Participatory Law Scholarship as Demosprudence

Through participatory law scholarship (“PLS”)—legal scholarship written in collaboration with those without formal legal training but expertise in law’s injustice through lived experience—Kempis Songster and Rachel López seek to dismantle the walls upon walls that divide the ideals of law from its lived experience. Building from the experience of coauthoring Redeeming Justice, their award-winning article, and drawing from the expertise of Gerald Torres, a leading scholar in critical race theory and law and social movements, this Essay explores the role that participatory methods in legal scholarship can play in democratizing the law and enhancing the practice of democracy. PLS democratizes the law by making it more accessible to non-lawyers and facilitating greater participation in the process of making legal meaning. This Essay situates PLS within the framework of “demosprudence”—a concept developed by Torres that examines how ordinary people, often acting collectively, participate in making legal meaning by shifting societal narratives that inform the law. We argue that legal scholarship is both a venue for studying this phenomenon and also a site for demosprudential genesis.

Specifically, at a time when democracy is facing a stress test that threatens the premises upon which it is based, PLS is one method for addressing the alienation between law and society that is in part to blame for the renewed rise of authoritarianism. The technicalities of the law often make non-lawyers feel disconnected from it and encourage apathy towards it as a vehicle of social change. This mystification of the law inhibits organizing and undermines democracy, because it alienates most of society from law’s creation. Traditional legal scholarship sometimes aids and abets this disconnection from the law by favoring a doctrinal focus that can feel so detached from how the law operates on the ground that it is rendered irrelevant to those who experience it most intimately. By contrast, PLS aims to center experiential knowledge as a source of legal expertise such that those for whom the law is most consequential can see themselves reflected in it and know that they are and can be a part of making legal meaning. PLS strives to ensure that people formally educated in the law are not the only people who can engage with legal scholarship and the development of legal theory. Ultimately, PLS seeks to democratize legal knowledge production by validating alternative ways of knowing the law and articulating what changes are needed for the law to realize its full potential.

Introduction

As we face an election that promises to shape the future of our democracy, recent polls suggest that our country is in trouble. Most Americans have a rather dismal view of the state of justice in the United States. They lack trust in our courts and public institutions and have little to no confidence in any branch of our government.1.Charles Franklin, New Marquette Law School National Survey Finds Approval of U.S. Supreme Court at 40%, Public Split on Removal of Trump from Ballot, Marq. L. Sch. (Feb. 20, 2024), https://law.marquette.edu/poll/2024/02/20/new-marquette-law-school-national-sur‌vey-finds-approval-of-u-s-supreme-court-at-40-public-split-on-removal-of-trump-from-ball‌ot/ [https://perma.cc/5YPQ-P8HN] (finding that only 40% of Americans approve of the U.S. Supreme Court, and that most Americans also lack confidence in the presidency, Congress, and the Department of Justice).Show More Moreover, approximately 83% of Americans believe that elected officials do not care what people like them think, and around 32% support some form of authoritarian governance.2.Richard Wike et al., Pew Rsch. Ctr., Representative Democracy Remains a Popular Ideal, but People Around the World Are Critical of How It’s Working 15 (Feb. 28, 2024), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2024/02/gap_2024.02.28_de‌mocracy-closed-end_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MHN-LACY]; Laura Silver & Janell Fetterolf, Who Likes Authoritarianism, and How Do They Want To Change Their Government?, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Feb. 28, 2024), https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024‌/02/28/who-likes-authoritarianism-and-how-do-they-want-to-change-their-government/ [https://perma.cc/BV59-4KQP].Show More These statistics reveal that most people in the United States feel unrepresented in democratic systems and disillusioned by the law and the legal actors who enact and interpret it.

At a time when democracy is facing a serious stress test, the legal academy has often compounded society’s alienation from the law and its institutions, producing legal scholarship that is described as irrelevant and hardly read outside of the closely guarded gates of academia.3.See, e.g., A Conversation with Chief Justice Roberts, C-SPAN (June 25, 2011), https://www.c-span.org/video/?300203-1/conversation-chief-justice-roberts [https://perma.cc‌/CXE5-KBQE] (“Pick up a copy of any law review that you see and the first article is likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th-century Bulgaria or something, which I’m sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote it but isn’t of much help to the bar.”); Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions,Judges Are Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant, N.Y. Times (Mar. 19, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/19/‌us/19bar.html [https://perma.cc/4W8J-VZN9]; Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34, 34–36 (1992).Show More This account of irrelevance is more than mere perception. Empirical data also suggests that most legal scholarship has little influence outside the academy.4.Jeffrey L. Harrison & Amy R. Mashburn, Citations, Justifications, and the Troubled State of Legal Scholarship: An Empirical Study, 3 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 45, 55, 83 (2015).Show More Indeed, because courts so rarely cite them, law review articles have been analogized to roads that lead to nowhere.5.Id. at 83.Show More

Over the last four years, Kempis Songster and Rachel López have been charting an alternative course for legal scholarship, envisioning it as a vehicle for bridging the divide between law and the society subject to it. This divide is partly to blame for the renewed rise of authoritarianism. Throwing aside many of the conventions of legal scholarship, we have been building, word by word, a rebellious form of legal scholarship—one in which legal elites are not the only ones to inform the making of legal meaning on the pages of law journals.6.We use the term “rebellious” as a nod to Gerald López’s concept of rebellious lawyering, a model of lawyering which aims to center community activism and empowerment.See Gerald P. López, Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano’s Vision of Progressive Law Practice 38 (1992).Show More Instead of being a product of legal academics alone, Participatory Law Scholarship (“PLS”) is written in collaboration with those who have not been formally trained in the law but who have expertise in law through bearing the bluntest consequences of its injustice.7.Rachel López, Participatory Law Scholarship, 123 Colum. L. Rev. 1795, 1798 (2023).Show More

This symposium and accompanying Essay present an opportunity to collaborate with another rebellious thinker, Gerald Torres, who, along with Lani Guinier, developed a concept deeply connected to PLS called demosprudence.8.Lani Guinier, Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 437, 442 (2013) [hereinafter Guinier, Courting the People] (describing demosprudence as a term coined by Gerald Torres and Guinier to “describe the process of making and interpreting law from an external—not just internal—perspective [that] emphasizes the role of informal democratic mobilizations and wide-ranging social movements that serve to make formal institutions, including those that regulate legal culture, more democratic”).Show More Demosprudence is the study of how ordinary people, acting collectively, make legal meaning by shifting societal narratives that inform the law.9.Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 Yale L.J. 2740, 2743, 2755 (2014) [hereinafter Guinier & Torres, Changing the Wind] (explaining that demosprudence involves “an analysis of how social power circulates and finds its expression in law” and of “the collective expressions of resistance (whether through counter-narratives or paradigm-shifting mobilizations) that test the democratic content of the formal institutions of lawmaking studied by jurisprudents and legisprudents”).Show More As a genre of legal scholarship, it seeks to “understand, analyze, and document those social movements that increase the extant democratic potential in our polity, and which do so in a way that produces durable social and legal change.”10 10.Id. at 2749.Show More In developing this canon, Torres and Guinier argue that lawmaking and interpretation should not just be an endeavor for legal elites; rather, it should be and, in fact, already is influenced by non-legal actors and social movements.11 11.Guinier, Courting the People, supra note 8, at 442.Show More

Thinking alongside Torres, in this Essay, we explore the democratizing features of PLS, delineating its connections to demosprudence. Part I of this Essay elucidates the unifying philosophy that binds PLS and demosprudence. Like demosprudence, PLS recognizes and values the role that individuals who are not legally trained can play in informing the making of legal meaning and democratizing the law.12 12.López, supra note 7, at 1820 (“PLS charts a path to developing a more holistic and democratic account of law through collaboration with nonlawyers who intimately know the law by their experience of its injustice.”).Show More In addition to sharing common principles and aspirations, Part II explains how PLS operationalizes demosprudence, creating a new venue for democratic dialogue and norm generation. For this reason, we identify PLS as a form of demosprudential praxis. In Part III, Kempis Songster, the participatory legal scholar who coauthored Redeeming Justice, the law review article that gave birth to PLS, describes how PLS operated as demosprudence in action for the movement he founded.13 13.Terrell Carter, Rachel López & Kempis Songster, Redeeming Justice, 116 Nw. U. L. Rev. 315, 318–19, 324–35 (2021) [hereinafter Carter et al., Redeeming Justice].Show More He explains how Redeeming Justice helped to catalyze an international coalition to concretize the right to redemption—a right which he and others serving life without parole (“LWOP”) conceptualized while behind bars—within international human rights law.14 14.For more information about this international coalition and their fight to recognize death by incarceration as a violation of human rights, see Death by Incarceration Is Torture, https://www.deathbyincarcerationistorture.com [https://perma.cc/2FXA-PZXE] (last visited Sept. 1, 2024).Show More

  1.  Charles Franklin, New Marquette Law School National Survey Finds Approval of U.S. Supreme Court at 40%, Public Split on Removal of Trump from Ballot, Marq. L. Sch. (Feb. 20, 2024), https://law.marquette.edu/poll/2024/02/20/new-marquette-law-school-national-sur‌vey-finds-approval-of-u-s-supreme-court-at-40-public-split-on-removal-of-trump-from-ball‌ot/ [https://perma.cc/5YPQ-P8HN] (finding that only 40% of Americans approve of the U.S. Supreme Court, and that most Americans also lack confidence in the presidency, Congress, and the Department of Justice).
  2.  Richard Wike et al., Pew Rsch. Ctr., Representative Democracy Remains a Popular Ideal, but People Around the World Are Critical of How It’s Working 15 (Feb. 28, 2024), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2024/02/gap_2024.02.28_de‌mocracy-closed-end_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MHN-LACY]; Laura Silver & Janell Fetterolf, Who Likes Authoritarianism, and How Do They Want To Change Their Government?, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Feb. 28, 2024), https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024‌/02/28/who-likes-authoritarianism-and-how-do-they-want-to-change-their-government/ [https://perma.cc/BV59-4KQP].
  3.  See, e.g., A Conversation with Chief Justice Roberts, C-SPAN (June 25, 2011), https://www.c-span.org/video/?300203-1/conversation-chief-justice-roberts [https://perma.cc‌/CXE5-KBQE] (“Pick up a copy of any law review that you see and the first article is likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th-century Bulgaria or something, which I’m sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote it but isn’t of much help to the bar.”); Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant, N.Y. Times (Mar. 19, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/19/‌us/19bar.html [https://perma.cc/4W8J-VZN9]; Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34, 34–36 (1992).
  4.  Jeffrey L. Harrison & Amy R. Mashburn, Citations, Justifications, and the Troubled State of Legal Scholarship: An Empirical Study, 3 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 45, 55, 83 (2015).
  5.  Id. at 83.
  6.  We use the term “rebellious” as a nod to Gerald López’s concept of rebellious lawyering, a model of lawyering which aims to center community activism and empowerment. See Gerald P. López, Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano’s Vision of Progressive Law Practice 38 (1992).
  7.  Rachel López, Participatory Law Scholarship, 123 Colum. L. Rev. 1795, 1798 (2023).
  8.  Lani Guinier, Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 437, 442 (2013) [hereinafter Guinier, Courting the People] (describing demosprudence as a term coined by Gerald Torres and Guinier to “describe the process of making and interpreting law from an external—not just internal—perspective [that] emphasizes the role of informal democratic mobilizations and wide-ranging social movements that serve to make formal institutions, including those that regulate legal culture, more democratic”).
  9.  Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 Yale L.J. 2740, 2743, 2755 (2014) [hereinafter Guinier & Torres, Changing the Wind] (explaining that demosprudence involves “an analysis of how social power circulates and finds its expression in law” and of “the collective expressions of resistance (whether through counter-narratives or paradigm-shifting mobilizations) that test the democratic content of the formal institutions of lawmaking studied by jurisprudents and legisprudents”).
  10.  Id. at 2749.
  11.  Guinier, Courting the People, supra note 8, at 442.
  12.  López, supra note 7, at 1820 (“PLS charts a path to developing a more holistic and democratic account of law through collaboration with nonlawyers who intimately know the law by their experience of its injustice.”).
  13.  Terrell Carter, Rachel López & Kempis Songster, Redeeming Justice, 116 Nw. U. L. Rev. 315, 318–19, 324–35 (2021) [hereinafter Carter et al., Redeeming Justice].
  14.  For more information about this international coalition and their fight to recognize death by incarceration as a violation of human rights, see Death by Incarceration Is Torture, https://www.deathbyincarcerationistorture.com [https://perma.cc/2FXA-PZXE] (last visited Sept. 1, 2024).

Foreword: Two Kinds of Participatory Legal Scholarship

Cross-pollination tends to improve legal writing.1.By “tends,” I mean that experiences of this kind can often improve a writer’s work-product, even if only slightly.Show More Examine an issue of a law review from fifty years ago and you will be struck at the stilted, inward-looking, formalistic, heavily-footnoted writing encapsulated in articles discussing other articles and cases that in turn rest on earlier cases for precedential value.2.See Richard Delgado, Groundhog Law, 21 J.L. Soc’y 1, 14–17 (2021) (describing how the imperative of citation to previous authors can hinder innovation).Show More Authors published in legal journals from that period cited law review articles almost exclusively, and only very rarely worked in other disciplines such as history, literature, or even economics.

Starting a few decades ago, this started to change as writers began creating new forms of legal scholarship, some of which were spurred by developments in other fields such as law and literature3.See generally James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination (45th Anniv. ed. 2018) (a foundational text of the law and literature movement).Show More or law and economics.4.See generally Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (9th ed. 2014) (setting out the main ideas in this field).Show More Empirical studies5.See Empirical Legal Studies, Legal Info. Inst., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/empirica‌l_legal_studies [https://perma.cc/9RZ7-9R78] (last updated Oct. 2022) (outlining the contours of the field).Show More and law-in-action6.See Our Law-in-Action Tradition, Univ. Wis. L. Sch., https://law.wisc.edu/law-in-action/ [https://perma.cc/LU78-NH9K] (last visited Mar. 28, 2024) (explaining the contributions of such writers as Willard Hurst and Stewart Macauley, who emphasized the importance of studying the actual effects of legal doctrine in the world of people, institutions, and corporations).Show More showed how law works in the real world. Critical race theorists7.E.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction 3–4 (4th ed. 2023) (discussing the origins and main ideas of this school of thought).Show More and critical legal studies exponents8.E.g., David Kairys, The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 3–4, 16 (3d ed. 1998); Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (1987) (describing the movement’s main concepts).Show More examined the racial and economic underpinnings of our social system.

No longer were the pages of top law reviews a succession of doctrinal articles.9.See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2073, 2073–75 (1989) (an early exposition of the narrative-study movement).Show More By most accounts, this change was much for the better.

Rachel López’s Participatory Law Scholarship is an important addition in this process of expansion.10 10.Participatory Law Scholarship is written in collaboration with individuals who are not legal scholars but have personal knowledge of some aspect of society, such as life in a total institution. See Rachel López, Participatory Law Scholarship, 123 Colum. L. Rev. 1795, 1798–1800 (2021) [hereinafter López, Participatory]; Terrell Carter, Rachel López & Kempis Songster, Redeeming Justice, 116 Nw. U. L. Rev. 315, 319–20 (2021) [hereinafter Carter et al., Redeeming]. For a significant forerunner, see V. Noah Gimbel & Craig Muhammad, Are Police Obsolete? Breaking Cycles of Violence Through Abolition Democracy, 40 Cardozo L. Rev. 1453, 1468 (2019).Show More She points out that authors who write with the goal of understanding and improving conditions for a vulnerable group, such as prisoners—and, presumably, others such as people with disabilities, mental inmates, young schoolchildren, and single moms—can often benefit from taking on co-authors from these groups.11 11.As López puts it: “Drawing from the experience of coauthoring scholarship with two activists who were sentenced to life without parole over three decades ago, this piece outlines the theory and practice of Participatory Law Scholarship . . . [which is] written in collaboration with authors who have no formal training in the law but rather expertise in its function and dysfunction through lived experience.” López, Participatory, supra note 10, at 1795.Show More

Tapping resources like these can enable a legal writer to ponder real-life circumstances he or she could easily overlook as a person who wears a neat suit and goes to work in a law building or library every day.12 12.See, e.g., id. at 1853 (noting that this form of writing can “improve[] legal scholarship by tethering it to the tangible” and that it enabled López to improve her thinking and scholarship as well).Show More One’s co-author may know things the primary writer does not know or may push her in directions she might not have considered.13 13.E.g., id. at 1800–01 (noting how López’s incarcerated co-authors—organic intellectuals in the manner of Antonio Gramsci—had access to knowledge that she lacked).Show More

For these reasons, Participatory Law Scholarship can enrich the work of almost any legal writer, bringing her into contact with people and ideas beyond the ones she encounters daily in a world of casebooks, treatises, and law journals.14 14.See id. at 1815–16 (noting that partnering with members of an outgroup can help an academic writer see reality more fully than she can see alone); Carter et al., Redeeming, supra note 10, at 318–19; see also supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text (elaborating on the perspective-enhancing quality of participatory scholarship).Show More

Just think what some of the new vistas might be. Professor López has already contributed two sparkling articles that focus mainly on the rights of the incarcerated.15 15.López, Participatory, supra note 10, at 1797–99; Carter et al., Redeeming, supra note 10, at 324 (describing participatory scholarship with co-authors who are incarcerated).Show More But other articles in the same vein might center on children trapped in classrooms that demean and disrespect them at every turn and deny them the possibility of realizing their potential.16 16.E.g., Jonathan Kozol, Savage Inequalities: Children in America’s Schools 104–07 (1991) (discussing some of the horrors of underfinanced, crowded public schools). For a critical view of life in school, see Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Myra Bergman Ramos trans., 2005).Show More They might include pieces co-authored with mentally ill individuals who are incarcerated,17 17.E.g., Titicut Follies (Bridgewater Films 1967) (recounting the atrocities of life in an institution for the mentally ill).Show More immigrants struggling to negotiate the Darien Gap,18 18.See Behind the Lens: On Migration Paths in Latin America, Associated Press (Dec. 16, 2022, 2:54 PM), https://apnews.com/article/colombia-south-america-panama-f586b73668dcd‌c15649b82e79b1929cf [https://perma.cc/W8PD-ZNBA] (graphically depicting life along the pipeline); Jeanine Cummins, American Dirt 8–9 (2019) (describing the experiences of a Mexican bookseller forced to leave Mexico with her son to escape retribution by cartels and make their way to the United States as undocumented immigrants); Polly Rosenwaike, American Dirt Offers a Thrilling Adrenaline Rush, Wash. Post (Jan. 13, 2020, 12:16 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/books/american-dirt-offers-a-thrilling-adren‌aline-rush–and-insights-into-the-latin-american-migrant-experience/2020/01/13/c52e6ea4-3‌005-11ea-9313-6cba89b1b9fb_story.html [https://perma.cc/XQ9G-4DYK] (describing the hair-raising events surrounding the main character’s decision to abandon her middle-class life in Acapulco, Mexico and flee to avoid the clutches of vicious cartels angered by her husband’s journalism).Show More or people working for a minimum wage.19 19.Barbara Ehrenreich, Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting by in America 1–3 (2001) (discussing life on a minimum wage).Show More

Participatory Legal Scholarship provides readers with concrete examples of lived experience, coupled with a sense of urgency to effect change. But writing processes undertaken in partnerships between legal scholars and those with expertise through personal experience can also result in scholarship that is clear and accessible.20 20.See López, Participatory, supra note 10, at 1836 (“[O]ur partnership . . . was forged . . . with members of the R2R Committee, which started in 2014 when members of the group trained me in community-based learning practices as part of a workshop for Drexel faculty engaged in experiential learning.”).Show More Consider, for example, an article about talented minority youth caught up in the school-to-prison pipeline.21 21.E.g., What Is the School-to-Prison Pipeline?, ACLU (June 6, 2008), https://www.aclu.org‌/documents/what-school-prison-pipeline [https://perma.cc/V6NE-36HW] (explaining how minor disciplinary actions may lead a schoolchild into a life of crime and incarceration). A judge might easily miss this connection because the narrative is foreign to his or her experience. See López, Participatory, supra note 10, at 1822–23 (discussing how even a well-intentioned judge can “kill” narratives that strike him or her as implausible).Show More Many schoolchildren are excellent writers, without the many tics and mannerisms some of us reveal when we are unsure of where we are going.22 22.See, e.g., Elisabeth Egan, Bronx Students Embraced a Book That Spoke to Them, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 2024, at C1.Show More Moreover, young students might easily know things that we might not: for example, how a single teacher who takes a dislike to a child can poison an entire teaching staff by a few choice remarks in the faculty lounge.

Thus, in addition to the substantive advantages of greater concreteness and immediacy, co-authorship can simply result in better writing.23 23.See, e.g., Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 Yale L.J. 2742, 2799–800 (2014).Show More Adult writers in other disciplines and fields do not write as badly as many of us in the legal profession do. Lynn Hunt, for example, showed how early novelists like Charles Dickens24 24.E.g., Charles Dickens, Oliver Twist 498–504 (London, Chapman & Hall 1897) (discussing conditions in Newgate prison).Show More and Samuel Richardson25 25.E.g., Samuel Richardson, Clarissa iii–vii (London, S. Richardson 1748) (covering the fortunes of a young woman of talent trapped by convention and a poor hand dealt her by fate).Show More were able to reach across the page and move readers who formerly knew—or cared—little about women, factory workers, or wretches locked up in debtors’ prison.26 26.Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History 38–39 (2007) (describing how early novels enabled readers to identify with the fortunes of new groups, such as the poor or women).Show More Nonfiction writers like Alex Haley and Malcolm X reached large audiences and changed minds.27 27.See generally Malcolm X, The Autobiography of Malcolm X (1965) (covering his upbringing, participation in the Nation of Islam, and activism).Show More And cinéma vérité movie directors like Frederick Wiseman brought viewers inside the world of mental patients locked up in asylums, winning awards and large audiences for their efforts.28 28.Titicut Follies, supra note 17.Show More

A Second Source: The World Within

Not every legal writer will find it feasible to write in such a fashion. Some will be disabled or located far from the penitentiary or immigrant detention center housing the people with whom he or she would like to write.29 29.Michael Olivas, for example, once lamented how his immigration law students were located far from the nearest detention center. Personal Conversation with Olivas (c. Fall 1999).Show More The institution, school, or asylum may have rules against working with the inmates or even gaining access to them.30 30.In similar fashion, this Author’s students have commented that a detention center located only thirty miles away makes it difficult for them to gain access to the inmates once they were there.Show More You may be disabled and unable to cover the distance between you and them.

Even for the able-bodied, the partners you choose may not cozy up to you. You may be too academic for them. They may not trust people from your world. You two may hit it off, but they may turn out to have little to add to what you know and were prepared to say. After all, you had to make a preliminary decision that they might be the kind of person you would like to work with. This preliminary decision may set parameters, so that you end up telling each other things that the other already knows. Your choice to write participatory research may turn out to require a prefiguring decision to choose this person or that, so that you and your readers gain little beyond what you could each have written alone.

By the same token, your choice of partners may cause confusion because it turns out that the client community is interested in one thing, while you and your legal colleagues are interested in something else. Derrick Bell once described a Black community in the South that was interested in better-funded schools with the same Black teachers and administrators that it had had all along.31 31.Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470, 477–78 (1976) (discussing divergent aims and interests between clients and lawyers in cases challenging school segregation in the South).Show More Often, though, the lawyer from a think tank or legal defense fund may be more interested in establishing a new legal theory, perhaps one in which schools are integrated by race.32 32.Id. at 475–77.Show More Or, as Lucie White warned, the client may just want a new pair of Sunday shoes.33 33.How disappointing, the lawyer thinks; why should they settle for that? See Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes:Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 48–49 (1990).Show More

If you find yourself constantly encountering obstacles such as these, a second place to look for new insights that sidestep many such barriers is, simply, inside yourself—what one might call self-participatory legal scholarship. Thus, a person with a disability might write about the frustration of trying to patronize a favorite restaurant only to encounter a door too narrow to accommodate his or her wheelchair.34 34.See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Law of Disability Discrimination 603–05 (6th ed. 2007) (discussing remedies for wrongs like these). Incidents like these can be frustrating. See ADA Compliance for Restaurants, Webstaurant (Nov. 27, 2023), https://www.webstaurantstore.co‌m/article/152/ada-compliance-for-restaurants.html#doors [https://perma.cc/47G6-JXY8]; see also I Went into a Restaurant Last Week and Their Bathroom Doors Were Not ADA Compliant. My Wheelchair Could Not Fit Through, Just Answer Legal, https://www.justans‌wer.com/law/ll1m8-went-restaurant-last-week-bathroom-doors.html [https://perma.cc/ZAT8‌-PBCP] (describing a humiliating encounter with a restaurant’s bathroom door that was too small).Show More A member of a racial minority may find a book written by this Author that suggests that life is turning him or her into an insect and write about how she felt upon the realization.35 35.Richard Delgado, Metamorphosis: A Minority Professor’s Life, 53 U.C. Davis L. Rev. Online 1, 1 (2019) (discussing how a sequence of put-downs and minor affronts turned a high-achieving fictional academic into an insect). See generally Delgado, supra note 2 (in which the Author takes on an imagined persona to perform an analysis of currents in legal scholarship).Show More A writer like Peter Gabel might consult a therapist and learn that he and many people like him wonder whether reality and consciousness may be different sides of the same thing.36 36.Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1563, 1563–64 (1984) (noting that “prevailing legal ideas . . . acquire social meaning and . . . this social meaning helps to constitute the social world”).Show More

Legal writing attenuates the role of the self. It is desiccated. We are taught not to use the word “I.” But you can reconnect with yourself by simply looking within to see if you have a hidden partner that you have yet to bring out into the open, ready to engage during your next adventure in law review writing.

If you are bashful about too much self-disclosure, you can co-author with an academic in a field different from yours but located in the same campus or even law building. Jean Stefancic and I once realized we were both interested in the shape of legal knowledge and ended up co-authoring an article on this subject.37 37.Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories?: Law Reform, Critical Librarianship, and the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 207, 208 (1989) (discussing how widely used research tools can hinder legal innovation).Show More If you are, like many in this audience, classroom teachers, clinical professors are often located nearby, right in your law school. Maybe they know a great deal about your teaching area from a real-world perspective. David Binder, for example, once told me that one’s theory of the case shifts and changes as the lawyer learns more about it in the course of meetings and interviews with the client and witnesses.38 38.Binder was a Clinical Professor of Law at UCLA during the period in question. See David A. Binder, LLB ’59, June 10, 1934–September 15, 2020, Stan. Law. Mag. (Oct. 30, 2020), https://law.stanford.edu/stanford-lawyer/articles/david-a-binder-llb-59-june-10-1934-septe‌mber-15-2020/ [https://perma.cc/72XQ-4YYV] (discussing his career).Show More This realization suggested that legal knowledge itself might be similarly dialogic.

* * *

Today reminds me in some respects of a joyous moment in 1989, when a dozen or so young professors met at a convent outside Madison, Wisconsin, to discuss common interests and coin a name for future civil rights scholarship.39 39.Viz, “critical race theory.” The ideas had been developing for some time, although they lacked a name and organizational structure. These early authors included Bell, Jr., supra note 31; Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1049 (1978); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound:A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev 133 (1982).Show More Or another a few years earlier, when an even smaller group met at a historic hotel in Los Angeles to propose a new element for the critical legal studies movement.40 40.This was the Critical Legal Studies (“CLS”) annual meeting at the Biltmore Hotel in Los Angeles that included a panel session on the advisability of including race, in addition to class, as an explanatory principle for analyzing U.S. society. See Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 301, 301 n.2 (1987) (describing the event in question).Show More Both occasions exhibited the same ferment and the same joy in finding, at last, a group of the like-minded, as does this one in Charlottesville. If someone prepares T-shirts memorializing this symposium, I hope somebody sends me one. I want to wear it around my law school while I’m pondering my next article and wondering who has the nitty-gritty background that I need to make it as engaging and reality-based as it can be.41 41.Angela Harris, Foreword to Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 7, at xiii, xiii­–xvii (describing the small gathering in Madison that she attended as a recent law school graduate, the sense of euphoria and invention the participants experienced, and the T-shirt she wears even today on special occasions).Show More

  1.  By “tends,” I mean that experiences of this kind can often improve a writer’s work-product, even if only slightly.
  2.  See Richard Delgado, Groundhog Law, 21 J.L. Soc’y 1, 14–17 (2021) (describing how the imperative of citation to previous authors can hinder innovation).
  3.  See generally James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination (45th Anniv. ed. 2018) (a foundational text of the law and literature movement).
  4.  See generally Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (9th ed. 2014) (setting out the main ideas in this field).
  5.  See Empirical Legal Studies, Legal Info. Inst., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/empirica‌l_legal_studies [https://perma.cc/9RZ7-9R78] (last updated Oct. 2022) (outlining the contours of the field).
  6.  See Our Law-in-Action Tradition, Univ. Wis. L. Sch., https://law.wisc.edu/law-in-action/ [https://perma.cc/LU78-NH9K] (last visited Mar. 28, 2024) (explaining the contributions of such writers as Willard Hurst and Stewart Macauley, who emphasized the importance of studying the actual effects of legal doctrine in the world of people, institutions, and corporations).
  7.  E.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction 3–4 (4th ed. 2023) (discussing the origins and main ideas of this school of thought).
  8.  E.g., David Kairys, The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 3–4, 16 (3d ed. 1998); Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (1987) (describing the movement’s main concepts).
  9.  See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2073, 2073–75 (1989) (an early exposition of the narrative-study movement).
  10.  Participatory Law Scholarship is written in collaboration with individuals who are not legal scholars but have personal knowledge of some aspect of society, such as life in a total institution. See Rachel López, Participatory Law Scholarship, 123 Colum. L. Rev. 1795, 1798–1800 (2021) [hereinafter López, Participatory]; Terrell Carter, Rachel López & Kempis Songster, Redeeming Justice, 116 Nw. U. L. Rev. 315, 319–20 (2021) [hereinafter Carter et al., Redeeming]. For a significant forerunner, see V. Noah Gimbel & Craig Muhammad, Are Police Obsolete? Breaking Cycles of Violence Through Abolition Democracy, 40 Cardozo L. Rev. 1453, 1468 (2019).
  11.  As López puts it: “Drawing from the experience of coauthoring scholarship with two activists who were sentenced to life without parole over three decades ago, this piece outlines the theory and practice of Participatory Law Scholarship . . . [which is] written in collaboration with authors who have no formal training in the law but rather expertise in its function and dysfunction through lived experience.” López, Participatory, supra note 10, at 1795.
  12.  See, e.g., id. at 1853 (noting that this form of writing can “improve[] legal scholarship by tethering it to the tangible” and that it enabled López to improve her thinking and scholarship as well).
  13.  E.g., id. at 1800–01 (noting how López’s incarcerated co-authors—organic intellectuals in the manner of Antonio Gramsci—had access to knowledge that she lacked).
  14.  See id. at 1815–16 (noting that partnering with members of an outgroup can help an academic writer see reality more fully than she can see alone); Carter et al., Redeeming, supra note 10, at 318–19; see also supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text (elaborating on the perspective-enhancing quality of participatory scholarship).
  15.  López, Participatory, supra note 10, at 1797–99; Carter et al., Redeeming, supra note 10, at 324 (describing participatory scholarship with co-authors who are incarcerated).
  16.  E.g., Jonathan Kozol, Savage Inequalities: Children in America’s Schools 104–07 (1991) (discussing some of the horrors of underfinanced, crowded public schools). For a critical view of life in school, see Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Myra Bergman Ramos trans., 2005).
  17.  E.g., Titicut Follies (Bridgewater Films 1967) (recounting the atrocities of life in an institution for the mentally ill).
  18.  See Behind the Lens: On Migration Paths in Latin America, Associated Press (Dec. 16, 2022, 2:54 PM), https://apnews.com/article/colombia-south-america-panama-f586b73668dcd‌c15649b82e79b1929cf [https://perma.cc/W8PD-ZNBA] (graphically depicting life along the pipeline); Jeanine Cummins, American Dirt 8–9 (2019) (describing the experiences of a Mexican bookseller forced to leave Mexico with her son to escape retribution by cartels and make their way to the United States as undocumented immigrants); Polly Rosenwaike, American Dirt Offers a Thrilling Adrenaline Rush, Wash. Post (Jan. 13, 2020, 12:16 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/books/american-dirt-offers-a-thrilling-adren‌aline-rush–and-insights-into-the-latin-american-migrant-experience/2020/01/13/c52e6ea4-3‌005-11ea-9313-6cba89b1b9fb_story.html [https://perma.cc/XQ9G-4DYK] (describing the hair-raising events surrounding the main character’s decision to abandon her middle-class life in Acapulco, Mexico and flee to avoid the clutches of vicious cartels angered by her husband’s journalism).
  19.  Barbara Ehrenreich, Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting by in America 1–3 (2001) (discussing life on a minimum wage).
  20.  See López, Participatory, supra note 10, at 1836 (“[O]ur partnership . . . was forged . . . with members of the R2R Committee, which started in 2014 when members of the group trained me in community-based learning practices as part of a workshop for Drexel faculty engaged in experiential learning.”).
  21.  E.g., What Is the School-to-Prison Pipeline?, ACLU (June 6, 2008), https://www.aclu.org‌/documents/what-school-prison-pipeline [https://perma.cc/V6NE-36HW] (explaining how minor disciplinary actions may lead a schoolchild into a life of crime and incarceration). A judge might easily miss this connection because the narrative is foreign to his or her experience. See López, Participatory, supra note 10, at 1822–23 (discussing how even a well-intentioned judge can “kill” narratives that strike him or her as implausible).
  22.  See, e.g., Elisabeth Egan, Bronx Students Embraced a Book That Spoke to Them, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 2024, at C1.
  23.  See, e.g., Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 Yale L.J. 2742, 2799–800 (2014).
  24.  E.g., Charles Dickens, Oliver Twist 498–504 (London, Chapman & Hall 1897) (discussing conditions in Newgate prison).
  25.  E.g., Samuel Richardson, Clarissa iii–vii (London, S. Richardson 1748) (covering the fortunes of a young woman of talent trapped by convention and a poor hand dealt her by fate).
  26.  Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History 38–39 (2007) (describing how early novels enabled readers to identify with the fortunes of new groups, such as the poor or women).
  27.  See generally Malcolm X, The Autobiography of Malcolm X (1965) (covering his upbringing, participation in the Nation of Islam, and activism).
  28.  Titicut Follies, supra note 17.
  29.  Michael Olivas, for example, once lamented how his immigration law students were located far from the nearest detention center. Personal Conversation with Olivas (c. Fall 1999).
  30.  In similar fashion, this Author’s students have commented that a detention center located only thirty miles away makes it difficult for them to gain access to the inmates once they were there.
  31.  Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470, 477–78 (1976) (discussing divergent aims and interests between clients and lawyers in cases challenging school segregation in the South).
  32.  Id. at 475–77.
  33.  How disappointing, the lawyer thinks; why should they settle for that? See Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 48–49 (1990).
  34.  See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Law of Disability Discrimination 603–05 (6th ed. 2007) (discussing remedies for wrongs like these). Incidents like these can be frustrating. See ADA Compliance for Restaurants, Webstaurant (Nov. 27, 2023), https://www.webstaurantstore.co‌m/article/152/ada-compliance-for-restaurants.html#doors [https://perma.cc/47G6-JXY8]; see also I Went into a Restaurant Last Week and Their Bathroom Doors Were Not ADA Compliant. My Wheelchair Could Not Fit Through, Just Answer Legal, https://www.justans‌wer.com/law/ll1m8-went-restaurant-last-week-bathroom-doors.html [https://perma.cc/ZAT8‌-PBCP] (describing a humiliating encounter with a restaurant’s bathroom door that was too small).
  35.  Richard Delgado, Metamorphosis: A Minority Professor’s Life, 53 U.C. Davis L. Rev. Online 1, 1 (2019) (discussing how a sequence of put-downs and minor affronts turned a high-achieving fictional academic into an insect). See generally Delgado, supra note 2 (in which the Author takes on an imagined persona to perform an analysis of currents in legal scholarship).
  36.  Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1563, 1563–64 (1984) (noting that “prevailing legal ideas . . . acquire social meaning and . . . this social meaning helps to constitute the social world”).
  37.  Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories?: Law Reform, Critical Librarianship, and the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 207, 208 (1989) (discussing how widely used research tools can hinder legal innovation).
  38.  Binder was a Clinical Professor of Law at UCLA during the period in question. See David A. Binder, LLB ’59, June 10, 1934–September 15, 2020, Stan. Law. Mag. (Oct. 30, 2020), https://law.stanford.edu/stanford-lawyer/articles/david-a-binder-llb-59-june-10-1934-septe‌mber-15-2020/ [https://perma.cc/72XQ-4YYV] (discussing his career).
  39.  Viz, “critical race theory.” The ideas had been developing for some time, although they lacked a name and organizational structure. These early authors included Bell, Jr., supra note 31; Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1049 (1978); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev 133 (1982).
  40.  This was the Critical Legal Studies (“CLS”) annual meeting at the Biltmore Hotel in Los Angeles that included a panel session on the advisability of including race, in addition to class, as an explanatory principle for analyzing U.S. society. See Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 301, 301 n.2 (1987) (describing the event in question).
  41.  Angela Harris, Foreword to Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 7, at xiii, xiii­–xvii (describing the small gathering in Madison that she attended as a recent law school graduate, the sense of euphoria and invention the participants experienced, and the T-shirt she wears even today on special occasions).

Disrupting Election Day: Reconsidering the Purcell Principle as a Federalism Doctrine

The Purcell Principle—the doctrine that courts should refrain from changing election rules during the period of time close to an election—has long been misconstrued. Where the Principle operates, it creates a near-categorical bar to federal judicial relief in the upcoming election cycle; the provisions of federal law that would normally safeguard voting rights, govern redistricting, and supervise how a state can conduct its elections are paralyzed until after election day. Born and raised on the shadow docket, the Principle has been underdeveloped by the Supreme Court. The Court has provided little guidance as to what triggers the Principle or how it will be applied in future cases. And, in recent years, the doctrine has become increasingly powerful in shaping election law. With the 2024 elections quickly approaching, this Note seeks to shed light on Purcell.

The goals of this Note are twofold. First, I suggest that courts and scholars have been thinking about Purcell incorrectly. I argue that Purcell cannot be justified on the grounds of preventing voter confusion—as the case law and scholarship have suggested—but instead is better explained by federalism. Under this conception, the Court’s historic applications of the doctrine make more sense. Second, I provide a new framework for understanding what triggers Purcell. In deciding whether the Purcell Principle should be applied, courts would reach more consistent, analytically sound results by asking whether judicial intervention would disrupt a state’s administration of its elections. I provide four conditions for courts to consider in determining whether injunctive relief is disruptive. But these conditions can also provide insight to future litigants making decisions about where, when, and how to bring their election claims to avoid running into Purcell’s snare.

Introduction

On January 24, 2022, two decisions1.Singleton v. Merrill, 582 F. Supp. 3d 924, 936 (N.D. Ala. 2022) (per curiam),affd sub nom. Allen v. Milligan, 143 S. Ct. 1487 (2023); Caster v. Merrill, No. 21-cv-01536, 2022 WL 264819, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 24, 2022), affd sub nom. Allen, 143 S. Ct. 1487.Show More of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama held that the districting plan adopted by the State of Alabama for its 2022 congressional elections was “substantially likely” to violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”).2.Singleton, 582 F. Supp. 3d at 936.Show More The court preliminarily enjoined Alabama from using that map in the forthcoming election and required the state legislature to enact a new plan with a second Black-majority congressional district.3.Id.Show More

Two weeks later, and some nine months before the general election, however, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the district court’s decision, authorizing Alabama to nevertheless move forward with its tarnished map in November.4.Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 879 (2022) (mem.).Show More The only rationale provided for this stay came not from the Court—which issued an unexplained, unsigned order on its shadow docket5.Id. Professor William Baude coined the term “shadow docket” to describe “everything other than the Court’s ‘merits docket.’” Stephen Vladeck, The Shadow Docket: How the Supreme Court Uses Stealth Rulings to Amass Power and Undermine the Republic, at xii (2023); see also William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 1, 1 (2015) (pointing to “a range of orders and summary decisions that defy its normal procedural regularity”).Show More—but a concurrence from Justice Kavanaugh.6.Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 879–82 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of applications for stays, joined by Alito, J.).Show More His basis for lifting the injunction rested on the Purcell Principle, a “bedrock tenet of election law” instructing that “federal district courts ordinarily should not enjoin state election laws in the period close to an election” and “federal appellate courts should stay injunctions when . . . lower federal courts contravene that principle.”7.Id. at 879–80.Show More

The effect of the Court’s order was to allow the map to apply to the 2022 elections, but with future elections governed by its decision on the merits.8.Id. at 882.Show More The map, enacted by a Republican-controlled legislature and signed by a Republican governor,9.Caster v. Merrill, No. 21-cv-01536, 2022 WL 264819, at *14–15 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 24, 2022); Brian Lyman, Gov. Kay Ivey Signs Off on Alabama Congressional, Legislative, SBOE Maps for 2022, Montgomery Advertiser (Nov. 4, 2021, 3:30 PM), https://www.montgomery‌advertiser.com/story/news/2021/11/03/alabama-congressional-state-house-maps-2022-heade‌d-gov-kay-ivey/6258353001/ [https://perma.cc/RBY9-WLDR].Show More produced a safe Republican seat as opposed to one that likely would have elected a Democrat.10 10.Melissa Murray & Steve Vladeck, The Supreme Court’s Voting Rights Act Ruling Is No Victory for Democracy, Wash. Post (June 8, 2023, 9:28 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.‌com/opinions/2023/06/08/supreme-court-alabama-redistricting-voting-rights-act/ [https://per‌ma.cc/EB4X-9HYG].Show More So on election day—as expected without the additional Black-majority district—six Republicans and one Democrat were elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from Alabama.11 11.State of Ala., Canvass of Results: General Election, November 8, 2022, at 15–28 (2022), https://www.sos.alabama.gov/sites/default/files/election-data/2022-11/Final%20Canvass%2‌0of%20Results%20%28canvassed%20by%20state%20canvassing%20board%2011-28-2022‌%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GRV-D9GD].Show More

But months after the election had been held, the Supreme Court reversed course. A majority affirmed the district court’s decisions and agreed that Alabama’s plan was indeed unlawful.12 12.See Allen v. Milligan, 143 S. Ct. 1487, 1498 (2023).Show More As a result, the invocation of Purcell provided the State with a one-time get-out-of-jail-free card; the Court allowed Alabama to use its map in the 2022 midterms before an adverse decision later on the merits. Scholars have criticized the Court’s use of the Purcell Principle—both on theoretical grounds and its application in this case specifically.13 13.See Vladeck, supra note 5, at 226–27 (arguing that the Court has applied Purcell “inconsistently, and in a way that outwardly favors Republicans far more often than it does Democrats”). See generally Steve Vladeck, 31. Emergency Applications and the Merits, One First (June 12, 2023), https://stevevladeck.substack.com/p/31-emergency-applications-and-the [https://perma.cc/XT2Q-LLAT]; Ruoyun Gao, Note, Why the Purcell Principle Should Be Abolished, 71 Duke L.J. 1139 (2022); Harry B. Dodsworth, The Positive and Negative Purcell Principle, 2022 Utah L. Rev. 1081; Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, 43 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 427 (2016); Michael T. Morley, Election Emergencies: Voting in Times of Pandemic, 80 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.359, 425–28 (2023); Wilfred U. Codrington III, Purcell in Pandemic, 96 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 941 (2021).Show More Indeed, some have even argued that the Republican Party owes its control of the House of Representatives in the 118th Congress to the Supreme Court’s intervention in redistricting actions like this one leading up to the 2022 elections.14 14.Murray & Vladeck, supra note 10.Show More

That the Purcell Principle is controversial is perhaps unsurprising. When the Principle operates, it creates a “presumptive categorical bar”15 15.Morley, supra note 13, at 427; see also Hasen, supra note 13, at 443 (referring to Purcell as “a per se rule to not allow last-minute judicial changes to election rules”). Justice Kavanaugh has also recognized that the “Court’s opinions, including Purcell itself, could be read to imply that the principle is absolute and that a district court may never enjoin a State’s election laws in the period close to an election.” Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 881 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of applications for stays, joined by Alito, J.).Show More to federal judicial relief in the upcoming election cycle. The provisions of both federal constitutional and statutory law that would normally protect voting rights, govern redistricting, and otherwise supervise how a state can conduct its elections are essentially put on hold until after the election at hand. Given the severity and categorical nature of its effect, great weight is thus placed on what triggers application of the Purcell Principle.

I argue that what should trigger Purcell is disruption to a state’s administration of its elections. This conception is different from that of other scholars and jurists, who claim that the Principle is guided by concerns of voter confusion. But disruption alone does not tell the full story either. Understanding Purcell also requires bringing to light the constitutional theory that is underlying the doctrine: federalism16 16.Federalism can broadly be defined as “[t]he legal relationship and distribution of power between the national and regional governments within a federal system of government, and in the United States particularly, between the federal government and the state governments.” Federalism, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).Show More (as applied here, the idea that decisions about election procedures are primarily the province of the states).

Even though Purcell is supposedly about confusion—indeed, everyone says as much—this Note will demonstrate that rationale does not adequately explain the case law. In practice, the Supreme Court’s applications of the Principle are better rationalized by federalism and disruption; both are necessary to trigger Purcell. Viewing Purcell as a part of the Court’s commitment to federalism is important not only to explain when and why the Principle should be invoked, but it also harmonizes this doctrine with the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence in other areas of election law and beyond. Further, because application of the Principle will effectively neuter election law in the federal courts for a given election cycle, my proposed disruption framework is useful to future litigants making strategic decisions about where, when, and how to bring their claims.

On their face, the Supreme Court’s applications of Purcell may seem partisan. Professor Steve Vladeck, for example, has characterized the Purcell Principle as “[h]ow the [c]urrent Court [u]ses the Shadow Docket to [h]elp Republicans.”17 17.Vladeck, supra note 5, at vii. In May 2024, however, the Supreme Court applied Purcell to hand what appeared to be a victory to Democrats—staying a district court injunction that paved the way for Louisiana to use a redistricting map with an additional majority-Black district in November. See Robinson v. Callais, 144 S. Ct. 1171, 1171 (2024) (mem.); Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Upholds Louisiana Redistricting Plan, NPR (May 15, 2024, 6:44 PM), https://www.npr.org/2024/05/15/1250937356/supreme-court-louisiana-redistricti‌ng [https://perma.cc/E8Y9-RDL8].Show More And Professor Wilfred Codrington has described it as “an empty vessel for unprincipled decisionmaking and inconsistent rulings.”18 18.Codrington, supra note 13, at 941.Show More But this Note suggests there may be an unarticulated rationale that better accounts for the Court’s decisions in this area. In doing so, I do not purport that this is the “true” motivation guiding Purcell or what individual Justices are necessarily thinking. Rather, this Note offers federalism as an alternate, novel ground in a framework that seeks to make the Court’s applications of the Principle more coherent. If you reconsider Purcell as a federalism principle with me and read these cases through the lens of disruption, you just might be disabused of your cynicism.

This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I introduces the origins of the Purcell Principle and its professed rationales: preventing voter confusion, providing clear guidance to the states, and deferring to the district court. It then surveys the development of the doctrine by reviewing each case in which the Supreme Court has applied the Purcell Principle or otherwise discussed it. Part II then analyzes whether the three rationales announced in Purcell are supported by the subsequent case law. (This Note contends they aren’t.) Having chipped away at those rationales, Part III argues that the Principle is better understood as being justified by the Court’s concerns with federalism. Federalism requires insulating to some degree the ability of the state to dictate the rules that govern its elections. If Purcell is defined by the power of federal courts vis-à-vis the states, the Court’s historic applications of the Principle and the Principle’s limits make more sense. Reconceptualizing the doctrine in this way, I propose a new framework to explain what should trigger Purcell. In deciding whether the Principle ought to be applied, courts would reach more consistent, analytically sound results by asking whether judicial intervention would disrupt a state’s administration of its elections. If an order changing the election rules or procedures would be disruptive, the Principle is invoked and operates as a near-total bar on judicial relief. But where intervention wouldn’t be disruptive, Purcell does not govern and a federal court’s decision to enjoin that state procedure is permissible. I conclude by proposing four conditions necessary for finding disruption, which courts can look to in determining whether the Principle should be applied in a given case.

  1.  Singleton v. Merrill, 582 F. Supp. 3d 924, 936 (N.D. Ala. 2022) (per curiam), aff’d sub nom. Allen v. Milligan, 143 S. Ct. 1487 (2023); Caster v. Merrill, No. 21-cv-01536, 2022 WL 264819, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 24, 2022), aff’d sub nom. Allen, 143 S. Ct. 1487.
  2.  Singleton, 582 F. Supp. 3d at 936.
  3.  Id.
  4.  Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 879 (2022) (mem.).
  5.  Id. Professor William Baude coined the term “shadow docket” to describe “everything other than the Court’s ‘merits docket.’” Stephen Vladeck, The Shadow Docket: How the Supreme Court Uses Stealth Rulings to Amass Power and Undermine the Republic, at xii (2023); see also William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 1, 1 (2015) (pointing to “a range of orders and summary decisions that defy its normal procedural regularity”).
  6.  Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 879–82 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of applications for stays, joined by Alito, J.).
  7.  Id. at 879–80.
  8.  Id. at 882.
  9.  Caster v. Merrill, No. 21-cv-01536, 2022 WL 264819, at *14–15 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 24, 2022); Brian Lyman, Gov. Kay Ivey Signs Off on Alabama Congressional, Legislative, SBOE Maps for 2022, Montgomery Advertiser (Nov. 4, 2021, 3:30 PM), https://www.montgomery‌advertiser.com/story/news/2021/11/03/alabama-congressional-state-house-maps-2022-heade‌d-gov-kay-ivey/6258353001/ [https://perma.cc/RBY9-WLDR].
  10.  Melissa Murray & Steve Vladeck, The Supreme Court’s Voting Rights Act Ruling Is No Victory for Democracy, Wash. Post (June 8, 2023, 9:28 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.‌com/opinions/2023/06/08/supreme-court-alabama-redistricting-voting-rights-act/ [https://per‌ma.cc/EB4X-9HYG].
  11.  State of Ala., Canvass of Results: General Election, November 8, 2022, at 15–28 (2022), https://www.sos.alabama.gov/sites/default/files/election-data/2022-11/Final%20Canvass%2‌0of%20Results%20%28canvassed%20by%20state%20canvassing%20board%2011-28-2022‌%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GRV-D9GD].
  12.  See Allen v. Milligan, 143 S. Ct. 1487, 1498 (2023).
  13.  See Vladeck, supra note 5, at 226–27 (arguing that the Court has applied Purcell “inconsistently, and in a way that outwardly favors Republicans far more often than it does Democrats”). See generally Steve Vladeck, 31. Emergency Applications and the Merits, One First (June 12, 2023), https://stevevladeck.substack.com/p/31-emergency-applications-and-the [https://perma.cc/XT2Q-LLAT]; Ruoyun Gao, Note, Why the Purcell Principle Should Be Abolished, 71 Duke L.J. 1139 (2022); Harry B. Dodsworth, The Positive and Negative Purcell Principle, 2022 Utah L. Rev. 1081; Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, 43 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 427 (2016); Michael T. Morley, Election Emergencies: Voting in Times of Pandemic, 80 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.

    359, 425–28 (2023); Wilfred U. Codrington III, Purcell in Pandemic, 96 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 941 (2021).

  14.  Murray & Vladeck, supra note 10.
  15.  Morley, supra note 13, at 427; see also Hasen, supra note 13, at 443 (referring to Purcell as “a per se rule to not allow last-minute judicial changes to election rules”). Justice Kavanaugh has also recognized that the “Court’s opinions, including Purcell itself, could be read to imply that the principle is absolute and that a district court may never enjoin a State’s election laws in the period close to an election.” Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 881 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of applications for stays, joined by Alito, J.).
  16.  Federalism can broadly be defined as “[t]he legal relationship and distribution of power between the national and regional governments within a federal system of government, and in the United States particularly, between the federal government and the state governments.” Federalism, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
  17.  Vladeck, supra note 5, at vii. In May 2024, however, the Supreme Court applied Purcell to hand what appeared to be a victory to Democrats—staying a district court injunction that paved the way for Louisiana to use a redistricting map with an additional majority-Black district in November. See Robinson v. Callais, 144 S. Ct. 1171, 1171 (2024) (mem.); Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Upholds Louisiana Redistricting Plan, NPR (May 15, 2024, 6:44 PM), https://www.npr.org/2024/05/15/1250937356/supreme-court-louisiana-redistricti‌ng [https://perma.cc/E8Y9-RDL8].
  18.  Codrington, supra note 13, at 941.