Issue 6

Foreign regulators exert a powerful and deeply underestimated influence on American complex litigation. From the French Ministry of Health and the United Kingdom’s National Health Services, to the Japanese Fair Trade Commission and the European Commission, foreign agencies have participated in some of the most important cases in the last two decades. The intersections between American litigation and foreign regulation range from plaintiff discovery requests of documents produced by or to foreign regulators, to coattail class actions against multinationals triggered by enforcement penalties abroad, all the way to foreign agency letters submitted to U.S. courts expressing an interest in a case. Indeed, dozens upon dozens of the most important multidistrict cases in the country—covering over 100,000 claims—have been influenced by foreign regulatory documents or enforcement actions. In this manner, litigation is importing foreign regulatory zeal to the United States. Yet few American legal actors know that foreign regulation affects domestic cases and even judges are unsure whether this practice is appropriate.

This Article presents a systematic study of the new relationship between foreign regulation and American litigation. The cross-border spread of litigation ideas sits at the center of broader debates about complex litigation, the regulatory role of multidistrict litigation, the recent trend of litigation isolationism, and the expanding role of discovery. The Article argues that litigation can import and domesticate foreign regulations, allowing private litigants to audit the work of captured domestic agencies. For instance, litigators can measure the work of the FDA against health regulators in France, or the work of the FTC against regulators in Germany. Litigation can also push U.S. law to match foreign regulation, promoting a rough harmonization across borders, coherence, and convergence. While the litigation-led use of foreign regulation promises a wealth of benefits for U.S. law, it has not been sufficiently recognized, nudged forward, or appreciated. The Article thus seeks to provide a solid theoretical footing for the incorporation of foreign regulations and argues that an understanding of litigation-led globalization clarifies scholarly debates in a variety of literatures. After this analysis, the Article also argues that courts should invite American regulators to help them decide whether to welcome or reject this foreign influence.

Introduction

In 2015, hundreds of pregnant mothers sued the pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) in courts throughout the United States, alleging that the drug Zofran caused severe birth defects.¹ 1.In re Zofran (Ondansetron) Prods. Liab. Litig., 368 F. Supp. 3d 94, 98 (D. Mass. 2019).Show More After the cases were consolidated into a massive multidistrict litigation, GSK argued there was no evidence that the drug caused birth defects and that even the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) had repeatedly rejected that link.² 2.Id.Show More Lacking sufficient evidence and facing the prospect of an adverse summary judgment, the plaintiffs’ case looked weak. But their claims came to hinge on a new source of evidence—discovered documents that defendants had produced in the 1990s to the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare, including a series of animal studies showing potential birth defects that defendants had “performed specifically to satisfy Japanese regulatory requirements.”³ 3.Id. at 108 (internal quotation marks omitted).Show More The use of discovery to uncover these communications allowed plaintiffs to defeat a motion for summary judgment, pegging their case to the content and application of Japanese regulations.⁴ 4.Id. at 99.Show More

Switching to a different context, in a series of spring press releases in 2017, Mexican antitrust regulators announced an investigation into seven banks, including three U.S. entities, for “price fixing and collusion in the government bond intermediation market.”⁵ 5.In re Mexican Gov’t Bonds Antitrust Litig., 412 F. Supp. 3d 380, 383–84 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).Show More That announcement triggered a piggyback antitrust lawsuit in the United States against the three American banks: J.P. Morgan, Citibank, and Bank of America. All three defendants moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that plaintiffs’ complaint did not meet Twombly’s pleading standard because there was no plausible allegation of a conspiracy.⁶ 6.Id.at 387; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545–46 (2007); Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Joint Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim at 7–18, In re Mexican Gov’t Bonds, 412 F. Supp. 3d 380 (No. 1:18-cv-02830).Show More Plaintiffs, among other things, responded that the Mexican investigation—and all of its potential documents—were a “plus factor” that makes their allegations more plausible.⁷ 7.Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Joint Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Class Action Complaint for Failure to State a Claim at 18, In re Mexican Gov’t Bonds, 412 F. Supp. 3d 380 (No. 1:18-cv-02830).Show More Due to settlement negotiations and dismissal on other grounds, Judge Oetken ultimately did not decide whether the existence of a foreign investigation can nudge a plaintiff’s claims beyond the plausibility requirement.⁸ 8.In re Mexican Gov’t Bonds Antitrust Litig., No. 18-cv-2830, 2020 WL 7046837, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2020) (granting motion to dismiss on other grounds); In re Mexican Gov’t Bonds Antitrust Litig., No. 18-cv-02830, 2020 WL 7398747, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2020) (approving proposed settlement).Show More

In re Zofran and In re Mexican Government Bonds are just two of thousands of claims in the United States that have been heavily shaped by foreign regulations.⁹ 9.See infra Part I.Show More Indeed, foreign regulators have come to exert a powerful and underestimated influence on American litigation. From the French Ministry of Health and the United Kingdom’s National Health Service, to the Japanese Fair Trade Commission and the European Commission, foreign agencies have shaped some of the most important cases in the last decade, ranging from antitrust claims, technology and privacy class actions, all the way to mass torts litigation.¹⁰ 10.See In re Davol, Inc./C.R. Bard, Inc., Polypropylene Hernia Mesh Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:18-md-2846, 2019 WL 341909, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2019) (National Health Services); Eve v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., No. 98-1429, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4531, at *71 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 7, 2001) (French Health Ministry); Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Their Motions to Compel re: RFP No. 33 and Interrogatory No. 35 at 1, In re Capacitors Antitrust Litig., 106 F. Supp. 3d 1051 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2014) (No. 3:14-cv-03264) (Japanese and Korean Fair Trade Commissions); Special Master’s Order Denying Motion of Direct Purchaser Class Plaintiffs to Compel Hitachi to Produce Foreign Regulatory Documents at 4, In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2011) (No. 3:07-md-01827) (European Commission).Show More The intersections between American litigation and foreign regulation include American discovery of documents produced to foreign regulators, coattail U.S. class actions against multinationals triggered by enforcement penalties abroad, and foreign agency letters submitted to U.S. district courts expressing an interest in a pending case.¹¹ 11.See infra Part I.Show More Sometimes the relationship is more informal—American litigators draw on foreign case theories, strategies, and findings.

In this manner, litigation is discreetly importing foreign regulatory zeal to the United States. Yet few American legal actors know that foreign regulation is impacting American cases, and even judges are unsure whether this practice is appropriate.

This Article presents the first systematic study of the relationship between foreign regulation and American litigation. It lays out the wide array of intersections between these two legal institutions, showing that this is an important, extensive, and understudied phenomenon. Scholars have long debated the role of foreign law in a handful of U.S. cases dealing with the alien tort statute, constitutional interpretation, or sovereign immunity, among others.¹² 12.See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005) (constitutional interpretation); Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 Va. J. Int’l L. 251, 253–54 (2006) (one hundred foreign-cubed securities suits); Cortelyou C. Kenney, Measuring Transnational Human Rights, 84 Fordham L. Rev. 1053, 1060 (2015) (sovereign immunity).Show More But the literature has mostly overlooked how thousands of domestic law claims rely extensively on foreign regulations.

More generally, the dominant view within the judiciary, led by the Supreme Court, has switched to skepticism of foreign law and foreign cases in U.S. courts.¹³ 13.See, e.g., Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1869 (2018) (declining to grant “conclusive effect” to a foreign government’s interpretation of its own law); Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 628–29 (7th Cir. 2010); Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 1081, 1084–85 (2015); David J. Seipp, Our Law, Their Law, History, and the Citation of Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1417, 1417 (2006); cf.Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013) (declining to apply the Alien Tort Statute extraterritorially). See alsoMaggie Gardner, “Foreignness”, 69 DePaul L. Rev. 469 (2020) (exploring what counts as a “foreign” case).Show More And this view often transcends partisan lines. Addressing questions about the potential approval of a coronavirus vaccine in the United Kingdom, Speaker Pelosi recently argued that Americans could not rely on foreign regulators who were not “on par” with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration:

We have very stringent rules about the Food and Drug Administration here about clinical trials, timing, number of people etc[.], so that when a drug is approved by the FDA that it’s safe and efficacious, then it has the trust of the American people. . . . My concern is that the UK’s system for that kind of judgment is not on par with ours. So if Boris Johnson decides he’s going to approve a drug and this president embraces that, that’s the concern I have.¹⁴ 14.Peter Beaumont & Sarah Boseley, US Won’t Rely on UK for Covid Vaccine Safety Tests, Says Nancy Pelosi, Guardian (Oct. 9, 2020, 1:28 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/oct/09/us-wont-rely-on-uk-for-covid-vaccine-safety-tests-says-nancy-pelosi [https://perma.cc/LQ3M-HRBZ] (emphasis added).Show More

Yet, despite this aversion to the importation of foreign law, American litigants routinely rely on foreign regulations to shape thousands of claims every year—even when foreign regulators disagree with U.S. regulators.¹⁵ 15.See, e.g., Bodum, 621 F.3d at 628, 630–31.Show More This Article highlights the hidden but powerful role that foreign regulations have occupied in complex litigation, a fact which should inform assumptions in an array of related literatures.¹⁶ 16.See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 74–75 (2000) (suggesting that U.S. businesses’ wariness to EU regulation is partially rooted in “businesses’ experience with U.S. legal culture”); David P. Graham & Jacqueline M. Moen, Discovery of Regulatory Information for Use in Private Products Liability Litigation: Getting Past the Road Blocks, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 653, 655 (2000) (discussing cross-border discovery).Show More

Part I of the Article begins by outlining three major channels through which foreign regulation is creeping into complex litigation cases. One common channel involves cases with American plaintiffs against multinational defendants in which plaintiffs request in discovery any documents that defendant produced to or received from foreign regulators. The kicker is that often, plaintiffs are interested in these documents because some foreign regulators impose higher burdens of production than domestic ones. In this manner, plaintiffs can take advantage of more burdensome safety and efficacy requirements imposed by, say, France or Japan. These cases cover dozens of the most important multidistrict litigation suits (“MDL”), including hundreds of thousands of products liability claims over faulty blood filters,¹⁷ 17.In re Bard IVC Filters Prods. Liab. Litig., 2020 WL 1166224, at *1–2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 6, 2020).Show More anti-psychotic medications linked to diabetes,¹⁸ 18.In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 447 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2006).Show More contraceptives,¹⁹ 19.In re Yasmin & YAZ (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100, 2011 WL 6733952, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2011).Show More a drug that allegedly caused birth defects,²⁰ 20.In re Zofran (Ondansetron) Prods. Liab. Litig., 368 F. Supp. 3d 94, 94–95, 107–08 (D. Mass. 2019).Show More surgical mesh products,²¹ 21.In re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prod. Liab. Litig., 299 F.R.D. 502, 509 (S.D. W. Va. 2014).Show More talcum powder,²² 22.In re Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Prods., Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:16-md-02738, 2017 WL 5196741, at *1–2 (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 2017).Show More and a blood anticoagulant.²³ 23.In re Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Prods. Liab. Litig., 65 F. Supp. 3d 1402, 1404 (J.P.M.L. 2014).Show More Importantly, through discovery in these cases, plaintiffs benefit from foreign regulations that exceed FDA requirements and effectively subject defendants to foreign regulations in U.S. courts.²⁴ 24.This phenomenon is the reverse of cases in which foreign litigants seek to use our broad discovery system in aid of foreign cases. SeeYanbai Andrea Wang, Exporting American Discovery, 87 U. Chi. L. Rev. 2089, 2092–93 (2020).Show More

Section I.B outlines a second channel involving American plaintiffs riding on the coattails of foreign agency findings or enforcement. These cases arise when agencies in countries like France or Germany either file successful claims in their own courts against multinationals or publicize the results of a new investigation or study. These public filings prompt American plaintiffs to file analogous claims in the United States under domestic law, transforming foreign regulatory actions into U.S. litigation.²⁵ 25.It is worth noting that claims filed in the United States that do involve foreign law often become entangled with foreign regulatory agencies. See, e.g.,Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 246 (2004).Show More For instance, a 2015 World Health Organization study, which found that glyphosate was likely a human carcinogen, triggered a massive and ongoing case against Monsanto over the glyphosate-based weed killer Roundup.²⁶ 26.See Complaint at 2, 11–12, Hardeman v. Monsanto Co., 216 F. Supp. 3d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (No. 4:16-cv-00525), 2016 WL 11574934.Show More This WHO study was not only the spark for the case, but it has also shaped the entire path of the litigation, including complaints, media coverage, discovery, trial, and an ongoing battle of foreign regulators, in which both plaintiffs and defendant have submitted studies and evidence on foreign regulatory findings from dozens of countries.²⁷ 27.Indeed, in the midst of these cases, dozens of foreign regulators have banned glyphosate. See Where Is Glysophate Banned?, Baum Hedlund Aristei & Goldman PC, https://www.baumhedlundlaw.com/toxic-tort-law/monsanto-roundup-lawsuit/where-is-glyphosate-banned-/ [https://perma.cc/XFA4-HG2T] (last visited July 18, 2020).Show More Similarly, plaintiffs have filed an array of cases against tech companies over privacy violations, citing European data protection laws and enforcement actions. These privacy related claims may represent what one survey of general counsels calls “the next wave of class actions.”²⁸ 28.2019 Carlton Fields Class Action Survey: Best Practices in Reducing Cost and Managing Risk in Class Action Litigation 4 (2019).Show More These cases present a remarkable expansion of foreign regulatory influence on American litigation.²⁹ 29.See infra Parts I & II.Show More

The final channel discussed in Section I.C. is when foreign regulators file letters of interest in ongoing cases, primarily in the antitrust context. These cases also involve discovery of documents produced to foreign antitrust regulators. But, unlike the cases above, a foreign agency then files a letter with U.S. courts objecting to the alleged violation of sovereignty and requesting that the information be kept confidential. For instance, just in the past decade, plaintiffs have filed class action claims alleging price-fixing by multinational corporations in an array of industries like vitamins,³⁰ 30.Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1867 (2018).Show More air freight,³¹ 31.In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. 06-md-1175, 2014 WL 7882100, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2014).Show More metals,³² 32.In re Capacitors Antitrust Litig., 106 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2015).Show More credit cards,³³ 33.In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 207, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).Show More and TV panels.³⁴ 34.In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1183 (N.D. Cal. 2009).Show More These cases prompted the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the European Commission, the Korea Fair Trade Commission, and the Japanese Fair Trade Commission to write letters arguing that the disclosure of documents would weaken their antitrust laws.³⁵ 35.See infra notes 165, 169, 171 and accompanying text. This phenomenon represents one of myriad challenges posed by globalizing markets and the proliferation of antitrust law worldwide. SeeF. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004).Show More In this manner, foreign regulators influence American law. ³⁶ 36.There is an older literature on the reverse phenomenon—the application of U.S. antitrust law abroad. SeeJonathan T. Schmidt, Note, Keeping U.S. Courts Open to Foreign Antitrust Plaintiffs: A Hybrid Approach to the Effective Deterrence of International Cartels, 31 Yale J. Int’l L. 211, 221–22 (2006); Wolfgang Wurmnest, Foreign Private Plaintiffs, Global Conspiracies, and the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law, 28 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 205 (2005).Show More

These three channels show how U.S. litigants are taking advantage of foreign regulations to shape cases in U.S. courts. Most of the time it is plaintiffs that seek foreign input to counter the strategy of multinational companies that selectively reveal information to some regulators but not others. But defendants can also present foreign regulatory approvals as exculpatory, pushing against liability in U.S. court. On the whole, U.S. litigants are importing regulatory information and not necessarily legal standards. But this information is only generated due to different legal requirements and is inevitably tied to a set of foreign institutions set up to produce and enforce law. This interaction is therefore not solely epistemic. As I argue below, foreign regulatory information can have a substantive effect on U.S. law.

After documenting these channels, Part II of the Article explores the consequences of this litigation and foreign regulation interaction, with specific focus on the role of foreign law in U.S. court, multidistrict litigation, regulatory harmonization, and the so-called Brussels Effect. Scholars and courts have long wrestled with the influence of foreign law on American litigation,³⁷ 37.Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 109, 116–24 (2005); Daniel J. Frank, Note, Constitutional Interpretation Revisited: The Effects of a Delicate Supreme Court Balance on the Inclusion of Foreign Law in American Jurisprudence, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 1037, 1064–69 (2007). For broader debates about foreign law in U.S. litigation, see, e.g., Jenny S. Martinez, Who’s Afraid of International and Foreign Law?, 104 Calif. L. Rev. 1579 (2016) [hereinafter, Martinez, Who’s Afraid?]; Ganesh Sitaraman, The Use and Abuse of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 653 (2009). In the most closely related work to date, David Noll argued that U.S. courts have promoted a policy whereby “U.S. regulatory systems are disabled in favor of regulation by other legal systems.” David L. Noll, The New Conflicts Law, 2 Stan. J. Complex Litig. 41, 44 (2014) [hereinafter Noll, Conflicts]. In this Article, however, I highlight how lower courts have allowed foreign regulation to complement domestic private enforcement.Show More and the rise of cross-border agency networks that promote regulatory convergence.³⁸ 38.Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1155, 1224–25 (2007); Eric C. Chaffee, The Internationalization of Securities Regulation: The United States Government’s Role in Regulating the Global Capital Markets, 5 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 187, 193–95 (2010).Show More But these debates have not considered the ways in which American litigation can import foreign regulation. The Article argues that while this phenomenon promises a wealth of benefits for U.S. institutions, it has not been sufficiently recognized, appreciated, or nudged forward. The Article argues that litigation-led globalization clarifies debates in three areas:

In Section II.A, the Article provides a normative appraisal, arguing that litigation can borrow foreign regulatory information, a process that promises benefits and corrects the conventional wisdom about foreign law in U.S. courts.³⁹ 39.See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 37, 116–18; Stephen C. Yeazell, When and How U.S. Courts Should Cite Foreign Law, 26 Const. Comment. 59, 67 (2009) [hereinafter Yeazell, Foreign Law]; Eugene Volokh, Foreign Law in American Courts, 66 Okla. L. Rev. 219, 227 (2014). The Article contributes to a literature examining the relationship between foreign and domestic regulation. See, e.g., Jason Marisam, The Internationalization of Agency Actions, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 1909 (2015); Buxbaum, supra note 12.Show More One benefit is that private claims that draw on foreign regulators can serve as a “failsafe” when domestic regulators are captured. In that sense, this kind of litigation can improve and audit (or replace) the work of domestic regulators. For instance, litigators can measure the work of the FDA against health regulators in France, or the work of the FTC against regulators in Europe. This failsafe role is particularly important given that research shows the staggering amount of lobbying that takes place in the United States as compared to some European countries.⁴⁰ 40.Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World 251 (2019) [hereinafter Bradford, Brussels Effect Book].Show More Moreover, these cases can also allow domestic regulators to draw on foreign expertise and improve domestic rules. For instance, in In re Zofran—involving agencies in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan—the judge personally submitted a comment to the FDA disclosing the facts of the case and urging the FDA to engage in rule-making “as expeditiously as possible.”⁴¹ 41.Letter from F. Dennis Saylor, IV, C.J. D. Mass., to Stacy Cline Amin, Chief Counsel, FDA (Dec. 13, 2019).Show More The use of foreign regulations to inform both tort liability and rulemaking exemplifies how litigation can domesticate the fruits of foreign regulations.

A sustained focus on litigation as an agent of globalization also highlights the understudied interaction between multidistrict litigation and foreign law.⁴² 42.The one explicit comment about this phenomenon notes that evidentiary rulings usually exclude foreign regulatory evidence but fails to recognize that earlier discovery rulings typically allow it. SeeMark Herrmann & David B. Alden,Drug & Device Product Liability Litigation Strategy 383 (2012).Show More The federal multidistrict statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, allows a panel of federal judges to consolidate thousands of related cases.⁴³ 43.28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018); see, e.g., Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, 129 Yale L.J. 2, 7 (2019) (discussing the literature) [hereinafter Engstrom, Lone Pine].Show More Most of the literature has focused on the domestic impact of this consolidation.⁴⁴ 44.See Engstrom, Lone Pine, supra note 43; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 La. L. Rev. 399 (2014); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Judicial Adjuncts in Multidistrict Litigation, 120 Colum. L. Rev. 2129 (2020); Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1165 (2018).Show More But it appears that foreign regulations have been at the core of some of the most important multidistrict litigation cases in the past decade, raising questions about the inner workings of MDLs and discovery. By uncovering and breaking down this process, the Article urges scholars to further explore the interaction between MDLs and foreign law.⁴⁵ 45.For samples of the existing literature on this relationship, see, e.g., Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1081 (2010).Show More

Section II.B of the Article then shows that litigation can be a surprising vehicle for regulatory harmonization, borrowing from and contributing to a literature on global administrative law.⁴⁶ 46.See generallyDaniel W. Drezner, Globalization, Harmonization, and Competition: The Different Pathways to Policy Convergence, 12 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y 841 (2005) (considering the role of agencies in enhancing international regulatory harmonization); Beth Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation, in Dynamics of Regulatory Change: How Globalization Affects National Regulatory Policies 42, 50–52 (David Vogel & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2004) (outlining challenges in regulating international capital markets); Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 735 (2014) [hereinafter Galbraith & Zaring, Soft Law] (recharacterizing “soft law” as the intersection of administrative and foreign relations law); Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International Law, 49 Harv. Int’l L.J. 323 (2008) (discussing the role of bureaucracies in shaping international treaty law); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 Stan. J. Int’l L. 283 (2004) (arguing that international cooperation enhances, rather than diminishes, state sovereignty); Lawrence L.C. Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening International Banking Supervision, 39 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 (1998) (recounting international movements against financial regulation and considering novel sources of international governance).Show More Recent works have explored the ways in which regulators develop transnational links that translate into common domestic regulatory agendas.⁴⁷ 47.See generallyBradford, Brussels Effect Book, supra note 40 (chronicling this phenomenon).Show More This is especially true during global events like the 2008 financial crisis, in which the Federal Reserve coordinated its response with European agencies.⁴⁸ 48.SeeGalbraith & Zaring, Soft Law, supra note 46, at 737.Show More But this Article argues that, because U.S. litigation often assumes the role of regulation, we should also expect litigation to serve as a vehicle of regulatory harmonization.⁴⁹ 49.See infra Subsection II.B.1.Show More And, as I show below, litigation may already be playing that role.⁵⁰ 50.See infra Subsection II.B.2.Show More

This litigation-led harmonization also challenges traditional views about U.S. adversarial legalism, as compared to European bureaucratic legalism.⁵¹ 51.See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law 3–4 (2001); Sean Farhang, The Litigation State: Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the U.S. (2010); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1975).Show More While much has been made of the differences between ex post private enforcement and ex ante regulation, the cases discussed here show that there can be substantial overlap and dialogue between the two systems.⁵² 52.See infra Subsection II.A.2.Show More This straightforward finding may have implications for political theory and congressional choices.

Finally, Section II.C. joins a growing scholarly literature that aims to rethink the scope of global, cross-border regulation, with specific focus on the so-called Brussels Effect.⁵³ 53.See generally Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 51–52 (2012) [hereinafter Bradford, Brussels Effect Article] (arguing that the European Union has exercised an outsize influence on global regulatory agendas by effectively exporting EU regulation to the rest of the world); Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1966 (2013) (arguing that Internet law has emerged as an area of significant cross-border regulation); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 903 (1998) (arguing in favor of international regulatory competition in securities law); Carla L. Reyes, Note, The U.S. Discovery-EU Privacy Directive Conflict: Constructing a Three-Tiered Compliance Strategy, 19 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 357 (2009) (discussing the challenges of incongruent regulatory schemes governing discovery in transnational litigation between U.S. and EU litigants).Show More Some recent works argue that the European Union successfully exports its regulations to the rest of the world in a variety of ways.⁵⁴ 54.Bradford, Brussels Effect Article, supra note 53, at 5–6.Show More While that literature sets private litigation aside, this Article shows that the Brussels Effect may be both larger and narrower than previously understood. On the one hand, when litigants request documents produced to European regulators, including in data protection cases, those regulators are de facto exporting their agendas to the American legal system. This influence strengthens the scope and impact of the Brussels Effect. On the other hand, perhaps a better way to view this phenomenon is that American courts and litigants are voluntarily importing foreign regulations through complex litigation, giving judges and litigants a large role in determining the reach of the Brussels Effect.

Foreign regulations, in short, can have an array of legal, economic, and political effects on U.S. law and institutions. This sustained focus on foreign regulations is timely. The weakening of multilateralism and the U.S. administrative state calls for new avenues of cross-border legal interaction.⁵⁵ 55.These developments have prompted a substantial body of literature that has called for such interaction in a variety of contexts. See, e.g.,Harold James, International Order after the Financial Crisis, 1 Penn. St. J.L. & Int’l Affs. 275, 283–84 (2012) (calling for cross-border collaboration in the economic regulation context); Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 Geo. L.J. 115, 179 (2017) (calling for cross-border collaboration in the data privacy context).Show More The Article demonstrates the power and promise of litigation-led harmonization.

After analyzing the implications of litigation as a tool for importing foreign regulation, Part III of the Article focuses on prescriptions, arguing that courts should invite domestic agencies to submit letters in these cases. Much of the literature frames the influence of foreign law on American courts as an either-or phenomenon: the internationalists encourage U.S. courts to use foreign law,⁵⁶ 56.See Martinez, Who’s Afraid?, supra note 37, at 1583; Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1824, 1824 (1998).Show More while the nationalists decry the legitimacy of such an exercise.⁵⁷ 57.See, e.g.,Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1557, 1560 (2003).Show More But this has always been, and continues to be, a false dichotomy in the context of litigation. We cannot decide ex ante that it is universally proper or improper to draw on foreign regulations. Rather, we should create better procedures to channel and control foreign regulatory input. The Article argues that domestic agencies can help courts understand—through the submission of letters or amicus briefs—the use and implications of foreign regulations in litigation.

Lastly, a word about this Article’s methodology is appropriate. I draw unique insights here from an in-depth examination of hundreds of MDL cases, dozens of foreign regulatory enforcement actions, a review of legal documents citing foreign regulation or regulators, and unstructured correspondence and interviews with plaintiffs’ attorneys who appeared in the relevant cases. The Article further explains the specific methods applied in each section below.

The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the three channels of interaction between U.S. litigation and foreign regulation. Part II argues that these interactions have a wide array of effects on U.S. law, courts, and institutions. Finally, Part III argues that courts should invite domestic agency input in these cases.

1. * Assistant Professor, Stanford Law School. For thoughtful comments and conversations, I thank Aaron Simowitz, Pam Bookman, Anu Bradford, Adam Chilton, John Coyle, William Dodge, Robin Effron, Seth Endo, Brian Fitzpatrick, Nora Freeman Engstrom, Maggie Gardner, Manuel Gomez, Andrew Hammond, Chimene Keitner, Amalia Kessler, Richard Marcus, Doug Melamed, Saul Levmore, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Aaron Simowitz, Yanbai Andrea Wang, Rebecca Wexler, and participants at the Berkeley Faculty Workshop, the Private International Law Workshop in U.C. Davis, the AALS Conflicts of Law Panel, and the Criser Distinguished Lecture Series at the University of Florida Levin College of Law. I am most grateful to Brian Erickson for invaluable research assistance, and I also thank Chris Meyer, Sam Telzak, and Mackenzie Austin. ↑
2. In re Zofran (Ondansetron) Prods. Liab. Litig., 368 F. Supp. 3d 94, 98 (D. Mass. 2019). ↑
3. Id. ↑
4. Id. at 108 (internal quotation marks omitted). ↑
5. Id. at 99. ↑
6. In re Mexican Gov’t Bonds Antitrust Litig., 412 F. Supp. 3d 380, 383–84 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). ↑
7. Id. at 387; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545–46 (2007); Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Joint Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim at 7–18, In re Mexican Gov’t Bonds, 412 F. Supp. 3d 380 (No. 1:18-cv-02830). ↑
8. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Joint Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Class Action Complaint for Failure to State a Claim at 18, In re Mexican Gov’t Bonds, 412 F. Supp. 3d 380 (No. 1:18-cv-02830). ↑
9. In re Mexican Gov’t Bonds Antitrust Litig., No. 18-cv-2830, 2020 WL 7046837, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2020) (granting motion to dismiss on other grounds); In re Mexican Gov’t Bonds Antitrust Litig., No. 18-cv-02830, 2020 WL 7398747, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2020) (approving proposed settlement). ↑
10. See infra Part I. ↑
11. See In re Davol, Inc./C.R. Bard, Inc., Polypropylene Hernia Mesh Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:18-md-2846, 2019 WL 341909, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2019) (National Health Services); Eve v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., No. 98-1429, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4531, at *71 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 7, 2001) (French Health Ministry); Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Their Motions to Compel re: RFP No. 33 and Interrogatory No. 35 at 1, In re Capacitors Antitrust Litig., 106 F. Supp. 3d 1051 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2014) (No. 3:14-cv-03264) (Japanese and Korean Fair Trade Commissions); Special Master’s Order Denying Motion of Direct Purchaser Class Plaintiffs to Compel Hitachi to Produce Foreign Regulatory Documents at 4, In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2011) (No. 3:07-md-01827) (European Commission). ↑
12. See infra Part I. ↑
13. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005) (constitutional interpretation); Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 Va. J. Int’l L. 251, 253–54 (2006) (one hundred foreign-cubed securities suits); Cortelyou C. Kenney, Measuring Transnational Human Rights, 84 Fordham L. Rev. 1053, 1060 (2015) (sovereign immunity). ↑
14. See, e.g., Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1869 (2018) (declining to grant “conclusive effect” to a foreign government’s interpretation of its own law); Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 628–29 (7th Cir. 2010); Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 1081, 1084–85 (2015); David J. Seipp, Our Law, Their Law, History, and the Citation of Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1417, 1417 (2006); cf. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013) (declining to apply the Alien Tort Statute extraterritorially). See also Maggie Gardner, “Foreignness”, 69 DePaul L. Rev. 469 (2020) (exploring what counts as a “foreign” case). ↑
15. Peter Beaumont & Sarah Boseley, US Won’t Rely on UK for Covid Vaccine Safety Tests, Says Nancy Pelosi, Guardian (Oct. 9, 2020, 1:28 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/oct/09/us-wont-rely-on-uk-for-covid-vaccine-safety-tests-says-nancy-pelosi [https://perma.cc/LQ3M-HRBZ] (emphasis added). ↑
16. See, e.g., Bodum, 621 F.3d at 628, 630–31. ↑
17. See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 74–75 (2000) (suggesting that U.S. businesses’ wariness to EU regulation is partially rooted in “businesses’ experience with U.S. legal culture”); David P. Graham & Jacqueline M. Moen, Discovery of Regulatory Information for Use in Private Products Liability Litigation: Getting Past the Road Blocks, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 653, 655 (2000) (discussing cross-border discovery). ↑
18. In re Bard IVC Filters Prods. Liab. Litig., 2020 WL 1166224, at *1–2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 6, 2020). ↑
19. In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 447 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2006). ↑
20. In re Yasmin & YAZ (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100, 2011 WL 6733952, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2011). ↑
21. In re Zofran (Ondansetron) Prods. Liab. Litig., 368 F. Supp. 3d 94, 94–95, 107–08 (D. Mass. 2019). ↑
22. In re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prod. Liab. Litig., 299 F.R.D. 502, 509 (S.D. W. Va. 2014). ↑
23. In re Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Prods., Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:16-md-02738, 2017 WL 5196741, at *1–2 (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 2017). ↑
24. In re Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Prods. Liab. Litig., 65 F. Supp. 3d 1402, 1404 (J.P.M.L. 2014). ↑
25. This phenomenon is the reverse of cases in which foreign litigants seek to use our broad discovery system in aid of foreign cases. See Yanbai Andrea Wang, Exporting American Discovery, 87 U. Chi. L. Rev. 2089, 2092–93 (2020). ↑
26. It is worth noting that claims filed in the United States that do involve foreign law often become entangled with foreign regulatory agencies. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 246 (2004). ↑
27. See Complaint at 2, 11–12, Hardeman v. Monsanto Co., 216 F. Supp. 3d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (No. 4:16-cv-00525), 2016 WL 11574934. ↑
28. Indeed, in the midst of these cases, dozens of foreign regulators have banned glyphosate. See Where Is Glysophate Banned?, Baum Hedlund Aristei & Goldman PC, https://www.baumhedlundlaw.com/toxic-tort-law/monsanto-roundup-lawsuit/where-is-glyphosate-banned-/ [https://perma.cc/XFA4-HG2T] (last visited July 18, 2020). ↑
29. 2019 Carlton Fields Class Action Survey: Best Practices in Reducing Cost and Managing Risk in Class Action Litigation 4 (2019). ↑
30. See infra Parts I & II. ↑
31. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1867 (2018). ↑
32. In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. 06-md-1175, 2014 WL 7882100, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2014). ↑
33. In re Capacitors Antitrust Litig., 106 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2015). ↑
34. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 207, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). ↑
35. In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1183 (N.D. Cal. 2009). ↑
36. See infra notes 165, 169, 171 and accompanying text. This phenomenon represents one of myriad challenges posed by globalizing markets and the proliferation of antitrust law worldwide. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004). ↑
37. There is an older literature on the reverse phenomenon—the application of U.S. antitrust law abroad. See Jonathan T. Schmidt, Note, Keeping U.S. Courts Open to Foreign Antitrust Plaintiffs: A Hybrid Approach to the Effective Deterrence of International Cartels, 31 Yale J. Int’l L. 211, 221–22 (2006); Wolfgang Wurmnest, Foreign Private Plaintiffs, Global Conspiracies, and the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law, 28 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 205 (2005). ↑
38. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 109, 116–24 (2005); Daniel J. Frank, Note, Constitutional Interpretation Revisited: The Effects of a Delicate Supreme Court Balance on the Inclusion of Foreign Law in American Jurisprudence, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 1037, 1064–69 (2007). For broader debates about foreign law in U.S. litigation, see, e.g., Jenny S. Martinez, Who’s Afraid of International and Foreign Law?, 104 Calif. L. Rev. 1579 (2016) [hereinafter, Martinez, Who’s Afraid?]; Ganesh Sitaraman, The Use and Abuse of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 653 (2009). In the most closely related work to date, David Noll argued that U.S. courts have promoted a policy whereby “U.S. regulatory systems are disabled in favor of regulation by other legal systems.” David L. Noll, The New Conflicts Law, 2 Stan. J. Complex Litig. 41, 44 (2014) [hereinafter Noll, Conflicts]. In this Article, however, I highlight how lower courts have allowed foreign regulation to complement domestic private enforcement. ↑
39. Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1155, 1224–25 (2007); Eric C. Chaffee, The Internationalization of Securities Regulation: The United States Government’s Role in Regulating the Global Capital Markets, 5 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 187, 193–95 (2010). ↑
40. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 37, 116–18; Stephen C. Yeazell, When and How U.S. Courts Should Cite Foreign Law, 26 Const. Comment. 59, 67 (2009) [hereinafter Yeazell, Foreign Law]; Eugene Volokh, Foreign Law in American Courts, 66 Okla. L. Rev. 219, 227 (2014). The Article contributes to a literature examining the relationship between foreign and domestic regulation. See, e.g., Jason Marisam, The Internationalization of Agency Actions, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 1909 (2015); Buxbaum, supra note 12. ↑
41. Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World 251 (2019) [hereinafter Bradford, Brussels Effect Book]. ↑
42. Letter from F. Dennis Saylor, IV, C.J. D. Mass., to Stacy Cline Amin, Chief Counsel, FDA (Dec. 13, 2019). ↑
43. The one explicit comment about this phenomenon notes that evidentiary rulings usually exclude foreign regulatory evidence but fails to recognize that earlier discovery rulings typically allow it. See Mark Herrmann & David B. Alden, Drug & Device Product Liability Litigation Strategy 383 (2012). ↑
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018); see, e.g., Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, 129 Yale L.J. 2, 7 (2019) (discussing the literature) [hereinafter Engstrom, Lone Pine]. ↑
45. See Engstrom, Lone Pine, supra note 43; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 La. L. Rev. 399 (2014); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Judicial Adjuncts in Multidistrict Litigation, 120 Colum. L. Rev. 2129 (2020); Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1165 (2018). ↑
46. For samples of the existing literature on this relationship, see, e.g., Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1081 (2010). ↑
47. See generally Daniel W. Drezner, Globalization, Harmonization, and Competition: The Different Pathways to Policy Convergence, 12 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y 841 (2005) (considering the role of agencies in enhancing international regulatory harmonization); Beth Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation, in Dynamics of Regulatory Change: How Globalization Affects National Regulatory Policies 42, 50–52 (David Vogel & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2004) (outlining challenges in regulating international capital markets); Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 735 (2014) [hereinafter Galbraith & Zaring, Soft Law] (recharacterizing “soft law” as the intersection of administrative and foreign relations law); Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International Law, 49 Harv. Int’l L.J. 323 (2008) (discussing the role of bureaucracies in shaping international treaty law); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 Stan. J. Int’l L. 283 (2004) (arguing that international cooperation enhances, rather than diminishes, state sovereignty); Lawrence L.C. Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening International Banking Supervision, 39 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 (1998) (recounting international movements against financial regulation and considering novel sources of international governance). ↑
48. See generally Bradford, Brussels Effect Book, supra note 40 (chronicling this phenomenon). ↑
49. See Galbraith & Zaring, Soft Law, supra note 46, at 737. ↑
50. See infra Subsection II.B.1. ↑
51. See infra Subsection II.B.2. ↑
52. See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law 3–4 (2001); Sean Farhang, The Litigation State: Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the U.S. (2010); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1975). ↑
53. See infra Subsection II.A.2. ↑
54. See generally Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev.
    

    1,

    51–52 (2012) [hereinafter Bradford, Brussels Effect Article] (arguing that the European Union has exercised an outsize influence on global regulatory agendas by effectively exporting EU regulation to the rest of the world); Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1966 (2013) (arguing that Internet law has emerged as an area of significant cross-border regulation); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 903 (1998) (arguing in favor of international regulatory competition in securities law); Carla L. Reyes, Note, The U.S. Discovery-EU Privacy Directive Conflict: Constructing a Three-Tiered Compliance Strategy, 19 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 357 (2009) (discussing the challenges of incongruent regulatory schemes governing discovery in transnational litigation between U.S. and EU litigants). ↑

55. Bradford, Brussels Effect Article, supra note 53, at 5–6. ↑
56. These developments have prompted a substantial body of literature that has called for such interaction in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Harold James, International Order after the Financial Crisis, 1 Penn. St. J.L. & Int’l Affs. 275, 283–84 (2012) (calling for cross-border collaboration in the economic regulation context); Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 Geo. L.J. 115, 179 (2017) (calling for cross-border collaboration in the data privacy context). ↑
57. See Martinez, Who’s Afraid?, supra note 37, at 1583; Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1824, 1824 (1998). ↑
58. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1557, 1560 (2003). ↑
59. Volokh, supra note 39, at 224. ↑
60. See Bradford, Brussels Effect Article, supra note 53, at 3
    

    –

    4. ↑

61. See supra note 37. ↑
62. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 2 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 1971); Yeazell, supra note 39, at 60–61; Volokh, supra note 39, at 227–31; Noll, Conflicts, supra note 37. ↑
63. See, e.g., In re Tylenol (Acetaminophen) Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., 181 F. Supp. 3d 278, 306–07 (E.D. Pa. 2016); In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1318–19 (M.D. Fla. 2009). ↑
64. Diego Zambrano, A Comity of Errors: The Rise, Fall, and Return of International Comity in Transnational Discovery, 34 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 157, 198–99 (2016) [hereinafter Zambrano, Comity]. See also Wang, supra note 24, at 2154–55 (calling for cross-border information sharing). Much of this may also be influenced by the specifics of e-discovery which makes it easier to access information stored abroad. Cf. Seth Katsuya Endo, Discovery Hydraulics, 52 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1317 (2019) (discussing the unexpected consequences of e-discovery). ↑
65. See Zambrano, Comity, supra note 63, at 167 (citing First City, Tex.-Hous., N.A. v. Rafidain Bank, 281 F.3d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 2002)). ↑
66. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). ↑
67. Id. ↑
68. Zambrano, Comity, supra note 63, at 164–65. ↑
69. Others have noted that this area of law involves constant procedural experimentation. See, e.g., Engstrom, Lone Pine, supra note 43, at 9–10; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Nudges and Norms in Multidistrict Litigation: A Response to Engstrom, Yale L.J.F. 64, 67 (2019), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/nudges-and-norms-in-multidistrict-litigation [https://perma.cc/TNJ7-53EL]. ↑
70. State tort law provides an interesting and useful avenue for “fraud-on-the-FDA” claims that would normally be preempted. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001). ↑
71. See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 751, 810 (2003). ↑
72. Of course, there is a distinction between information generated internally by the company and information generated only to satisfy foreign regulatory requirements. For information that exists regardless of foreign regulation, the policy question discussed in Part II is whether (i) we welcome any information that increases the likelihood that courts will make fully informed decisions or (ii) mindful of the costs and benefits of such laws, we want to confine litigation to that which can be sustained by the ingenuity of the plaintiffs themselves, even at the expense of reducing punishment for bad acts. I thank Doug Melamed for some of the details here. ↑
73. Hardy v. Pharmacia Corp., No. 4:09-cv-119, 2011 WL 2118983, at *3 (M.D. Ga. May 27, 2011). ↑
74. See Apps. I–II. ↑
75. In re Bard IVC Filters Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 15-02651, 2020 WL 1166224, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 6, 2020). ↑
76. In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 447 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2006); U.S. Jud. Panel on Multidistrict Litig., Multidistrict Litigation Terminated Through September 30, 2020, https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Cumulative%20Terminated%‌202020_‌0.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2021) [https://perma.cc/3BT4-PPP8]. ↑
77. In re Yasmin & YAZ (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-20021, 2011 WL 6733952, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2011); U.S. Jud. Panel on Multidistrict Litig., supra note 75. ↑
78. In re Ethicon Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prod. Liab. Litig., 299 F.R.D. 502, 508–09 (S.D. W. Va. 2014); U.S. Jud. Panel on Multidistrict Litig., MDL Statistics Report—Distribution of Pending MDL Dockets by Actions Pending, https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/‌jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Dockets_By_Actions_Pending-March-15-2021.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2021) [https://perma.cc/3ZX9-YALU]. ↑
79. In re Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Prods., Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:16-md-02738, 2017 WL 5196741, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 2017). ↑
80. In re Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Prods. Liab. Litig., 65 F. Supp. 3d 1402, 1403–04 (J.P.M.L. 2014); U.S. Jud. Panel on Multidistrict Litig., supra note 77. ↑
81. See Apps. I–II. ↑
82. In re Tylenol (Acetaminophen) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 181 F. Supp. 3d 278, 307 (E.D. Pa. 2016). ↑
83. In re Bard IVC Filters Prods. Liab. Litig., 317 F.R.D. 562, 566 (D. Ariz. 2016). ↑
84. In re Davol, Inc./C.R. Bard, Inc., Polypropylene Hernia Mesh Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:18-md-2846, 2019 WL 341909, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2019) (internal citation omitted). ↑
85. Yet, foreign privilege law can differ from U.S. law. For a discussion of selective waiver, see In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2012). Confidentiality agreements and statutory provisions could also change this calculus. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(x) (2018); Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. CIV.A. 18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2002). ↑
86. See Joseph W. Cormier, Advancing FDA’s Regulatory Science Through Weight of Evidence Evaluations, 28 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 1, 1–2 (2011). ↑
87. Cf. Catherine M. Sharkey, The Opioid Litigation: The FDA Is MIA, 124 Dick. L. Rev. 669, 671 (2020) (discussing the regulatory shortcomings of the American FDA in light of the opioid epidemic) [hereinafter Sharkey, Opioid Litigation]. ↑
88. See, e.g., Brunston v. Bayer Healthcare Pharm., Inc., No. EDCV 13-1904, 2014 WL 12587032, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2014). ↑
89. See, e.g., Hardy v. Pharmacia Corp., No. 4:09–cv–119, 2011 WL 2118983, at *3 (M.D. Ga. May 27, 2011). ↑
90. Kubicki v. Medtronic, 307 F.R.D. 291, 294 (D.D.C. 2014). ↑
91. See, e.g., In re Tylenol (Acetaminophen) Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., 181 F. Supp. 3d 278, 306–07 (E.D. Pa. 2016); In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1316, 1318–19 (M.D. Fla. 2009). ↑
92. Cf. In re Trasylol Prods. Liab. Litig., 709 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1336 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (declining to admit expert testimony in part because it “merely summarizes and restates the findings of the foreign Inspection Reports” without broader context). ↑
93. See In re Tylenol, 181 F. Supp. 3d at 306–08. ↑
94. See Eve v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., No. IP 98-1429, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4531, at *60–63, *69–71 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 7, 2001). ↑
95. See, e.g., Hodges v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 14-4855, 2016 WL 1222229, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2016) (considering the arguments that foreign regulatory evidence is irrelevant or inadmissible); In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. C-07-5944, 2014 WL 5462496, at *4–7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2014) (considering and rejecting the argument that a discovery request should be denied because disclosure could raise a conflict with foreign law). ↑
96. Hodges, 2016 WL 1222229, at *3. Compare St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc. v. Sorin CRM USA, Inc., No. 14–cv–00119, 2014 WL 1056526, at *4 (D. Colo. Mar. 19, 2014) (granting plaintiff’s request), with In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:06-md-1769, 2008 WL 508391, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2008) (dismissing such a request). ↑
97. See Apps. I–II. ↑
98. See App. I. ↑
99. Hardy v. Pharmacia Corp., No. 4:09-cv-119, 2011 WL 2118983, at *3 (M.D. Ga. May 27, 2011). ↑
100. Hodges, 2016 WL 1222229 at *3. ↑
101. Pretrial Order at 4, In re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2327 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 18, 2013) (Pretrial order #68 granting plaintiff’s motion to compel and denying defendant’s motion for protective order). ↑
102. Id. at 4–7. ↑
103. In re Bard IVC Filters Prods. Liab. Litig., 317 F.R.D. 562, 566 (D. Ariz. Sep. 16, 2016). See also SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., No. 98 C 3952, 1999 WL 311697, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 1999) (allowing discovery of only a portion of the documents that plaintiff requested from a prior Canadian suit); Kubicki v. Medtronic, 307 F.R.D. 291, 296–97 (D.D.C. 2014) (refusing to grant plaintiffs request for “all documents exchanged with foreign and domestic regulators for 15 years”). ↑
104. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., No. 98 C 3952, 1999 WL 311697, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 1999) (declining a discovery request that would require defendants to “embark on a fishing expedition in pursuit of . . . products that will never reach the United States”). ↑
105. See, e.g., In re Yasmin & Yaz: (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Relevant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100, 2011 WL 3759699, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2011); In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 2010 WL 3420517, at *6–7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010); Campbell v. Facebook Inc., No. 13-cv-05996, 2015 WL 4463809, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2015). ↑
106. In re Davol, Inc./C.R. Bard, Inc., Polypropylene Hernia Mesh Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:18-md-2846, 2019 WL 341909, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2019); U.S. Jud. Panel on Multidistrict Litig., supra note 77. ↑
107. In re Davol, 2019 WL 341909, at *2. ↑
108. Id. at *1. ↑
109. Id. at *2. ↑
110. Id. at *2. ↑
111. In re Bard IVC Filters Prods. Liab. Litig., 317 F.R.D. 562, 563 (D. Ariz. Sept. 16, 2016); U.S. Jud. Panel on Multidistrict Litig., supra note 77. ↑
112. In re Bard IVC Filters, 317 F.R.D. at 563. ↑
113. Id. at 566. ↑
114. Id. ↑
115. Id. ↑
116. In re Eur. Gov’t Bonds Antitrust Litig., No. 19 CIV. 2601, 2020 WL 4273811, at *2–4 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2020). ↑
117. Id. ↑
118. Id. at *10. ↑
119. Brenner v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. SACV 16-1093, 2016 WL 8192946, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2016) (internal citation omitted). ↑
120. Class Action Complaint at 2, Brenner v. Procter & Gamble Co., 2016 WL 8192946 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2016) (No. 8:16-cv-1093). ↑
121. Brenner, 2016 WL 8192946, at *6 (emphasis added). ↑
122. Rotondo v. Amylin Pharm., Inc., No. B275314, 2018 WL 5800780, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2018). ↑
123. In re Commodity Exch., Inc., 213 F. Supp. 3d 631, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). ↑
124. Hinds Cnty., Miss. v. Wachovia Bank N.A., 790 F. Supp. 2d 106, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see, e.g., Starr v. Sony BMG Music Ent., 592 F.3d 314, 323–24 (2d. Cir. 2010). But see In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (investigation itself “carries no weight”); In re Commodity Exch., 213 F. Supp. 3d at 662 (same). ↑
125. Barry’s Cut Rate Stores Inc. v. Visa, Inc., No. 05-md-1720, 2019 WL 7584728, at *32 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2019). ↑
126. Id. ↑
127. Jones v. Micron Tech. Inc., 400 F. Supp. 3d 897, 921 (N.D. Cal. 2019). ↑
128. In re Mexican Gov’t Bonds Antitrust Litig., 412 F. Supp. 3d 380, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). ↑
129. Complaint at 6, Hardeman v. Monsanto Co., 216 F. Supp. 3d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (No. 4:16-cv-00525). ↑
130. See id. at 11–12. ↑
131. Id. ↑
132. See In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 385 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2019). Indeed, in the midst of these cases, dozens of foreign regulators have banned glyphosate. See Where Is Glysophate Banned?, supra note 27. ↑
133. Transcript of Proceedings of the Official Electronic Sound Recording 2:14 PM–3:01 PM at 9, Hardeman v. Monsanto Co., 216 F. Supp. 3d 1037 (N.D. Cal. argued May 3, 2016) (No. 3:16-cv-00525). ↑
134. See In re Roundup, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1047. ↑
135. Id. ↑
136. W. Gregory Voss & Kimberly A. Houser, Personal Data and the GDPR: Providing a Competitive Advantage for U.S. Companies, 56 Am. Bus. L.J. 287, 288 (2019). ↑
137. Paul W. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 771, 776 (2019). ↑
138. Bradford, Brussels Effect Book, supra note 40, at 237. ↑
139. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. 573 U.S. 258, 263 (2014). ↑
140. See, e.g., id. at 263–64. ↑
141. Flynn v. Sientra, Inc., No. CV 15-07548, 2016 WL 3360676, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2016). ↑
142. Jasin v. Vivus, Inc., No. 14-cv-03263, 2016 WL 1570164, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2016), aff’d, Jasin v. Vivus, Inc., 721 F. App’x 665 (9th Cir. 2018). ↑
143. Vallabhaneni v. Endocyte, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-01048, 2016 WL 51260, at *1, *16 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 4, 2016). ↑
144. Class Action Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws at 9–10, Yuan v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:18-cv-01725 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2018). ↑
145. Class Action Complaint at 7, Ikeda v. Baidu, No. 3:20-cv-02768 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2020). ↑
146. See, e.g., In re Facebook, Inc. Sec. Litig., 405 F. Supp. 3d 809, 846 (N.D. Cal 2019). ↑
147. Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws at 4, Gordon v. Nielsen Holdings PLC, No. 1:18-cv-07143 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2018). ↑
148. See id. at 3–4. ↑
149. Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws at 13–14, 16–17, In re Alphabet Securities Litigation, 4:18-cv-06245 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2019). ↑
150. [Unredacted] Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint for Violation of Securities Law, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Waste of Corporate Assets, and Unjust Enrichment at 2, 37, Green et al. v. Page et al., No. 5:19-cv-01165 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2019). ↑
151. See In re Facebook, 405 F. Supp. 3d at 847. ↑
152. See Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1873–74 (2018) (discussing the role of foreign regulators but only in interpreting foreign law). ↑
153. Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1501, 1536 (1998). ↑
154. Id. at 1507 n.14. ↑
155. See, e.g., Brief for the Japan External Trade Organization as Amicus Curiae, Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (Nos. 80-2070, 81-24), 1982 WL 608724, at *2, *7. ↑
156. See Zambrano, Comity, supra note 63, at 170. ↑
157. William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 Harv. Int’l L.J. 101 (1998). ↑
158. See supra Subsection I.B.1. ↑
159. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1870 (2018). ↑
160. In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. 06-md-1175, 2014 WL 7882100, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2014). ↑
161. In re Capacitors Antitrust Litig., 106 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2015). ↑
162. In re Payment Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 207, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). ↑
163. In re Rubber Chems. Antitrust Litig., 232 F.R.D. 346, 348 (N.D. Cal. 2005). ↑
164. In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1183 (N.D. Cal. 2009). ↑
165. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. 1865,1870–71 (2018). ↑
166. Id. ↑
167. Id. at 1869. ↑
168. Memorandum Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Discovery of Korea Fair Trade Commission Materials at 1–2, In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation, 1:06-md-01775 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2011). ↑
169. In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. 07-cv-01827, 2011 WL 13147214, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2011). ↑
170. See, e.g., Brief of the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (No. 17-2); Letter from European Commission in Response to Special Master’s December 22, 2010 Order, In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. 3:07-md-01827 (Feb. 15, 2011) [hereinafter European Commission Letter]; In re Rubber Chems. Antitrust Litig., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Statement of Objections at 1, In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merchant Disc. Antitrust Litig., 1:05-md-01720 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2010). ↑
171. See e.g., In re Rubber Chems., 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1081–84; European Commission Letter, supra note 169, at 7–8 (citing several district court decisions). Interestingly, the European Court of Justice has allowed national courts to consider the discoverability of antitrust leniency agreements. See Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt, 2011 E.C.R. I-5186, I-5199. ↑
172. See Wang, supra note 24, at 2149 (discussing other letters); Japan Fair Trade Commission Letter, In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation, No. M: 07-1827 (Feb. 3, 2011). ↑
173. Japan Fair Trade Commission Letter at 3, In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. 3:07-md-01827 (Feb. 3, 2011). ↑
174. Id. ↑
175. European Commission Letter, supra note 169, at 4. ↑
176. Id. at 5. ↑
177. Id. at 6. ↑
178. Id. ↑
179. Brief of the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186, 2–8 (2018) (No. 17-2). ↑
180. This partly confirms Noll’s point that “the new conflicts law privileges the regulatory preferences of actors operating across jurisdictional lines over the preferences of litigants seeking to enforce U.S. law.” Noll, Conflicts, supra note 37, at 65. ↑
181. See, e.g., In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. C-07-5944, 2014 WL 5462496, at *4–7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2014). ↑
182. Special Master’s Order Denying Motion of Direct Purchaser Class Plaintiffs to Compel Hitachi to Produce Foreign Regulatory Documents at 5-6, In Re TFT (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation, No. 3:07-md-01827 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2011). ↑
183. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Foreign Sovereigns as Friends of the Court, 102 Va. L. Rev. 289 (2016); Daniel Fahrenthold, Note, Respectful Consideration: Foreign Sovereign Amici in U.S. Courts, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 1597 (2019). ↑
184. Brief of Amicus Curiae Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China in Support of Respondents at 24–25, Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018) (No. 16-1220). ↑
185. Brief of the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 3, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (No. 17-2). ↑
186. Brief for the Japan External Trade Organization as Amicus Curiae at 2, Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (No. 80-2070), 1982 WL 608724. ↑
187. See infra Section II.A. ↑
188. See Anu Bradford, Adam Chilton, Katerina Linos & Alexander Weaver, The Global Dominance of European Competition Law Over American Antitrust Law, 16 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 731, 731–32 (2019). ↑
189. Cf. Wang, supra note 24, at 2142–46 (noting tensions that arise when discovery requests in the United States adversely affect litigation abroad); Deborah Hensler et al., RAND Institute for Civil Justice, The Globalization of Mass Civil Litigation: Lessons from the Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Case 58–59 (Feb. 2021) (manuscript) (documenting how American litigation impacted litigation in Chile). ↑
190. Pamela K. Bookman, The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum Shopping, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 579, 580 (2016). ↑
191. Id. at 580–81, 619. ↑
192. See Andrea Thomas, Germany Set to Allow Collective Lawsuits Following VW Scandal, Wall St. J. (May 9, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/germany-set-to-allow-collective-lawsuits-following-vw-scandal-1525869967 [https://perma.cc/M7YM-YFPV]. ↑
193. Id; see also Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 767, 797–804 (2017) (detailing Germany’s slow adoption of consumer-initiated redress legislation). ↑
194. I thank Amalia Kessler for this insight. ↑
195. See, e.g., In re Facebook, Inc. Sec. Litig., 405 F. Supp. 3d 809, 847 (N.D. Cal. 2019). ↑
196. In re Tylenol (Acetaminophen) Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., 181 F. Supp. 3d 278, 283 (E.D. Pa. 2016). ↑
197. Id. at 284–93. ↑
198. Id. at 306–07. ↑
199. Id. at 307. ↑
200. Id. ↑
201. Defendants’ Motion In Limine Number 13 at 2, In re Tylenol (Acetaminophen) Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., 181 F. Supp. 3d 278 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (No. 2:12-cv-07263) (internal citation omitted). ↑
202. Health Canada, Revised Guidance Document: Acetaminophen Labelling Standard 6 (2016). ↑
203. In re Tylenol, 181 F. Supp. 3d at 307–08. ↑
204. No. 3:16-md-2734, 2017 WL 4399198, at *10 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2017). ↑
205. Complaint at 2, In re Abilify (Aripiprazole) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:16-md-2734 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2016). ↑
206. Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). ↑
207. See id. at 2–3. ↑
208. Omnibus Order and Amended Case Management Schedule, In re Abilify (Aripiprazole) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:16-md-2734, 2017 WL 4399198, at *10 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2017). ↑
209. In re Abilify (Aripiprazole) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:16-md-2734, 2019 WL 7859557, at *3–4 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2019). ↑
210. See id. at *4. ↑
211. See, e.g., Mahaney ex rel. Est. of Kyle v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 835 F. Supp. 2d 299, 318 (W.D. Ky. 2011) (holding that a plaintiff may introduce evidence of foreign warning labels for the purpose of showing that defendant had knowledge of side effects, but plaintiff may not introduce them to suggest that defendant violated FDA regulations). ↑
212. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 Yale L.J. 616 (2013) [hereinafter Engstrom, Gatekeepers]; Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 Vand. L. Rev. 285 (2016) [hereinafter Clopton, Redundant]. ↑
213. See Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 862–63 (2014) (arguing that public and private litigation “increasingly work together” to fulfill a common function: “compensating victims”). ↑
214. Engstrom, Gatekeepers, supra note 211, at 630. ↑
215. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 Md. L. Rev. 215, 228 (1983); William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 2129, 2151 (2004). ↑
216. There are many cases that nudge the FDA to consider rulemaking. See, e.g., Peter Shapiro, All-Natural Class Action Suit in New York Federal Court Is Placed on Hold, Lewis Brisbois, https://lewisbrisbois.com/print/12131 [https://perma.cc/U4Y8-ZBUA] (last visited Apr. 18, 2021). ↑
217. See, e.g., In re Tylenol (Acetaminophen) Mktg., Sales Practs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., 181 F. Supp. 3d 278, 307 (E.D. Pa. 2016). ↑
218. In re Trasylol Prods. Liab. Litig., 709 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1323 (S.D. Fla. 2010). ↑
219. Id. at 1330. ↑
220. Id. at 1351. ↑
221. There are important limits to the failsafe argument. Under Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001), a piece of evidence cannot be admitted if it is going to be used to advance a fraud-on-the-FDA claim. See, e.g., Mahaney ex rel. Est. of Kyle v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 835 F. Supp. 2d 299, 317 (W.D. Ky. 2011). Because the Supreme Court has disallowed fraud-on-the-FDA claims, litigants have to defend the use of foreign information on alternative grounds. ↑
222. In re Mex. Gov’t Bonds Antitrust Litig., 412 F. Supp. 3d 380, 382–84 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). ↑
223. Brenner v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. SACV 16-1093, 2016 WL 8192946, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2016). ↑
224. Rotondo v. Amylin Pharm., Inc., No. B275314, 2018 WL 5800780, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2018). ↑
225. Id. at *4. ↑
226. See Bradford, Brussels Effect Article, supra note 53, at 14–16. ↑
227. I thank Doug Melamed for this insight. ↑
228. Cf. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Directives in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1339, 1359–62 (2012) (discussing problems that plague public enforcement); Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 183, 205 (2003) (noting that agencies like the EEOC can underenforce statutory rights). ↑
229. Michael X. Imbroscio & Paul W. Schmidt, Border Control: Keeping Foreign Regulatory Evidence Out of U.S. Pharmaceutical Litigation, Covington & Burling (2007), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2007/01/border_control_keeping_‌foreign_‌regulatory_evidence_out_of_the_us_pharmaceuti.pdf [https://perma.cc/SLG9-NXRG]. ↑
230. Id. ↑
231. Andy Pasztor, Congressional Report Faults Boeing on MAX Design, FAA for Lax Oversight, Wall St. J. (Mar. 6, 2020) https://www.wsj.com/articles/‌congressional-report-says-max-crashes-stemmed-from-boeings-design-failures-and-lax-faa-oversight-11583519145 [https://perma.cc/3P8Z-HBVV]. ↑
232. Andy Pasztor & Andrew Tangel, European Air Regulators Break From FAA on 737 MAX Timeline, Wall St. J. (Oct. 21, 2019) https://www.wsj.com/‌articles/european-air-regulators-break-from-faa-on-737-max-timeline-11571692941 [https://perma.cc/D8Y3-2S82]. ↑
233. This may also be an outgrowth of the Brussels Effect. See Bradford, Brussels Effect Article, supra note 53, at 46–47 (hypothesizing that EU regulators may be motivated by a desire to “establish[] standards for universal conduct”). To be sure, the EUASA could itself be captured by Airbus. ↑
234. See Kevin M. Clermont, Degrees of Deference: Applying vs. Adopting Another Sovereign’s Law, 103 Cornell L. Rev. 243, 245–46 (2018). ↑
235. Volokh, supra note 39, at 220–27; Jackson, supra note 37, at 109–12. ↑
236. John O. McGinnis, Medellín and the Future of International Delegation, 118 Yale L.J. 1712, 1715–17 (2009) [hereinafter McGinnis, Medellín]. But see Alan O. Sykes, Transnational Forum Shopping as a Trade and Investment Issue, 37 J. Legal Stud. 339, 340 (2008) (arguing that American courts should adjudicate the disputes of foreigners only in certain cases). ↑
237. John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 303, 306–09 (2006). ↑
238. Even more broadly, literature on the virtues of “many minds” argues that increasing the number of eyes on a problem improves solutions to a problem. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 131, 155 (2006). ↑
239. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Administrative States: Beyond Presidential Administration, 98 Tex. L. Rev.
     

     265, 285–86

     (2019) (citing sources). ↑

240. See infra Section II.B. ↑
241. Id. ↑
242. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 238, at 285–87. ↑
243. McGinnis, Medellín, supra note 235, at 1738–39. ↑
244. See, e.g., In re Trasylol Prods. Liab. Litig., 709 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1330 (S.D. Fla. 2010). ↑
245. This is especially so because of the many procedural barriers that prevent foreign litigants from suing in American courts. See Bookman, supra note 13, at 1090–99. ↑
246. See Sean Farhang, Legislating for Litigation: Delegation, Public Policy, and Democracy, 106 Calif. L. Rev. 1529 (2018). ↑
247. Id. at 1534. ↑
248. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, § 27(a), 109 Stat. 737, (1995). ↑
249. Cf. Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 Int’l Org. 1, 3 (1992) (setting forth a theory of “epistemic communities” among multinational bodies, focused on the sharing of knowledge for international coordination). ↑
250. Yet, since most scholars and courts agree that the objections are weak, debates focus on how to determine the content of foreign law. See, e.g., Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 628–31 (7th Cir. 2010). To be sure, U.S. courts rarely cite foreign law. See, e.g., David Zaring, The Use of Foreign Decisions by Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis, 3 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 297, 297 (2006). ↑
251. See, e.g., David L. Noll, MDL as Public Administration, 118 Mich. L. Rev. 403 (2019); Richard A. Nagareda, Mass Torts in a World of Settlement 57, 60, 70 (2007). ↑
252. See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 Calif. L. Rev. 1259, 1262–64 (2017). ↑
253. See, e.g., Transcript of Proceedings at 4–6, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804 (N.D. Ohio argued Jan. 9, 2018) (imploring the parties to reach a solution that would do something to “abate [the national opioid] crisis”). ↑
254. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Conservative Case for Class Actions 16 (2019). ↑
255. For a thorough discussion of MDL settlements, see D. Theodore Rave, Closure Provisions in MDL Settlements, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 2175 (2017). For a discussion of class action settlements, see Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 811, 819 (2010) (documenting that 68% of federal settlements from 2006 to 2007 were settlements of class actions). See also Andrew D. Bradt, Something Less and Something More: MDL’s Roots as a Class Action Alternative, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1711 (2017) (discussing the relationship between the two devices). ↑
256. See supra Subsection II.A.1. ↑
257. See, e.g., In re Bard IVC Filters Prods. Liab. Litig., 317 F.R.D. 562, 566 (D. Ariz. 2016). ↑
258. Daniel S. Wittenberg, Multidistrict Litigation: Dominating the Federal Docket, Am. Bar Ass’n (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/‌groups/litigation/publications/litigation-news/business-litigation/multidistrict-litigation-dominating-federal-docket/ [https://perma.cc/7QZD-RKRC]. ↑
259. Bradford, Brussels Effect Article, supra note 53, at 16–17. ↑
260. See Subsection I.C.1. ↑
261. See Adam S. Zimmerman, The Global Convergence of Global Settlements, 65 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1053, 1057–58 (2017). ↑
262. Noll, Conflicts, supra note 37, at 44–47 (discussing manners by which “U.S. regulatory systems are disabled in favor of regulation by other legal systems”). ↑
263. Curtis A. Bradley, International Law in the U.S. Legal System 75 (2013). ↑
264. Galbraith & Zaring, Soft Law, supra note 46, at 737 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,609, 77 Fed. Reg. 26, 413 (May 1, 2012)). ↑
265. Id. at 737–39. ↑
266. Press Release, U.S. and Foreign Antitrust Officials Launch International Competition Network, FTC (Oct. 25, 2001) https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2001/10/us-and-foreign-antitrust-officials-launch-international [https://perma.cc/B9CX-8MTL]. ↑
267. See, e.g., Slaughter, supra note 46; Lawrence L.C. Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening International Banking Supervision, 39 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 (1998). ↑
268. Galbraith & Zaring, Soft Law, supra note 46, at 739–40. ↑
269. Id. at 740. ↑
270. Id. ↑
271. Id. ↑
272. Id. at 780. ↑
273. This resembles a literature on unusual transnational enforcement. See, e.g., Zachary D. Clopton, Diagonal Public Enforcement, 70 Stan. L. Rev. 1077, 1080–81 (2018); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 3, 14 (2005). ↑
274. See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law 3 (2001); Sean Farhang, The Litigation State: Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the U.S. (2010); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1975). ↑
275. See Diego A. Zambrano, Discovery as Regulation, 119 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 75 (2020) [hereinafter Zambrano, Discovery]. ↑
276. Id. at 77. ↑
277. See Clopton, Redundant, supra note 211, at 297–300. ↑
278. Plaintiff’s Motion Addressing Production of Foreign Regulatory Files at 1–2, In re Zofran (Ondansetron) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:15-md-02657 (D. Mass. July 27, 2017). ↑
279. Memorandum and Order on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Federal Preemption at 18, In re Zofran (Ondansetron) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:15-md-02657 (D. Mass. Feb. 5, 2019). ↑
280. Letter from F. Dennis Saylor, IV, C.J. D. Mass., to Stacey Cline Amin, Chief Counsel, Food and Drug Administration, In re Zofran (Ondansetron) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:15-md-02657 (Dec. 13, 2019). ↑
281. Letter from Craig Wildfang, Robins, Kaplan, Miller, & Ciresi LLP, to James Orenstein, Mag. J. E.D.N.Y., In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 1:05-md-01720 (Jan. 5, 2010). ↑
282. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., No. 05-md-1720, 2010 WL 3420517, at *9–10, (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010). ↑
283. Id. at *1, *9. ↑
284. To be sure, it may be unfair to call “harmonization” what in fact seem like instances of foreign frustration of American antitrust litigation. But I’m referring here to a kind of rough harmonization that promotes convergence. ↑
285. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Actions Deter Wrongdoing?, in The Class Action Effect 197 (Catherine Piché ed., 2018). ↑
286. Brief of Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 12, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2018) (No. 17-204). ↑
287. See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. Legal Stud. 575, 575 (1997); Steven Shavell, The Level of Litigation: Private Versus Social Optimality of Suit and of Settlement, 19 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 99, 99 (1999). ↑
288. Cf. George A. Bermann, Regulatory Cooperation with Counterpart Agencies Abroad: The FAA’s Aircraft Certification Experience, 24 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 669 (1993) (arguing for the superiority of transnational cooperation in aeronautical regulation). ↑
289. See Marisam, supra note 39, at 1915–17. ↑
290. I thank Anu Bradford for this insight. ↑
291. Cf. Julian G. Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, 81 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 5–8 (2006) (arguing that allowing U.S. courts to recognize international tribunal judgments would be constitutionally problematic, since that authority lies with the other two branches). ↑
292. Galbraith & Zaring, Soft Law, supra note 46, at 767–68. ↑
293. Ingrid Wuerth, The Future of the Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations, 106 Geo. L.J. 1825, 1830–33 (2018). ↑
294. See Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade and the Separation of Powers, 107 Calif. L. Rev. 583, 662–66 (2019). ↑
295. One may also worry that litigation-led harmonization limits the ability of regulated entities to adjust compliance to each country. ↑
296. Bradford, Brussels Effect Article, supra note 53, at 64. ↑
297. Comm’n Eur. Cmties., Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Single Market for Citizens 7 (Feb. 21, 2007). ↑
298. Bradford, Brussels Effect Book, supra note 40, at 131–32. ↑
299. Bradford, Brussels Effect Article, supra note 53, at 29–30. ↑
300. I thank Anu Bradford for some of this language. ↑
301. Bradford, Brussels Effect Article, supra note 53, at 4. ↑
302. 2 Max Huffman & Andre Fiebig, Antitrust and American Business Abroad § 15:24 (4th ed. 2020). ↑
303. See Bradford, Brussels Effect Book, supra note 40, at 251. ↑
304. David L. Noll, Administrative Sabotage, 120 Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 4) (on file with author). ↑
305. See Section I.A. ↑
306. See, e.g., In re Incretin-Based Therapies Prods. Liab. Litig., 721 F. App’x 580, 583 (9th Cir. 2017). ↑
307. See Zambrano, Comity, supra note 63, at 206–07. ↑
308. Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth § 11.494 (2004). ↑
309. Zambrano, Comity, supra note 63, at 164–67. ↑
310. See, e.g., In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 309 F. Supp. 2d 531, 551–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). ↑
311. See, e.g., In re Viagra Prods. Liab. Litig., 658 F. Supp. 2d 950, 965–66 (D. Minn. 2009). But see In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 309 F. Supp. 2d 531, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The Court finds no legal basis upon which now to rule . . . that testimony regarding foreign regulatory actions is irrelevant as a matter of law in a United States products liability case governed by American law.”). ↑
312. Mahaney ex rel. Est. of Kyle v. Novartis Pharm., 835 F. Supp. 2d 299, 318 (W.D. Ky. 2011). ↑
313. Schedin v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharms., 808 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1138 (D. Minn. 2011). ↑
314. In re Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Prods. Liab. Litig., 2017 WL 4168410, at *3 (E.D. La. 2017); see, e.g., In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1318 (M.D. Fla. 2009); In re Trasylol Prods. Liab. Litig., 709 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1336 (S.D. Fla. 2010). ↑
315. Cf. Maggie Gardner, Parochial Procedure, 69 Stan. L. Rev
     

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     941, 958–67 (2017) (discussing how judges approach foreign cases). ↑

316. See, e.g., Jones v. Micron Tech. Inc., 400 F. Supp. 3d 897, 921 (N.D. Cal. 2019). ↑
317. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–58 (2007). ↑
318. Alexis Kramer, Securities Fraud Claims Get Boost From EU Data Privacy Rules, Bloomberg L. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberglawnews/tech-and-telecom-law/XFD6V9SC000000?bna_news_filter=tech-and-telecom-law#jcite [https://perma.cc/W5QW-Z36F]. ↑
319. See e.g., In re Zofran (Ondansetron) Prods. Liab. Litig., 368 F. Supp. 3d 94, 108 (D. Mass. 2019). ↑
320. See In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 385 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2019). ↑
321. See supra Section I.C. ↑
322. See In re Rubber Chems. Antitrust Litig., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2007). ↑
323. See Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1868 (2018). ↑
324. See, e.g., In re Rubber Chemicals, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1081–84; European Commission Letter, supra note 169, at 8 (citing several district court decisions). ↑
325. Animal Sci. Prods., 138 S. Ct. at 1875 (limiting the Court’s holding to foreign letters that seek to aid in interpreting foreign law). ↑
326. Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 449, 477 (2008) [hereinafter Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption]; Sharkey, Opioid, supra note 86, at 686. In the international context, the closest work comes from Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 429, 434 (2003) (calling for more transnational communications among judiciaries). ↑
327. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 325, at 485. ↑
328. See Engstrom, Gatekeepers, supra note 211, at 657. ↑
329. David Zaring, Sovereignty Mismatch and the New Administrative Law, 91 Wash. U. L. Rev. 59, 74–75 (2013). ↑
330. Stanley M. Gorinson & Robert Pambianco, U.S. and European Merger Policies Move Towards Convergence, Wash. Legal Found. (Aug. 9, 2002), https://www.wlf.org/‌2002/08/09/publishing/u-s-and-european-merger-policies-move-towards-convergence/ [https://perma.cc/MJ2C-J255]. ↑
331. See Robert V. Percival, The EPA as a Catalyst for the Development of Global Environmental Law, 70 Case W. Res. L. Rsrv. 1151, 1152–85 (2020). ↑
332. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (“[I]n foreign affairs the President has a degree of independent authority to act.”). ↑
333. Galbraith & Zaring, Soft Law, supra note 46, at 768. ↑
334. Id. at 770–73. ↑
335. Id. at 771. ↑
336. See Engstrom, Gatekeepers, supra note 211, at 674–80. ↑
337. Monsanto Company’s Notice of Motion for Scheduling Order Regarding General Causation and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support at 6, Hardeman v. Monsanto Co., (N.D. Cal. 2016) (No. 3:16-cv-00525); Transcript of Proceedings of the Official Electronic Sound Recording 2:14 PM–3:01 PM at 21–22, Hardeman v. Monsanto Co., 216 F. Supp. 3d 1037 (N.D. Cal. argued May 3, 2016) (No. 3:16-cv-00525). ↑
338. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 325, at 471–80 (highlighting many examples of agency amicus briefs). ↑
339. See Diego A. Zambrano, Foreign Dictators in U.S. Court, 89 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 31) (on file with author). ↑
340. Engstrom, Agency Gatekeepers, supra note 211, at 652. ↑
341. Id. at 648. ↑
342. Sharkey, Opioid Litigation, supra note 86, at 670–71. ↑
343. Engstrom, Gatekeepers, supra note 211, at 644. ↑
344. Id. at 649–50. ↑
345. Id. at 649. ↑
346. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-2804 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2018) (order granting discovery request). ↑
347. See Catherine M. Sharkey, CAFA Settlement Notice Provision: Optimal Regulatory Policy?, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1971, 1972 (2008). ↑
348. Id. ↑
349. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 32 (2005). ↑
350. Engstrom, Gatekeepers, supra note 211, at 687. ↑
351. Sharkey, Opioid Litigation, supra note 86, at 686. ↑
352. Engstrom, Gatekeepers, supra note 211, at 646. ↑
353. Sharkey, Opioid Litigation, supra note 86, at 686. ↑
354. This is not necessarily a representative sample of MDL cases but just all the discovery or evidentiary decisions I could find on Bloomberg Law/Westlaw using search terms related to foreign regulatory evidence. ↑

355. This is not necessarily a representative sample of MDL cases but just all the discovery or evidentiary decisions I could find on Bloomberg Law/Westlaw using search terms related to foreign regulatory evidence. ↑