Issue 6

Second Opinions and Institutional Design

In many settings, decisionmakers seek second opinions, and are wise to do so. Sometimes decisionmakers do not seek second opinions when they should have, or seek them when they should not have. In yet other settings, legal rules require decisionmakers to seek second opinions before taking action.

There is a burgeoning literature on second opinions in professional contexts, as when patients or clients seek advice from doctors or lawyers. My aim, by contrast, is to analyze second opinions as a technique for the design of lawmaking institutions. I will try to show that many institutional structures, rules and practices have been justified as mechanisms for requiring or permitting decisionmakers to obtain second opinions; examples include judicial review of statutes or of agency action, bicameralism, the separation of powers, and the law of legislative procedure. I attempt to identify the main costs and benefits of second opinions, to identify the conditions under which second-opinion arguments prove more or less successful, and to consider how the lawmaking system might employ second-opinion mechanisms to greater effect.

Part I provides an analytic taxonomy of second-opinion mechanisms and introduces some conceptual distinctions. Part II analyzes the main benefits and costs of second-opinion mechanisms, and then ties the benefits and costs together with some comparative statics, attempting to identify general conditions under which second-opinion mechanisms are desirable or undesirable. Part III applies the analysis to legislative structure and procedure, and to judicial stare decisis. I claim, among other things, that the Supreme Court should adopt a norm that two successive decisions, not merely one, are necessary to create binding law.

Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social Meanings

Government acts, statements, and symbols that carry the social meaning of second-class citizenship may, as a consequence of that fact, violate the Establishment Clause or the constitutional requirement of equal protection. Yet social meaning is often contested. Do laws permitting same-sex couples to form civil unions but not to enter “marriages” convey the social meaning that gays and lesbians are second-class citizens? Do official displays of the Confederate battle flag unconstitutionally convey support for slavery and white supremacy? When public schools teach evolution but not creationism, do they show disrespect for creationists? Different audiences reach different conclusions about the meaning of these and other contested acts, statements, and symbols. Accordingly, one needs some method for selecting the relevant audience. No method is perfect, but this Article tentatively advances a “reasonable victim” perspective as the presumptive starting point for constitutional analysis.

The Future of Locke v. Davey

The Supreme Court’s decision, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, to uphold a voucher program allowing state funds to be diverted to sectarian schools, did not address the question whether such programs are constitutionally required to include religious institutions. Locke v. Davey had the potential to resolve this question, but a surprisingly lopsided 7-2 majority decided the case without squarely addressing it. Davey upheld Washington’s refusal to allow a student to apply a state scholarship towards a degree in “devotional theology,” and it appeared, on its face, to be limited to “the State’s interest in not funding the religious training of clergy.” Yet the Court’s asserted principle of “play in the joints” between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses suggested a rationale with much broader implications: A mere denial of funding does not by itself create a cognizable burden on religious practice. Davey did not make clear which line of reasoning should control, and the first two federal appellate court decisions addressing the case are in fundamental disagreement about its meaning and scope.

This Note responds to these developments, and concludes that a circumscribed version of the no-burden rationale should control Davey’s future application. The opinion’s discussion of the clergy is a red herring, because ultimately the Court found no violation of any constitutional right, meaning that the exclusion required no more than a merely “legitimate” justification. And while the Court suggested that the program created no problem for the sometimes-asserted constitutional requirement of neutrality, it did so in such a way as to highlight the fact that neutrality is an incoherent concept unsuited to a sound understanding of the religion clauses. The no-burden rationale should ultimately control because it is founded on a theory—free exercise as an autonomy right—that is of a piece with our understanding of other similar rights. Of course, the state’s power is not unlimited, and the paper concludes by offering four important restrictions. This reading of Davey harmonizes the case with other Religion Clause doctrine, and protects religious liberty while allowing local governments the freedom to adapt policy to local conditions. 
 

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