Should Treasury regulations and IRS guidance documents be eligible for pre-enforcement judicial review? The D.C. Circuit’s 2015 decision in Florida Bankers Ass’n v. U.S. Department of the Treasury puts its interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act at odds with both general administrative law norms in favor of pre-enforcement review of final agency action and also the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the nearly identical Tax Injunction Act. A 2017 federal district court decision in Chamber of Commerce v. IRS, appealable to the Fifth Circuit, interprets the Anti-Injunction Act differently and could lead to a circuit split regarding pre-enforcement judicial review of Treasury regulations and IRS guidance documents. Other cases interpreting the Anti-Injunction Act more generally are fragmented and inconsistent. In an effort to gain greater understanding of the Anti-Injunction Act and its role in tax administration, this Article looks back to the Anti-Injunction Act’s origin in 1867 as part of Civil War–era revenue legislation and the evolution of both tax administrative practices and Anti-Injunction Act jurisprudence since that time.
Issue 8
Enforcing the FCPA: International Resonance and Domestic Strategy
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), which bans corporations from offering bribes to foreign government officials, was enacted during the Watergate era’s crackdown on political corruption but remained only weakly enforced for its first two decades. American industry argued that the law created an uneven playing field in global commerce, which made robust enforcement politically unpopular. This Article documents how the executive branch strategically under-enforced the FCPA, while Congress and the President pushed for an international agreement that would bind other countries to rules similar to those of the United States. The Article establishes that U.S. officials ramped up enforcement only after the United States successfully concluded the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) Anti-Bribery Convention in 1997, twenty years after the enactment of the FCPA. Afterward, U.S. officials, desiring to maintain industry support for the FCPA, prosecuted both foreign and domestic corporations, thereby minimizing the statute’s competitive costs for American companies.
This Article argues that the OECD Convention was critical to the dramatic expansion of FCPA enforcement because it allowed American prosecutors to adopt an “international-competition neutral” enforcement strategy, investigating domestic corporations and their foreign rivals alike. The existence of the treaty was decisive because it established anti-bribery as a binding legal principle and legitimized U.S. prosecutions of foreign corporations. Today, seven of the ten highest FCPA penalties have been against foreign corporations.
This Article advocates, on a theoretical level, for a reevaluation of the multidirectional relationship between international and domestic law in transnational issue areas, such as foreign bribery. National laws are most often viewed as self-contained legal rules that develop or decline based on domestic officials’ policy decisions. The evolution of the FCPA, however, demonstrates that some statutes may require “international resonance” to be meaningfully enforced: a domestic statute can create pressure for national leaders to conclude an international agreement, and then that agreement provides the means for the national law to develop into a robust national policy. As this Article establishes, the OECD Convention owed its existence to the FCPA and, in turn, the FCPA owes much of its development and strength to the OECD Convention. A greater appreciation for international resonance’s feedback mechanisms is essential to understanding national enforcement of a wide range of transnational commercial, financial, and environmental statutes.
In Defense of the Secular Purpose Status Quo
The secular purpose rule, one prong of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, requires that government action be justified by a primary, genuine secular purpose. Government actions supported only by religious beliefs, therefore, are unconstitutional. A debate about the morality of the secular purpose rule has emerged, with the main arguments tending to view religious beliefs as either permissible or impermissible. This Note argues that rather than decide purely for or against the secular purpose rule, courts should maintain the current status quo, which is underenforcement of the rule.
To justify this approach to resolving the secular purpose debate, this Note analyzes common arguments made for and against the rule, and distills each argument to its core animating political value. The arguments against the secular purpose rule are motivated by the value of political access, while arguments for the secular purpose rule are motivated by the value of political legitimacy. Underenforcement creates equilibrium between these political values.
Some may worry that underenforcement will change the underlying meaning of the secular purpose rule. But a constitutional requirement can retain its full meaning and be legally binding even if underenforced. Another possible objection is that underenforcement would be tantamount to nonenforcement. To respond to that objection, this Note attempts to canalize underenforcement by marking out situations in which the secular purpose rule should be fully enforced. When, for example, underenforcement would allow discrimination against vulnerable groups, the secular purpose rule should be enforced.