When, why, and how does a firm decide to invest its resources in political capital? What factors inform the firm’s decision to lobby political bodies? How important is the resulting durability of law in making this calculus? Although these questions have been largely unanswered in the legal literature, they are fundamental to a complete understanding of public choice theory. Using Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code as a framework for examining these questions, this Note identifies four threshold inquiries each firm must answer before engaging in political investment. It then develops those factors that a firm may consider in estimating its return on political investment (ROPI). A puzzle emerges, however, when one considers the default nature of the U.C.C. Economic theory and the right to contract suggest that the ex post distribution of such terms will achieve general equilibrium regardless of their ex ante value. Without ex post legal durability in the form of mandatory rules, it is difficult to imagine just how commercial banks are capable of harnessing long-term permanent returns from their political investment in the U.C.C. While the current legal literature simply assumes that banking interests can harness a non-negative return on political investment, this Note relies upon behavioral economics and the notion of bounded rationality to conclude that private banking interests are likely to capture a positive ROPI, even where default rules with seemingly little durability govern their contracts. In arriving at this conclusion, it first identifies the political investment threshold inquiries a firm must answer prior to contributing capital to a political investment, as well as the substantive returns that firms are likely to realize as a result.
Issue 5
The Right to Judicial Review
Judicial review is typically justified on consequentalist grounds, namely that it is conducive to the efficacious protection of rights. This paper disputes this popular explanation for judicial review and argues that judicial review is based on a “right to voice a grievance” or a “right to a hearing” – a right designed to provide an opportunity for the victim of infringement to challenge it. The state must justify, and in appropriate cases, reconsider, any infringement in light of the particular claims and circumstances of the victims of the infringement. This right-based justification implies that judicial review is justified even if it is found that it is ultimately detrimental to the efficacious protection of rights. Last, it is argued that the right to a hearing is a participatory right and consequently that judicial review does not conflict with the right to equal democratic participation.
Intergovernmental Liability Rules
This Article offers an innovative approach to settling disputes about interjurisdictional externalities. Focusing attention on the negative spillover effects of local government zoning decisions on neighboring jurisdictions, the Article develops a monetary compensation regime intended to enrich the currently limited spectrum of intergovernmental legal remedies. This new liability rule scheme is intended to promote regional efficiency in land use decisions, without wholly upsetting local government powers. To achieve this aim in a way that is both normatively desirable and administratively feasible, the Article suggests that the parties to the litigation would be the respective local governments, and the remediable damages — the time-fixed loss of public revenues resulting from the expected cross-border adverse effects of the new land use. Hence, for example, a local government would be entitled to compensation for a decrease in its property tax revenues following the devaluation of properties in its territory due to the expected environmental spillovers of a newly approved land use across the border.
As this Article shows, the focus on public revenues may often serve as an effective proxy for evaluating the entire set of public and private marginal effects of the land use decision, making the proposed legal regime a reliable mechanism to promote overall social welfare without resorting to a costly full-scale litigation involving private parties. In addition, the liability rule framework reveals the potential for a monetary internalization of cross-border positive spillovers, and offers a fresh basis for addressing a wide array of intergovernmental conflicts and dilemmas beyond the land use context.