning that I was responsible in my body and soul for the fate reserved for my brother. Since then, I have understood that what he meant quite simply was that the anti-Semite is inevitably a negrophobe.[15]

The history that joins Blacks and Jews has suffered the tensions of any filial relation, especially one borne of each having overcome centuries of oppressions, state-sponsored injustices, and violent hatreds. At times that history has overlapped, both Blacks and Jews were united against the social formation of what one scholar has called “the archetypal ‘Others.’”[16] The overlap historically emerged from the American abolitionist tradition, which linked the Jewish Exodus to the Black emergence from slavery.[17] This religious imagery played a prominent role from nineteenth-century abolition to twentieth-century civil rights activism.[18] Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. adopted this imagery of the emergence from bondage to advocate for concrete liberation of Soviet Jews from the Iron Curtain.[19] He spoke out vigorously against anti-Semitism and in support of Israel.[20] King’s fellow travelers in supporting Jewish causes included influential civil rights leaders such as W.E.B. Du Bois,[21] Roy Wilkins,[22] Whitney Young,[23] and A. Philip Randolph.[24] An integrated coalition drove civil rights progress throughout much of the twentieth century, with the NAACP, National Urban League, and Southern Christian Leadership Conference joining forces with the American Jewish Congress, American Jewish Committee, and the Anti-Defamation League.[25] One study finds that during the 1960s about half of all civil rights lawyers in the South were Jewish, and that Jews were well represented among those who challenged Jim Crow segregation laws.[26]

At other historical moments, however, the relationship was strained, sometimes to a breaking point, despite all the two groups had in common.[27] There are and have been internal challenges to the vital alliance between the Black and Jewish communities, making opportunities to reflect on the historical alliance—such as the 2018 Symposium—even more pressing. Dangerous alliances harm both Jews and Blacks and draw us away from our shared interest in equality, liberty, and the common good.

The central message of this letter is this: The Virginia Law Review, and indeed all who seek to create a path toward racial and ethnic reconciliation, should critically engage with the fact that anti-Semitism lies at the core of white nationalism and supremacism. That ancient hatred is often coupled with anti-Black racism, as it was at the 2017 Unite the Right rally. The failure to see and vigorously oppose the existential and historical linkages between the two is to give power to the terrorists who roamed the streets of Charlottesville and who are increasingly invading the hearts and minds of people well beyond Virginia today.

 


[1] See Symposium, One Year After Charlottesville: Replacing the Resurgence of Racism with Reconciliation, 105 Va. L. Rev. 263 (2019).

[2] Federal Bureau of Investigation, Table 1: Incidents, Offenses, Victims, and Known Offen­ders by Bias Motivation,  2017 Hate Crime Statistics (2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/­2017/tables/table-1.xls [https://perma.cc/C4C7-QE7D]. In 2017, 48.73% of all 4,131 racial hate crime incidents were against Blacks, and 59.97% of all 1,564 religious hate crime inci­dents were against Jews, accounting for the largest portions of their respective groups. See id.

[3] Spencer S. Hsu, Charlottesville White Supremacist Rally in August Drew Attendees from 35 States, Study Finds, Wash. Post (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/­public-safety/study-charlottesville-white-supremacist-rally-in-august-drew-attendees-from-35-states/2017/10/08/fe57868e-ac45-11e7-a908-a3470754bbb9_story.html?utm_term=.d­f63eba2cf4f [https://perma.cc/KM8G-N86P].

[4] AWD is “a neo-Nazi organization eager for a race war and committed to terrorist attacks against Jews, immigrants and other targets in the U.S.—power grids, nuclear facilities—that would foment fear.” Joe Sexton, Las Vegas Man Arrested in Plots Against Jews Was Said to Be Affiliated with Atomwaffen Division, ProPublica (Aug. 14, 2019, 5:00 PM), https://­www.propublica.org/article/las-vegas-man-conor-climo-was-said-to-be-affiliated-with-atom­waffen-division [https://perma.cc/K23M-954D]. Additionally, the Anti-Defamation League, a watchdog that tracks hate organizations, reports that “Atomwaffen members have a macabre fascination with serial killer Charles Manson and his vision of a race war between whites and blacks.” Atomwaffen Division (AWD), Anti-Defamation League, https://www.adl.org/re­sources/backgrounders/atomwaffen-division-awd [https://perma.cc/A67X-YA88] (last visit­ed Oct. 29, 2019).

[5] Two Years Ago, They Marched in Charlottesville. Where Are They Now?, Anti-Defamation League (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.adl.org/blog/two-years-ago-they-marched-in-charlottesville-where-are-they-now [https://perma.cc/X78N-4EXC]; Proud Boys, Anti-Defamation League, https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/proud-boys [https://per­ma.cc/L39T-RCTM] (last visited Oct. 29, 2019); VICE, Charlottesville: Race and Terror­ –VICE News Tonight on HBO, Youtube (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?­time_continue=1&v=RIrcB1sAN8I [https://perma.­cc/4A9F-GUW5].

[6] VICE, supra note 5. The park was originally named Lee Park but was renamed Eman­cipation Park amidst white supremacist stirrings in June 2017. Charlottesville City Council Changes the Names of Two Renamed Parks, Daily Progress (July 16, 2018), https://­www.dailyprogress.com/news/local/char­lottesville-city-council-changes-the-names-of-two-renamed-parks/article_9ac64d52-8963-1­1e8-853a-a3864982745e.html [https://perma.cc/7S­U5-EXVQ]. In July 2018, the Charlottesville City Council changed the name again to the more neutral Market Street Park. Id.

[7] ‘The Fight for the White Race’: What Some of the Charlottesville Rally Participants Stand For, N.Y. Times (Aug. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/19/us/char­lottesville-quotes.html [https://perma.cc/AE3R-NB8J].

[8] Rabbi Spike Anderson, Temple Emanu-El: Rise Up to Drive Out Hate, Atl. Jewish Times (Sept. 13, 2017, 1:07 PM), https://atlantajewishtimes.timesofisrael.com/temple-emanu-el-we-must-rise-up-to-drive-out-hate/ [https://perma.cc/PTN9-5HQB] (“Robert Ray, who runs the neo Nazi website the Daily Storm, spoke to the reporter about the reason why 1,000 people were marching with torches, guns and Nazi flag [sic]: ‘We are showing this parasitic class of anti-white vermin that this is our country . . . . We will clear them from the streets, forever. We are starting to slowly unveil our power level. You ain’t seen nothing yet.’”).

[9] David Neiwert, When White Nationalists Chant Their Weird Slogans, What Do They Mean?, S. Poverty L. Ctr. (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/10/10/­when-white-nationalists-chant-their-weird-slogans-what-do-they-mean [https://perma.cc/Q3­B3-8NXC].

[10] Mykal McEldowney, What Charlottesville Changed, Politico (Aug. 12, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/08/12/charlottesville-anniversary-suprema­cists-protests-dc-virginia-219353 [https://perma.cc/5223-JFYF]. The Nazis not only threw dead victims but also living ones into ovens at concentration camps. Mary Fulbrook, Reckon­ings: Legacies of Nazi Persecution and the Quest for Justice 215 (2018).

[11] Yair Rosenberg, ‘Jews Will Not Replace Us’: Why White Supremacists Go After Jews, Wash. Post (Aug. 14, 2017, 10:03 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2017/08/14/jews-will-not-replace-us-why-white-supremacists-go-after-jews/ [https­://perma.cc/6E2T-D6B3].

[12] Joe Heim, Recounting a Day of Rage, Hate, Violence and Death, Wash. Post (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/charlottesville-timeline/ [https­://perma.cc/DRG5-HAZT].

[13] Ronsenberg, supra note 11.

[14] Julian E. Zelizer, Trump Needs to Demilitarize His Rhetoric, Atlantic (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/americas-long-history-anti-semitism/5­74234/ [https://perma.cc/J96Y-D52W].

[15] Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks 101 (Richard Philcox trans., Grove Press 2008) (1952).

[16] Edith Bruder, The Black Jews of Africa: History, Religion, Identity 37, 41 (2008).

[17] Melanie Kaye/Kantrowitz, The Colors of Jews: Racial Politics and Radical Diasporism 47 (2007).

[18] See David Brion Davis, Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World 396 n.26 (2006) (listing Jewish abolitionists during the nineteenth century).

[19] Albert D. Chernin, Making Soviet Jews an Issue: A History, in A Second Exodus: The American Movement to Free Soviet Jews 15, 33, 48 (Murray Friedman & Albert D. Chernin eds., 1999).

[20] Anti-Semitism Held Immoral by Dr. King, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1967, at 59.

[21] Benjamin Sevitch, W.E.B. Du Bois and Jews: A Lifetime of Opposing Anti-Semitism, 87 J. Afr. Am. Hist. 323 (2002).

[22] Nancy L. Green, Blacks, Jews, and the “Natural Alliance”: Labor Cohabitation and the ILGWU, Jewish Soc. Stud., Fall 1997, at 79, 96; Johnpeter Horst Grill & Robert L. Jenkins, The Nazis and the American South in the 1930s: A Mirror Image?, 58 J. S. Hist. 667, 689 (1992).

[23] Yvonne D. Newsome, International Issues and Domestic Ethnic Relations: African Americans, American Jews, and the Israel-South Africa Debate, 5 Int’l J. Pol., Culture, & Soc. 19, 36–37 (1991); Alan Petigny, Black-Jewish Relations and the Decline of Modern Liberalism, 35 Rev. Am. Hist. 556, 563 (2007) (reviewing Cheryl Greenberg, Troubling the Waters: Black-Jewish Relations in the American Century (2006)).

[24] James H. Meriwether, African Americans and the Mau Mau Rebellion: Militancy, Violence, and the Struggle for Freedom, J. Am. Ethnic Hist., Summer 1998, at 63, 76.

[25] See generally Hasia R. Diner, In the Almost Promised Land: American Jews and Blacks, 1915–1935 (Johns Hopkins Paperbacks ed. 1995) (1977) (discussing early twentieth-century relations between Blacks and Jews).

[26] Black and Jewish Relations, An Article, AAREG (Sept. 29, 2019), https://aaregist­ry.org/story/black-and-jewish-relations-an-article/ [https://perma.cc/3696-Z7­2S].

[27] See, e.g., Annalisa Jabaily, 1967: How Estrangement and Alliances Between Blacks, Jews, and Arabs Shaped A Generation of Civil Rights Family Values, 23 L. & Ineq. 197, 205–07 (2005) (discussing black nationalist break with mainstream Jewish organizations); Winston McDowell, Race and Ethnicity During the Harlem Jobs Campaign, 1932–1935, 69 J. Negro Hist., 134, 136 (1984).

Constructing Originalism or: Why Professors Baude and Sachs Should Learn to Stop Worrying and Love Ronald Dworkin

This piece is a response to an article by Professors Baude and Sachs published in the Northwestern University Law Review. It expands upon the conversation begun by Professor Barzun’s prior article published in the Stanford Law Review.

I. Introduction

The philosopher of science Ernest Nagel once observed that “[t]here is, in general, little intellectual nourishment to be found in rebuttals to rejoinders to replies.”[1] That is especially true when there are other able critics ready to carry the mantle. But, although Professor Eric Segall in a recent essay raises powerful objections to the argument Professors William Baude and Stephen Sachs advance in Grounding Originalism, he gives them a pass on what seems to me the key issue.[2] Segall concedes that the originalism Baude and Sachs offer “might be our law in some academic, theoretical sense”; however, he insists that even if so, originalism does little work “on the ground” in the practical business of courts deciding cases.[3] There, political ideology dominates.[4]

Segall may be right about that. Originalism may only be a “rhetorical device” judges deploy.[5] But law is a rhetorical practice through and through, so it matters (to me, at least) what arguments are advanced and what stories are told. Like Baude and Sachs, I care about whether there is an “official story” of American law and, if so, what it is, what purpose it serves, and how it relates to what we call “law.”[6] This brief response thus presses them on their claims about law in this “theoretical sense.”

In my initial critique of the novel brand of originalism Professors Baude and Sachs had advanced, both separately and together, my objection was not so much that their theory was wrong but rather that it depended on conceptual claims and normative commitments they refused to acknowledge.[7] Their response and further elaboration of their theory in Grounding only partially remedies those defects. They now explicitly align themselves with H.L.A. Hart’s theory of law, which usefully focuses the debate.[8] But they still fail to reckon with the difficulties Hart’s model of law poses for their approach. In fact, their somewhat creative interpretation of Hart further confirms my initial observation that their true jurisprudential ally is Ronald Dworkin.[9] It also points to another feature of the “deep structure” of law that Baude and Sachs mostly ignore.[10]

Below I expand upon and clarify these claims. Part II briefly recapitulates the debate between Baude and Sachs and me. The next two Parts each address one of the two core issues that divide us. The first issue is about American judicial practice, and the question is, how originalist (in their distinctive sense of that term) is our practice? The second issue is about the relationship between judicial practice and “law,” according to H.L.A. Hart’s theory of law. There the question is, can originalism still be our law even if no judges recognize that fact? Part V concludes by suggesting that Baude and Sachs’s use of Hart’s theory reveals the way in which both legal practice and theory is interpretive in a technical sense of that term I will explain.

II. “Previously on . . .”

Baude and Sachs each initially offered their theories of originalism separately, but because each stressed the way in which his approach was premised on a “positivist” understanding of law, their common approach was dubbed the “positive turn” in originalism.[11] The basic argument proceeded in two steps. First, they suggested that scholarly debates over the proper methods of constitutional and statutory interpretation, including originalism, could be resolved, or at least advanced, by looking to our actual, “positive” law.[12] Rather than defending originalism (or any other interpretive approach) by reference to normative claims about what would lead to good results or would be democratically legitimate, or to conceptual claims about what, for example, the act of “interpretation” necessarily requires, we should look to “our law.”[13]

The second step was to say that if you take this approach, what you see is that our law requires originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation.[14] More specifically, it required a particular version of originalism, which Professor Sachs had dubbed “original-law originalism” (herein “OLO”).[15] According to this doctrine, rules or methods for interpreting statutes and the Constitution qualify as law if and only if they either were the law at the time of the Founding or were changed pursuant to a “rule of change” that can itself trace its lineage back to the Founding.[16]

My main objection to the so-called “positive turn” was that its advocates purported to remain agnostic on the question of which positivist theory of law was the right one, whereas it seemed to me that they could not remain so agnostic since different positivist theories pick out different social facts in determining what counts as law.[17] Professor Mark Greenberg made the same point in specific reference to their joint article on the “law of interpretation.”[18] Moreover, deciding which theory of law to rely on requires them to engage in precisely the kind of normative argument and conceptual analysis they seemed inclined to avoid—a point I demonstrated by applying their approach to three of the best-known positivist theories of law in order to show the difficulties such application necessarily entailed.[19]

Although Baude and Sachs continue to talk about the lack of any need to “solve[] jurisprudence,” they effectively concede Greenberg’s and my point by aligning themselves with Hart’s philosophy of law.[20] So that’s some progress. But we also both argued that Hart’s theory was a bad fit for them.[21] I made two arguments. First, courts do not seem to apply OLO when deciding cases.[22] Second, even if some courts do so, for Hart, the existence of law requires a judicial consensus as to the criteria of legal validity, and yet there is no such consensus around the statutory and constitutional interpretive methods under discussion. Therefore, such methods cannot be part of the rule of recognition.[23]

Baude and Sachs have still not met those essential objections, though they have clarified their strategy for doing so. First, they argue that courts need not establish the pedigree of interpretive rules back to the Founding if Founding law itself treated interpretive rules as a form of customary law.[24]  Second, they insist that interpretive disagreement among judges is not a problem for Hart’s theory because it may be that some judges are simply mistaken about what the rule of recognition—or, what they call the “official story”—properly requires.[25] In fact, all judges might be so mistaken such that there exists “global error” as to what the rule of recognition demands.[26]

We can thus state fairly crisply the issues on the table. Once we wade through discussions of “dephlogisticated air,”[27] felonious sandwiches,[28] Pteropus fruit bats,[29] the Territory of Alaska,[30] Al Capone’s nephew,[31] and endangered elephants,[32] there remain two, core issues that divide us. The first issue is whether the central requirement of OLO, namely the demand that constitutional and interpretive rules and methods trace their pedigree back to the Founding, is a feature of judicial practice today; that is, do courts explicitly or implicitly demand (even if only indirectly) satisfaction of the OLO rule? They think they do; I think they do not. The second issue is, even if the OLO rule is not a feature of judicial practice, can it still be part of our “positive law,” according to Hart’s theory of law? They think it can be; I think it cannot be. Or, to put it more precisely, Hart’s theory only allows for such a profound disconnect between judicial practice and the “law” under a creative reinterpretation of that theory. I consider each of these issues in turn.

III. Do Judges Practice Original-Law Originalism?

In my earlier article, I considered first the possibility that OLO was part of our rule of recognition.[33] Since Hart defines the rule of recognition as a practice of courts and officials,[34] I pointed out that in most of the cases they relied on in support of their claim that judges practice OLO, the Court made no effort to trace the pedigree of an interpretive rule or method back to the Founding.[35] I also observed that it was easy to find cases where the Court explicitly employs an interpretive method and only bothers to cite a few cases in support.[36] I offered these cases as evidence of what I took to be a banal observation, namely that courts do not today, nor have they ever, required interpretive rules to prove an originalist pedigree (or any other sort of pedigree) before invoking them. Thus, OLO is not part of our rule of recognition. Courts are not methods-originalists.

I then suggested that a more plausible explanation for why courts cite only a handful of cases (if any) when invoking interpretive methods is that they treat interpretive rules as deriving from judicial practice itself—in other words, as a form of customary or common law.[37] Baude and Sachs now respond by saying that that view is in fact perfectly consistent with OLO if, but only if, such a customary practice was the law at the timing of the Founding.[38] Here is the key passage:

Customary law was itself a well-recognized kind of law at the Founding, and the Founders’ law likely included the possibility, within certain fields, of legal “evol[ution] by slow accretion.” . . . We see such customary fields, together with any limits on their potential evolution, as possible contingent implications of our legal system’s official story.

    By contrast, Barzun proposes customary law as an alternative to our view, requiring confidence that it would still be compatible with American legal norms regardless of whether there had been such law at the Founding—apparently, even if the modern use of customary law in a given field were entirely the product of some mid-century judicial power grab. That, we think, is a much taller order, at least as judged by our existing legal culture.[39]

Let’s be clear about what the issue here is. We are now agreed that courts treat canons of construction and other interpretive methods as a form of customary law, so that those methods do not themselves require a pedigree back to the Founding; one must only establish that the custom of treating them as customary traces back to the Founding. So the question is, do courts today apply something like the following rule?: In order for Interpretive Method X to be validly invoked by a court, that canon or method must either establish a pedigree back to the Founding or derive from judicial custom that is itself traceable back to the Founding.

This is an interesting question, and any reader of this Essay, or at least any domestic one, is probably well-equipped to help answer it. Anyone who has read this far in an essay about abstruse questions of constitutional theory and jurisprudence is likely either to be an expert (or expert-in-training) on what the rule of recognition in the United States is (i.e., what all or nearly all courts treat as law) or someone whose view on the matter is actually constitutive of the rule of recognition. So, what do you think, dear reader? If you discovered that at the time of the Founding the law did not treat canons of construction and other interpretive rules as amenable to common-law development in spite of the fact that many of the canons and interpretive methods courts use today had entered our law through precisely such a process, would your judgment as to the “legality” or judicial propriety of those methods be materially altered?

In answering this question, though, do not be misled by the false dichotomy Baude and Sachs (once again) draw between a pedigree-to-the-Founding rule, on the one hand, and a “mid-century judicial power grab,” on the other.[40] For one thing, almost by definition, if a legal doctrine is plausibly characterized as a “power grab,” then it will not be plausibly understood as having been properly derived from custom. More important, the contrast drawn misstates the burden their theory must meet. To say that OLO is part of the rule of recognition is to say that our current practice treats having a pedigree back to the Founders’ law as a necessary condition of legal validity, which means that even if the customary features of an area of law developed slowly throughout the nineteenth century, it would still be inconsistent with OLO and so not valid law.

Even with this clarification, my question is not meant to be rhetorical. I suspect some readers with originalist inclinations may answer in the affirmative—such a discovery might indeed make a big difference to them. But my bald, speculative guess is that a good many readers  would not care much at all. These readers may understand our system of law to bottom out in a common-law tradition of legal evolution and judicial practice, so that the legal status of customary law does not critically depend on proving that the founders approved of its use in some particular domain—especially when it comes to methods for interpreting statutes and the Constitution.

If I am right that the opinions of judges might vary on this question, then that would seem to be enough to establish my negative claim that OLO is not our law. Remember that in order for a rule to be part of the rule of recognition, all or nearly all judges must accept it as a criterion of legal validity. So, you might think that, unless virtually all judges agree that the use of customary law is only valid if the law at the Founding authorized its use in that particular domain, Baude and Sachs have failed to show that OLO is part of our rule of recognition. Where there is disagreement, there can be no rule of recognition.

IV. Can Positive Law Exist in “Exile”?

You might think that, but you’d be wrong; Baude and Sachs have a response to that line of reasoning. Maybe OLO is not itself part of our rule of recognition at all. Instead, it achieves the status of “law” by satisfying the criteria that that rule of recognition provides.[41] In Hart’s terms, OLO is a “subordinate” rule of our legal system.[42] I will first summarize and explain this response and then show why it still places more weight on Hart’s theory than it can bear, even under a charitable reading.

A. Original-Law Originalism as a Valid Subordinate Rule

The argument goes like this: the rule of recognition in the United States is what Baude and Sachs call “the official story” of American law, which includes things like: “We treat the Constitution as a legal text, originally enacted in the late eighteenth century,” and “Actors in our legal system don’t acknowledge, and indeed reject, any official legal breaks or discontinuities from the Founding,” and the other apparent truisms about American legal practice they list in Grounding.[43] Because the vast majority of judges would accept these truisms as accurate statements about the fundamental assumptions of our legal practice, they constitute—or at least “help guide us toward”—our rule of recognition.[44]

The official story, as recounted by Baude and Sachs, nowhere includes an explicit requirement to the effect that “no method of constitutional or statutory interpretation is legally permissible unless it was part of Founding law or produced by a rule of change ultimately authorized by Founding law” (i.e., the OLO rule). But that’s not a problem because that rule is a mere subordinate rule (in Hart’s terms) entailed by, or derived from, the official story, which itself provides the ultimate criteria of legal validity.[45] The OLO rule follows from the fact that courts do not recognize any “official legal breaks” since the Founding, so it counts as part of “our law” even if many courts—perhaps all courts—fail to do so. Courts today may simply be mistaken in their failure to see that OLO is entailed by the criteria implicit in the official story. Thus, as Baude and Sachs put it, “[a]n originalist rule can still be a legal rule, even if no court applies it—so long as the legal system still recognizes an official story with that result.”[46]

Under this view, then, OLO is part of our law in the same way that the U.S. tax code is part of our law. Both become law through application of parts of our rule of recognition. The only difference is that OLO is part of our law because it satisfies a part of our rule of recognition that is unwritten (namely, the official story) and so must be inferred from judicial practice, whereas the federal tax code became law by satisfying the criteria for passing legislation laid out in Article I of the Constitution.

Once OLO is understood to be a subordinate rule, rather than part of our rule of recognition, then it is easy to see why judges could be in “global error” about it.[47] Imagine, for instance, that the rule of recognition provides that “whatever rule written on Paper X is law,” but no judge has ever noticed that, on Paper X, Rule Y was written in faint ink in tiny script. Rule Y would still be “valid law” according to the criteria specified in the rule of recognition, even though no court recognized it. Or, to continue the two prior examples, just as it is conceivable that all judges might misapply some technical provision of the tax code, so, too, is it possible that all of them would err in failing to apply OLO when employing rules of statutory or constitutional interpretation. The possibility of such “surprise” as to what the law requires follows from the “hierarchical structure” of a legal system, where certain rules derive their legal status from still other rules, until you get back to the ultimate rule of recognition.[48]

B. Hartian Positivism and Judicial Practice

It’s a clever argument and one I did not fully appreciate the first time around.[49] Moreover, it insightfully exploits a deep tension that runs throughout Hart’s theory and which has divided scholars of Hart’s work.[50] But even on the reading of Hart more favorable to Baude and Sachs’s approach, it is hard to see how his theory can support the claim that judges are in “global error” about such fundamental aspects of our law.

The tension in Hart revolves around the question of whether law is better understood as a genuine feature of practical reasoning or is instead merely a brute sociological fact about a given society. Traditionally, natural lawyers had argued for the first view, whereas legal positivists argued for the latter.[51] Hart tried to forge a middle path between the two by showing the way in which it could be both. On the one hand, for a legal system to exist, legal officials must treat the system’s ultimate “rule of recognition” as a genuine guide or standard for rendering decisions; that is, they must take the “internal” point of view with respect to it.[52] Austin’s “habits of obedience” are not enough.[53] On the other hand, what the rule of recognition happens to be in any given society is entirely a question of fact. So, as long as that society’s courts and officials treat it as providing the authoritative criteria for legal validity, and as long as the general populace complies with their orders, law exists there.[54]

It’s not entirely clear, though, how Hart thinks one should ultimately answer the question of whether any particular rule in a given society qualifies as a law: should one, as Baude and Sachs maintain, apply the criteria of the rule of recognition to the rule and so render an answer from the “internal point of view” (law-as-practical reasoning)?[55] Or should one simply observe the behavior of courts and officials to see whether they are enforcing the rule against private citizens and thus presupposing its satisfaction of the rule of recognition (law-as-brute-fact)?

To continue with the example from above, when we see that judges have ignored Rule Y written on Paper X, should we conclude that the judges have failed to properly apply the rule of recognition, “whatever rule is written on Paper X is law,” or should we instead say that the rule of recognition is really “whatever rule is written on Paper X is law unless the rule is not visible under normal conditions” (or any rule that would explain the judicial behavior)?

Under the latter view, it should be clear that Baude and Sachs can get little help from Hart. The reason is that according to this view, Hart’s theory is a work of “descriptive sociology,” as he famously put it in the preface to The Concept of Law, so making judgments as to what rules exist in a legal system is fundamentally an empirical inquiry that looks to official behavior.[56] True, it is a sociological approach that treats the language officials use as part of the sociological data that needs to be explained and in that way it does not restrict itself to the “external point of view.” But Hart’s critique of that more behavioristic approach was that it would “miss out a whole dimension of the social life” of those who live under the rules examined.[57] The observer would fail to see, for instance, that a red light is not only a sign that people stop their cars, but, by their lights, a reason for them to do so.[58] But nowhere does Hart ever suggest that such an “external” observer would fail to see a society’s rules because no one was even conforming their conduct to them.

This reading—which we might call the “sociological” reading—is supported by Hart’s discussion of “rule-scepticism” in Chapter Seven of The Concept of Law.[59] There he again pursues a middle path, rejecting the extreme skepticism of the legal realists, who denied that rules could ever constrain, while also denying that every case either does or does not fall under a rule’s scope.[60] Rather, due to the inherently “open-textured” nature of language, some applications of general rules were, in his view, simply indeterminate.[61] In such cases, “all we can profitably offer in answer to the question: ‘What is the law on this matter?’ is a guarded prediction of what courts will do.”[62] In other words, pace Baude and Sachs, in such cases—i.e., hard cases, where courts disagree—all we can do is to adopt the “external” point of view.[63]

But let’s adopt a reading of Hart more charitable to Baude and Sachs. As I have written elsewhere, The Concept of Law is ambiguous on these questions, and there is definitely evidence that Hart aimed to give an account of how the law could generate genuine, even if not moral, obligations.[64] It seems most likely that Hart was conflicted on this question—a fact to which his biographer, Nicola Lacey, has reported that his journals attest.[65] And if that’s the case, then it would seem that answering questions about the validity of legal rules should be responsive to “internal” or “legal” arguments as to whether the rule properly satisfies the rule of recognition. So, in my view, Baude and Sachs are picking up on something real in Hart.[66]

Even on this more normative reading of Hart, though, it is hard to see how his theory can do the work they require of it. The reason is that for law to figure in practical reasoning in the way that Hart envisioned, there must be a limit to how far it can deviate from official practice. So it is hard to see how Hart’s concept of the rule of recognition could generate a “constitution in exile.”[67]

To see why, consider that for Hart, the essential function of a rule of recognition is to remedy various “defects” that plague a system governed only by “primary rules of conduct.” In particular, having such rules cures the problem of uncertainty as to which rules are the official rules of society.[68] When officials accept a rule that effectively says, “we will enforce as law any rule that passes X test or possess Y features,” it makes it clear to people which rules they must pay attention to at the risk of being punished for their violation.[69] Plainly, a rule of recognition as abstract and amenable to competing plausible interpretations as the “official story” will not do much to remedy such uncertainty.

This point is reinforced by a revision Hart made to his own theory, in which he emphasized the conventional nature of the rule of recognition. When Ronald Dworkin pointed out that not all rules are “social rules” in Hart’s sense (that is, rules whose existence depends on the fact that others treat them as rules), Hart conceded the point.[70] He nevertheless insisted that even if not all rules were social, the rule of recognition was. More specifically, the rule of recognition is a conventional rule insofar as officials treat the fact that other officials apply it as itself a reason for them to apply it, too—just as the fact that people drive on the right side of the road is a reason for you to do so as well.[71] But if the rule of recognition is so uncertain in its implications that no official could have confidence that its application would produce similar behavior, what would be the point of such a convention?[72]

Perhaps a concrete example will illustrate the point. Hart is famous for defending the view that the Nazis had law.[73] He thought the issue important because he wanted to stress that the law, and the obligations it imposes, were distinct from morality and the obligations it imposes. Recognizing that difference mattered to Hart because he thought it clarified the nature of certain practical dilemmas the existence of law raises. So, for instance, you can understand more clearly the difficulty that postwar German courts faced when considering cases of the so-called “grudge informer” (people who had informed on someone during the Nazi regime so that he or she would be imprisoned or killed by the regime) if you see that the two sources of obligation—legal and moral—are in conflict in such cases.[74]

But one can easily imagine making the case, on Baude-Sachsian grounds, that the “Third Reich,” and all of its actions, were not legal under German law. You would point to the fact that the Rules Enabling Act of 1933, which purported to authorize Hitler’s government to make laws (including those inconsistent with the constitution), was improperly enacted because the Reichstag did not have the 432 members necessary to establish a quorum.[75] Since the statute that delegated to Hitler the power to make law was itself a legal nullity, all the rules of the Third Reich promulgated pursuant to that authority were legally null and void.

Now Baude and Sachs might happily allow for this interpretation. They would say that their whole point is that what the law is in any given country at any given time is a contingent question of social fact. So it’s an “empirical” question whether the legal argument above is a correct. It all depends on what the rule of recognition was in Germany at the time and what the law required, as assessed from the “internal point of view.”[76] Maybe the “official story” that German courts and other officials accepted at the time entailed that after 1933 Hitler was acting ultra vires; or maybe it entailed that his actions were properly authorized; or maybe the Fuhrer’s edicts were only treated “as if” they were law[77]; or maybe the official story recognized an official legal break from the Weimar regime in 1933, as historians now do. Any of these scenarios is possible—it all depends on contingent facts about official attitudes and assumptions, so you have to “look and see” what German law really required.[78]

Maybe so. But the point is that Hart would have had none of this. Why not? The reason is not because he clearly assumed that Nazi laws satisfied whatever the German legal system’s rule of recognition at the time, though that is true (after all, Hart could have been unaware of this particular procedural defect). Nor is the reason that he understood the rule of recognition to be an exclusively sociological phenomenon observable by looking to judicial conduct alone, though that may also be true. (After all, we are accepting for the sake of argument the more normative reading of Hart here—one that ascribes to him the ambition of showing how the existence of a rule of recognition can generate rules of “law” that are “valid” and so impose genuine legal obligations).

Instead, the reason Hart’s theory is inconsistent with the idea that judges or officials could be in “global error” about fundamental aspects of its law is that if such law existed entirely in “exile,” it would be incapable of playing the role in practical reasoning Hart envisioned for it in the sorts of ethical dilemmas he thought his positivist account of law helped to clarify. If the people in a society could only come to know the law by engaging in esoteric debate as to what the “deep structure” of their legal system entailed, such law would not have even have a prima facie claim to obedience when it conflicts with basic moral duties. The reason is that such law would be effectively unknown to those living under it, and that’s the key issue for Hart.[79] Indeed, a society governed by such “positive law” would suffer from precisely the same defect as a society consisting of only “primary rules” of behavior without any rule of recognition at all, namely profound uncertainty as to which rules were the official rules of the group. Thus, although the postwar German courts Hart criticized happened to invoke “natural law” as their basis for punishing grudge informers, the problem would have been precisely the same had they instead based their decisions on a judgment about what the “deep structure” of German law had really required at the time. In both cases, the courts would be essentially punishing people retroactively for conduct they had no reason to think was illegal at the time.

So yes, for Hart, as for Baude and Sachs, the question of whether the Nazis had law was an “empirical” question. But it was not a question of what the “official story” of German judicial practice was or a question of what subordinate unwritten rules could be derived from the “deep structure” that that story reflects and embodies.[80] It was simply a question of whether the judges and officers of the Third Reich carried out Hitler’s orders, implicitly treating them as legally authoritative. And we know all too well what the answer to that question is.

V. Constructing Originalism

To all of this Baude and Sachs might offer something like the following response:

We are not saying that ours is the only possible interpretation of Hart’s account; we are just saying that our interpretation is logically consistent with the essential features of his theory of law and even seems compelled by it if one takes seriously the idea that the rule of recognition provides the criteria of legal validity—the ultimate test of which laws “exist” in that society. Hart himself may well have been conflicted in his ambitions, and there may be tensions in his book that reflect such internal conflict. But our interest lies not in Hart’s psychology nor in intellectual history but in legal theory and in what that theory can tell us about our practice.[81] So it hardly matters, for instance, that Hart himself put little stock in the capacity of “ordinary legal reasoning” to resolve disputes about the proper application of the rule of recognition in a way that our analysis assumes.[82] That is what a proper application of his theory in fact requires.

 Indeed! I think that’s exactly the right response to make. What is more, there is something appealing in the Baude-Sachsian version of Hart. It is a Hart much more willing to see judges as struggling to “find” the law than the actual Hart was and, relatedly, one less constrained by the metaphysical skittishness of the ordinary-language philosophers who surrounded and influenced him.[83] So what if you can’t see (or feel or touch or even read—after all, it’s unwritten) the “deep structure” of the law, and so what if not everyone agrees about what it is or what it requires—that does not necessarily mean it does not exist or that it’s not worth trying to figure out what it entails.[84] You can’t see gravity either, but that doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist.[85]

But as is perhaps obvious by now, in going this route, Baude and Sachs would be confirming the point I tried to make in my initial critique, namely that they are really closet Dworkinians. True, they continue pretending as if Ronald Dworkin never existed by rarely citing and never engaging with his work.[86] But they share much more in common with him, substantively and methodologically, than they do with Hart. As I previously pointed out, like Dworkin, they think law can exist in the face of judicial disagreement; like him, they take seriously the idea that judges can discover the law; and like him, they privilege the “internal” perspective of lawyers and judges when determining what the law is.[87]

Now, with their inventive interpretation of Hart, Baude and Sachs reveal yet another resemblance to Dworkin. Dworkin once wrote that “no firm line divides jurisprudence from adjudication or any other aspect of legal practice.”[88] For Dworkin, both judges and legal theorists engage in what he called “constructive interpretations” of legal practice. Judges constructively interpret some area of doctrine when they (1) make judgments about what sources and materials constitute the relevant area of law, (2) extract from those materials some underlying purpose or principle that best fits and justifies them, and then (3) apply that rationale to the case at hand.[89] Legal philosophers do the same thing at a higher level of generality. They draw conclusions about what principles best fit and justify legal practice as a whole.[90]

Baude and Sachs are constructively interpreting Hart’s theory of law. They discern in it (not entirely unfairly) an underlying purpose to render intelligible, and even plausible and attractive, the practice of judges identifying rules as either valid or invalid by reference to some publicly recognized source of authority (i.e., a rule of recognition) and using those rules to determine who wins and loses in the cases before them. Baude and Sachs then apply this rationale to our own legal practice in order to show what taking it seriously might imply for our legal practices. The result is their account of the “official story” and, derivatively, their account of the original-law originalism they think the official story entails.

I will close this Essay by suggesting that Baude and Sachs’s act of Dworkinian constructive interpretation reveals two important points. First, it reminds us that the “deep structure” of legal reasoning is not only deductive and hierarchical in the way Baude and Sachs both preach and practice. They see law as essentially a hierarchy of authorities and even treat Hart himself as an authority, deflecting any challenges to his theory as effectively involving matters above their pay grade.[91]

But their creative use of Hart reminds us that legal theory, like legal practice, is also interpretive and holistic.[92] Yes, lawyers routinely trace titles to properties and require legal rules to be properly authorized by higher-order rules. But in harder cases, they also rely on analogies between cases to discern underlying purposes in the law or to reconcile seemingly inconsistent legal authorities. Similarly, there is, of course, nothing wrong with drawing on an expert or authority in some intellectual domain to support one’s arguments when one has not adequately investigated the underlying issues oneself. But philosophical texts are nearly always susceptible to competing interpretations, requiring the reader to make difficult interpretive judgments. The same is true of legal texts and authorities. Yet Baude and Sachs downplay this aspect of our practice, treating the difficulties involved as mainly, if not exclusively, “empirical” in nature.

The second, related point that their constructive interpretation nicely reveals is also why Baude and Sachs would reject this characterization of their argument. Dworkin insisted that constructive interpretations necessarily involve what they want to deny, namely reliance upon the interpreter’s own evaluative judgments.[93] The contrast between Baude and Sachs’s invocation of an “official story” and Dworkin’s concept of “constructive interpretation” is in this way telling. Both “official” and “constructive” convey something of a formal or artificial quality, but only the latter term, in its association with such legal doctrines as “constructive possession” or “constructive knowledge,” conveys the further fact that its artificiality is meant to serve an underlying purpose.

The view that interpreting practices necessarily requires interpreters to make value judgments is controversial and I cannot defend it here. But if Baude and Sachs admit that Hart’s account is at the very least ambiguous on the matters discussed above, which seems impossible to deny, on what basis do they choose their own reading? Perhaps because it makes the best sense of Hart’s theory overall?[94] “Best” in what sense? For what purpose? The same question could be asked of their particular gloss on the “official story.” Why not a looser understanding of what “continuity” to the Founding demands?

Ultimately, some criteria for selecting one theory, or interpretation of a theory, over another must be applied. The question is whether those criteria include moral or political considerations or whether, instead, they are exclusively epistemic or theoretical. Dworkin and other legal philosophers have argued that when it comes to theorizing about legal practice the former sort of criteria dominate, and properly so.[95] Even if that’s not always true, it seems likely to be true here since Baude and Sachs seek to employ Hart’s positivism in service of claims about how the Supreme Court should conduct its business—a domain in which the political stakes are high. On this view, then, they are making an implicit judgment as to the purpose of having an “official story” in the first place. But what is that purpose? They do not say. If they could answer that question, then we might start getting somewhere.

Baude and Sachs might deny all of this and insist that their criteria for choosing legal theories (or interpretations of those theories) are purely epistemic and theoretical, not moral or political. But then we might worry that they are either proceeding in bad faith or (more intriguingly) suffering from a mild form of false consciousness. I doubt it’s the former, which makes the latter possibility more likely. If that’s true, then legal theory may require us to go deeper than either Hart or Dworkin were willing to venture.

 


[1] Ernest Nagel, Fact, Value, and Human Purpose, 4 Nat. L. F. 26, 26 (1959).

[2] William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Grounding Originalism, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1455 (2019); Eric J. Segall, Originalism Off the Ground: A Response to Professors Baude and Sachs, 34 Const. Comment. 313 (2019).

[3] Segall, supra note 2, at 326.

[4] See id.

[5] Id. at 313.

[6] Baude & Sachs, supra note 2, at 1458.

[7] Charles L. Barzun, The Positive U-Turn, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 1323, 1378 (2017).

[8] See Baude & Sachs, supra note 2, at 1463.

[9] See Barzun, supra note 7, at 1355–57.

[10] Baude & Sachs, supra note 2, at 1463.

[11] William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 2349, 2351 (2015) (refer­ring to the “positive turn” in originalist theory); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 817, 819, 835 (2015).

[12] Baude, supra note 11, at 2351.

[13] Id. at 2351, 2392; Sachs, supra note 11, at 823–35.

[14] Baude, supra note 11, at 2392–93; Sachs, supra note 11, at 874–75.

[15] Sachs, supra note 11, at 874–75.

[16] Baude, supra note 11, at 2355; William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1079, 1131 (2017); Sachs, supra note 11, at 845; Their theory of originalism is very similar to what Professors McGinnis and Rappaport have dubbed “methods-originalism.” See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 751, 783 (2009). But, unlike Baude and Sachs, McGinnis and Rappaport have not offered their theory as a descriptive one about what our law today requires.

[17] Barzun, supra note 7, at 1339, 1341–42; see Baude, supra note 11, at 2362 (making the comparison to methods-originalism).

[18] Mark Greenberg, What Makes a Method of Legal Interpretation Correct? Legal Standards vs. Fundamental Determinants, 130 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 105, 117–18 (2017) (observing that “an inquiry into legal interpretation cannot afford to set aside the question of how the content of the law is determined at the fundamental level,” because “prominent theories of law have extremely different implications for legal interpretation”).

[19] Barzun, supra note 7, at 1342 (“It matters which theory of law underwrites the [positive turn], and defending any of them requires engaging in conceptual or normative argument.”).

[20] Baude & Sachs, supra note 2, at 1462–63. That theory is laid out in H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (3d ed. 2012).

[21] Cf. Greenberg, supra note 18, at 114 (observing that “Hart’s theory is an unfortunate choice for theorists who claim that longstanding debates over legal interpretation can be resolved by looking to the law of interpretation”).

[22] Barzun, supra note 7, at 1347–52.

[23] Id. at 1352–60. Again, Greenberg raised a similar objection. See Greenberg, supra note 18, at 115 (explaining that “no theory of legal interpretation that is not widely accepted can be part of the rule of recognition”).

[24] See Baude & Sachs, supra note 2, at 1483.

[25] Id. at 1473–74.

[26] Id. at 1473.

[27] Id. at 1461.

[28] Id. at 1462.

[29] Id. at 1465.

[30] Id. at 1467.

[31] Id. at 1469.

[32] Id. at 1471.

[33] See Barzun, supra note 7, at 1347–51.

[34] Hart, supra note 20, at 110 (describing the rule of recognition as a “complex, but normally concordant, practice of the courts, officials, and private persons in identifying the law by reference to certain criteria”). As the passage quoted indicates, Hart was not always consistent as to whose practice matters for establishing a rule of recognition. It is another of the ambiguities referred to below. See infra note 50. For simplicity, I followed Baude and Sachs’s lead in assuming, for present purposes, that judges or courts are the relevant community for our purposes, Barzun, supra note 7, at 1346, and I continue to do so here. At times, Baude and Sachs suggest that they may differ with Hart as to the scope of the recognitional community and that perhaps lawyers and legal scholars ought to be included as well. See Baude, supra note 11, at 2370 (“[I]t may ultimately be important to look to official practice beyond judges.”); Sachs, supra note 11, at 883 (acknowledging the significance of—without actually answering—the question, “Does the best positivist theory identify law through the conventions of ordinary people, or through the practices of lawyers, judges, and officials?”). Such an extension of the recognitional community would fit well with my suggestion below, infra Part V, that Baude and Sachs are engaged in a constructive interpretation of Hart’s theory.

[35] Barzun, supra note 7, at 1349–50.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] Baude and Sachs also argue that citation practices do not constitute sufficient evidence of the “deep structure” of our practice, because sometimes courts do not cite a source when its authority can be safely assumed. See Baude & Sachs, supra note 2, at 1478–82. Fair enough, but that just pushes the issue back to the question of whether courts are in fact assuming what the authors say they are, namely that the interpretive methods they employ are valid because those methods can trace a pedigree back to the Founding. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.

[39] Baude & Sachs, supra note 2, at 1483 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).

[40] Baude & Sachs, supra note 2, at 1483. Sachs drew the same contrast in his initial article. See Sachs, supra note 11, at 866–67; Barzun, supra note 7, at 1350.

[41] Baude & Sachs, supra note 2, at 1474.

[42] Hart, supra note 20, at 110 (distinguishing between the rule of recognition of a legal system and “subordinate” rules of the system).

[43] Baude & Sachs, supra note 2, at 1477–78.

[44] Id. at 1478. The “guiding toward” formulation may be preferable because the “official story,” according to Baude and Sachs, does not consist of prescriptive or rule-like provisions. See id. at 1468.

[45] Id. at 1474.

[46] Id. at 1477.

[47] Id. at 1473.

[48] Id. at 1465 (“This hierarchical structure makes it possible for the correct ground-level legal rules to surprise us.”).

[49] Baude and Sachs thus fairly point to an imprecise statement in my article. I had said that under Hart’s view, “a rule no court applies cannot be law,” Barzun, supra note 7, at 1360 n. 228, but they correctly note that that is not true of subordinate rules. Baude & Sachs, supra note 2, at 1473–74. I should have specified more clearly that a rule that no court applies cannot be part of the rule of recognition. I had assumed (incorrectly, it now turns out) that they understood OLO to be part of the rule of recognition itself.

[50] The issue has traditionally been framed as whether Hart’s ambition was to explain the normativity of law or whether, instead, he intended to limit himself to a purely sociological analysis. Compare Scott Hershovitz, The End of Jurisprudence, 124 Yale L.J. 1160, 1168 (2015) (“Hart invites us to derive a normative statement (that is, a claim about what you are legally obligated to do) from descriptive statements about the social practice among legal officials around here.”), and Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Peter Winch and H.L.A. Hart: Two Concepts of the Internal Point of View, 20 Canadian J.L. & Juris. 453, 460 (2007) (interpreting Hart as seeking to explain how “rules give reasons for actions”), with Brian Leiter, Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence, 48 Am. J. Juris. 17, 38 (2003) (“Hart has nothing to say about the normativity of law in the main text of The Concept of Law, beyond a refutation of the Austinian account.”), Stephen Perry, Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law: Liberating the Internal Point of View, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1171, 1173 (2006) (“Since the internal point of view is nothing more than an attitude that a standard is binding, Hart is not offering an account of the normativity of law that looks to its (potential) reason-givingness.”), and Scott J. Shapiro, What is the Internal Point of View?, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1157, 1166 (2006) (“Hart did not intend for the internal point of view to provide an explanation for the reason-giving nature of social rules and law.”).

[51] Compare Thomas Aquinas, Treatise on Law: Summa Theologica, Questions 90-97, at 10–11 (1996) (defining law as “an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care for the community, and promulgated”), with John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 147 (David Campbell & Philip Thomas eds., 1998) (“Every positive law, or every law simply and strictly so called, is set by a sovereign person, or a sovereign body of persons, to a member or members of the independent political society wherein that person or body is sovereign or supreme.”).

[52] Hart, supra note 20, at 116.

[53] Austin, supra note 51, at 147 (emphasis omitted).

[54] Hart, supra note 20, at 116.

[55] Baude & Sachs, supra note 2, at 1475 (“But whatever the criteria of validity may be, those criteria are to be applied from the internal point of view, using the ‘characteristic vocabulary’ of ‘it is the law that . . . ,’ and so on.”) (quoting Hart, supra note 20, at 102).

[56] Hart, supra note 20, at vi.

[57] Id. at 90.

[58] Id.

[59] Id. at 124–54.

[60] Id. at 130 (emphasizing the need to “escape this oscillation between extremes” as to the determinacy of rules).

[61] Id. at 128.

[62] Id. at 147.

[63] Baude & Sachs, supra note 2, at 1470 (“The essence of the internal/external distinction is not simply to accept that ‘[i]t is what the Court has been doing that is our law’—for it matters greatly why a court is doing what it’s doing, and what kind of grounds it can cite in support.”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Richard Primus, Is Theocracy Our Politics?, 116 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 44, 51–52 (2016)).

[64] Charles L. Barzun, Inside-Out: Beyond the Internal/External Distinction in Legal Scholarship, 101 Va. L. Rev. 1203, 1223–24 & n. 65 (2015) (offering textual support from The Concept of Law for this view).

[65] Nicola Lacey, A Life of H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream 228 (2004) (observing that Hart’s notebooks reveal that he “struggled with the concept of legal obligation” and that he thought that the concept of legal obligation “would be the linchpin of his delicate middle way between Realism or crude positivism and natural law: the idea of law as generating genuine obligations rather than merely forcing compliance, those obligations however falling short of moral obligations”).

[66] See Hart, supra note 20, at 110 (explaining that once a rule of recognition is in place, “a subordinate rule of a system may be valid and in that sense ‘exist’ even if it is generally disregarded”).

[67] Stephen E. Sachs, The “Constitution in Exile” as a Problem for Legal Theory, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2253 (2014).

[68] Hart, supra note 20, at 92.

[69] Id. at 94.

[70] Id. at 255.

[71] Id. at 256; see Leslie Green, Introduction, in id. at xxii (“Not all rules, [Hart] now admits, are practice rules, but conventional rules are and they form the basis of law.” (emphasis omitted)).

[72] Ronald Dworkin made a similar criticism of Jules Coleman’s nearly identical strategy for handling disagreement. Coleman distinguished between agreement as to the content of the rule of recognition and agreement over its proper application, arguing that Hart’s theory only required the former, which could exist at a very high level of generality (i.e., something akin to Baude and Sachs’s “official story”). Jules Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory 116–17 (2001). In response, Dworkin pointed out that this strategy “eviscerates the idea of convention itself” because, among other problems, it would seem to allow for rules of recognition (e.g., “decide the case properly”) that are so abstract that they could not plausibly constitute conventional rules. See Ronald Dworkin, Thirty Years On, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1655, 1660–61 (2002) (reviewing Coleman, supra).

[73] H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 619 (1958) (criticizing a German court for “declaring a statute established since 1934 not to have the force of law”); Hart, supra note 20, at 210 (making a similar point).

[74] Hart, supra note 20, at 210.

[75] Hermann Goring, who served as presiding officer of the Reichstag, said the quorum requirement was satisfied because he did not count the communists, thereby reducing the needed number to 378. According to the historian Richard Evans, “[t]his was a high-handed decision that had no legitimacy in law whatsoever.” See Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich: A History 351–52 (2003).

[76] Cf. Baude & Sachs, supra note 2, at 1491 (empirical question); id. at 1475 (“internal point of view”).

[77] Id. at 1472.

[78] Id. at 1463 (“The thing to be explained strikes us as a feature of our society, and so it seems fair to ‘[l]ook and see’ what our society’s practices actually are.”) (quoting Leslie Green, Introduction, in Hart, supra note 20, at xlv).

[79] Hart, supra note 20, at 210.

[80] Cf. Baude & Sachs, supra note 2, at 1476 (“The deep structure of our legal system is a question of present law. . . .”).

[81] Cf. id. at 1463 (endorsing a “generally Hartian version of positivism”).

[82] Cf. Hart, supra note 20, at 274 (noting the “familiar rhetoric” from judges that there are no “legally unregulated cases,” but asking rhetorically, “how seriously is this to be taken?” and observing that many judges have acknowledged that “there are cases left incompletely regulated by the law where the judge has an inescapable though ‘interstitial’ law-making task”).  

[83] See Barzun, supra note 64, at 1214–15 (discussing this aspect of ordinary-language philosophy and its influence on Hart).

[84] Cf. Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 Calif. L. Rev. 527, 581 (2019) (“Unwritten law can be found, as well as made; the brooding omnipresence broods on.”).

[85] Or does it? See Bas van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (1980) (expounding an anti-realist philosophy of science, dubbed “constructive empiricism,” which denies that science does or should deliver the truth about unobservable entities or forces).

[86] Dworkin is not mentioned or cited once in either Grounding Originalism or Professor Sachs’s recent article, Finding Law, supra note 84. The omission in the latter piece is particularly glaring since Dworkin is more associated with the view that judges (at least in some sense) discover the law, even in hard cases, than just about any other modern legal philosopher.

[87] See Barzun, supra note 7, at 1385.

[88] Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 90 (1986).

[89] Id. at 52, 65–67.

[90] Id. at 90.

[91] See, e.g., Baude & Sachs, supra note 2, at 1471 (“In modern societies, law is a hierarchical and structured normative practice.” (emphasis omitted)); id. at 1463–64 (acknowledging that “[i]t might turn out that the Hartian account is generally wrong,” but insisting that that is “bigger game” and that they are “satisfied to show that our account of the law is generally consistent with the most-accepted theory of positivism”).

[92] For my own effort to identify a form of interpretive holism that differs in important ways from Dworkin’s particular brand of it, see Charles L. Barzun, Justice Souter’s Common Law, 104 Va. L. Rev. 655 (2018), and Charles L. Barzun, Three Forms of Legal Pragmatism, 95 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1003 (2018).

[93] Compare Dworkin, supra note 88, at 52–53 (explaining that constructive interpretation involves “imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong”), with Baude & Sachs, supra note 2, at 1465 (arguing that “originalism can be a correct descriptive account of our legal system, even if few people would currently describe our system that way” (emphasis omitted)).

[94] Cf. Baude & Sachs, supra note 2, at 1487 (“We believe we’ve put forward the best account of the official story of our constitutional law.”).

[95] See, e.g., Dan Priel, Toward Classical Legal Positivism, 101 Va. L. Rev. 987 (2015) (arguing that the best defense of legal positivism is a normative one); see also Charles L. Barzun, The Forgotten Foundations of Hart and Sachs, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1, 32 n.130 (2013) (collecting sources in the methodology debate); Leiter, supra note 50 (describing the debate and endorsing a descriptivist, but non-conceptual approach to jurisprudence).

Paved in Good Intentions: The Venerable Aims and Unique Vulnerabilities of Purportedly Independent Committees

Introduction

Prior to the Twelfth Amendment’s ratification in 1804, electors for the Electoral College cast two votes for President; the person who would receive the most votes would be named President, the runner-up named Vice President.

The presidential election of 1796, the first contested presidential election, ended in such a manner. Fearing a de facto monarchy or lifetime appointment, President George Washington decided not to run for a third term of office.[1] Then-Vice President John Adams ran alongside then-South Carolina Governor Thomas Pinckney as the Federalist Party’s candidates, while then-Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and then-Senator Aaron Burr ran as Democratic-Republicans.[2] Adams ascended to the Presidency while Jefferson inherited Adams’s old office; the two highest posts were to be held by persons of different parties with starkly different beliefs.[3]

This election is far from the only instance in which a minority opinion was guaranteed a voice; within the last decade, politicians have deliberately sought to appoint—and in fact have appointed—those in different political camps.[4] More recent nominations had better success of achieving bipartisan cooperation than did “Jefferson [who]—although vice president—did little to inhibit, and in fact encouraged, the growing Republican opposition to the Adams administration.”[5] Currently, myriad federal statutes limit the number of persons of the same political party who can serve on an executive-appointed board, commission, or committee,[6] thereby guaranteeing future iterations of Jefferson’s accidental vice presidency—albeit on a smaller scale—and guarding against “a tyranny of the majority over minority interests.”[7]

But the laudable goals of those statutory guarantees are imperiled for two divergent reasons. First, these statutes simply limit the maximum number of persons affiliated with one political party or with the President’s party who can serve on a committee.[8] They accordingly rely on a series of norms to ensure that the minority view is indeed put forward, allowing a President to subvert these goals with simple maneuvering. Second, and somewhat orthogonally, the political landscape in the United States is changing, with increased polarization and, relatedly, renewed interest in third parties.[9]

Recognizing these changes, this Essay reviews the generic structure of statutes creating purportedly independent committees[10] and discusses its aforementioned vulnerabilities. Thereafter, the Essay offers a novel solution, reinventing committee size and composition to prevent manipulation and ensure proper representation of the country’s views, including those of third parties.

I. The Problem

Congress created myriad executive departments to carry out its various statutory mandates. The President directly controls these departments, which serve at the President’s pleasure. Congress has also created a number of so-called “independent agencies” to neutrally carry out congressional directives independent of the President and related partisan politics, which are often controlled by a committee or commission.[11]

If the goal of these agencies is to implement statutory directives without direct allegiance to the President, one wonders: how is this independence to be created and enforced? To ensure the independence of judges, Article III guarantees life tenure and stable salary.[12] Judges are thus not subject to political whims because they cannot be professionally penalized for their judicial acts.[13]

However, life tenure is a poor approach for staffing administrative agencies. Unlike courts, agencies are designed to possess and apply technical expertise reflecting the current state of knowledge in a given field.[14] Given the need for dynamic growth and adaptation, life tenure would hinder rather than further the overall goals of administrative agencies.

Recognizing this, Congress instead adopted a “light” version of life tenure: agency chairs may only be terminated “for cause,” barring their firing simply based on policy decisions.[15] In addition to for-cause termination, independent agencies also feature a bipartisan requirement, which ensures a seat at the table for those who purportedly disagree with the President. For example, the Federal Communications Commission’s enabling statute provides: “The maximum number of commissioners who may be members of the same political party shall be a number equal to the least number of commissioners which constitutes a majority of the full membership of the Commission.”[16]

Thus, unlike judges, commissioners of independent agencies retain a level of democratic accountability: because they are not tenured for life, commissioners have an interest in remaining in the good graces of their respective political parties to ensure future employment. Relatedly, such agencies are not structured to effectuate pure winner-take-all majoritarian will; instead they are designed to represent a broader spectrum of political views. With these features, such agencies are effectively “independent” of the Executive while remaining accountable to and representative of the public.

While much ink has been spilled discussing the President’s ability to terminate independent commissioners,[17] little has been said about the bipartisanship requirement. This is unsurprising, as the requirement is an unusually straightforward mechanism that may not prompt academic inquiry. But despite its seemingly unambiguous command, the bipartisanship mechanism requires further analysis, as it can neither ensure broader democratic accountability nor prevent majoritarian control. This is so for two independent but closely interrelated reasons.[18]

The first reason is what we call the “enforceability problem.” The bipartisanship requirement creates a limitation on the number of “members of the same political party” as the President.[19] But these statutes provide no guidance to determine whether this requirement has been met in a litigated case; party affiliation could be defined by voter registration, previous presidential vote, previous congressional vote, or any number of other litmus tests. Furthermore, such indicia of partisan alliance—voter registration, latest political vote or donation, etc.—are volitional and thus subject to manipulation.

Additionally, the text of these statutes appears to permit a President to appoint a simple majority of commissioners from her own party and thereafter appoint additional commissioners whose views closely align with hers but identify as independents or members of a non-dominant party. Many Americans do not identify with a political party[20] and, in fact, Presidents have on many occasions appointed self-declared “independents” as agency heads.[21] In sum, the bipartisanship requirement provides inadequate guidance to courts and permits significant gamesmanship.

As a matter of practice, the statutory requirement is executed by a norm overlay in which each political party is entitled to an equal number of seats on an independent commission to be selected by members of the Senate.[22] The President then appoints the chair, supplying the vote to create a simple majority. But no law compels the President to nominate those in the minority. And as is well documented, in recent years, there have been “pervasive[] . . . breaches in ethical norms, especially at the highest levels of government. These breaches threaten to undermine public trust not only in particular officials but also in the integrity of bedrock governmental institutions,”[23] including the independent agencies at issue here.[24] Thus, a judicially enforceable legal structure may be required to preserve minority representation in independent agencies. Such a framework should provide clear guidance about how partisan affiliation should be defined and provide safeguards against gamesmanship by manipulation of the confirmation process.  

The second reason is what we will call the “underinclusiveness problem.” That is, while independent agencies are designed to represent a broader spectrum of political views than the President and executive departments, these commissions in fact represent the views of the two dominant political parties and, moreover, only the views of Senate leaders. Because the minority-viewpoint requirement is a mere bipartisanship requirement, the statutory framework is underinclusive insofar as it ignores the broader spectrum of views not encapsulated in the two dominant political parties as reflected in the Senate. While forced bipartisanship may serve as a counterbalance to the whims of any administration, agency commissions should not simply replicate the political preference of the Senate; they should instead reflect a broader spectrum of the country’s political preferences for how the laws should be executed Moreover, broadening the spectrum of views represented in independent committees will become essential should third parties gain national support that is significant, yet insufficient to secure representation in the legislative branch. [25]

II. The Solution

The purpose of this Essay is not solely to highlight “independent” committees’ flaws; it also offers remediation.[26] It must be said at the outset, though, that no solution is perfect; this Essay does not purport to have the silver bullet. Rather, the goal is to identify laudable principles that could guide legislatures in fashioning a system far superior to the current structure.

A. Committee Composition

There exist two potential options to ensure that independent committees include views other than those of the dominant political party. One option eliminates all partisan affiliation requirements and simply requires a super-majority of senators (60) to consent to a given appointment. Unfortunately, this option likely fails to address concerns identified supra, particularly the “underinclusiveness” problem. A second option reimagines the committee structure altogether, modifying both its size and its political composition. While this is the better overall option, there are many potential variations on how one could redesign the committee. Unfortunately, potential features aimed at addressing one flaw would introduce or exacerbate another, thereby undermining the very purpose of the redesign. Thus, this Essay offers a “Goldilocks” solution, an ideal solution that minimizes the harms laid out without implicating others.

1. Option One: Super-Majority Senate Approval

One solution is simple: require that appointees receive a supermajority of Senate votes to ensure a broader set of viewpoints represented on the committee. Because this would theoretically take non-majoritarian views into account, this approach should allow for a broader spectrum of appointees without a need for formal partisan allocation, thereby solving the “proxy problem.”

While seemingly elegant, this is an imperfect solution. First, if supermajority consent is the only qualification, there would be no safeguard in the event that one party controls sixty seats in the Senate and the White House, something that has occurred within the last decade.[27] Second, in today’s hyper-partisan political reality, if the party in the White House does not also control sixty seats in the Senate, there is a good chance that no nominees are ever passed. This approach could therefore freeze the status quo at arbitrary points in time—when the President’s party does not also hold a supermajority in the Senate.

Further, the supermajority solution is inadequate to address the underinclusiveness problem; it would, at most, reflect the political preferences of a supermajority of senators and simply create committees of mini-Senate replicas and would arguably do nothing to tolerate, let alone encourage, third-party recognition. Thus, supermajority approval, while nice in theory, fails to adequately address the aforementioned concerns.

2. Option Two: Reimagining the Committee Size, Structure

Because the supermajority protection would not achieve its desired aims, independent committees must be recreated to accommodate two important political realities today: increasing support for a third party in American politics[28] and a growing schism between the national popular vote and the Electoral College.[29] Therefore, the committee should be restructured to represent the electorate’s political preferences by apportioning the committee’s seats based on a given party’s national support. To realize this aim, the committee’s size must also be tied to the number of viable parties, with viability based on the percentage of support the party receives at a national level.

This solution minimizes the deficiencies above, providing meaningful definition of the minority views to be represented and broadening the spectrum of represented views. What’s more, this proposal has the added benefit that it will not change the composition of committees today, but provides an adaptable framework to accommodate changes once the landscape indeed shifts.

To be sure, this approach will not lessen the import of political parties as a key source of power. This answer is not perfect, but it is at worst the same as the status quo in which high-ranking members of the dominant political parties select nominees; however, it provides greater upside potential in the event that non-dominant parties generate sufficient support to receive seats on a commission.

B. Party Viability

If committees are to incorporate minority viewpoints so as to remain independent, any political party that receives the support of a substantial portion of the electorate should get its policy position(s) represented. Three questions are bound in that assertion: how does one measure support, how much support is sufficient to entitle a party to representation, and how does partisan affiliation translate into commissioner selection?

1. Measuring Support

To measure support, it would be easy to tabulate the percentage of representatives, senators, governors, or other officeholders affiliated with a party. The more egalitarian metric, however, is the percentage of votes that party’s candidate received in the presidential election. Because of structural biases against third-party candidates, such candidates rarely make it through the legislative electoral process; limiting representation to parties that have obtained elected positions therefore perpetuates these biases and ignores the political preferences of many Americans. Moreover, aligning committee representation to the national popular vote would incentivize would-be third-party voters to come to the polls rather than stay home for sake of defeatism.

More fundamentally, the presidential election represents a voter’s view of how the law should be executed. Preference in a presidential election should therefore better reflect voters’ preferences for the actions of independent committees than would votes for federal legislative or state executive offices.

2. Viability Threshold

The appropriate threshold percentage to entitle a party to a commissioner is a complicated question. If the viability threshold is too high, this enterprise will be for naught because independent committees will remain de facto bipartisan. However, setting the threshold too low risks introducing fringe viewpoints that have failed to gain significant support and do not represent the views of most Americans.[30] Because determining the threshold will involve this intricate balancing, the legislature should determine what level is appropriate.

While it may be counterintuitive to believe that members of Congress would have any willingness to embrace a system that could introduce nonmajor parties into the federal government, it is actually in the best interest of congressional members to endorse this proposal. As discussed supra, the bipartisan committee structure as it exists, implemented by a series of norms, is susceptible to manipulation and gamesmanship across several axes. By addressing the “enforceability problem,” this proposal actually furthers the interests of the majority parties, especially in the short term when there is no viable third-party contender.

3. From Support to Representation

Any party over the determined threshold is entitled to representation on these independent commissions. But, as discussed supra, most indicia of partisan affiliation are subject to manipulation, and relying on an informal process is an inadequate safeguard in a political climate of rapidly deteriorating norms. Therefore, this approach should include a meaningful reasonability standard: a nominee shall be considered a member of a party if there is a reasonable demonstration of affiliation with that party’s belief over time. Such a standard allows for flexibility but empowers a judge to invalidate an appointment when pretext and abuse are present.[31]

C. Committee Size

If the legislature decides who must have a seat at the table to remain independent, a subsequent question is: how big should the table be? The committee’s size should be directly tied to the threshold percentage of a political party such that political representation is proportional on the committee.

Consider a committee that has a fixed size of five seats. If the viability threshold is set at 5%, a party with 6% support is guaranteed one slot, while the other two parties—totaling 94% support—would have to split four seats among them. Leaving committee size and party viability untethered to one another could distort political representation on the committee, undermining the very purpose of this restructuring. Put simply, there would be a significant difference between a party’s popular support and the representation it wields on a committee.[32] Therefore, N, the number of people on the committee, is in some way inversely proportional to T, the threshold amount:

[[{“fid”:”872″,”view_mode”:”full”,”type”:”media”,”attributes”:{}}]]

In real terms, as T gets smaller, N will get larger, and vice versa.

D. The Upshot

The logical conclusion from these observations—that committees’ composition should be proportional to popular political support and that committee size must be tied to the number of viabilities—is twofold. First, the threshold for party viability must be high enough to prevent creating a massive committee but low enough that substantial third parties are not foreclosed representation. Second, the President’s party is no longer guaranteed a majority.

1. Reasonable Thresholds

The math spells out the need for reasonable bounds on thresholds. On one hand, T has a maximum for including a third party at 33.33%: if it were set any higher, a third party would not be mathematically eligible for representation. And if T is set near that mark, third parties will likely be foreclosed representation until they are of equal size and force as the two dominant parties—not exactly an ideal solution to nurture the growth of third parties.

On the other hand, if T is 5%, the committee will be ~20 persons large, a far cry from where most stand today.[33] Even assuming that 5% national support would be a desirable viability threshold, this is simply impracticable. In a government that boasts “hundreds of federal agencies and commissions,”[34] filling so many seats with genuine experts that can adequately represent the interests of the populace is at best unlikely, requiring tens of thousands of families to uproot their lives, move to Washington, and likely cut their income. And even if this were possible, it is doubtful that the government would allocate the funds necessary to pay these new commissions and even a barebones staff.

Even if we could identify the right individuals and staffers, and even if legislatures budgeted for their salaries, there is no guarantee that they would be approved in time to do the job.[35] Adding more to the Senate’s workload without commensurate changes to the Senate rules to expedite voting would mean many of the seats would remain open indefinitely,[36] defeating the very purpose of a larger committee. And, finally, supersized committees would likely be unable to function efficiently and would almost certainly be subject to the same deadlock that plagues the Senate. Therefore, a large committee may simply not be possible.

In sum, T is likely best set between 10 and 25% to accommodate yet another “Goldilocks” problem. Setting T at 20% provides an easy, viable solution for two chief reasons: first, the math is simply more practicable—creating a five-person commission—and thus the solution is more digestible to those suffering from arithmophobia.[37] Second, 20% is simply a reasonable middle ground in the boundaries laid out above—until a third party is thriving and a fourth party begins its ascent, at least.

2. The President’s Party Is Not Guaranteed a Majority

Necessarily, the President’s party would no longer be guaranteed the commission’s majority. Indeed, if the President’s party does not represent the majority opinion, this guarantee undermines fair representation. To this point, a study conducted by National Public Radio estimates that, because of the Electoral College’s peculiarities and because forty-eight states demand that the majority of the state popular vote receives 100% of its Electoral College votes, one could win the Presidency with approximately 23% of the national popular vote.[38] While unlikely, the winner of the Electoral College lost the popular vote twice in the last five presidential elections.[39] Therefore, to maintain genuine representation, the President’s party cannot automatically be granted a majority representation on an odd-numbered committee. Acknowledging that this is inconsistent with any theory of a unitary executive and could be seen as undermining the President’s role in executing the laws of the United States, it should be stressed that this proposal applies only to independent committees. Accepting that such committees should in fact operate independent of the day-to-day machinations of the executive branch, proportional representation rather than presidential control should be the preferable structure.

E. Limiting Principles: Simple Majority

To ensure that this proposal does not result in less diversified commissions, a party’s representation should be capped at a simple majority. Leaving a committee to be purely representative could create a tyranny of the majority: if one party dominates the popular vote, the entire committee would then be members of that party. Skeptics could argue that in the biggest electoral landslide in recent history, Ronald Reagan trounced Walter Mondale. Reagan won forty-nine states but only won 58% of the vote.[40]

Nevertheless, for fear of this hypothetical, and to ensure independent commissions retain moderating forces, this rejiggered committee caps one party’s representation to a simple majority. In the event of such a landslide victory, the excess seats would simply be distributed amongst the minority parties pro rata.[41]

Conclusion

The United States political system has in recent years undergone significant transformation and is on the verge of an even greater sea change. Whether it takes years or decades for the waves to crest is yet to be seen, though continued discord with the two-party system and further norm-breaking suggests we may see white caps on the earlier side of this spectrum. We must therefore (metaphorically) batten down the hatches and solidify the foundations of our institutions while allowing for the flexibility of change. Understandably, pushes for such reform, where forwarded, have focused on institutions such as the Supreme Court.[42] But the administrative state, arguably “the president’s most effective tool for exercising power in domestic affairs,”[43] cannot be overlooked. This Essay charts such a path, explaining the pitfalls of the current structure vis-a-vis undercurrents of norm-breaking and third-party demand. More than that, however, we hope it inspires deeper thinking about adopting analogous structural changes across the government.

 

 


[1] See, e.g., George Washington’s Farewell Address, George Washington’s Mount Vernon, https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/george-washingtons-farewell-address/ [https://perma.cc/X9CC-FARC] (last visited July 30, 2019) (“Washington feared that if he were to die while in office, Americans would view the presidency as a lifetime appointment.”).

[2] Peter Onuf, Thomas Jefferson: Campaigns and Elections, Miller Ctr., https://miller­center.org/president/jefferson/campaigns-and-elections [https://perma.cc/XS7T-HRXS] (last visited July 30, 2019).

[3] Id.

[4] See, e.g., Ross Cohen, Why Did President Obama Appoint a Republican to Head the FBI?, HuffPost (June 28, 2017, 3:26 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-did-president-oba­ma-appoint-a-republican-to-head_b_­5949ae52e4b0710bea889a4d [https://perma.cc/U5RC-MVM9] (“President Obama liked to be bipartisan as often as he could. He either appointed, or tried to appoint, an unusually high number of Republicans in his administration (e.g. Chuck Hagel, Bob Gates, Judd Gregg, Jon Huntsman, Ray LaHood, Ben Bernanke, David Petraeus, Robert McDonald, John McHugh, Michael Donley, etc.)”); Toby Harnden, Barack Obama to Appoint Republicans to Key Cabinet Roles, Telegraph (Nov. 12, 2008, 6:55 PM), https://­www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/barack­obama/3448362/Barack-Obama-to-appoint-Republicans-to-key-cabinet-roles.html [https://­perma.cc/AZ2X-RYY4] (“Obama is planning to appoint Republicans to key positions in his cabinet as part of a new bipartisan approach in Washington.”).

[5] Onuf, supra note 2.

[6] See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012) (establishing the Securities and Exchange Commis­sion and requiring that “[n]ot more than three of such commissioners shall be members of the same political party”); 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1) (2012) (establishing the Federal Election Commission and stating that “[n]o more than 3 members of the Commission appointed under this paragraph may be affiliated with the same political party”).

[7] Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 64 (1975).

[8] See, e.g., supra note 6 (listing examples of committees that limit the number of persons serving on a commission in one political party); 15 U.S.C. § 7107 (2012) (holding that of the 15-person Interagency Committee on Women’s Business Enterprise, “4 shall be . . . members of the same political party as the President” and “4 shall . . . not be members of the same political party as the President”).

[9] More extreme views can give rise to increased demand for a third political party that either encompasses the extreme view or occupies an increasingly-barren middle ground.

[10] This Essay’s conclusions regarding committee structure do not apply to proposals reimagining the Supreme Court’s appointment process. See, e.g., Josh Lederman, Inside Pete Buttigieg’s Plan to Overhaul the Supreme Court, NBC News (June 3, 2019, 6:03 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/inside-pete-buttigieg-s-plan-overhaul-supreme-court-n1012491 [https://perma.cc/4C6G-6ZDT]. That process has far different considerations and deserves individualized analysis.

[11] See, e.g., Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 1111 (2000).

[12] U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior . . . .”).

[13] However, judges are directed to abide by a code of conduct. Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges Canon 2(B) (U.S. Jud. Conf. 2019) (“A judge should not allow family, social, political, financial, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment.”).

[14] See, e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 342 (2014) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (“Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government.”).

[15] See Breger & Edles, supra note 11, at 1138; see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010) (invalidating dual-layer for-cause removal protection as inconsistent with the executive power of the President); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935) (upholding constitutionality of for-cause removal protection for Federal Trade Commission commissioner).

[16] 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(5) (2012).

[17] See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2013).

[18] A more fundamental problem persists: whether political party affiliation is an adequate proxy for policy preferences. Accepting today’s political system, this Essay does not directly challenge this assumption but seeks to shore up protections against manipulation on the basis of this assumption. Moreover, solutions which attempt to address the “proxy problem” would likely prove infeasible. See infra Subsection II.A.1.

[19] See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(5) (2012).

[20] See Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Continue to Embrace Political Independence, Gallup (Jan. 7, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/245801/americans-continue-embrace-political-independence.aspx [https://perma.cc/QSR5-2XXD].

[21] See Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Importance of Independence, 14th Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Corporate Securities and Financial Law Lecture at Fordham Law School (Oct. 3, 2013) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/­spch100113mjw [https://perma.cc/GPU6-XG9D]) (chair of an agency self-identifying as an “Independent”).

[22] See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Independent Agencies, Sometimes in Name Only, N.Y. Times (Aug. 8, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/09/business/independent-agencies-some­times-in-name-only.html [https://perma.cc/F3HY-WSW4].

[23] Preet Bharara et al., Nat’l Task Force on Rule of L. & Democracy, Proposals for Reform 4 (2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/TaskForceReport_­2018_09_.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JKR-TLRN]. And, indeed, it appears to be the case that “one breach of norms begat another.” Brian Beutler, Republicans Think Capitol Hill’s Rules Are for Suckers, New Republic (Jan. 9, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/139707/rep­ublicans-think-capitol-hills-rules-suckers [https://perma.cc/CM9N-8SVG]. The ways in which norms have been broken are extensive and varied, but exemplars can be found in the judiciary, e.g., Noah Feldman, Opinion, Don’t Pack the Supreme Court, Democrats. You’d Live to Regret It., Bloomberg (Mar. 28, 2019, 11:59 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/­opinion/articles/2019-03-28/supreme-court-packing-would-backfire-on-democrats [https://­perma.cc/5FRC-EEHW] (referring to the failed nomination of Judge Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court as “br[ea]k[ing] the existing norms of judicial appointment”); Five Ways the White House and Senate Have Broken the Judicial Confirmation Process, Am. Const. Soc’y: In Brief (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/inbrief/broken-process-an-unprecedented-senate-judicial-nomination-hearing/ [https://perma.cc/X4AF-ZZ5X] (listing five ways in which the Trump Administration and Republican Senate have undermined norms in the judicial confirmation process: lacking advice from home-state senators on appointments, the undermining of the blue slip process, diminishing the importance of ratings from the American Bar Association, insufficient vetting, and significantly cutting hearings for appointees to answer potentially hostile questions). However, we do not feel that enshrining this norm in law is the optimal way to solve the enforceability problem.

[24] Cf. David Dayen, Chuck Schumer Neglected to Name a Democratic Commissioner for the SEC. Now It’s Open Season for Wall Street, Bank Lawyers Crow, Intercept (Mar. 28, 2019, 2:37 PM), https://theintercept.com/2019/03/28/sec-democratic-commissioner-chuck-schumer/ [https://perma.cc/AMR9-QG8L] (“When the Republican nominee, former chief counsel for the Senate Banking Committee Elad Roisman, sailed through the Senate to confirmation in September, it effectively orphaned Lee, giving the Trump administration incentive to slow-walk her nomination, and giving Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell incentive in the future to prevent her from getting a floor vote. This freezes out one of the SEC’s seats, giving Republicans an indefinite 3-1 advantage.”).

[25] Those that would argue that third parties ought not be represented on commissions lest they gain a foothold in Congress fail to see that structural problems with first-past-the-post voting and head-to-head matchups create institutional barriers to entry that commissions can bypass. Commissions should not replicate Congress’s problems.

[26] Cf. President Theodore Roosevelt, The Man in the Arena: Citizenship in a Republic, Address at the Sorbonne, Paris (Apr. 23, 1910), in Theodore Roosevelt: Letters and Speeches 778, 781–82 (Louis Auchincloss ed., 2004) (“It is not the critic who counts . . . . The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena . . . .”).

[27] Gary Price & Tim Norbeck, A Look Back at How The President Was Able to Sign Obamacare into Law Four Years Ago, Forbes (Mar. 26, 2014, 1:27 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/physiciansfoundation/2014/03/26/a-look-back-at-how-the-pre­sident-was-able-to-sign-obamacare-into-law-four-years-ago/ [https://perma.cc/KX3C-R5KE] (“Now the Democrats had a safe majority in the House and a filibuster-proof supermajority of 60 in the Senate.”).

[28] Lee Drutman, How Much Longer Can the Two-Party System Hold?, Vox (Sept. 17, 2018, 2:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2018/9/17/17870478/two-party-system-electoral-reform [https://perma.cc/D7G8-P2X2] (noting that demand for a third party sits at “68 percent . . . the highest in at least 25 years”).

[29] See, e.g., Daniel Ura, Coalition to Change Electoral College Votes Grows Closer to 270-Vote Mark, United Press Int’l. (June 13, 2019, 6:25 AM), https://www.upi.com/Top_News/­US/2019/06/13/Coalition-to-change-Electoral-College-votes-grows-closer-to-270-vote-ma­rk/6361560294210/ (noting that two of the five instances in which a candidate won the popular vote but lost the Electoral College occurred recently and that such results have spurred increased demand to bypass the Electoral College by way of the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact).

[30] One may argue that this whole proposal risks substituting nonpartisan moderate com­missioners for third-party extremists. However, that argument depends on a series of assumptions about the nature of the two dominant political parties in the coming decades and about the type of third party that may emerge and, ultimately, garner substantial public support. More importantly, refusing a potential ideological extremist a seat at the table, we feel, would be a far greater evil than undermining democratic principles of representation.

[31] A more straightforward standard may theoretically be beneficial, but may be a constitutionally dubious encroachment of the President’s appointment power.

[32] Admittedly, no solution will be perfect. Even today’s five-person commissions hold an imbalance; five-person committees in a country that is split 50.1%–49.9% would consist of three and two members of each respective party, a 60-40 split resulting in representation disproportionate by 19.8%. Perfection, however, cannot be the enemy of progress.

[33] See generally Christopher M. Davis & Michael Greene, Cong. Res. Serv., Presidential Appointee Positions Requiring Senate Confirmation and Committees Handling Nominations 13, 33–34, 48 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30959.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XKS-KAMT] (noting that only a handful of commissions or boards have over 20 members, including the National Institute of Building Sciences’ Board of Directors (21 members), the National Science Board (24), National Museum and Library Services Board (20), National Science Foundation (24), National Council on the Arts (25), and the National Council on the Humanities (27)).

[34] Our Government: Federal Agencies & Commissions, White House, https://www.white­house.gov/about-the-white-house/federal-agencies-commissions/ [https://perma.cc/5B9P-42­YS] (last visited July 30, 2019).

[35] The Senate, the “world’s greatest deliberative body,” The Idea of the Senate, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/idea_of_the_senate/1842Clay.htm [https://perma.cc/GL6F-NUA3] (last visited July 30, 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted), does not meet every day; their votes are lumbering, and there are already “approximately between 1,200 and 1,400 [executive branch] positions” that require the Senate’s advice and consent. Maeve P. Carey, Cong. Res. Serv., Presidential Appointments, the Senate’s Confirmation Process, and Changes Made in the 112th Congress 7 (2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41872.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HLA-CQ5R].

[36] Not to mention the current administration’s penchant for leaving positions open. Cf. Amanda Becker, Trump Says Acting Cabinet Members Give Him ‘More Flexibility,’ Reuters (Jan. 6, 2019, 11:51 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-cabinet/trump-says-acting-cabinet-members-give-him-more-flexibility-idUSKCN1P00IG [https://perma.cc/77­Y8-92HS] (reporting that President Trump appreciates that non-confirmed acting department heads afford him “more flexibility,” though without explanation).

[37] A fear of math, common for those in law and politics.

[38] Danielle Kurtzleben, How to Win The Presidency with 23 Percent of The Popular Vote, NPR (Nov. 2, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/11/02/500112248/how-to-win-the-presidency-with-27-percent-of-the-popular-vote [https://perma.cc/3TLN-T8D6].

[39] Tara Law, These Presidents Won the Electoral College — But Not the Popular Vote, Time (May 15, 2019), https://time.com/5579161/presidents-elected-electoral-college/ [https:­//perma.cc/WRT7-GD77].

[40] See Presidential Elections 1972–2008, Voting America: United States Politics, 1840–2008, https://dsl.richmond.edu/voting/preselections.html [https://perma.cc/Q8ZG-J6WG] (last visited July 30, 2019).

[41] As it currently stands, committees often share terms that extend beyond a President’s term—another mechanism to encourage bipartisan cooperation. To match committees to presidential votes, the commissioners’ terms would necessarily need to be adjusted to match the President’s term.

[42] See, e.g., Burgess Everett & Marianne Levine, 2020 Dems Warm to Expanding Supreme Court, Politico (Mar. 18, 2019, 5:04 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/18/2020-democrats-supreme-court-1223625 [https://perma.cc/QJ6F-5TEB].

[43] M. Anthony Mills, Deconstructing the Administrative State, RealClearPolicy (June 29, 2017), https://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2017/06/29/deconstructing_the_administra­tive_state_110284.html [https://perma.cc/4XM2-R3T5].