Who speaks in federal court for the structural principles of the federal Constitution? Under familiar practice—endorsed by the Supreme Court in its 2011 decision Bond v. United States—it is not solely the institutions empowered directly by federalism or the separation of powers but also individual litigants who can raise structural constitutional objections. Such individual standing for the structural constitution is unusual because, in effect, it enables a species of third-party standing elsewhere condemned by the Court. This Article analyzes individual standing for the structural constitution from both doctrinal and political economy perspectives. Such individual standing, I contend, conflicts with Article III’s larger ambition to exclude from federal court those controversies with excessive externalities. Consideration of structural litigation’s political economy further shows that enlarging the pool of litigants by allowing individual as well as institutions to sue is unlikely to yield closer conformity to the Constitution given interest group dynamics. As an alternative to the current regime, the Article specifies a straitened regime of narrow justiciability that is more harmonious with Article III goals and more likely to secure fidelity to the structural constitution.
Issue 7
Making a Statement About Private Securities Litigation
In June 2011, the Supreme Court decided its latest case concerning the right of investors to sue for securities fraud under Rule 10b–5. The case, Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders, completes a trio of cases beginning in 1994 which severely limit the scope of this private cause of action. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court in Janus determined that only the entity with “ultimate authority” over a given statement can be its “maker” for purposes of Rule 10b–5. As a result, investors in mutual funds and arguably other securities are left with little remedy for fraud, a consequence that has drawn significant criticism to this decision.
Responding to such criticism, this Note examines the merits of the approaches taken in the majority and dissenting opinions, and argues that the case was decided correctly under an accurate construction of current securities laws. Next, this Note predicts that the Court’s ruling will be applied broadly, drastically limiting liability for corporate officers and management under Rule 10b–5.
Finally, this Note addresses potential measures of rectifying what is currently a lack of remedy for investors in securities. It then concludes by advocating that Congress expand the authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission to compensate defrauded investors for their losses.
Free Speech, Hate Speech, and the Hostile Speech Environment
Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to protect free speech rights, this Note proposes a new cause of action: the hostile speech environment claim. This claim is necessary to combat the continuing infringement of hate speakers’ First Amendment rights by public colleges and universities. After Part I reviews relevant case law to prove that hate speech is afforded First Amendment protection, Part II examines how and why public colleges and universities persist in regulating constitutionally protected hate speech. Part III explains and justifies the proposed hostile speech environment cause of action. Refuting the argument that hostile work environment law can support an analogous “hostile academic environment” claim against campus hate speakers, this Note draws the opposite inference: more protection of hate speech is needed if public universities are to abide by the First Amendment. Thus, this Note borrows from Title VII employment discrimination law to sketch the hostile speech environment claim. It consists of three elements: (1) severe or pervasive hostility (2) by the government (3) towards protected speech. Two strands of First Amendment law provide the claim’s constitutional foundation: the freedom of thought that inheres in the freedom of speech and the captive audience doctrine. Notably, nothing in its analytical mechanics restricts this new cause of action to higher education, which may lead some to argue that it opens the possibility for waves of First Amendment litigation against government speech and policy. Any such fear is illusory, however. The cause of action’s “severe or pervasive hostility” prong and the practical realities of other contexts—such as secondary education and the government workplace—make it unlikely that hostile speech environment claims could apply to other arenas.