Catalyzing Judicial Federalism

Introduction

In response to a U.S. Supreme Court that is retrenching many important civil rights, some advocates are turning to state courts and constitutions as alternative means of protection.1.See, e.g., Riley Brennan, ACLU Staffs Up for New Initiative: ‘State Supreme Courts Are More Important Now Than Ever,’ ALM Law.com (May 2, 2023, 11:29 AM), https://www.law.com/2023/05/02/aclu-staffs-up-for-new-initiative-state-supreme-courts-are-more-important-now-than-ever [https://perma.cc/MN9H-9YRP]; Amy Myrick & Tamar Eisen, Building Protections for Reproductive Autonomy in State Constitutions, Ms. Mag. (May 24, 2022), https://msmagazine.com/2022/05/24/state-constitution-courts-abortion-rights/ [https://perma.cc/CJ8A-A5Q9] (“A more expansive vision for reproductive autonomy is necessary—and state courts can lead the way.”).Show More The Court’s regression follows a recent ideological change, a jurisprudential turn towards originalism and a long-standing normalization of judicial supremacy.2.See, e.g., David Cole, Egregiously Wrong: The Supreme Court’s Unprecedented Turn, N.Y. Rev. Books (Aug. 18, 2022), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2022/08/18/egregious‌ly-wrong-the-supreme-courts-unprecedented-turn-david-cole/ [https://perma.cc/2CMZ-KV‌4F]; Mark A. Lemley, The Imperial Supreme Court, 136 Harv. L. Rev. F. 97, 110–11 (2022); Noah Feldman, Opinion, Supreme Court ‘Originalists’ Are Flying a False Flag, Bloomberg (July 17, 2022, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-07-17/supre‌me-court-s-conservative-originalists-are-flying-a-false-flag#xj4y7vzkg [https://perma.cc/FZM8-G2FG] (arguing that the Court relies on selective originalism to “rationalize its activism”).Show More For some, transplanting legal strategies from federal to state courts risks bringing this old soil with it.3.See, e.g., Christopher Jon Sprigman, Congress’s Article III Power and The Process of Constitutional Change, 95 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1778, 1833 (2020) (observing that arguments in favor of placing “a lot of faith in state courts” as an alternative to federal courts “are especially weak” and recreate judicial supremacy); Joseph Fishkin, Courts and Constitutional Political Economy, LPE Project (July 24, 2021), https://lpeproject.org/blog/courts-and-constitutional-political-economy/ [https://perma.cc/M6AN-8VZF] (arguing that “[w]e need the courts, but we also need to understand that the courts are not our friends—and are unlikely ever to be,” and cautioning against placing our hopes in them); Zachary Clopton, Commentary, Judges Will Not Save Us. Pushing for Truly Democratic Solutions Will, Chi. Trib. (Aug. 24, 2022, 1:37 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-opinion-state-courts-constitution-rights-judicial-supremacy-20220824-ig2eravofbb5rgh3k4ckzdw52a-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZKD9-EFJR] (suggesting excessive reliance on state courts “feeds into the notion of judicial supremacy that created these problems in the first place”).Show More That is, a pivot to the states risks perpetuating these pathologies and recreating at the state level the same regressive norms and jurisprudence that precipitated the turn in federal courts in the first place.

In this brief Essay, I explore two aspects of this view. First, there are good reasons to believe originalism will not achieve the traction among state supreme courts that it currently enjoys at the U.S. Supreme Court. Briefly stated, several of the theory’s bugs and features likely disincentivize its adoption by most state supreme courts. Second, the renewed interest in state courts provides advocates with an opportunity to protect their clients and advance their causes in ways that do not necessarily require the aggressive forms of judicial review that seem characteristic of federal constitutional culture. State-level institutions offer means to protect important rights and liberties that widen the lens beyond a myopic focus on constitutional litigation. In this Essay, I briefly highlight three of these pathways: direct democracy, state courts’ non-adjudicative powers, and the common law. To be sure, expansive constitutional protection via judicial interpretation may be necessary for certain rights in certain contexts. But for advocates turning to state-level institutions, that should not necessarily be the default rule. Rather, a meaningful turn to the states should draw on the broader constellation of tools for protecting rights available at the state level that may be more effective and flexible than the predominant federal approach.

  1.  See, e.g., Riley Brennan, ACLU Staffs Up for New Initiative: ‘State Supreme Courts Are More Important Now Than Ever,’ ALM Law.com (May 2, 2023, 11:29 AM), https://www.law.com/2023/05/02/aclu-staffs-up-for-new-initiative-state-supreme-courts-are-more-important-now-than-ever [https://perma.cc/MN9H-9YRP]; Amy Myrick & Tamar Eisen, Building Protections for Reproductive Autonomy in State Constitutions, Ms. Mag
    .

    (May 24, 2022), https://msmagazine.com/2022/05/24/state-constitution-courts-abortion-rights/ [https://perma.cc/CJ8A-A5Q9] (“A more expansive vision for reproductive autonomy is necessary—and state courts can lead the way.”).

  2.  See, e.g., David Cole, Egregiously Wrong: The Supreme Court’s Unprecedented Turn, N.Y. Rev. Books (Aug. 18, 2022), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2022/08/18/egregious‌ly-wrong-the-supreme-courts-unprecedented-turn-david-cole/ [https://perma.cc/2CMZ-KV‌4F]; Mark A. Lemley, The Imperial Supreme Court, 136 Harv. L. Rev. F
    .

    97, 110–11 (2022); Noah Feldman, Opinion, Supreme Court ‘Originalists’ Are Flying a False Flag, Bloomberg (July 17, 2022, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-07-17/supre‌me-court-s-conservative-originalists-are-flying-a-false-flag#xj4y7vzkg [https://perma.cc/FZM8-G2FG] (arguing that the Court relies on selective originalism to “rationalize its activism”).

  3.  See, e.g., Christopher Jon Sprigman, Congress’s Article III Power and The Process of Constitutional Change, 95 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1778, 1833 (2020) (observing that arguments in favor of placing “a lot of faith in state courts” as an alternative to federal courts “are especially weak” and recreate judicial supremacy); Joseph Fishkin, Courts and Constitutional Political Economy, LPE Project (July 24, 2021), https://lpeproject.org/blog/courts-and-constitutional-political-economy/ [https://perma.cc/M6AN-8VZF] (arguing that “[w]e need the courts, but we also need to understand that the courts are not our friends—and are unlikely ever to be,” and cautioning against placing our hopes in them); Zachary Clopton, Commentary, Judges Will Not Save Us. Pushing for Truly Democratic Solutions Will, Chi. Trib. (Aug. 24, 2022, 1:37 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-opinion-state-courts-constitution-rights-judicial-supremacy-20220824-ig2eravofbb5rgh3k4ckzdw52a-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZKD9-EFJR] (suggesting excessive reliance on state courts “feeds into the notion of judicial supremacy that created these problems in the first place”).

Chronic Nuisance Ordinances, Impossible Choices, and State Constitutions

Introduction

When Lakisha Briggs’s partner attacked her in April 2012, her daughter called the police.1.Lakisha Briggs, I Was a Domestic Violence Victim. My Town Wanted Me Evicted for Calling 911, Guardian (Sept. 11, 2015, 6:45 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/‌commentisfree/2015/sep/11/domestic-violence-victim-town-wanted-me-evicted-calling-911 [https://perma.cc/7NR4-Z269]; Verified First Amended Complaint at 10, Briggs v. Borough of Norristown, No. 2:13-cv-02191 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2013). Because Ms. Briggs’s story was well-publicized compared to most evictions resulting from chronic nuisance ordinance (“CNO”) enforcement, other scholarly pieces about chronic nuisance ordinances have also highlighted her endeavor. See, e.g., Salim Katach, Note, A Tenant’s Procedural Due Process Right in Chronic Nuisance Ordinance Jurisdictions, 43 Hofstra L. Rev. 875, 875–78 (2015).Show More Their response ensured that neither Ms. Briggs nor her daughter would ever take that risk again. Once officers arrived at Ms. Briggs’s home, they told her that, even as a victim of domestic violence, she was “on three strikes,” and they were “gonna have [her] landlord evict [her].”2.Briggs, supra note 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).Show More Unfortunately, Ms. Briggs lived in Norristown, Pennsylvania, one of hundreds of municipalities across the country with a chronic nuisance ordinance (“CNO”) in effect.3.Norristown, Pa., Mun. Code § 245-3 (2012). Norristown repealed this law as part of Briggs’s settlement, but its text remains available in Briggs’s complaint. Verified First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 1–2.Show More

Under a CNO, a local government can deem a property a “nuisance” when a certain number of police visits—responding to everything from marijuana use to domestic violence calls—occur at the property.4.SeeScout Katovich, NYCLU & ACLU, More Thana Nuisance: The Outsized Consequences of New York’s Nuisance Ordinances 6 (2018) [hereinafter More Than a Nuisance], https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/nyclu_nuisancereport_‌20180809.pdf [https://perma.cc/QPG3-L6P2] (explaining how CNOs operate in New York); see also Emily Werth, Sargent Shriver Nat’l Ctr. on Poverty L., The Cost of Being “Crime Free”: Legal and Practical Consequences of Crime Free Rental Housing and Nuisance Property Ordinances 2, 4, 8 (2013) (examining CNOs and other similar crime-free housing provisions in Illinois).Show More If the landlord fails to “abate the nuisance,” often an implicit command to evict the tenant, the locality retains broad discretion to impose heavy fines upon the landlord, revoke their rental license, close the property temporarily, or even seize it.5.More Than a Nuisance, supra note 4, at 6, 8; Matthew Desmond & Nicol Valdez, Unpolicing the Urban Poor: Consequences of Third-Party Policing for Inner-City Women, 78 Am. Socio. Rev. 117, 118–20 (2012) (identifying potential punishments).Show More With the threat of eviction looming over her and her children, Ms. Briggs was forced to suffer in silence.

Ms. Briggs’s troubles reached a new height two months later, when that same ex-partner stabbed her in the neck.6.Verified First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 15.Show More Despite her pleas not to call 9-1-1, concerned neighbors did so, and she was airlifted to the hospital.7.Erik Eckholm, Victims’ Dilemma: 911 Calls Can Bring Eviction, N.Y. Times (Aug. 16, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/17/us/victims-dilemma-911-calls-can-bring-evict‌ion.html [https://perma.cc/QUX7-ZWYG].Show More Her fears were well-founded. When she returned home, her landlord informed her that she had to leave within 14 days: the town’s restrictive nuisance ordinance “gave him no choice but to file a case against [her].”8.Briggs, supra note 1.Show More The town had revoked his license three days after Ms. Briggs was hospitalized.9.Verified First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 16.Show More Even though she subsequently succeeded in eviction court, the city insisted that Ms. Briggs leave.10 10.Briggs, supra note 1.Show More The Norristown ordinance “gave the city the power to condemn the property if [the landlord] did not remove me,” she explained.11 11.Id.Show More

Fortunately, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) soon took up Ms. Briggs’s case.12 12.Verified First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 38.Show More She reached a settlement with the city that included repealing the CNO.13 13.Briggs, supra note 1; see also Press Release, ACLU, Norristown Will Pay $495,000 to Settle Case on Behalf of Woman Threatened with Eviction for Calling Police (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/pennsylvania-city-agrees-repeal-law-jeopardizes-safety-domestic-violence-survivors [https://perma.cc/GB3P-EV7Y] (stating that Norristown voted to repeal the ordinance as part of the Briggs settlement).Show More Pennsylvania then passed a law prohibiting municipalities from punishing victims for calling emergency services.14 14.53 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 304 (2014).Show More

Although Ms. Briggs and the ACLU succeeded in repealing this CNO, hundreds like it remain in effect throughout the United States—from its largest cities to its smallest towns.15 15.See, e.g., Cincinnati, Ohio, Mun. Code § 761-1-C–N (2013); Sumner, Wash., Mun. Code ch. 9.50 (2022). Over one hundred municipalities in Illinois have enacted CNOs and other harmful types of crime-free ordinances. Werth, supra note 4, at 26–28 app. A. A non-exhaustive study of Ohio CNOs and other crime-free ordinances revealed that at least forty municipalities have enacted them. Joseph Mead et al., Cleveland State Univ., Who Is a Nuisance? Criminal Activity Nuisance Ordinances in Ohio 19–20 app. A (2017). An investigation into New York CNOs revealed that twenty-five of the forty most populated municipalities outside of New York City have enacted them. More Than a Nuisance, supra note 4, at 10.Show More This Essay explores how CNOs harm marginalized groups and how local communities can stop that harm. Part I explains how CNOs typically operate and where they come from. Part II illustrates how CNOs can detrimentally impact communities of color, domestic violence victims, and people with physical and mental disabilities or illnesses. Finally, Part III examines how legal challenges and state-level reform can mitigate the harms of CNOs. This Essay intervenes in the scholarly discussion by arguing that state constitutional amendments—an undervalued instrument of reform—can limit harmful exercises of local power, invalidate CNOs, and strengthen individual rights. To that end, the Essay proposes model language for these amendments.

  1.  Lakisha Briggs, I Was a Domestic Violence Victim. My Town Wanted Me Evicted for Calling 911, Guardian (Sept. 11, 2015, 6:45 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/‌commentisfree/2015/sep/11/domestic-violence-victim-town-wanted-me-evicted-calling-911 [https://perma.cc/7NR4-Z269]; Verified First Amended Complaint at 10, Briggs v. Borough of Norristown, No. 2:13-cv-02191 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2013). Because Ms. Briggs’s story was well-publicized compared to most evictions resulting from chronic nuisance ordinance (“CNO”) enforcement, other scholarly pieces about chronic nuisance ordinances have also highlighted her endeavor. See, e.g., Salim Katach, Note, A Tenant’s Procedural Due Process Right in Chronic Nuisance Ordinance Jurisdictions,
    43 H

    ofstra

    L. R

    ev

    .

    875, 875–78 (2015).

  2.  Briggs, supra note 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
  3. N

    orristown

    , P

    a

    ., M

    un

    . C

    ode § 245-3 (2012). Norristown repealed this law as part of Briggs’s settlement, but its text remains available in Briggs’s complaint. Verified First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 1–2.

  4.  See Scout Katovich,
    NYCLU & ACLU, M

    ore

    T

    han

    a Nuisance: The Outsized Consequences of New York’s Nuisance Ordinances 6 (2018) [hereinafter More Than a Nuisance], https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/nyclu_nuisancereport_‌20180809.pdf [https://perma.cc/QPG3-L6P2] (explaining how CNOs operate in New York); see also Emily Werth, Sargent Shriver Nat’l Ctr. on Poverty L., The Cost of Being “Crime Free”: Legal and Practical Consequences of Crime Free Rental Housing and Nuisance Property Ordinances 2, 4, 8 (2013) (examining CNOs and other similar crime-free housing provisions in Illinois).

  5.  More Than a Nuisance, supra note 4, at 6, 8; Matthew Desmond & Nicol Valdez, Unpolicing the Urban Poor: Consequences of Third-Party Policing for Inner-City Women, 78 Am. Socio. Rev. 117, 118–20 (2012) (identifying potential punishments).
  6.  Verified First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 15.
  7.  Erik Eckholm, Victims’ Dilemma: 911 Calls Can Bring Eviction, N.Y. Times (Aug. 16, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/17/us/victims-dilemma-911-calls-can-bring-evict‌ion.html [https://perma.cc/QUX7-ZWYG].
  8.  Briggs, supra note 1.
  9.  Verified First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 16.
  10.  Briggs, supra note 1.
  11.  Id.
  12.  Verified First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 38.
  13.  Briggs, supra note 1; see also Press Release, ACLU, Norristown Will Pay $495,000 to Settle Case on Behalf of Woman Threatened with Eviction for Calling Police (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/pennsylvania-city-agrees-repeal-law-jeopardizes-safety-domestic-violence-survivors [https://perma.cc/GB3P-EV7Y] (stating that Norristown voted to repeal the ordinance as part of the Briggs settlement).
  14.  53 Pa. Cons. Stat.
    § 304 (2014).

  15.  See, e.g., Cincinnati, Ohio, Mun. Code § 761-1-C–N (2013); Sumner, Wash., Mun. Code ch. 9.50 (2022). Over one hundred municipalities in Illinois have enacted CNOs and other harmful types of crime-free ordinances. Werth, supra note 4, at 26–28 app. A. A non-exhaustive study of Ohio CNOs and other crime-free ordinances revealed that at least forty municipalities have enacted them. Joseph Mead et al., Cleveland State Univ., Who Is a Nuisance? Criminal Activity Nuisance Ordinances in Ohio 19–20 app. A (2017). An investigation into New York CNOs revealed that twenty-five of the forty most populated municipalities outside of New York City have enacted them. More Than a Nuisance, supra note 4, at 10.

Reconsidering The Legal Definition of Gambling: A Resuscitation of the Gambling Instinct Test

The modern chance-based test for gambling is fundamentally flawed. It is descriptively inaccurate, difficult to apply, and easily circumvented. Despite these shortcomings, the test is by-and-large the only test employed for the identification of gambling activity. But this was not always the case. In the first part of the twentieth century, some courts employed a competing test that looked to the underlying psychological phenomenon rather than the mechanical form of the activity. This Note advocates for a re-adoption of that test. The modern test, originally put forth as the definition of a lottery, was never intended to be a test for gambling. Over time, courts warped this definition to the point where many forms of gambling could reasonably be deemed a “lottery,” blurring the distinctions between gambling and lotteries to such a degree that some states’ highest courts have held that the two terms are synonymous.

The competing test—referred to by modern academics as “the Gambling Instinct Test”—has been understudied and mischaracterized by the literature. Admittedly, the decisions applying the test were unstructured in their analysis; however, closer examination of those cases reveals that the test can be distilled into two steps: (1) whether there exists a contingent contract, and (2) whether the prospect of receiving a return of disproportionate value induced the gambling party into conveying her consideration. As so refined, resuscitation of the Gambling Instinct Test would bring the legal doctrine in lockstep with medical conceptions of gambling. Given the explosion of gambling activity in recent years, such a change has never been more necessary.

Introduction

As one of the traditional vices, gambling has long been regulated by governments.1.See Nat’l Inst. L. Enf’t & Crim. Just., U.S. Dep’t of Just., The Development of the Law of Gambling: 1776–1976, at 4–13 (1977) [hereinafter Development of the Law of Gambling].Show More During the post-medieval period in England, gambling in and of itself was not unlawful, but the law tried to address its collateral consequences, such as the disruption of the public peace and members of the aristocracy gambling away their estates.2.Id. at 39–41, 240.Show More In early colonial America, the justification for and degree of regulation varied widely, from the wholesale condemnation of gambling as a form of idleness in Puritan Massachusetts, to more permissive laws in the southern colonies that only dealt with the evils of gambling as they arose.3.See I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: The Third Wave of Legal Gambling, 17 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J. 361, 368–74 (2010).Show More Since those early days, gambling has twice gone through cycles of legalization and prohibition.4.Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1481 (2018). Thirty-six states and the District of Columbia have legalized sports betting since that decision, and a number of other states are currently in the process of legalization. Will Yakowicz, Where Is Sports Betting Legal? A Guide to All 50 States, Forbes (Jan. 9, 2023, 12:48 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/willyakowicz/2022/01/07/where-is-sports-betting-legal-americ‌a-2022/ [https://perma.cc/Y67H-4SNL].Show More Given the rapid legalization of sports betting at the state level that has occurred in the years following the Supreme Court’s landmark decision that a federal statute’s prohibition on state authorization of sports betting violated the anti-commandeering principle,5.See Rose, supra note 4, at 374–75 (tracing the third wave of legal gambling back to the early 1930s).Show More we appear to be approaching the crest of what one prominent gambling law scholar terms “the third wave of legal gambling.”6.Roland J. Santoni, An Introduction to Nebraska Gaming Law, 29 Creighton L. Rev. 1123, 1129 (1996) (citing examples of such cases from a number of states); D.A. Norris, Annotation, What Are Games of Chance, Games of Skill, and Mixed Games of Chance and Skill, 135 A.L.R. 104, 107 (1941) (“In construing statutes or ordinances prohibiting gaming, gambling, or gambling devices wherein nothing is said about chance or a game of chance or skill, many courts have required, inter alia, the element of chance to be involved.”).Show More

Although gambling in the modern-day United States is primarily defined by statute, courts, “concerned that clever operators would find ways to subvert the [statutory] prohibitions,” have frequently held that a game or activity constituted gambling if the three elements of the common law definition—Prize/Chance/Consideration—were present.7.See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:37-1(b) (West 2023).Show More Many modern state statutes now utilize this definition, often with slight variations.8.See 347 U.S. 284, 290 (1954).Show More However, this definition should not apply to all forms of gambling—nor was it originally intended to. The case most often cited in support for this definition, FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., was defining a “lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme,” not gambling writ large.9.See, e.g., Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163, 168 (1850) (“Experience has shown that the common forms of gambling are comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with the wide-spread pestilence of lotteries.”).Show More Historically, lotteries have been recognized as a distinct form of gambling, not as an interchangeable term.10 10.Anthony N. Cabot, Glenn J. Light & Karl F. Rutledge, Alex Rodriguez, a Monkey, and the Game of Scrabble: The Hazard of Using Illogic to Define the Legality of Games of Mixed Skill and Chance, 57 Drake L. Rev. 383, 390–91 (2009) [hereinafter Cabot et al., Mixed Skill and Chance]; Anthony N. Cabot & Louis V. Csoka, The Games People Play: Is It Time for a New Legal Approach to Prize Games?, 4 Nev. L.J. 197, 202 (Winter 2003–2004) [hereinafter Cabot & Csoka, The Games People Play].Show More Accordingly, in using this definition to evaluate all forms of gambling, courts have stretched and twisted the three elements in order to fit their intuitions of whether a gambling-like activity should be prohibited or not.

Chance is the most consistently problematic element from this definitional framework. The prevailing test for the chance element is the Dominant Factor Test: if the winner is determined predominantly by chance, as opposed to skill, then the activity is gambling.11 11.For instance, Haralabos Voulgaris has made millions as both a professional sports bettor and poker player, and he parlayed his success using statistical models in sports gambling into becoming the Director of Quantitative Research and Development for the Dallas Mavericks. See Marton, Haralabos Voulgaris’s Life: Biggest Profits, Losses, Private Life & Net Worth, So Much Poker (Aug. 20, 2020), https://somuchpoker.com/haralabos-voulgaris-life-biggest-profits-losses-private-life-net-worth/ [https://perma.cc/Z9CU-JKNQ].Show More Although appealing at first glance, the chance/skill dichotomy is a nebulous concept. Various paradigmatic forms of gambling, such as poker and sports wagering, have such a material skill component that highly skilled gamblers have been able to make a substantial living off of their pursuits.12 12.See Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. Gibson, 359 P.2d 85, 87 (Nev. 1961).Show More On the other hand, certain “games of skill”—such as common carnival games or hole-in-one contests—can be structured so as to create games where the luck component predominates over the skill component, even for the most skilled participants.13 13.See, e.g., Indoor Recreation Enters. v. Douglas, 235 N.W.2d 398, 400–01 (Neb. 1975) (upholding a ruling that chess and checkers—paradigmatic examples of games of skill—are games of chance).Show More Even outside of these edge cases, the chance element has proved to be sufficiently confusing for courts in the analog context.14 14.See Yash Nair, What Does RNG Mean in Gaming?, DOT Esports (July 12, 2022, 11:16 AM), https://dotesports.com/general/news/what-does-rng-mean-in-gaming [https://perma.cc/H2DH-XLU7] (describing how video games use random number generators in which an algorithm decides a number value that determines certain in-game outcomes).Show More Given the importance of random number generation to the outcome of e‑sports contests, the chance element is bound to cause even greater confusion in the coming years.15 15.Anthony N. Cabot, Glenn J. Light & Karl F. Rutledge, Economic Value, Equal Dignity and the Future of Sweepstakes, 1 UNLV Gaming L.J. 1, 10–15 (2010) [hereinafter Cabot et al., Future of Sweepstakes] (citing FCC v. Am. Broad. Co., 347 U.S. 284, 296 (1954)).Show More

The other two elements, consideration and prize, have seen difficulties as well. Although consideration is a well‑defined concept in contract law, the Supreme Court in FCC v. American Broadcasting Co. departed from the so-called “contract theory” of consideration in favor of what is now referred to as the Economic Value Test, which many states have subsequently adopted.16 16.See Cabot et al., Future of Sweepstakes, supra note 16, at 23–36.Show More There has been continual debate and disagreement over how to evaluate non-monetary consideration and the possibility of free entry under this test.17 17.See Mark D. Griffiths, Is the Buying of Loot Boxes in Video Games a Form of Gambling or Gaming?, 22 Gaming L.R. 52, 53 (2018). The loot box mechanism works as follows: “Players use real money to buy virtual in-game items and can redeem such items by buying keys to open the boxes where they receive a chance selection of further virtual items.” Id. at 52.Show More Prize has come under less scrutiny historically, but has recently come to the forefront in the debate over whether video game loot boxes should be considered gambling schemes.18 18.U.K. Gambling Commission, Virtual Currencies, eSports and Social Casino Gaming – Position Paper ¶ 3(17)–(18) (2017), https://assets.ctfassets.net/j16ev64qyf6l/4A644HIpG1‌g2ymq11HdPOT/ca6272c45f1b2874d09eabe39515a527/Virtual-currencies-eSports-and-soci‌al-casino-gaming.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HL8-E9FX] (“Where prizes are successfully restricted for use solely within the game, such in-game features would not be licensable gambling, notwithstanding the elements of expenditure and chance.”).Show More The U.K. Gambling Commission declined to designate these loot boxes as a form of gambling because they did not view the in-game items awarded as prizes to have any real-life value outside of the game.19 19.The Federalist No. 37, at 180 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).Show More Though the current definition of gambling can be summed up in a pithy phrase, its application in practice misses the forest for the trees.

A critical threshold in any system of regulation is the identification of the regulated activity. The modern application of Prize/Chance/Consideration has often resulted in normative policy judgments being made simultaneously with the classification of the activity—a fundamental misstep. Although we may now find that the outright prohibition of vices like gambling creates more harms than it prevents, we, as James Madison once warned, “ought not to assume an infallibility in rejudging the fallible opinions of others.”20 20.See Cabot et al., Mixed Skill and Chance, supra note 11, at 393–94.Show More Separating classification from moralization would better allow a regulatory scheme to adjust to changes in information, custom, and societal attitudes.

In lieu of the modern framework, this Note advocates for a modern revitalization of the Gambling Instinct Test, which simply looks to whether the activity in question triggers one’s gambling instinct.21 21.See Jim Leitzel, Regulating Vice, in The Handbook of Deviance 45, 46 (Erich Goode ed., 2015).Show More The Gambling Instinct Test is a superior doctrine because it homes in on the central harm‑causing mechanism of gambling. Like other vices, gambling is “prone to excess” and “particularly likely to compromise rational decision-making,” even amongst non-addicted adults.22 22.213 N.W. 335, 339 (Wis. 1927).Show More As described in City of Milwaukee v. Johnson:

The machine makes an appeal to the gambling instinct, because the player has constantly before him the chance that the next play will assure him of the right on the next succeeding play to secure from 2 to 20 trade checks. Were it not for this appeal to the gambling instinct, these machines, which attempt to adhere to the letter of the law while violating its spirit, would never have been placed upon the market.23 23.See Cabot et al., Future of Sweepstakes, supra note 16, at 4–5.Show More

The Gambling Instinct Test is typically associated with the deontological view of gambling: that gambling is a sin and inconsistent with a moral society.24 24.See, e.g., Mills-Jennings of Ohio, Inc. v. Dep’t of Liquor Control, 435 N.E.2d 407, 409–10 (Ohio 1982) (detailing Ohio’s shift away from an anti-gambling public policy).Show More This test, peaking in usage in the 1930s, has mostly fallen out of favor since the 1950s, alongside the broad changes to society’s moral judgment of gambling that occurred in that time period.25 25.See Cabot et al., Mixed Skill and Chance, supra note 11, at 394.Show More The Gambling Instinct Test has also been criticized for being a highly subjective test that “can vary widely in its application to particular games.”footnote_id_27_26 In light of these considerations, it may seem counterintuitive that this test would be a good fit for the modern era, where paternalistic legislation of morality is increasingly disfavored and more objective judicial methodologies are preferred. However, a broad, flexible definition better enables a smart, robust system of regulation than the illogical application of the current doctrine.

The Gambling Instinct Test is justly maligned for its subjectivity. This Note attempts to ameliorate this defect by providing more color to what it means to “appeal to the gambling instinct,” first by delving deep into the cases which applied this test, and then by drawing from empirical research to find evidentiary indicators of when that instinct is being stimulated. But before doing so, some background on the current doctrinal definition is needed.

  1.  The earliest English anti-gambling statute was enacted by King Richard II in 1388. R. Randall Bridwell & Frank L. Quinn, From Mad Joy to Misfortune: The Merger of Law and Politics in the World of Gambling, 72 Miss. L.J. 565, 622–23 (2002) (citing 1388, 12 Rich. 2 c. 6 (Eng.)). Records from third-century India indicate that there was a governmental department responsible for the regulation of gambling during the reign of Chandragupta Maurya. Ronald J. Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical Examination of State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. Rev. 11, 16 (1992) (citing Will Durant, Our Oriental Heritage 444 (1954)); Vincent A. Smith, The Oxford History of India 78 & n.2 (1919) (citing Arthasāstra bk. 3, ch. 20).
  2.  See Nat’l Inst. L. Enf’t & Crim. Just., U.S. Dep’t of Just., The Development of the Law of Gambling: 1776–1976, at 4–13 (1977) [hereinafter Development of the Law of Gambling].
  3.  Id. at 39–41, 240.
  4.  See I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: The Third Wave of Legal Gambling, 17 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J. 361, 368–74 (2010).
  5.  Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1481 (2018). Thirty-six states and the District of Columbia have legalized sports betting since that decision, and a number of other states are currently in the process of legalization. Will Yakowicz, Where Is Sports Betting Legal? A Guide to All 50 States, Forbes (Jan. 9, 2023, 12:48 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/willyakowicz/2022/01/07/where-is-sports-betting-legal-americ‌a-2022/ [https://perma.cc/Y67H-4SNL].
  6.  See Rose, supra note 4, at 374–75 (tracing the third wave of legal gambling back to the early 1930s).
  7.  Roland J. Santoni, An Introduction to Nebraska Gaming Law, 29 Creighton L. Rev. 1123, 1129 (1996) (citing examples of such cases from a number of states); D.A. Norris, Annotation, What Are Games of Chance, Games of Skill, and Mixed Games of Chance and Skill, 135 A.L.R. 104, 107 (1941) (“In construing statutes or ordinances prohibiting gaming, gambling, or gambling devices wherein nothing is said about chance or a game of chance or skill, many courts have required, inter alia, the element of chance to be involved.”).
  8.  See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:37-1(b) (West 2023).
  9.  See 347 U.S. 284, 290 (1954).
  10.  See, e.g., Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163, 168 (1850) (“Experience has shown that the common forms of gambling are comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with the wide-spread pestilence of lotteries.”).
  11.  Anthony N. Cabot, Glenn J. Light & Karl F. Rutledge, Alex Rodriguez, a Monkey, and the Game of Scrabble: The Hazard of Using Illogic to Define the Legality of Games of Mixed Skill and Chance, 57 Drake L. Rev. 383, 390–91 (2009) [hereinafter Cabot et al., Mixed Skill and Chance]; Anthony N. Cabot & Louis V. Csoka, The Games People Play: Is It Time for a New Legal Approach to Prize Games?, 4 Nev. L.J. 197, 202 (Winter 2003–2004) [hereinafter Cabot & Csoka, The Games People Play].
  12.  For instance, Haralabos Voulgaris has made millions as both a professional sports bettor and poker player, and he parlayed his success using statistical models in sports gambling into becoming the Director of Quantitative Research and Development for the Dallas Mavericks. See Marton, Haralabos Voulgaris’s Life: Biggest Profits, Losses, Private Life & Net Worth, So Much Poker (Aug. 20, 2020), https://somuchpoker.com/haralabos-voulgaris-life-biggest-profits-losses-private-life-net-worth/ [https://perma.cc/Z9CU-JKNQ].
  13.  See Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. Gibson, 359 P.2d 85, 87 (Nev. 1961).
  14.  See, e.g., Indoor Recreation Enters. v. Douglas, 235 N.W.2d 398, 400–01 (Neb. 1975) (upholding a ruling that chess and checkers—paradigmatic examples of games of skill—are games of chance).
  15.  See Yash Nair, What Does RNG Mean in Gaming?, DOT Esports (July 12, 2022, 11:16 AM), https://dotesports.com/general/news/what-does-rng-mean-in-gaming [https://perma.cc/H2DH-XLU7] (describing how video games use random number generators in which an algorithm decides a number value that determines certain in-game outcomes).
  16.  Anthony N. Cabot, Glenn J. Light & Karl F. Rutledge, Economic Value, Equal Dignity and the Future of Sweepstakes, 1 UNLV Gaming L.J. 1, 10–15 (2010) [hereinafter Cabot et al., Future of Sweepstakes] (citing FCC v. Am. Broad. Co., 347 U.S. 284, 296 (1954)).
  17.  See Cabot et al., Future of Sweepstakes, supra note 16, at 23–36.
  18.  See Mark D. Griffiths, Is the Buying of Loot Boxes in Video Games a Form of Gambling or Gaming?, 22 Gaming L.R. 52, 53 (2018). The loot box mechanism works as follows: “Players use real money to buy virtual in-game items and can redeem such items by buying keys to open the boxes where they receive a chance selection of further virtual items.” Id. at 52.
  19.  U.K. Gambling Commission, Virtual Currencies, eSports and Social Casino Gaming – Position Paper ¶ 3(17)–(18) (2017), https://assets.ctfassets.net/j16ev64qyf6l/4A644HIpG1‌g2ymq11HdPOT/ca6272c45f1b2874d09eabe39515a527/Virtual-currencies-eSports-and-soci‌al-casino-gaming.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HL8-E9FX] (“Where prizes are successfully restricted for use solely within the game, such in-game features would not be licensable gambling, notwithstanding the elements of expenditure and chance.”).
  20.  The Federalist No. 37, at 180 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).
  21.  See Cabot et al., Mixed Skill and Chance, supra note 11, at 393–94.
  22.  See Jim Leitzel, Regulating Vice, in The Handbook of Deviance 45, 46 (Erich Goode ed., 2015).
  23.  213 N.W. 335, 339 (Wis. 1927).
  24.  See Cabot et al., Future of Sweepstakes, supra note 16, at 4–5.
  25.  See, e.g., Mills-Jennings of Ohio, Inc. v. Dep’t of Liquor Control, 435 N.E.2d 407, 409–10 (Ohio 1982) (detailing Ohio’s shift away from an anti-gambling public policy).
  26.  See Cabot et al., Mixed Skill and Chance, supra note 11, at 394.